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Jack and the Beanstalk: Property Rights in Genetically 
Modified Plants 
Nathan A. Busch1
INTRODUCTION
The conversion of domesticated plant species into 
transgenic plants and their subsequent utilization in the 
agricultural production of usable crops has created a tension 
between the farmer, the seed manufacturer, and the public.  
The farmer desires to save the progeny transgenic seeds from 
one planting cycle for use in the next and to be autonomous in 
his decisions regarding the utilization of his land, his financial 
resources, and his crop.  The seed manufacturer desires to 
make a profit from the transgenic plant.  The public desires 
that the food and fiber produced by the transgenic plants be 
safe for consumption.  While all of these positions are equally 
valid, discussions among these three parties usually fall into a 
quagmire of often emotional and irrational arguments.  The 
theory upon which this paper is founded is that each of the 
parties is merely articulating, sometimes without eloquence, a 
position derived from the property rights fundamental to each 
party.  Through examination of the property rights of each of 
the parties, a path to the resolution of the tension will be 
illuminated. This paper aims to examine the farmer’s and seed 
manufacturers’ property rights in genetically modified plants, 
leaving the public property rights for the time being.  The story 
of Jack and the Beanstalk2 provides a useful allegory and sets 
 1. J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, 2002.  B.S. 
Chemical Engineering, Purdue University, 1978.  Ph. D. Biomedical 
Engineering, Louisiana Tech University, 1984. Ph. D. Chemical Engineering, 
Rutgers University, 1995.  I wish to thank Dr. Edward Coen, Professor 
Emeritus of Economics at the University of Minnesota, for many helpful and 
constructive discussions on the topics addressed in this work.  I also wish to 
recognize the assistance of the librarians of the University of Minnesota Law 
School law library.  Without their patient assistance this work would never 
have been brought forward. 
2. See generally PAUL GALDONE, JACK AND THE BEANSTALK (1974)
(published by Clarion Books, New York).  The version of the tale of Jack and 
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the stage for this discussion. 
In the tale of Jack and the Beanstalk, Jack trades a 
sixpence, which his mother gave him for a magic bean.3  Jack 
plants the bean, which produces a vine that reaches up to a 
magic castle in the clouds.  The spectacular growth rate and 
ultimate size of Jack’s beanstalk resulted from the bean’s 
magic.  The vine also produced progeny beans.  Jack, 
presuming he was a clever entrepreneur, could have either 
saved the progeny beans for planting the next year (and hence 
found another magic castle in the clouds) or sold the beans to 
others.  No legal consequences would have befallen Jack for 
engaging in either of these two alternatives.  With current 
biotechnology results analogous to the beanstalk’s spectacular 
growth rate and size, Jack’s beanstalk could be the result of 
genetic modification.  In modern times, various statutes would 
protect Jack’s genetically modified progeny beans.  While an 
innocent child’s story, the tale of Jack and his beanstalk would 
indeed keep modern day attorneys busy for quite some time.  In 
modern times, Jack, by purchasing the bean, might be subject 
to restraints imposed by the Plant Variety Protection Act4 and 
the Patent Act.  By planting the bean and growing the 
beanstalk, Jack could be infringing the protections afforded by 
a utility patent granted to the bean’s manufacturer.  In 
addition, by harvesting the progeny beans from the beanstalk, 
Jack might be liable for damages under the Patent Act, the 
Plant Variety Protection Act, and contract law for violating the 
terms of a license agreement.  The following two examples 
illustrate that Jack’s modern day hypothetical case indeed 
resembles reality in several aspects. 
Percy Schmeiser, a canola farmer in Canada, has been 
developing a variety of canola suitable for his farming practice 
for nearly 50 years.  Monsanto representatives entered his 
fields and found plants bearing Monsanto’s gene, which confers 
the Beanstalk written by Paul Galdone was adapted from B. A. T., THE
HISTORY OF MOTHER TWADDLE AND THE MARVELOUS ACHIEVEMENTS OF HER 
SON JACK and published by J. Harris, corner of St. Paul’s Churchyard (1807). 
 3. In the story of Jack and the Beanstalk, Mother Twaddle found the 
sixpence while cleaning her cottage.  She sent Jack to the fair to purchase a 
goose for dinner. Instead of purchasing the goose, Jack spent the entire 
sixpence on a single bean. Because of the special properties of the bean, a 
modern version of the story might posit that the bean was genetically 
modified.
 4. Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) 
(current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1994 & Supp. II 1996)). 
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glyphosate resistance on the canola.  Monsanto sued Mr. 
Schmeiser.5  The result: Monsanto won.  In his decision, Judge 
W. Andrew MacKay found Mr. Schmeiser guilty of infringing 
Canadian Letters Patent No. 1,313,830 assigned to Monsanto.6
Dallas Thomason is a cotton and beef farmer in Rayville, 
Louisiana.  He also owns a cotton ginning facility.  Mr. 
Thomason purchased “brown-bag” cotton seed from a local 
commercial seed dealer; however, he did not know that the 
seeds were Bt cotton seeds.  The commercial seed dealer 
neither asked Mr. Thomason to sign a technology use license 
nor did Mr. Thomason actually sign such a license.  After Mr. 
Thomason planted the cotton seeds, Monsanto received a tip 
that the seeds Mr. Thomason had planted were Bt cotton 
seeds.7  Monsanto sued because Mr. Thomason did not obtain a 
technology use license before planting the seeds.  Monsanto 
won.8  Dallas Thomason was found guilty of patent 
 5. Monsanto has also levied a heavy fine against farmers who have 
genetically modified plants on their land without a valid license agreement.  
Once Monsanto finds that a farmer is allegedly growing an unlicensed crop, it 
sends a letter to the farmer demanding payment of a fine.  One of these 
letters, made available on the Internet, was sent to Mr. Edward Zielinski of 
Mikado, Saskatchewan, on November 12, 1998 and signed by Mr. Keith A. 
MacMillian, Director of Legal Affairs of Monsanto Canada, Inc.  Mr. Zielinski 
had obtained the seeds at issue as the result of a trade with a farmer from 
Prince Albert. See http://www.tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/canola (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2001).  The letter stated that Monsanto Canada had “very good 
evidence to believe that Roundup Ready canola was planted on approximately 
250 acres of land identified as SE 28-30-2, NE 28-30-2 and SE 19-30-2 in 
violation” of propriety rights which Monsanto had in the Roundup Ready 
canola.  The letter further stated that before “making any final decision as to 
what steps we will be taking, and in an attempt to resolve this issue in a 
timely and economical manner, we are prepared to refrain from commencing 
any legal proceedings against you subject to the following” conditions: first, 
that a fine be paid to Monsanto in the amount of  $28,750.00; second, that 
“Monsanto has the right to take samples from all of your owned or leased land 
and storage bins for three years from the date of this letter”; and third, that 
Mr. Zielinski “agree not to disclose the specific terms and conditions of this 
Settlement Agreement to any third party.” This letter is available at 
http://www.tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/canola/docz1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 
2001).
6. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256 
(Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/
2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001). 
 7. Evidently, the person who sold Mr. Thomason the Bt cotton seeds also 
informed Monsanto that Mr. Thomason was using those same seeds without 
the technology use license.  Telephone Interview with Mr. Dallas Thomason, 
Farmer, Rayville, Louisiana (July 3, 2001) [hereinafter Interview: Thomason]. 
8. See Grower Fined for Saving Bollgard Seed, PROGRESSIVE FARMER,
October 2000, at 10. 
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infringement and violation of the provisions of the Plant 
Variety Protection Act in a pre-trial decision by Federal 
Magistrate Kirk.  The trial jury, deciding on the question of 
damages only, found Mr. Thomason liable to Monsanto for 
$401.00 per acre for infringing the patent, and liable to Delta 
and Pine Land for $100.00 per acre for violating the PVPA.  
Typically, Mr. Thomason retained neighboring farmers’ cotton 
seeds as consideration for ginning their cotton.  Most of these 
seeds he sold for animal feed and oil extraction, while retaining 
the balance for planting his own fields.  Even if the case 
against Mr. Thomason concerned these particular seeds, he 
would still have been found guilty of infringement and violation 
of the Plant Variety Protection Act because he would be using 
the Bt cotton seeds without a license. 
The fictional case of Jack and the Beanstalk and the real 
cases involving Percy Schmeiser and Dallas Thomason 
intrinsically involve property rights in genetically modified 
plants.  This Note discusses the mechanism by which the seed 
manufacturers retain property rights in genetically modified 
plants while denying the farmer property rights in both the 
progeny seed that he has grown on his own land and the land 
upon which the genetically modified plants are grown.  In Part 
I, the foundation of property rights in genetically modified 
plants is discussed.  In Part II, the development of the law with 
regard to property rights in genetically modified plants, and 
how the seed manufacturers who develop the seeds retain those 
rights is discussed.  In Part III, the provisions of the law that 
remove the property rights from the farmer and allocate those 
rights to the seed manufacturer are discussed.  Also, the 
mechanisms by which the farmer can retract those same 
property rights are discussed in this section. 
This Note argues that the current state of judicial 
interpretation of property rights in genetically modified plants 
weighs heavily in favor of the seed manufacturers, and that 
such an interpretation is justified if only the costs to the seed 
manufacturers are considered.  This Note proposes that the 
farmer is an integral part of agricultural biotechnology and 
must be accounted for when statutes granting property rights 
are interpreted.  Such an interpretation would strike a balance 
between the needs and costs incurred by the seed 
manufacturers and the needs and costs incurred by the 
farmers.
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I. BACKGROUND 
“Labor, for a fair remuneration, whether of the brain or 
hand, should be the glory of America; besides, there is true 
dignity in labor, especially in cultivating the soil.”9
A. AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY
Farming is a business, and as such, the entrepreneurs 
engaged in it are driven to maximize profit by increasing 
productivity10 while minimizing labor and financial input.  
Since the early stages of cultivating crops, improvements in 
productivity were obtained by one of two mechanisms: artificial 
selection and plant breeding.  Artificial selection functions on 
the genetic variability of plants and appears to have been the 
first method successfully employed for increasing productivity.  
The earliest farmers would have selected those plants with the 
most favorable traits, such as the largest or most abundant 
fruits.  Early on, the gains realized by artificial selection could 
have occurred rapidly and required only a rudimentary 
understanding by the farmers that the most favorable traits 
would have been found in the each succeeding generation.  It is 
not surprising then, that since the beginning of recorded 
history (and perhaps before that time in certain societies11)
farmers have been artificially selecting plants12 for the most 
 9. Isaac Newton, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year 
1862, 1862 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 1, 15 (1863) (also published as: ISAAC 
NEWTON,  REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1862, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 37-78, at 15 (3d. Sess. 1863)). 
 10. From nearly the beginning of the development of genetically modified 
plants it was recognized that productivity from the genetically modified plant 
was significantly lower than from similar but non-genetically modified plants.  
See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, GENETIC 
ENGINEERING OF PLANTS: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND 
POLICY CONCERNS 45 (1984) (program of the convocation on genetic 
engineering of plants published by the National Academy Press) [hereinafter 
BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND 
POLICY CONCERNS].  Now, over a decade and a half later, the farmers have 
become keenly aware that the genetically modified plants do not out produce 
traditional hybrid lines despite assurances by the seed manufactures that the 
plants would do so.  Therefore, those farmers who employ genetically modified 
plants may remain competitive only by minimizing input costs and labor, not 
by gaining an improvement in productivity. 
11. See KONRAD SPINDLER, THE MAN IN THE ICE (1994) (published by 
Harmony Books). 
 12. It is essential to understand the difference between natural and 
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desirable characteristics in each planting cycle.13  Seeds from 
plants that displayed these characteristics were saved and used 
in a subsequent planting cycle.14
Through artificial selection, plants that were deemed 
suitable for agricultural purposes were eventually 
domesticated.  The domestication of plants was a long-term 
process that had evolutionary consequences for many species.  
From the agricultural viewpoint, the result of the 
domestication process was the creation of a relatively narrow 
set of plants that now serve human needs.15  In some species of 
domesticated plants, artificial selection has altered the genetic 
construct to the extent that no wild relatives exist with which 
to cross breed the domesticated plant in order to expand its 
genome.16  There can be no doubt that traditional agricultural 
practices narrowed the range of species employed in providing 
food and fiber for humans. However, the continued practice of 
artificial selection can have the effect of expanding the genetic 
diversity within a particular species.  Through artificial 
selection, those plants that exhibit some trait that is different 
than the characteristics exhibited by other plants of the same 
species and is the result of genetic variation created by 
artificial selection.  Charles Darwin argued that a species currently in 
existence had evolved from an ancestral species as the result of environmental 
factors.  This evolution was termed, by Darwin, as “natural selection”.  See
generally CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL
SELECTION (D. Appleton and Co., New York 1890) (1848).  Artificial selection 
is the result of human intervention in the process of the “natural” evolution of 
a species whereby humans select, for breeding, the next generation of a 
particular species from a particular subset of the current generation of that 
same species.  See NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 399 (4th ed. 1996).  It might 
be noted that humans have been engaged in artificial selection of not only 
plant species, but also human and non-human animal species for millennia.  
See generally Manspeizer, infra note 145. 
13. See NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 399, 407 (4th ed. 1996). 
14. See id. at 399 ff. 
15. See generally TRANSGENIC PLANTS AND WORLD AGRICULTURE
(Washington, D.C., National Academy Press 2000), at
http://www.nap.edu/html/transgenic (last visited Feb. 15, 2001) [hereinafter 
TRANSGENIC PLANTS].
 16. It is known that certain traits can be bred into a domesticated plant 
only by the use of a non-domesticated “wild” close relative plant species.  For 
example, the insertion of atrazine resistance into canola was accomplished by 
cross breeding domesticated canola with the atrazine-resistant weed wild 
turnip (Bassica campestris). See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 10, at 42.  The 
report summarizes the discussions of the convocation for examination of the 
potential contribution of genetic manipulation to agricultural productivity. 
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environmental factors, can be used as progenitor plants for a 
new variety.  The multi-millenia old practice of artificial 
selection is still employed at the outset of the twenty-first 
century, even by “modern” farmers.  For example, Mr. 
Schmeiser, a Canadian canola farmer, has been developing his 
own variety of canola, suitable for the soil and environmental 
conditions in his region, for over a half century.  His practice 
has involved exclusively the technique of artificial selection.  
While the practice of artificial selection may not be suitable for 
all crop species, the practice still must be preserved and 
continued because it exerts an expanding pressure on the 
genetic diversity in the domesticated plant species. 
The process of artificial selection by farmers became an 
agricultural institution at this country’s beginnings and 
continued as a core function of agricultural production up 
through the early part of the twentieth century.17  In early 
America, very few native plant species were suitable for 
agricultural production. Plant species imported from England 
and Europe were likewise unsuitable for agricultural 
production in North America. The early non-indigenous 
farmers realized that these imported plant varieties were not 
immediately well suited for large-scale agricultural production 
in North America18 due to the continent’s unique climate and 
soil.
Consequently, these early farmers soon determined that 
seeds and plants had to be selected which were best adapted to 
the climate and local environment of North America.19  The 
farmer was the only instrument by which agricultural 
techniques including domesticated plants, that were suitable 
for the soil, climate, and population of the (eventual) United 
States were developed.  The farmer was responsible for the 
adaptation of native species for domestic purposes, the 
adoption of species already domesticated by indigenous peoples 
for commercial purposes, and the development of new varieties 
of agricultural plants from those plants familiar in Europe.  
The early American farmers’ process of adoption and 
 17. The advent and introduction of hybrid crop varieties effectively halted 
the practice of artificial selection by the farmers.  The hybrid qualities, which 
were desired in the first generation plants, would not necessarily be 
transmitted to progeny plants. 
18. See JACK RALPH KLOPPENBURG, JR., FIRST THE SEED: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, 1492-2000 51 (1988). 
19. See id.
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adaptation of plants for American agriculture involved testing 
different seed varieties and saving seed from those plants with 
the most favorable characteristics for the next planting cycle.20
Thus, the farmers established artificial selection as a central 
principle of agricultural practice early in the development of 
this country. 
Through the practice of artificial selection, a base of 
germplasm21 was developed which eventually became well 
suited to large-scale agriculture in North America.22  The 
process of germplasm development, and the farmer’s role in 
that process, was well established before the independence of 
the United States, even though the product of the process was 
nowhere near mature in nature.23
The process of artificially selecting plan varieties did not 
benefit all farmers uniformly.  Certain farmers practiced 
artificial selection through the late eighteenth century on 
private or communal farms.24  However, not all farmers 
possessed the skill or resources to mount an effective program 
of plant variety development.25  A few wealthy landowners, 
including Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, could 
afford to import exotic seeds26 and adapt those seeds to local 
conditions.  Seeds from these privately grown varieties that 
20. See id. at 51-52. 
 21. The collective genetic stock of a species of plant is the called its 
germplasm. See JOHN MILTON POEHLMAN, BREEDING FIELD CROPS 4 (3d ed. 
1987).
 22. The roles of the government, industry, and farmers in the 
development of the germplasm base in the United States has been detailed in 
a recently published article.  See Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property 
Protection and Its Impact On The U.S. Seed Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 
297 (1999).  Since certain aspects of the interaction between the government, 
industry, and farmers are central to the analysis presented here, and since 
some of these points are inadequately treated by Blair, it is necessary to 
review the background on the development of the germplasm base given in 
part by Blair. 
 23. An excellent history is given by Cary Fowler, The Plant Patent Act Of 
1930: A Sociological History Of Its Creation, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y. 621 (2000). 
24. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 52-53. 
 25. George Washington recognized that successful agriculture would not 
advance by following “the ordinary farm routine which his neighbors 
practiced.” ALFRED CHARLES TRUE, A History of Agricultural Education in the 
United States, 36 U.S.D.A. MISC. PUB. 14 (1929).  Because of this observation, 
Washington devoted considerable resources to agricultural experiments aimed 
at improving varieties and introducing exotic species of plants. See id. at 15. 
26. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 52. 
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performed well and exhibited desired characteristics were 
distributed among the members of agricultural societies to 
which the grower belonged.27  As a result, members of 
agricultural societies were able to develop successful farms and 
plantations while simultaneously broadening the germplasm 
available in the United States.28  Because the common farmer 
could not gain membership to these agricultural societies he 
had either no or limited access to these new and exotic 
varieties.29  The common farmer was then economically 
disadvantaged in a system that granted an exclusive interest to 
those who could afford to develop the plant varieties best suited 
to agriculture in the United States. 
Maintaining control of the nation’s germplasm base in the 
hands of a few wealthy merchants and farmers had the effect of 
limiting the agricultural productivity of the significantly larger 
27. See id.
28. See id.
 29. The stature of those who organized and were members of the 
agricultural societies leads one to the conclusion that the societies were not 
meant for the common farmer.  A few examples illustrate the point.  The 
South Carolina Society for Promoting and Improving Agriculture and Other 
Rural Concerns was established in 1784.  In the rules of the society it was 
recommended that the farmer set aside a portion of his lands upon which 
agricultural experiments would be conducted.  Further, written records of the 
experiments should be maintained and reported to the society.  See ALFRED
CHARLES TRUE, A History of Agricultural Experimentation and Research in 
the United States, 251 U.S.D.A. MISC. PUB. 6-7 (1937). The Philadelphia 
Society for Promoting Agriculture was organized in 1785 by Judge Bordley 
and “23 distinguished citizens of that city” and whose first president was 
“Samuel Powel, a graduate of the College of Philadelphia, and twice mayor of 
that city.” See TRUE, supra note 25, at 7.  The society set goals similar to the 
other agricultural societies for its members and added the lure of premiums 
for the best agricultural experiments.  See id. The New York Society for the 
Promotion of Agriculture, Arts, and Manufactures was established in 1791 for 
the communication of results of experiments in agriculture, the useful arts 
and manufacturing.  See id. at 7. The Society for Promoting Agriculture in the 
State of Connecticut, formed in 1794, invited its members “to make 
experiments in the various departments of Agriculture,” id. at 9 (quoting E. H. 
Jenkins, HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT), the results of which were to be freely 
communicated to the society.  The Albemarle Agricultural Society was formed 
in 1817 by 30 men under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson.  See TRUE, supra
note 25, at 15.  Careful examination of the history of the agricultural societies 
indicates that a common thread running through all of the early agricultural 
societies is that the membership was limited to those who could engage in the 
gentlemanly endeavor of “scientific agriculture” and who could accurately 
record and report the results of that endeavor to the membership of the 
society.  Indeed, the common farmer most certainly lacked the resources to 
engage in such endeavors and therefore would not be able to benefit from the 
seed-sharing programs of the agricultural societies. 
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number of common farmers.  To aid agricultural productivity in 
general and to continue broadening the germplasm available to 
American farms, Secretary of the Treasury William H. 
Crawford requested in 1819 that ambassadors and military 
officers retrieve seed from countries around the world and 
supply that seed to American farmers.30  The project initiated 
by Crawford had the effect of initializing the process of 
centralizing the maintenance and extension of the available 
germplasm base with the United States government.31  Such 
centralization had the effect of providing new varieties of seed 
to all farmers rather than to only those farmers wealthy 
enough to belong to exclusive agricultural societies.  To solidify 
centralization of control of the germplasm base with the 
government, the Commissioner of Patents, Henry Ellsworth, in 
1839 obtained federal funding for the collection and 
distribution of new plant varieties to the farmers.32  The 
30. See NELSON KLOSE, AMERICA’S CROP HERITAGE: THE HISTORY OF 
FOREIGN PLANT INTRODUCTION BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 26 (1950) 
(describing the introduction of exotic plants into the United States, and roles 
that the federal government, farmers, and seed manufacturers had in 
developing modern plant agriculture). 
 31. Because the project was unfunded, it was not immediately successful.  
However, because naval officers had an inherent interest in collecting exotic 
species, during their travels around the world, for their own use, the 
germplasm did arrive in the United States as a result of the program.  See
KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 55.  More importantly, however, was the 
recognition that the collection and introduction of new varieties and species 
into the United States and the successful adaptation of those exotic plants for 
agricultural purposes in the United States was beyond the capacity of 
individuals.  Rather the efforts must be accomplished by the collective efforts 
available through the federal government. See id. at 54. 
32. See KLOSE, supra note 30, at 39. By 1837, Commissioner Ellsworth 
had clearly recognized the importance of instituting a seed collection and 
distribution program under the purview of the federal government.  
Specifically, Commissioner Ellsworth stated that husbandry might derive 
assistance “from the establishment of a regular system for the selection and 
distribution of grain and seeds of the choicest varieties for agricultural 
purposes.” HENRY ELLSWORTH, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS
FOR THE YEAR 1837, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 25-112, at 5 (3d. Sess. 1838).  As 
early as 1835, Ellsworth was collecting and distributing various types of 
agricultural seeds from the Patent Office.  In his own words: 
 [t]he Patent Office is crowded with men of enterprise, who, when 
they bring the models of their improvements in such implements [of 
husbandry], are eager to communicate a knowledge of every other 
kind of improvement in agriculture, and especially new and 
valuable varieties of seeds and plants.  Hence, the undersigned 
[Commissioner] has been led to receive and distribute, during the 
last two years, many articles of this kind which have been 
committed to his care; and experience has induced him to believe 
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collection and distribution efforts were eventually assigned to 
the Patent Office.  With congressional funding, by 1847 the 
Patent Office was distributing approximately 60,000 packets of 
seed to farmers free of charge.33  The program of collecting and 
distributing seed continued to expand so that more than one 
million packages of seed were distributed by 1855.34  While the 
government played an important role as collector and 
that there is no spot in the Union so favorable to this object as the 
seat of Government. 
The great disideratum at the present time seems to be, that some 
place should be designated and known as the depository of all 
articles of this kind, and from whence they may be dispensed to 
every part of the United States. 
Id. at. 5.  Thus, Commissioner Ellsworth urged upon Congress the concept 
that agricultural productivity could be assisted to a considerable extent in the 
United States if the management of the seed collection and distribution 
program were to be formalized within the federal government.  Ellsworth 
supported his position with a set of well articulated examples.  The first 
concerns the production of wheat: 
 [a] short time since, the most eastern State of our Union was, in a 
measure, dependent on others for her bread-stuffs.  That State is 
now becoming able to supply its own wants, and will soon have a 
surplus for exportation; and this is effected by the extensive 
introduction of spring wheat.  Among the varieties of this wheat, 
however, there is great room for selection: there is at least 20 per 
cent. Difference, if regard is paid to the quality and quantity of the 
crop.
Id.  The second concerns experiments on the production of maize: 
 [f]rom experiments made the last summer, there can be no doubt 
that the crop of Indian corn [maize] may be improved at least one-
third, without any extra labor; and this, effected by a due regard 
only to the selection of seeds. 
 And here it may be mentioned, that an individual has devoted 
twenty-five years to this single object; and, from our common Indian 
corn, has produced a new variety, which, if distributed as it ought to 
be, may prove a great benefit to the husbandman and to the country. 
 From samples transmitted to the Patent Office, especially from the 
shores of lake Superior, there is a moral certainty of a good crop of 
corn in the higher latitudes, if proper attention is paid to the 
selection of seeds. 
Id. at 5-6 (emphasis added).  Thus, it appears that Ellsworth understood that 
the development of new varieties by a single person or by individual 
agricultural societies would be of little use to agricultural production in the 
United States without a well designed, and federally backed, seed collection 
and distribution system.  He certainly recognized that individual farmers 
could play a critical role in the distribution system, but also certainly was not 
promoting the distribution program merely to benefit the welfare of the 
farmers.
33. See id.
34. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 56. 
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distributor of seed, the farmer remained an essential 
functionary in the process of refining and developing the 
available germplasm in the United States.35
Through the process of screening and selecting those 
plants and seeds that gave superior yields, the farmers in 
partnership with the federal government had created a well-
developed germplasm base by the start of the Civil War.36  To 
rationalize and continue the centralized control of germplasm 
development and distribution, Congress in 1862 established the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)37 to “acquire 
35. See id.
36. See J. C. FORBES & R. D. WATSON, PLANTS IN AGRICULTURE 212 
(1992) [hereinafter FORBES & WATSON].
 37. The United States Department of Agriculture was created in 1862 
with Isaac Newton appointed as the first Commissioner of Agriculture.  See
Isaac Newton, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year 1862,
1862 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 1, 3 (1863) (also published as: ISAAC NEWTON,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1862, H.R. 
EXEC. DOC. NO. 37-78, at 3 (3d. Sess. 1863)). The Department of Agriculture, 
with Isaac Newton as its first Commissioner, started operation on July 1, 
1862, with a budget allowance of $60,000 of which $34,342.27 was spent by 
the end of the year.  Id. at 21.  Commissioner Isaac Newton articulated the 
objectives of the Department of Agriculture as follows: 
 Collecting, arranging, publishing, and disseminating, for the benefit 
of the nation, statistical and other useful information in regard to 
agriculture in its widest acceptation, embracing, not only the usual 
cultivation of the soil, but orcharding, plain and ornamental 
gardening, rural embellishment, the veterinary art, and household 
economy.  In this connexion the department whould aim to teach or 
recommend authoritatively, by concentrating the ripest agricultural 
experience and scholarship, the best methods of culture, the choicest 
plants, vegetables, and fruits, the most valuable grains, grasses, and 
animals, domestic and otherwise, and the most improved 
implements of husbandry. 
 Collecting, from different parts of our own and foreign lands, such 
valuable animals, cereals, seeds, plants, slips, and cuttings as may 
be obtained by exchange, purchase, or gift, with information as to 
their modes of propagation, culture, preservation, and preparation 
for market, and distributing the same throughout the country.  
Through our postal franking privilege at home, and our foreign 
ministers, consuls, merchants, missionaries, travellers, and the 
officers of our naval and merchant fleet, the government enjoys 
unusual facilities for carrying out this project. 
 Answering inquiries of farmers and others on all matters relating to 
agriculture, at the same time stimulating inquiry, inviting 
discussion, and rewarding research by publishing agricultural 
statistics of various States and sections of States in order to guard 
against the excess or diminution of given products, thereby saving 
much time, labor and capital to farmers.  And as this department 
has been created and is sustained for their benefit, they are 
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and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful 
information in subjects connected with agriculture in the most 
general and comprehensive sense of that word, and to procure, 
propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable 
seeds and plants.”38  The establishment of the USDA in effect 
institutionalized within the government the artificial selection 
model of plant evolution, which had previously been conducted 
by individual farmers.39  After the Civil War, the development 
and testing of new varieties of domestic crop species were 
earnestly invited to correspond with it in order that a proper 
selection of subjects may be afforded for publication. 
Testing, by experiment, the value of different agricultural 
implements and their adaptation to the purposes intended, as well 
as testing the value of cereals, seeds, and plants, and their 
adaptation to our soil and climate, before transmitting them to our 
farmers.  In order to carry out this object the department should 
have under its control a model farm. 
Analysis, by means of a chemical laboratory, of various soils, grains, 
fruits, plants, vegetables, and manures, and publishing the results 
for the guidance and benefit of agriculturists. 
Establishing a professorship of botany and entomology.  It is well 
known that insects are annually destroying a vast amount of the 
products of our soil, and that their ravages appear to be on the 
increase.  If the damage done to our wheat crop alone could be 
prevented, millions of money would be saved to the country. 
Establishing an agricultural library and museum.  In this library the 
most valuable works would gradually accumulate by exchange, gift 
and purchase, forming a rich mine of knowledge.  The museum 
would embrace models of all the most approved implements of 
husbandry; specimens of soils, rocks, \&c.; samples of the various 
productions of garden, field, and forest; varieties of grain in straw, 
and in sample, now generally cultivated or recently introduced into 
the country, with explanations respecting their soils, climates, 
weight, yield per acre, and their value as food.  Here should be 
arranged specimens of the component parts of soils, manures, and 
all the products of agriculture, showing especially the values of 
different kinds of food.  On the walls of this museum should hand 
the portraits of animals of the most celebrated breeds, and under its 
roof should be gathered whatever would tend to attract and instruct 
persons of the highest taste and education. 
Id. at 20-1. 
 38. Act of May 15, 1862, ch. 72, 12 Stat. 387 (the act is entitled: “An Act to 
establish a Department of Agriculture”).  See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 
59 (quoting GLADYS L. BAKER ET AL., CENTURY OF SERVICE: THE FIRST ONE
HUNDRED YEARS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 13 (1963)).  See also
Isaac Newton, supra note 37 at 3. 
39. See Frederick H. Buttel & Jill Belsky, Biotechnology, Plant Breeding, 
and Intellectual Property: Social and Ethical Dimensions, in OWNING
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES 110 
(Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper eds., 1989) [hereinafter Buttel & Belsky]. 
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conducted primarily by the land grant colleges in conjunction 
with the USDA and the resulting seeds were distributed free of 
charge to the nation’s farmers.40  Efforts by the USDA and land 
grant colleges, however, did not reach vegetable and plant 
varieties intended for domestic use as these varieties were 
already marketed to the farmer and home gardener through a 
small private seed trade.41  The growth of the collection and 
distribution program was so extensive that by 1878 
approximately one-third of the department’s budget was 
committed to the project.42  By the end of the nineteenth 
century the program had become exceedingly successful, and 
the germplasm was as well developed as possible given the 
limited understanding, by both the farmer and applied 
scientist, of plant genetics.  From a business perspective, the 
government-farmer relationship was in prime condition for the 
newly founded seed companies to replace the government and 
exploit the well developed germplasm base.  In order to affect 
the replacement, the seed manufacturers found a sympathetic 
ear and a powerful friend in the then Secretary of Agriculture 
J. Sterling Morton. 
Mr. M. Fagan, Chief of the Seed Division under Secretary 
Morton, considered the gratuitous distribution of seed as a 
program that “has outlived its usefulness, and that its further 
continuance is an infringement of the rights of citizens engaged 
in legitimate trade pursuits”43 and in 1893 called for the end of 
40. See Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord: Monsanto’s Gene Police Raise Alarm 
on Farmers’ Rights, Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at A6. 
41. See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 39, at 113. 
42. See KLOSE, supra note 30, at 62 
 43. M. E. Fagen, Report of the Chief of the Seed Division, in 1893 U.S.D.A. 
ANNUAL REPORTS 389, 391 (1894) (also published in: REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1893, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO.
53-1, pt. 6, at 389-91 (2d. Sess. 1894)). Mr. J. Sterling Morton, in the same 
year, called the gratuitous seed program one of “unwieldy, unnecessary, and 
extravagant proportions,” J. STERLING MORTON, Report of the Commissioner 
of Agriculture, 1893 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS 7, 19 (1894) (also published 
as: J. STERLING MORTON,  REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE
FOR THE YEAR 1893, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 389-91 (2d. Sess. 
1894)), that was an “enormous expenditure, without compensatory benefits, 
[that] ought to be abolished.”  Id. at 20. Then, as now, proponents of 
monopolization by a particular sector of the business community argue that 
such monopolization is to protect “the rights of citizens engaged in legitimate 
trade pursuits” (that is the businessmen).  What these proponents fail to 
realize is that the prior legal structure already protected the interests of 
persons engaged in a “legitimate trade pursuit” (that is the farmers) as well as 
building a stronger community.  That special interests could not enter into the 
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the project.44  Despite Morton’s claims of infringement and his 
belief that the gratuitous distribution of the seed was 
“antagonistic to the seed as a commodity-form and in direct 
competition with the private seed trade,”45 Congress refused to 
halt the program.46  Morton failed to veil his contempt for the 
gratuitous seed program devised to aid the farmers and to help 
feed the American people.47  Since Congress refused to halt the 
market arena is neither the fault of the farmers (they were engaging in the 
economically sound practice of maximizing output while minimizing input of 
labor and capital) nor of the nation, but rather their own inability to compete 
in a market which favors the public welfare rather than the welfare of a select 
group of businessmen.  Kloppenburg also employed this quote, although in a 
different context. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 62. 
44. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18 at 62-63. 
45. Id. at 63. 
46. See id.
 47. Mr. J. Sterling Morton, in his report for 1894, stated that: “[t]he 
extravagance and inutility of these disbursements are apparent to any person 
who will investigate the results of the expenditure.” J. Sterling Morton, Report
of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1894 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS 5, 69 (1895)
(also published as: J. STERLING MORTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF 
AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1894, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 69 (3d. 
Sess. 1895)). He further argues that those to whom the seeds were distributed 
were not only ungrateful, but indifferent as well. Identifying that the newly 
established agricultural experiment stations “are in charge of scientific men” 
who are “particularly well equipped for the trial, testing, and approval or 
condemnation of such new varieties as may be introduced from time to time,” 
his position was that the responsibility of artificial selection of new varieties 
should fall to these experiment stations. See id. at 69-70. Since Secretary 
Morton was closely aligned with the emerging private seed manufacturing 
industry (see KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 61-65), his argument, contained 
in his annual report for the year 1894, clearly indicated that he expected the 
United States government to continue funding agricultural research and that 
the private seed manufacturers would later have an opportunity to reap some 
monetary benefits from that research. It is ironic that Morton expressed his 
desired for the agricultural experimental stations to have control of the 
discovery and introduction of new varieties in light of his well-articulated 
contempt for both the land grant universities and the agricultural experiment 
stations.  See J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1893 
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS 7, 8 (1894) (also published as: J. STERLING
MORTON, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1894, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 8 (2nd. Sess.1894)).  Based upon his 
conservative federalist views, Morton believed that both the university system 
and the experimental stations were the responsibility of the several States.  
Because of his close alignment with industry, Morton was apparently blinded 
to the fact that agriculture problems and developments to solve those 
problems do not end at the state line.  He was also unable to understand that 
no single state could be completely self supporting in any manner, and that 
federally guided programs that encouraged the production and dissemination 
among the peoples of the several States of knowledge and technology is the 
critical factor to continued development of the nation. It is fortunate that 
16         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
seed program,48 Morton took it upon himself to not only 
terminate the seed distribution program in 1894, but also to 
completely eliminate the USDA’s ability to ever engage in the 
distribution program again. 49 Not only did Secretary Morton 
openly display his contempt for the gratuitous seed distribution 
program in 1894,50 but he also openly demonstrated his disgust 
Commissioner Morton did not succeed in defeating the land grant university 
program or the agricultural experiment station program.  This is because the 
agricultural industry has and continues to benefit from both public 
institutions.  See generally Donald N. Duvick, Biotechnology in the 1930s: The 
Development of Hybrid Maize, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 69-74 (Jan., 
2001).
 48. The stated duty of the USDA was to collect and disseminate 
information, seeds, and plants for the advancement of agriculture in the 
United States. See supra note 37.  However, members of Congress found the 
gratuitous seed distribution so politically attractive that, by 1878, 
Commissioner William LeDuc found it necessary to remind Congress that by 
statute  the distribution of seed was exclusively the duty of the USDA.  See
William G. LeDuc, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year 
1878, 1878 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 5, 32-9 (1879).  LeDuc admonished 
Congress stating that: “[o]nly by obeying the organic law, which requires the 
Commissioner of Agriculture to distribute to agriculturist the seeds which 
invite them, can we hope to obtain these reports with any degree of certainty.  
This law is mandatory and must be obeyed until Congress shall see fit to 
amend the same, and thus permit or prescribe some other method of 
distribution.” Id. at 34. Commissioner LeDuc then instituted a program 
whereby he wrestled control of the program from the members of Congress.  
By 1879, LeDuc’s program had gained the approval of agricultural 
organizations, several newspaper editors, and some members of Congress. See
William G. LeDuc, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year 
1879, 1879 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 5, 21 (1880).  Evidently, some 
Congressmen found the political benefits of the largesse attendant to the 
gratuitous seed distribution program so attractive that, by 1885, two-thirds of 
all seeds, plants, and cuttings distributed through the gratuitous seed 
program were actually being distributed by members of Congress. See Norman
J. Colman, Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Year 1884, 1884 
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 5, 25-6 (1885).  Even in the case of a program 
meant to benefit all of society, by increasing and diversifying the germplasm 
base, members of Congress seemed to have no compunction over using that 
program for their own political benefit. 
49. See J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1894 
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS  7, 67-70 (1895) (also published as: J. STERLING
MORTON,  REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1894, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 67-70 (3d. Sess. 1895)). 
 50. In 1895, Commissioner Morton reminded Congress that in 1893 he: 
“recommend[ed] that the purchase of seed for gratuitous and promiscuous 
distribution be utterly abolished, and that not one cent be appropriated for 
such distribution.” J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture,
1894 U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS  7, 67 (1895) (also published as: J. STERLING
MORTON,  REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1894, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 53-1, pt. 6, at 67 (3d. Sess. 1895)).  To buttress his 
position, Secretary Morton included in his report for 1894 a report from Mr. 
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for Congress’51 decision to continue the program by turning to 
United States Attorney General Richard Olney in 1894 for a 
non-judicial interpretation of the statute which established the 
United States Department of Agriculture.  Secretary Morton 
believed that Attorney General Olney had stated that the 
Secretary of Agriculture reserved the right to determine 
whether government was obliged to continue the gratuitous 
seed program. Consequently, Secretary Morton rejected three 
bids in response to a limiting advertisement for seeds in an 
overt move to eliminate the gratuitous seed program in fiscal 
year 1895.52  Such an outcome is hardly surprising given the 
members of the board were seedsmen, including Mr. Enos S. 
Enos S. Harnden, Special Agent for the Purchase of Seed for the United States 
Department of Agriculture.  Mr. Harnden stated that: “[i]n the light of my 
experience as a former seedsman, however, I consider the free distribution of 
seeds by this Department as an infringement upon and interference with a 
legitimate business, and I believe it should be abolished.”  Id. at 211.  Further, 
Mr. Harnden stated that: “this Department has no moral right to interfere 
with this or any other legitimate business interest by a free political 
distribution of garden seeds . . . or any other commodity the subject of 
legitimate trade.” Id.  Conceding that “years ago the seed division did much 
for the agricultural interests of the country in introducing new and improved 
cereals and other field seeds,”  id. at 212, Harnden argues that “the recipients, 
as a rule, want to obtain good seeds for the least possible money,” id., and 
suggests “that the purchase of seeds for free distribution by this Department 
be discontinued,” id. at 213. 
 51. Perhaps the contempt that Mr. Morton felt for Congress was the 
consequence of the result of a hearing held before the Committee of Elections 
of the House of Representatives in 1862.  See MR. DAWES, J. STERLING
MORTON VS. SAMUEL G. DAILY, HOUSE COMM. OF ELECTIONS, H.R. REP. NO.
37-69, at 1-18 (2d. Sess. 1862) [hereinafter DAWES]; see also MR. VOORHEES, J. 
STERLING MORTON VS. SAMUEL G. DAILY: VIEWS OF THE MINORITY, HOUSE
COMM. OF ELECTIONS, H.R. REP. NO. 37-69, at 1-15 (2d. Sess. 1862) 
[hereinafter VOORHEES].  The election for the pertinent seat in the House of 
Representatives was held on October 9, 1860 in the Territory of Nebraska.  
Between Mr. Morton and Mr. Daily, the initial election results were in favor of 
Mr. Morton by 14 votes (2957 for Mr. Morton, 2945 for Mr. Daily).  See DAWES,
supra, at 1.  Upon contest of the election results by Mr. Daily, the governor of 
the Territory of Nebraska revoked the certificate of election (initially given in 
favor of Mr. Morton) and granted it to Mr. Daily.  The ground upon which the 
governor reversed the election was alleged voter fraud in the vote counted for 
Mr. Morton. See DAWES, supra, at 1.  The Committee reviewed extensive 
testimony on the question, found instances of voter fraud in favor of Morton, 
and consequently upheld the certificate of election in favor of Mr. Daily. See
DAWES, supra, at 18. 
52. See J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1895 
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT 5, 53-5 (1895) (also published as: J. STERLING
MORTON,  REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
1895, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 54-6, at 53-5 (1st. Sess. 1895)). 
18         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
Harnden.53  The space previously occupied by the Seed Division 
of the USDA was “speedily transformed into apartments for the 
Division of Entomology and the Division of Ornithology and 
Mammalogy, and immediately occupied by the chiefs and clerks 
thereof.”54  Further, arguing that the introduction of exotic 
species and varieties was the duty of the agricultural 
experiment stations, Secretary Morton urged Congress to 
“materially and profitably reduce[]” the “appropriation for the 
care of the thirty-five acres of grounds about” the USDA which 
were previously used as grounds for the cultivation of plants for 
home use and for distribution.55
Notwithstanding Morton’s use of the Attorney General as 
an authority on the meaning of the statute, Congress clearly 
felt that Morton had overstepped his authority by terminating 
the seed program.  In 1895, Morton grudgingly reinstated the 
seed distribution program.56  This is one of the clearest 
 53. Secretary Morton quoted a report from Mr. Harnden as stating that: 
“we have opened and examined the bids received and find that the same do 
not meet the requirements of the advertisement as printed, and therefore 
respectfully recommend that all bids be rejected.” Id. at 55. 
54. Id. at 55. 
55. Id. at 56. 
56. See J. Sterling Morton, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1896 
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORT v (1896) (also published as: J. STERLING MORTON,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1896, H.R. 
EXEC. DOC. NO. 54-6, at v (2nd. Sess. 1896)).  Commissioner Morton stated 
that if the garden area planted by the gratuitous seed were a strip of ground a 
single rod in width, it would stretch around the globe one and one-half times.  
He also argued that: “[t]he 10,125,000 packets of vegetable seeds cost the 
Government $75,000, while the transportation of the same through the mails 
added the sum of $74,520,” a cost “paid for by money raised from all the 
people, and bestowed upon only a few people.”  Id. at xxxix.  The computation 
reported by Commissioner Morton was provided by Mr. Harnden.  See Enos S. 
Harnden, Report of the Special Agent on Seed Distribution, in 1896 U.S.D.A. 
ANNUAL REPORTS 155-57 (1896) (also published in: REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1896, H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO.
54-6, at 155-57 (2nd. Sess. 1896)).  Mr. Harnden, maintaining an unwavering 
contempt equaled only by that of Commissioner Morton for both the 
gratuitous seed distribution program and for Congress, complained in 1896, 
following reinstitution of the seed distribution program, that “[e]stimating 
each Congressional quota on a basis of 450 equal parts, each Senator, 
Member, and Delegate would receive sufficient seed to plant a trifle more than 
163 1/2 acres to garden truck,” and that if this land was accumulated into a 
patch 1 rod in width, “a fast express train traveling at the rate of 60 miles per 
hour along this garden patch would require fifty-one days three hours and 
fourteen minutes to pass from one end to the other.”  Id. at 156.  Only due to 
the greed for political power exhibited by the members of Congress was the 
centralized institution of agricultural management preserved for another 28 
years for the benefit of the farmers and the peoples of this nation. 
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examples of a government officer using the power vested in his 
office to destroy the long-established business practice of a 
large group of people in order to create a new business practice 
which benefits only a small group of favored individuals.  
Despite Secretary Morton’s efforts, the gratuitous seed 
distribution program had grown and was so pervasive that by 
1897 the USDA was distributing approximately one billion 
packets of seed per year.57
Without the government seed program and the efforts of 
American farmers, the germplasm58 base present in the United 
States by the end of the nineteenth century, would certainly 
not have been developed.  The underlying purpose of the 
government’s gratuitous seed program was to expand the 
germplasm available and to allow farmers to develop varieties 
that were particularly well suited for the local environment.59
The seed manufacturers’ main goal was to develop the 
minimum number of varieties that would maximize sales to the 
grower and hence maximize profits.  Development of a 
multitude of seed varieties is both costly for a single entity and 
may not be an optimal business strategy.  Thus, the gratuitous 
seed program’s purpose is antithetical to that underlying the 
seed manufacturers’ business strategy.  The government’s 
intention of expanding the available germplasm base, of 
increasing the number of varieties of exotic and native seeds 
used by the farmers, and of adapting new varieties to the local 
environments found in the United States, was a resounding 
success.60  The process of artificial selection by the farmer had 
become a well-established agricultural practice61 in part 
because the farmer was well equipped to carry out the simple 
program required for successful artificial selection.  As such, 
57. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 64-65. 
58. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING GLOBAL GENETIC 
RESOURCES: THE U.S. NATIONAL PLANT GERMPLASM SYSTEM 1 (1991) 
(published by the National Academy Press). The USDA has an ongoing and 
active program to preserve the germplasm diversity by storing seeds of all 
known plant varieties at the National Seed Storage Laboratory in Fort 
Collins, Colorado. 
 59. Kloppenburg argues that members of Congress had an the ulterior 
motive of maintaining “a convenient means of ingratiating themselves with 
their constituents.” See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 63. While this 
argument may be valid, the ultimate support for the program must have been 
predicated upon the demand by the farmers and consumers for the gratuitous 
seed provided by the government. See id.
60. See id. at 61. 
61. See id. at 65. 
20         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
the farmer was a “researcher”, a “plant breeder”,62 and his 
practice of artificial selection was a “natural right” possessed 
by him before the framing of the Constitution. 
By 1897, the Department of Agriculture’s attitude had 
changed significantly with the appointment of Mr. James 
Wilson as Secretary of Agriculture.  Recognizing that the 
“country has profited by introducing new seeds and plants,”63
but that the progress was made without a clear scientific basis, 
the Secretary appointed a scientist to “have charge of seed and 
plant importation,”64 and to bring a scientific basis to the 
importation and adaptation of plants for use in the United 
States.  The Secretary was careful to recognize that the “law 
requires that the seeds, plants, bulbs, etc., be rare and 
valuable,”65 and thus urged Congress that “more of the 
appropriation given for seeds should be available for the 
introduction of what is new and rare.”66  While Congress was 
obviously reluctant to decrease funding for the politically 
popular gratuitous seed program, it appropriated $130,000 for 
the program in 1897 and $20,000 for distribution of the seeds 
and for discovering and importing new and rare varieties in the 
same year.  For fiscal year 1899, Congress appropriated 
$130,000 for the “purchase and distribution of valuable 
seeds.”67  Of that amount, $70,978.36 was used for the purchase 
of seeds to be distributed through the Members of Congress.68
Under Secretary Wilson, the program of discovering, importing, 
and adapting new and rare varieties of seed constituted “[q]uite 
a large percentage of the $130,000 appropriated” by Congress.69
Even though Secretary Wilson urged Congress to 
appropriate larger sums to the importation and adaptation of 
 62. See infra, Parts II.B.3, for an analysis of why the farmer may be both 
a researcher and a plant breeder. 
 63. JAMES WILSON, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1897 U.S.D.A. 
ANNUAL REPORTS v, vii (1897) (also published as: JAMES WILSON,  REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1897, H.R. EXEC. DOC.
NO. 55-6, at vii (2nd. Sess. 1897)). 
64. Id.
65. Id. at xxxvi. 
66. Id.
67. See JAMES WILSON, Report of the Secretary of Agriculture, 1899 
U.S.D.A. ANNUAL REPORTS, ix, lv (1899) (also published as: JAMES WILSON,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR 1899, H.R. 
EXEC. DOC. NO. 56-6, at lv (2nd. Sess. 1899)). 
68. Id.
69. Id. at lvi. 
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new and rare varieties, the seed manufacturing industry was 
still pressing Congress to discontinue the gratuitous seed 
program.  Secretary Wilson recognized that the Department of 
Agriculture’s distribution of seeds that compete directly with 
the seed manufacturers’ sales was a questionable practice 
(particularly when no experimental feature existed, and “no 
intelligent direction regarding the use of the seeds beyond that 
which is provided by dealers”70).  However, he also recognized 
that the Department of Agriculture’s distribution of seeds and 
plants served a very valuable commercial and social purpose.  
In particular, he stated that: “[t]he introduction of these and 
many other seeds and plants, entirely beyond the ability of 
private individuals to compass, in order that such seeds and 
plants may eventually enter the commercial class and be 
handled by seedsmen, is the aim of the Department of 
Agriculture in seed distribution at the present time.”71
Obviously, by 1899 the seed manufacturing industry had made 
little progress against the Department of Agriculture’s 
gratuitous seed distribution program. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the seed 
manufacturing industry had gained only a small fraction of the 
market for field crop seeds, a market that was almost 
exclusively dominated by on-farm production of the seed and 
sale of the seed through inter-farm commerce.72  During the 
last forty years of the nineteenth century, the seed 
manufacturing industry was, however, able to make 
substantial inroads into the flower and vegetable seeds market.  
This is because the seed sets in most vegetables and flowers 
develop when the plant is mature and after the crops are 
harvested,73 thus, the home gardener was disinclined to 
produce flower and vegetable seeds for himself.  There was, 
therefore, very little competition between the seed 
manufacturing industry and the individual farmers for the 
production and sale of garden plant variety seeds.  This 
market, however, was threatened by the expansion of the 
government’s gratuitous seed program into the area of garden 
vegetable and flower seeds.74  The seed manufacturing 
industry, not surprisingly, responded to this threat by 
70. Id. at lvi 
71. Id.
72. See id. at 61. 
73. See id.
74. See id.
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pressuring the USDA to halt its seed program.  Due to this 
pressure, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the government eventually relinquished control of 
the nation’s germplasm base, including both field and garden 
crop varieties, to the private seed manufacturing companies.  
The process by which control was ceded is outlined below. 
Before 1900, the farmer had several options for obtaining 
seed for planting:  he could grow the seed himself or obtain the 
seed through the inter-farm commerce system; purchase the 
seed from fledgling seed manufacturers; or, obtain the seed 
stock gratis from the USDA.  Obtaining seed for a subsequent 
planting cycle either from his own crop or through inter-farm 
commerce usually involved crop improvement through either 
artificial selection, or in certain limited situations, crop-
breeding.75  Because the farmer could obtain new seed stocks 
gratis from the USDA, there was no incentive for him to pay for 
the seed from seed manufacturers.  The disincentive was 
sharpened in light of the relative quality and productivity of 
varieties available through the seed manufacturers and 
75. See Edmund Burke, Report of the Commissioner of Patents, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS; FOR THE YEAR 1847 1, 131, (1849) 
(also published as: EDMUND BURKE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER 
OF PATENTS, FOR THE YEAR 1847, H.R. EXEC. DOC. 30-54, at 131 (1st Sess. 
1848). Commissioner of Patents Edmund Burke reported that: 
 [a]n interesting experiment, in which a fine variety was secured, by 
blending two or three dissimilar ones, is mentioned in the Columbia 
Advocate of South Carolina.  The corn produced is stated to have 
measured, in some cases, from twelve to thirteen inches in 
circumference, and from twelve to fourteen inches in length, having 
from forty to forty-eight rows of grain in an ear.  This was, however, 
the yield of a single ear to a stalk; the ears which were from stalks 
bearing five or six ears, even of those stalks would each measure, 
when shelled, nearly twice as much as the largest ear of common 
corn.  It was mostly of the white gourd seed, but the varieties from 
which selection had been made were thus described: The one was 
remarkable only for the length of the cob, but extremely slender.  
Either of these varieties, regarded singly or separately as to its 
properties, would have been considered hardly worth the planting.  
By attention, and suitably blending these varieties, he obtained the 
valuable one which has been mentioned above, and which might be 
truly called a mammoth corn.  The ground on which it was raised is 
described as being an exhausted plantation near Monticello, on the 
red hills of Little river, but the mode of cultivation is not given. 
Many instances might be mentioned of the uncommon size of single 
ears or large crops of corn.  A few, however, will be all that we shall 
quote to shew the capabilities of this most valuable grain. 
Id.
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available to the farmer through other channels.76  The 
consequence of the long-term practice of artificial selection and 
inter-farm commerce can easily be determined as follows. 
Upon examination of the agricultural productivity before 
1900 in general, and for maize in particular, it is clear that 
productivity in the United States was stagnating.77  While new 
varieties of plants were initially rapidly and successfully 
introduced to American agriculture through the traditional 
practice of artificial selection, the stagnation in agricultural 
productivity near the end of the nineteenth century required 
the introduction of alternative practices of developing new 
varieties.  Although hybridization78 technology was becoming 
important in agricultural research,79 and hybrid varieties were 
being developed, commercial or production scale use of hybrids 
did not exist.80  While the farmer was able to perform the 
76. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 8 (discussing the quality of seeds 
distributed by the early seed manufacturers). 
77. See id. at 66.  The production and economic trends surrounding the 
recent and current development and deployment of genetically modified plants 
is analogous to the production and economic trends surrounding the 
deployment of hybrid seed varieties in the United States between 1933 and 
1946.  See Appendix A for a discussion of the economics of maize production in 
during the years between 1933 and 1946, and Appendix B for a discussion of 
the methods of data analysis used to develop the discussion in Appendix A. 
78. See Buttel &  Belsky, supra note 39, at 114. Hybridization is an 
artificial selection technique where plants are the result of interbreeding of 
two distant and distinct lines of the same plant species.  Ricard A. 
Steinbrecher and Patric Mooney, Terminator Technology: The Threat to World 
Food Security, 28 THE ECOLOGIST 276 (1998) [hereinafter Steinbrecher  &  
Mooney]. The hybrid resulting hybrid seeds will incorporate the desirable 
characteristics of the parental lines whilst suppressing the undesirable 
characteristics. See id.  The seeds from the first generation hybrid plants will 
not be able, in general, to express the desirable qualities, resulting in a loss of 
yield, and plant variability.  See Lewontin, infra note 127, at 72.  Because the 
quality “hybridized” into the seed would generally be lost after the first 
generation, the development of hybridization technology prevented farmers 
from saving the seeds from one crop for planting the following crop cycle.  As a 
result, the plant breeders were able to capitalize on the development of new 
seed varieties. See Steinbrecher  &  Mooney, supra at 276.  While the 
hybridization technique has been technically and economically feasible for 
corn, cotton, sunflowers and tomatoes it cannot be applied to important crops 
such as soybeans and wheat.  See id.  Furthermore, the hybridization 
technology cannot always be used to introduce specific characteristics into the 
plant.  See id.
79. See generally Diane B. Paul & Barbara A. Kimmelman, Mendel in 
America: Theory and Practice, 1900-1919, in THE AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT OF 
BIOLOGY 281 (Ronald Rainger, Keith R. Benson & Jan Maienschein eds. 1988) 
[hereinafter Paul & Kimmelman]. 
 80. See Appendix A for a discussion of the economics of maize production 
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function of simple artificial selection, and more sophisticated 
farmers were able to perform simple cross-breeding, it is not 
clear that the individual farmer was capable of engaging in the 
more sophisticated plant breeding techniques required to 
produce a uniform and consistent hybrid variety.  Simply put, 
the farmers were not skilled enough in research and plant 
breeding methods to undertake developing hybrid varieties for 
themselves.  The fledgling seed manufacturing industry 
evidently was incapable of engaging in the level of research 
required to significantly alter the stagnation in agricultural 
productivity.  Thus, the nearly simultaneous creation of the 
USDA81 and land grant colleges82 set the stage for shifting the 
development of new varieties from the farmer to research 
establishments staffed and operated strictly by state 
agricultural colleges and funded by the USDA.83  Before 1900, 
these efforts were unable to yield the much-needed revolution 
in agricultural practices.  Such a revolution took the form of 
extraordinary developments in science and a shift in control of 
the nation’s germplasm base. 
In the years between 1883 and 1924 three significant 
events brought change to the dynamic between the 
government, the farmer, and the seed industry: the 
establishment of the American Seed Trade Association in 1883; 
the discovery and publication of Mendel’s works in 1900; and, 
the termination of the gratuitous seed program in 1924. 
In 1883, the American Seed Trade Association was formed 
in New York City by representatives of thirty-four seed 
manufacturing companies.84  The purpose of the American Seed 
Trade Association was to promote the seed companies’ interests 
to the United States Government.85
in during the years between 1866 and 2001, and Appendix B for a discussion 
of the methods of data analysis used to develop the discussion in Appendix A. 
81. See generally Newton, supra note 37. 
 82. The Morrill Land-Grant Act establishing the land grant colleges was 
signed by President Lincoln on July 2, 1862. See TRUE, supra note 25, at 106.  
The purpose of these colleges was to “claim the authority of teachers to 
announce facts and fix laws, and to scatter broadcast that knowledge which 
will be useful in building up a great nation.” See id. at 107. 
 83. While the establishment of state agricultural experiment stations 
precedes the establishment of both the USDA and land-grant colleges (see
TRUE, supra note 29, at 67-130), the Hatch Act, signed on March 2, 1887 by 
President Cleveland, formalized the establishment of federally funded 
agricultural experiment stations in the United States. See id. at 129. 
84. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 62. 
85. See id.
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The rediscovery and publication of Mendel’s laws in 1900 
lead to the rationalization of crop-breeding science.  In the 
crop-breeding technique, the farmer or plant breeder selects 
two plant varieties, each of which has some particular set of 
desired traits for cross-breeding.86  When crossed, the first 
generation progeny may exhibit the desired traits of both 
parents, depending upon which traits are recessive and which 
are dominant.  The technique was initially unsuccessful 
because farmers and plant breeders did not understand the 
mechanism for transmitting traits and, therefore, were unable 
to predict the likely outcome of the cross of two particular plant 
varieties.
The basis of inheritance of a particular trait by the first 
generation progeny from two cross-bred progenitors was not 
well understood until the Mendel’s work was “rediscovered.”  
By studying peas in his monastery garden in the 1860’s, Gregor 
Mendel deduced that the inherited traits were stored in 
discrete units that are now called genes.87  Mendel published 
his observations in 1866.88  However, between the time when 
Mendel’s observations were first published and the turn of the 
twentieth century, his work was largely ignored89 for reasons 
that are not entirely clear.  In 1900, Mendel’s work was 
“rediscovered”90 by three botanists: Hugo de Vries91 of 
 86. Edmund Burke gave early reports of successful crop-breeding 
experiments in 1847. See Burke, supra note 75 (reporting that a variety of 
maize “secured” by blending two or three dissimilar ones, is mentioned in the 
Columbia Advocate of South Carolina). 
87. See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 6. 
 88. Gregor Mendel, Versuche über Pflazen-Hybriden, 4 VERHANDLUNGEN
DES NATURFORSCHENDEN VEREINES, ABHANDLUNGEN, 4 Brünn 3 (1866). The 
English translations appear in THE ORIGIN OF GENETICS: A MENDEL SOURCE
BOOK, (Curt Stern & Eva R. Sherwood, ed.) (1966) [hereinafter Stern & 
Sherwood]; J. H. BENNET, EXPERIMENTS IN PLANT HYBRIDIZATION, (1965); 
and JAMES ARTHUR PETER, CLASSIC PAPERS IN GENETICS, (1959). 
 89. “Mendel’s concept of the laws of genetics was lost to the world for a 
generation because his publication did not reach the few who were capable of 
grasping and extending it; and this sort of catastrophe is undoubtedly being 
repeated all about us, as truly significant attainments become lost in the mass 
of the inconsequential.” Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 101 (July 1945). 
90. See Daniel L. Hartl & Vitezslav Orel, What Did Gregor Mendel Think 
He Discovered?, 131 GENETICS 245 (1992). 
91. See Hugo de Vries, The Law of Separation of Characteristics in 
Crosses, 25 J. ROYAL HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY 243 (1900) (arguing that 
specific characteristics of the plants must be regarded as “sharply separated 
quantities,” id. at 243, independent from all the other quantities); Hugo de 
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Amsterdam, Carl Correns92 of Tubingen, and Eric von 
Tschermak93 of Esslingen, Austria.  Shortly following the 
“rediscovery,” the geneticist William Bateson stated “[a]n exact 
determination of the laws of heredity will probably work more 
change in man’s outlook on the world, and in his power over 
nature, than any other advance in natural knowledge that can 
be foreseen.”94  Indeed, in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, Mendel’s investigations stimulated an enormous 
amount of work in the science of genetics.95  As a result, 
biologists in the early 1900’s discovered how genes were 
assorted in the process of cell division and how the properties of 
the progeny are determined.  Using the science of genetics, 
plant breeders were able to cross-breed plants with precision, 
manipulating the genome to successfully produce new varieties 
with desired traits.96
The early hybridization experiments, conducted mainly at 
government and university experimental stations,97 resulted in 
improved varieties through the introduction of a single trait or 
selected traits from one variety, crossed into another variety 
Vries, On Crosses With Dissimilar Heredity, 25 J. ROYAL HORTICULTURAL
SOCIETY 249 (1900) de Vries discloses the observation that false hybrids, 
cenothera muricata, follow Mendel’s laws, see id. at 255. 
92. See Carl Correns, G. Mendel’s Regel Über das Verhalten der 
Nachkommenschaft der Rassenbastarde, 18 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHE 
BOTANISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT 158-68 (1900).  For an English translation, see: 
Leonie Kellen Piternick, G. Mendel’s Law Concerning the Behavior of Progeny 
of Varietal Hybrids, 35 SUPPLEMENT TO GENETICS NO. 5, PT. 2 33-41 (1950); 
and Stern & Sherwood, supra note 88, at 119-32. 
93. See Eric von Tschermak, Über künstliche Kreuzung bei Pisum 
Sativum, 18 BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHE BOTANISCHEN GESELLSCHAFT 232-39 
(1900). For an English translation, see Aloha Hannah, Concerning Artificial 
Crossing in Pisum Sativum, 35 SUPPLEMENT TO GENETICS NO. 5, PT. 2 42-47 
(1950).
 94. William Bateson, Problems of Heredity as a Subject for Horticultural 
Investigation, 25 J. ROYAL HORTICULTURAL SOCIETY 54, 54 (1900) (a lecture 
presented at the Royal Horticultural Society on Mendel’s work in order to 
persuade its members to adopt and use the laws of heredity to improve the 
understanding of the transmission of genetic traits). 
 95. Hybrid technology was already well advanced by 1900. See generally 
R. Irwin Lynch, The Evolution of Plants, 25 J. ROYAL HORTICULTURAL
SOCIETY 54-61 (1900). However, the developments were progressing slowly 
because of a lack of understanding of the transmission of genes from 
progenitor to progeny plants. 
96. See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 6. 
97. See Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79. 
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through backcrossing.98  This practice constitutes hybridization 
in the more expansive sense of the word, whereas hybridization 
to produce a hybrid maize plant, for example, represents a 
narrower construction of the word.99  Through the early 1900s, 
the field crop seeds produced by cross-breeding different 
varieties were open pollinated100 varieties,101 which meant that 
a progeny plant would closely resemble the progenitor plant.  
While these early breeding experiments, which took place 
before the rediscovery and widespread acceptance 102 of 
Mendel’s works,103 created new plant varieties with traits which 
were of interest to the farmers, commercial seed manufacturers 
still faced the inherent problem that the seed a farmer planted 
for one growing cycle would create a sufficiently similar 
progeny seed for that farmer to plant during the subsequent 
growing cycle.104  In addition, because there were no legal 
protections in place for the seeds that the commercial seed 
manufacturer produced, the farmer was free to sell progeny 
seed to his neighbor farmers.  In fact, there were no legal 
constraints prohibiting the farmer from growing sufficient 
progeny seed to establish his own seed business.  Before the 
use of Mendel’s work to establish the hybrid seed industry in 
the United States, it was precisely this problem which 
inhibited the growth of the commercial farm-crop seed 
industry.  This is because without legal protection for varieties 
that were created by the seed manufacturers, it would be 
difficult to obtain an adequate return on the investment in 
order to research and develop the new varieties.105  Today, 
commercial seed manufacturers still employ this same 
argument to justify bringing the full weight of their legal 
departments against any farmer whom they perceive might be 
stealing their profits through “nefarious dealings.” Given the 
advance in techniques for producing new varieties, such a 
position by commercial seed manufacturers may be supported 
only by clear and convincing evidence of the cost of bringing a 
98. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 78-81. 
99. See id. at 68. 
100. See POEHLMAN, supra note 21, at 20. 
101. See CURTIS NORSKOG, HYBRID SEED CORN ENTERPRISES: A BRIEF 
HISTORY 69 (Maracom Corp. 1995). 
 102. Bateson presents an excellent discussion on the importance of 
Mendel’s works. See BATESON, supra note 94. 
103. See Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79. 
104. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 71. 
105. See id. at 81. 
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variety to market and the profits gained from that variety.  
Such an accounting has yet to be produced by commercial seed 
manufacturers.
Between 1915 and 1925, government researchers’ efforts at 
many United States agricultural experiment stations were 
directed toward the development and evaluation of inbred seed 
lines and hybrid seed varieties.106  Inbred seed lines are so 
genetically stable, or homozygous, that when allowed to self-
fertilize, the resulting progeny seed will grow a plant that is 
nearly identical to the progenitor plant.107  It is precisely these 
germplasm lines that farmers and governmental plant breeders 
had worked since the early nineteenth century to develop.  By 
cross-breeding the inbred seed lines to each other (a single 
cross) or by cross-breeding the single-cross progeny plants to 
each other (double-cross), the resulting progeny plants had a 
mix of genetic material that produced far more vigorous 
progeny plants with much higher yields than the progenitor 
plants exhibited.108  The discovery of the new hybrid vigor,109 or 
106. See ARNEL R. HALLAUER ET AL., CORN BREEDING AMERICAN SOC’Y OF 
AGRONOMY, INC. ET AL., AGRONOMY PUB. NO. 18, CORN AND CORN
IMPROVEMENT 463, 463-464 (George F. Sprague &  John Wesley Dudley eds., 
3d ed. 1988); see generally Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79. 
107. See generally FORBES & WATSON, supra note 36, at 224-227. 
108. See generally POEHLMAN, supra note 21, at 239-46. 
 109. The court in Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. v Holden Foundation Seeds, 
Inc., 1987 WL 341211 (S.D.Iowa 1987) gave an unusually clear discussion of 
hybrid vigor.  Specifically, the court stated that: 
 [t]he number of inbred lines that are used to produce the hybrid sold 
to the farmers has varied.  In the early days, there were double 
crosses, which meant that the hybrid sold to the farmer was a cross 
of two F sub1 hybrids.  (Tr. 3018).  The companies preferred single-
cross hybrids because of ease of production and economic 
advantages.  By the 1960s, single-cross hybrids became dominant.  
(Tr. 3018).  Each parent of a single-cross hybrid is an inbred. (Tr. 
3018).  However, in many cases, modified single crosses are used in 
which one or the other parent of the hybrid is a backcross rather 
than a 100% pure inbred.  In order to create a hybrid seed, a 
company typically plants four to six rows of a particular parent 
referred to as a female, and alongside of it two rows of a parent 
referred to as the male.  All plants in the female rows are detassled 
so that no pollen from those plants can fertilize the silks on those 
same plants. 
 Seed fields are usually planted in isolation from other corn.  Thus, 
the only pollen that can fertilize the female rows is from the male 
rows planted alongside.  The seed on the ears in the female rows is 
the F sub1 hybrid seed.  The male rows self pollinate, have no value 
in the further breeding process, and are either chopped out or 
harvested separately and fed to livestock or commingled with other 
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heterosis, was of considerable benefit to the farmer who desired 
an increased yield, however, the discovery also brought an even 
greater benefit to the commercial seed manufacturers.110  Once 
the first generation hybrid plant was grown and allowed to 
open pollinate, the genetic construct of the progeny hybrid 
plant was such that the hybrid vigor and productivity began to 
diminish.111  Due to the diminished productivity, the farmer 
was disinclined to save the progeny seeds from hybrid 
progenitor plants for replanting.  The inbred seed lines, which 
were used to create the first generation hybrid plant, could 
remain a trade secret held by the seed manufacturer because 
only the progeny hybrid seeds were sold.112  Thus, if the farmer 
wished to maintain a profitable level of productivity and 
remain competitive, he was forced to abandon his traditional 
practice of saving seed to plant in the next crop cycle and 
instead become reliant on the seed manufacturing industry.  
The seed manufacturer’s market for the first generation hybrid 
seed line had two sources: first, the biological fact that open 
pollination of hybrid progenitor plants yield progeny with 
reduced vigor and productivity; and second, the seed 
manufacturers controlled the inbred germplasm lines 
necessary to create the first generation hybrid seed lines.113
corn at elevators. 
 The parent or inbred material may often have rather small-even 
deformed-ears.  However, when one such parent is crossed with 
another parent as above described, the result of mixing the genes, 
called “heterosis,” . . . is such that if the proper parents are selected, 
the resulting hybrid seed produces a splendid crop, i.e., a large ear, a 
higher yield, and other sought-after characteristics. 
To put it another way, if an inbred line-called A-with small stalks, 
small ears and low yield, is crossed with itself or another inbred line 
essentially the same as A, all you are going to get are plants that are 
small, have small ears and low yield.  Similarly, an inbred line called 
B, crossed with itself or a similar inbred line will produce only plants 
much like those of inbred line B.  However, if you crossed inbred line 
A with inbred line B each with small stalks, small ears and low 
yield, sometimes if you have the right cross, the hybrid of inbred A 
times inbred B will produce plants of great vigor, good ears and 
outstanding yield.  This phenomenon is called hybrid vigor. 
Id. at 2-3. 
110. See id.
111. See generally FORBES & WATSON, supra note 36, at 231. 
112. See generally POEHLMAN, supra note 21, at 239-46. 
 113. There is a yet another manner in which hybrid seeds afford seed 
manufacturers property right protection.  Recently, a seed manufacturer 
developed a molecular technique for producing fertile hybrid seed. The method 
and product appear to be patentable. See Steven F. Fabijanski, Diego Albani, 
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Aside from these two sources, there was no way to protect their 
seeds.
With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that the 
“rediscovery” of Mendel’s work at the beginning of the 
twentieth century caused the demise of the farmer as a plant 
breeder and the rise of the dominance of commercial seed 
manufacturers in creating and distributing both field and 
garden crop seed varieties.  The transition from the farmer-
based artificial selection program to the seed manufacturer-
based plant-breeding program occurred over a half-century 
span between the 1880’s114 and the 1930’s.115  The end result 
was that the farmer no longer had the partnership with the 
government that was responsible for giving the United States 
its germplasm base which the commercial seed manufacturers 
eventually used to breed seeds to sell to farmers.116
Laurian S. Robert & Paul G. Arnison, Molecular Methods of Hybrid Seed 
Production, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,013,859 (issued Jan. 11, 2000). 
114. See Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79. 
 115. By the late 1930’s, the adoption of hybrid seed varieties was nearly 
complete such that by 1946 nearly 100 percent of corn, wheat, and soybeans 
planted in the Midwest were of hybrid varieties.  See U.S.D.A., Table 46.-
Hybrid Corn: Percentage of Total Corn Acreage Planted With Hybrid Seed, by 
States, 1933-1945, 1945 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 42 (1945); Table 
U.S.D.A., 47.-Hybrid Corn: Percentage of Total Corn Acreage Planted With 
Hybrid Seed, by States, 1937-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS
41 (1946). 
 116. The acceptance of the hybrid maize seed lines was nearly complete in 
the corn belt states by 1946.  However, the increase in yields from the fields 
planted to the hybrid maize lines did not start to rise significantly until the 
early 1950’s. See Appendix A, infra.  This is due primarily to the introduction 
and use of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers starting in the early 1950’s, as well as 
other advances in agricultural technology.  These advances include the use of 
chemical herbicides starting in the early 1950’s and the use of more efficient 
planting and harvesting machinery. See Donald N. Duvick, Biotechnology in 
the 1930s: The Development of Hybrid Maize, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS
69-74, 71 (January 2001).  One might argue that had the traditional varieties 
been used with the new agricultural technology, then the advances in yield 
observed starting in the early 1950’s would still have been observed.  To 
simplify, the argument holds that the increase in yield is not due to the hybrid 
but rather to the farming practices.  This argument is incorrect on two points: 
first, the hybrid varieties produce a more uniform ear at a more uniform 
height from the ground and the hybrid varieties do not lodge.  Hence, the 
hybrid varieties are readily and more efficiently harvested by modern 
machinery. See id. at 73.  Second, the hybrid varieties are more resistant to 
drought, disease, insects, and environmental stress, see id. at 71, as well as 
the stress of high production levels under conditions of high fertilizer usage, 
see id. at 73.  Therefore, the hybrid varieties were necessary to permit the 
development and deployment of technological advances in agriculture since 
the early 1950s. 
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The agricultural stagnation of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century combined with the newly available 
“scientific” approach to plant breeding, caused the business 
community to pressure Congress to create resources for basic 
agricultural research.  This political pressure exerted by the 
seed manufacturing industry pushed the USDA into basic 
agricultural research.117  Once this had been accomplished, the 
ASTA, the American Breeders Association and the seed 
manufacturers were in a position to force the USDA out of the 
business of seed distribution.  In 1924, the gratuitous 
distribution of seeds and plants by the USDA was 
terminated.118  It is interesting to note that the cooperation 
between the USDA and agricultural colleges continued to 
improve the understanding of plant genetics,119 an effort that 
vastly assisted the seed manufacturers in their exploitation of 
their new found market in seeds and plants. 
The farmer, by the mid 1920’s, had lost control of and 
access to the inbred lines, and lacked the expertise and 
resources necessary to create first generation hybrid seeds.  
The farmer could only maximize his yield by purchasing first 
generation hybrid seeds from the commercial seed 
manufacturer.120  Because the hybrid seeds afforded the seed 
manufacturing industry some protection for their market 
advantage, the emergence of the hybrid seed technology helped 
facilitate the dominance of the seed production and distribution 
by the seed manufacturers. 
The government’s exit from the program of collecting, 
producing and distributing seed varieties left the market open 
to commercial seed manufacturers.  While it was not of interest 
to either the government or university researchers to obtain 
protection for the intellectual property in the germplasm lines 
that they had produced, the commercial seed manufacturers 
believed that such protection was critical.  Legal prohibitions 
on propagation of the variety are a prerequisite to successful 
marketing of plant varieties that are not amenable to 
hybridization or inbred lines. 
The seed manufacturers were faced with a set of difficult 
problems.  First, the seed manufacturers would market a 
117. See Paul & Kimmelman, supra note 79. 
118. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 71. 
119. See TRUE, supra note 29, at 255-60. 
120. See generally FORBES & WATSON, supra note 36, at 231. 
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variety (non-hybrid) of seeds to the farmer and since the 
progeny crop was nearly identical to the parent crop, the 
farmer could sell the progeny to his neighboring farmers121
through the mechanism of inter-farm commerce.122 Second, the 
seed manufacturer would employ certain farmers to grow the 
seed crop and if the seed company failed to take the entire crop 
from the farmer, the farmer could sell the excess to his 
neighboring farmers.123  Without intellectual property 
protection, and without the natural protection afforded through 
the hybrid seed lines, the seed manufacturers were creating 
their own competition in the farmers.124
While all new seed varieties represented the intellectual 
property of the seed manufacturers, the hybrid seed 
represented, in addition, a means for protecting that 
intellectual capital.  The introduction of hybrid seed, while not 
eliminating the need for legal intellectual property protection, 
certainly reduced the possibility that the farmer would be a 
direct competitor to the seed manufacturer.  The introduction 
of hybridization technology also accompanied the movement 
from the dependence upon a centralized public institution for 
germplasm maintenance to privatization of the seed and plant 
industry.  During the transition phase (in the early decades of 
the twentieth century) the farmer was left in the position of 
either depending upon the government for both inbred and 
hybridized seed lines125 for both the first and subsequent 
generations of seeds, or, depending upon the commercial seed 
manufacturers, which would provide only the hybrid seeds.126
The later option left the farmer in the unfamiliar territory of 
being unable to save seed from one planting cycle for use in the 
next planting cycle.127  The result was that the farmer, by 
necessity, had to purchase new seed each planting cycle128 and 
the well-established practice of saving seed for planting the 
next crop cycle had to be abandoned for most field crops; that 
the process of artificial selection and adoption of new and exotic 
121. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 72. 
122. See id. at 47 and 61. 
123. See id. at 72. 
124. See id.
125. See generally Buttel & Belsky, supra note 39. 
126. See id. at 114. 
127. See R. C. Lewontin, The Maturing of Capitalist Agriculture: Farmer as 
Proletarian, 50 MONTHLY REV. 72-84 (July/August, 1998). 
128. See id.
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plant species and varieties was effectively terminated; and the 
informal inter-farm commerce in most seeds ceased to exist. 
Had the gratuitous seed program not existed, the seed 
manufacturers would have had incentives to expand earlier 
than they eventually did.129  The seed manufacturers would 
have been motivated to develop techniques for protecting their 
market share from inter-farm commerce.130  The result would 
have been that the development of the germplasm base would 
have been in the hands of the seed manufacturers and the vast 
array of individual farmers, with there first hand knowledge of 
plant husbandry, would have been excluded.  The landscape of 
American agriculture might very well have looked considerably 
different today had the seed manufacturers been given an 
earlier entrance into the management of the American 
germplasm base-certainly to the detriment of agriculture in 
this country. 
Between 1924 and 1970, three pieces of legislation were 
enacted which permanently changed the manner in which the 
seed and plant manufacturing industry operated.  First, in 
1924, Congress enacted legislation that terminated the 
gratuitous distribution of seeds to farmers by the federal 
government, causing the farmers to rely exclusively on private 
seed manufacturers.131  Second, the Plant Patent Act of 1930132
granted patent protection for asexually133 reproduced plants.  
The Plant Patent Act of 1930 did not include sexually 
reproduced plants because it was thought that plants could not 
be reliably reproduced from seeds.  Third, in 1970 Congress 
enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act that provided 
intellectual property protection for sexually reproduced seed.134
Subsequently, in 1980 the Supreme Court recognized patent 
protection in living organisms under 35 U.S.C. section 101.135
The seed manufacturers now have the full weight of the law to 
apply against any farmer who would attempt the traditional 
practice of artificial selection of crop varieties. 
129. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 54. 
130. See id. at 61. 
131. See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 39, at 113. 
 132. Plant Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (current 
version at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). 
 133. Asexually reproduced plants are those which are the product of either 
grafting of part of one plant onto another, or the result of growing up cuttings 
from a parent plant. 
134. See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 39, at 113. 
135. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-10 (1980). 
34         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
Although the seed manufacturers were willing to take the 
profits which accrued when the federal government cancelled 
the program of collecting and distributing seeds, the 
manufacturers certainly were, and are, unwilling to bear the 
cost of research necessary to develop technologies underlying 
the new varieties.  Such a position was clearly articulated by 
Renvan Sacher, then director of biological research at 
Monsanto Co., in his statement that by coupling the research 
talent available in American universities “with the 
development skills of American industry in general” the United 
States can remain at “the leading edge in biotechnology.”136
Sacher related Monsanto’s position that “it is ‘inconceivable’ 
that industry support [for university research] will exceed 6 or 
7 percent,” with the balance coming from the government.137
This position was codified into legislation enacted in the 1980’s, 
which encouraged cooperation between federal agencies and 
private seed manufacturers.138  The result of this cooperation 
between federal agencies or universities and the seed 
manufacturers is that the seed manufacturers have been able 
to enjoy a substantial profit margin from seeds developed with 
government assistance.139  In the meantime, the farmer is left 
completely marginalized and subject to commercial and legal 
exploitation of the seed manufacturers. 
136. See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 63. 
137. See id. at 64. 
138. See Weiss, supra note 40, at A1. 
139. See Melvin John Oliver, Jerry Edwin Norma Lee Glover Trolinder & 
Don Lee Keim, Control of Plant Gene Expression, U.S. PATENT NO. 5,723,765 
(issued Mar. 3, 1998). The terminator seed technology, which is the subject of 
‘765, was developed during collaboration between the government and Delta 
and Pine Land, Inc.  The assignees were: “Delta and Pine Land Co. (Scott, MS) 
and The United States of America . . . (Washington, DC).” Id.
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B.  GENETICALLY MANIPULATED PLANTS 
 
Genetic manipulation140 has been most successfully 
employed141 to create herbicide142 and insect143 resistant field 
crops, although genetically modified plants resistant to certain 
other plant pathogens have been created.144  Genetic 
manipulation involves harvesting a gene, or ideally multiple 
genes, from the donor organism and inserting the gene, or set 
of genes, into the target cell.145  In the case of plants, the cell is 
 
 140. This author prefers the more precise term “genetic manipulation” to 
the more obtuse terminology “genetic engineering”.  Genetic engineering is, to 
the best of this author’s ability to determine, the practice of applying 
engineering principles to genetics; very much as the terminology “chemical 
engineering” has been used to describe the practice of applying engineering 
principles to chemistry.  Traditionally, the result of the practice of chemical 
engineering was the mass production of chemical compounds for the consumer 
market.  The situation is significantly different in the case of “genetic 
engineering” where the focus of the practice is to insert a gene into the genome 
of an organism.  Such activity more closely resembles the science of chemistry 
than the practice of engineering.  “Genetic manipulation”, by distinction, is far 
more descriptive of what actually occurs when the genome of an organism is 
manipulated in such as way as to introduce a particular gene. 
 141. Other applications of genetic manipulation technology have recently 
been employed. See Gerard F. Barry, Jan Willem de Weerd, Ganesh Murthy 
Kishore, Gerard Francis Barry & Marcia Lee Weldon, Expression of Sucrose 
Phosphorylase in Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,222,098 (issued Apr.  24, 2001). 
 142. See Dilip M. Shah, Creve Coeur, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert Horsch & 
Robert T. Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 4,940,835 (issued 
Jul. 10, 1990); Dilip M. Shah, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert B. Horsch & Robert 
T. Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,188,642 (issued Feb. 
23, 1993); Robert T. Fraley, Robert B. Horsch & Stephen G. Rogers, Chimeric 
Genes for Transforming Plant Cells Using Viral Promoters, U.S. PAT. NO. 
5,352,605 (issued Oct. 4, 1994); Robert T. Fraley, Robert B. Horsch & Stephen 
G. Rogers, Chimeric Genes for Transforming Plant Cells Using Viral 
Promoters, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,530,196 (issued June 25, 1996). 
 143. Stephen G. Rogers, Leslie Brand, Robert B. Horsch, Robert T. Fraley, 
James Scott Elmer & David Bisaro, Plant Vectors, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,147,278 
(issued Nov. 14 2000); Uwe Sonnewald,  Marcus Ebneth & Ralf-Michael 
Schmidt, Leaf-Specific Gene Expression in Transgenic Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 
6,229,067 (issued May 8, 2001); Camille Deluca-Flaherty, Victor J. Chan, 
Liliana E. C. Scarafia & Karen J. Brunke, Thiol Protease Inhibitor, U.S. PAT. 
NO. 5,629,469 (issued May 13, 1997); Thomas Malvar and Amy Jelen Gilmer, 
Hybrid Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxins With Novel Broad-Spectrum 
Insecticidal Activity, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,156,573 (issued Dec. 5, 2000). 
 144. See Brian J. Staskawics, Karen S. Century, Allan Shapiro, Peter P. 
Repetti & Douglas Dahlbeck, Composition and Method for Plant Pathogen 
Resistance, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,166,295 (issued Dec. 26, 2000). 
 145. See generally David Manspeizer, The Cheshire Cat, the March Hare, 
and the Harvard Mouse: Animal Patents Open Up a New, Genetically-
Engineered Wonderland, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 417 (1991). 
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induced146 to produce a mature adult plant147 in which the 
cellular machinery is caused to produce the desired protein or 
other molecule.148  In the case of animals, it is not yet possible 
to produce an adult animal from a single donor cell in an in
vitro culture system.149  At the core of genetic manipulation 
technology lies the DNA molecule. 
The double helical structure of the deoxyribose nucleic acid 
(DNA) molecule,150 which carries the genetic information of the 
cell, was revealed in 1953 by Watson and Crick.151  DNA 
consists of a sequence of nucleotides,152 the exact linear 
146. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 390. 
147. See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 33-39. 
148. See generally Dan L. Burk, Biotechnology and Patent Law: Fitting 
Innovation to the Procrustean Bed, 17 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J., 1 
(1991).
149. See generally Timothy A. Stewart, Erwin F. Wagner & Beatrice Mintz, 
Human -Globin Gene Sequences Injected into Mouse Eggs, Retained in Adults, 
and Transmitted to Progeny, 217 SCIENCE 1046-48 (1982).  Leder and Stewart 
demonstrated that foreign gene sequences can be inserted into a mammalian 
genome, that after birth of the animal, the foreign gene sequences are present, 
expressed, and transmissible in mammals.  A patent was issued for 
“transgenic non-human mammals.” See Philip Leder & Timothy A. Stewart, 
Transgenic non-human mammals, U.S. PAT. NO. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 
1988). See also I. Wilmut, A. E. Schnieke, J. McWhir, A. J. Kind & K. H. S. 
Campbell, Viable Offspring Derived From Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells,
385 NATURE, 810-12 (1997); GINA KOLATA, CLONE: THE ROAD TO DOLLY, at 
27-28 (1998) (examining the creation of Dolly and the future of mammalian 
cloning).
 150. It has since been discovered that DNA does not have a single unique 
helical structure, but has a set of stable structures depending upon 
environment, amongst other factors. See WILLIAM H. ELLIOT & DAPHNE C. 
ELLIOT, BIOCHEMISTRY AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 244 (1997). 
151. See Francis Crick & James Watson, Molecular Structure of Nucleic 
Acids: A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953). 
 152. For a comprehensible description of the construction and functioning 
of DNA in the cell, See Note, Altering Natures Blueprint for Profit: Patenting 
Multicellular Animals, 74 VA. L. REV. 1327, 1330-1333 (1988). Because the 
basic structure of the DNA molecule is of some import to this discussion, a 
brief review of the essentials follows. A single nucleotide consists of a 
backbone of sugar and phosphate molecules. See ELLIOT & ELLIOT, supra note 
150, at 239.  The phosphate-sugar backbone is connected to one of four base 
molecules: adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G). See id. at
240. The bases hydrogen bond to form pairs, A-T and C-G, with the phosphate-
sugar backbone on the outside and the base pairs on the inside. See id. at 242. 
The phosphate-sugar backbone then form a polymer sequence, which 
naturally forms a double helical structure.  Genes are groups of nucleotides, 
which are not necessarily contiguous. The encoding of a single amino acid, 
which is the building block of peptides and proteins, is found in each triplet of 
bases in the gene. See CHRISTOPHER K. MATHEWS AND K. E. VAN HOLDE,
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sequence and expression of which determines the organism’s 
characteristics.153  A sequence of nucleotide triplets constitute a 
gene; multiple genes are in turn connected to form a 
chromosome.  The creation of a successful transgenic plant 
requires, at least initially, that three identifications be 
completed: first, the identification of the plant pathology 
(whether fungal, parasitic, insect or herbal); second, the 
identification of the molecular compound that is key to 
resolving the pathology; and third, the identification of the 
genetic code (the gene) which ultimately leads the plant to 
express the desired compound or resistance.154 
Transgenic organisms are produced by using the gene from 
a donor organism and placing it into the genome of the host 
organism. Neither the genus nor the species of the host 
organism necessarily need be the same as either the genus or 
species of the donor organism.  The technology involved in 
transferring a gene from a donor organism to a host organism 
is known as recombinant DNA technology.155  Recombinant 
DNA technology is comprised of several techniques: first, the 
use of restriction enzymes to specifically cleave the DNA 
molecule at particular locations to extract the gene; second, 
identification of the desired sequence of DNA by its ability to 
bind a complementary nucleic acid sequence; third, amplifying, 
by cloning, the amount of the desired specific DNA sequence by 
integrating that sequence into a genetic element which is 
 
BIOCHEMISTRY 119 (1990). 
 153. It is known that not all of the nucleotides in the cellular DNA of an 
organism are “expressed”, that is they do not all encode for proteins that are 
actually constructed by the cell.  For instance, Agrobacterium tumefaciens was 
genetically manipulated by incorporating into its genome the nod and nif 
genes from the bacteria Rhizobium.  While the transformed Agrobacterium 
tumefaciens infected the roots of an alfalfa plant and induced the formation of 
both root nodules and infection threads, the gene for nitrogen fixation failed to 
be expressed.  See BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16, at 51. 
 154. Introduction of a gene from one genus and species into another genus 
and species does not necessarily imply that the gene will be expressed.  In 
fact, the plant cellular machinery requires a different nucleotide composition 
for expression than does the insect or animal genome.  Therefore, the 
introduction of the Bacillus thuringiensis, a gram-positive bacterium, -
endotoxin gene into maize may yield a genetically modified plant that does not 
express the desired -endotoxin.  See generally Koziel, infra note 173. 
 155. Insertion of the donor DNA fragment into the host cell may be 
accomplished by a number of techniques. See generally BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL. 
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 199 (1983) (published by Garland 
Publishing, Inc. New York). 
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capable of rapid expansion, such as a plasmid or virus, and 
cloning that element in yeast cells or bacteria; and fourth, 
extraction of the desired cloned DNA sequence from the 
amplification culture; and sequencing of the nucleotides in a 
cloned DNA fragment.156 These steps form only a small, but 
key, fraction of the steps involved in recombinant DNA 
technology.  They are, however, by no means trivial and do not 
always succeed.  Because gene expression depends upon a 
number of cellular level factors beyond the mere presence of 
the gene,157 the gene may not function normally, if at all, in the 
host organism, and hence, will not  produce the desired 
product.158
Advances in biotechnology have yielded techniques159 for 
the introduction of genes from a non-plant species160 into the 
genome of a plant species where the transformed cells of the 
plant species are able to produce fully fertile plants.161  A 
favored technique in producing transgenic maize is the particle 
bombardment of embryonic maize cells.162  These cells are then 
grown to yield fully fertile adult plants.  These adult transgenic 
plants are crossed with non-genetically modified elite lines to 
produce the final, marketable seed product.  By introducing the 
non-plant genes into elite maize lines, the time required to 
develop commercial transgenic hybrids can be significantly 
reduced.163
Altering the genetic construct of plants has been difficult 
despite the rapid advances in genetic manipulation 
technology.164  Three primary reasons lie behind the slow 
156. See id.
157. See generally BOARD ON AGRICULTURE: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY CONCERNS, supra note 16. 
158. See Manspeizer, supra note 145, at 424. 
159. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, TRANSGENIC ANIMAL 
PATENT REFORM ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 888, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-35 (1988); 
Booth, Simple Gene-Altering Method Claimed, WASH. POST, June 2, 1989, at 
A3, col. 1; Schmeck, Simplified Gene Transplant Method Reported, N. Y. 
TIMES, June 2, 1989, at A1, col. 2. 
160. See J. S. Feitelson, J. Payne & L. Kim, Bacillus thuringiensis: Insects
and Beyond, 10 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 271 (1992). 
161. See W. J. Gordon-Kamm et al., Transformation of Maize Cells and 
Regeneration of Fertile Transgenic Plants 2 PLANT CELL 603 (1990). 
162. See Paul Christou, Dennis McCabe, William F. Swain & Kenneth A. 
Barton, Particle-Mediated Transformation of Soybean Plants and Lines, U.S. 
PAT. NO. 5,015,580 (issued  May 14, 1991). 
163. See KOZIEL, infra note 173, at 168. 
164. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 390. 
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progress of genetic manipulation of plants: first, identifying 
particular genes of interest is a complex and time-consuming 
process;165 second, gene expression may change when the gene 
is placed into the host cell;166 and third, some desirable traits 
require the transfer of multiple genes which yields extremely 
difficult genetic manipulation problems.167  Despite the 
difficulties involved in genetic manipulation technology, the 
products of genetic manipulation technology are extremely 
profitable for seed companies.168  This profitability and the use 
of genetically manipulated seeds by farmers appears to have 
permanently altered the agricultural landscape.169
C. DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSGENIC PLANTS
The most significant systematic source of yield loss in 
world agricultural crops is insect pests.170  For example, the loss 
in the North American maize crop due to the European corn 
borer, Ostrinia nubilalis (Hübner) is in excess of  $1 billion 
annually.171  Some crop species or varieties express natural 
165. See id.
166. See David Ehrenfeld, A Techno-Pox Upon the Land, 295 HARPER’S
MAG. 13-17 (Oct. 1, 1997). 
167. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 390. 
168. See Scott Kilman & Susan Warren, Old Rivals Fight for New Turf,
WALL STREET J., May 27, 1998, at B1. 
 169. Indeed, genetically modified seeds appear to have been widely 
accepted by farmers in the United States. Given the global resistance to 
genetically modified crops, the lower yields and higher herbicide use 
associated with the use of these plants, the contamination of the human food 
chain with crops not approved for human consumption, and questions 
regarding the safety and environmental impact of genetically modified plants 
it is not clear that acceptance of the current generation of genetically modified 
plants by farmers will continue to be the rule.  Even in light of the admonition 
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger that “the genetic research and related 
technological developments may spread pollution and disease, that it may 
result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to 
depreciate the value of human life,” Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
316 (1980), genetically modified seeds have had, and will continue to have, an 
enormous impact on American agriculture.  Perhaps Justice Burger was 
correct in stating that, “it is sometimes better to bear those ills we have than 
fly to others that we know not of.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
170. See TRANSGENIC PLANTS, supra note 15, at 4, 12. 
171. See J. F. Witkowski et al., Bt Corn & European Corn Borer, NCR 
PUBLICATION 602 (Univ. of Minnesota Extension Service, St. Paul, MN, 1997) 
(K. R. Ostlie, W. D. Hutchinson, and R. L. Hellmich, eds.). This manuscript is 
also available at www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/cropsystems/ 
DC7055.html (last visited Apr. 2 2001). 
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insect resistance,172 which provides at least some protection for 
that particular species or variety.173  When the resistance is 
found to be endogenous to a particular variety of a crop species, 
it may be moved to another variety through traditional plant 
breeding techniques.  This is true whether the resistance is to 
plant pathogens, insects, or to herbicide since what is actually 
being moved by conventional cross-breeding techniques is the 
gene, or genes, which confer the resistance.  While successful in 
some cases, the traditional plant breeding technique for moving 
the resistance between varieties of the same plant species is 
counter-indicated on three points: first, the traditional breeding 
technique is often time-consuming and can take as long as ten 
years to yield the final product;174 second, the genes that carry 
the resistance may be tightly linked with other genes which, 
when transferred with the desired gene, may have a 
deleterious effect on yield from the final plant product; and 
third, the desired gene conferring the resistance simply does 
not exist in the particular plant species. In most cases, these 
three situations are neither exclusive nor independent.  
Therefore, the desired resistance cannot, in general, be 
obtained in a particular plant variety by traditional plant 
breeding techniques.  Alternative routes of control include 
insecticides for control of insect pests in agriculture, and 
herbicides for control of weeds.  Broadcasting herbicides may 
172. See COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED
PLANTS, GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND 
REGULATION 55 (2000) (report on the science and regulation of plants which 
have been genetically manipulated for increased pest resistance) [hereinafter 
COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS].
173. See Michael G. Koziel et al., Transgenic Maize for the Control of 
European Corn Borer and Other Maize Insect Pests, 792 ANNALS N. Y. ACAD.
SCI. 164 (1996). This paper presents the scientific developments behind the 
production of a maize resistant to European corn borer and is directed towards 
an audience of scientists working in the areas of plant molecular biology, and 
as such is virtually impenetrable by laypersons. Since understanding the work 
is important in developing our argument for property rights in genetically 
manipulated plants, a review, reduced as much as possible to lay terms, is 
presented here. The study of this example is useful because the method is 
similar to that used to transfect other varieties or species to confer desired 
resistance characteristics. 
 174. While the argument that the time required to create transgenic plants 
that express particular traits should be shorter than that required for 
traditional breeding methods is popular, it is essentially without merit. In 
fact, the time required to produce a transgenic plant product is nearly the 
same as that required to produce a plant product using traditional breeding 
techniques. See Ronald L. Meeusen, Commercialization of Transgenic Seed 
Product: Two Case Studies, 792 ANNALS  N. Y. ACAD. SCI. 172 (1996). 
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be problematic because many herbicides are unable to 
distinguish between the desired plant and the noxious plant.  
Chemical insecticides have proven valuable for controlling 
insect pests in most areas.  However, insecticides are 
expensive, and can adversely affect human health as well as 
the environment.175  These factors militate an increase in the 
use of insecticides in agricultural practice.  Early efforts of 
producing transgenic plants were motivated by the need to 
reduce the use of herbicides and insecticides and increase the 
overall yield per acre of crops.  That is, the motivation for 
creating transgenic crops was to increase productivity and 
reduce inputs, which is similar to the motivation for using the 
process of artificial selection and plant breeding.  Through 
genetic manipulation, the plant can be induced to produce its 
own resistance.176  One of the most successful examples of this 
strategy is genetically modified corn, or maize. 
Maize is one of the most important crops in the United 
States.  Through traditional breeding practices, the yields of 
modern maize varieties have seen substantial improvements in 
the course of the last century.177  As previously mentioned, 
maize is subject to insect pests, in particular the European corn 
borer, Ostrinia nubilalis.  The European corn borer has two 
generations per year in most growing regions in the United 
States.  The first generation larvae feed on the tissue in the 
corn whorl and then bore into the stalk, where they continue to 
feed and grow.178  These larvae then pupate within the stalk 
and subsequently emerge as adult moths.  The second 
generation of larvae feed on the pollen that has accumulated in 
the leaf axials, sheath, and collar tissue before boring into the 
stalk.  In the stalk these larvae repeat the same cycle as the 
first generation larvae.  The European corn borer spends most 
of its life cycle in the corn stalk; consequently disrupting the 
175. See TRANSGENIC PLANTS, supra note 15, at 5. 
176. See, e.g., R. B. Horsch, J. E. Fry, N. L. Hoffmann, D. Eichholtz, S. G. 
Rogers & R. T. Fraley, A Simple and General Method for Transferring Genes 
into Plants, 227 SCIENCE 1229 (1985) (describing a method for transferring 
the nopaline synthase gene and the chimeric NOS/ NPTII/ NOS gene for 
kanamycin resistance into Nicotiana tabacum Samson, N. tabacum Havana 
425, F1 hybrid of Petunia hybrida and L-2 tomato plants using Agrobacterium
tumefaciens strain (GV3Ti11SE)). 
 177. See Appendix A for a discussion of the economics of maize production 
in during the years between 1866 and 2001, and Appendix B for a discussion 
of the methods of data analysis used to develop the discussion in Appendix A. 
178. See generally Witkowski, supra note 171. 
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normal physiologic plant processes.179  The result can be 
between three and seven percent yield loss for each insect in 
each plant.180  Traditional breeding techniques provide limited 
success in producing hybrid, or inbred, maize lines which 
control the European corn borer in general and the second-
generation European corn borer larvae in particular.181  The use 
of conventional chemical insecticides has proven to be of 
limited value in controlling the European corn borer because 
the insect spends very little time feeding on the exterior of the 
plant.182  Also, those exterior plant tissue regions which are 
favored by the first and second generation European corn borer 
are difficult to reach with chemical insecticide sprays.183
Recently, biologic insecticides have been developed which have 
been proven to be of some limited efficacy in controlling insect 
pests.  The most common of the biologic insecticides are those 
based on microbial sprays that employ the fermentation of 
gram-positive bacterium, which is typically Bacillus
thuringiensis (Bt).  However, the biologic insecticidal sprays 
face the same practical constraints as do the chemical 
insecticidal sprays.184  In addition to the problems discussed 
above, several other points lead to early attempts to induce 
maize to produce its own insecticide. 
It was observed that the -endotoxins produced by Bt have 
a high specific activity towards a relatively narrow spectrum of 
insect pests,185 including the European corn borer.  Early in the 
process of developing techniques for plant transformation,186 it 
was determined that a possible method of controlling boring 
insects would induce the plants to express the -endotoxins.187
Biotechnology provided the tools that allow the insertion of 
specific genes into the genome of the target, or host, cells.  Once 
179. See id.
180. See generally R. E. Lynch, European Corn Borer: Yield Losses in 
Relation to Hybrid and Stage of Corn Development, 73 J. ECON. ENTOMOL. 159 
(1980).
181. See generally Koziel, supra note 173. 
182. See generally Witkowski, supra note 171. 
183. See generally Koziel, supra note 173. 
184. See id.
185. See generally Witkowski, supra note 171. 
 186. The first reports of plant transformation were presented at the Miami 
Winter Symposium in January 1983. See generally Meeusen, supra note 174. 
187. See generally Meeusen, supra note 174; See generally Lynch, supra
note 180. 
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the gene188 is inserted into the genome, the trait related to that 
particular gene may be expressed as any other trait of the 
plant.  Thus, insect resistance may be conferred upon the maize 
plant by inserting the relevant gene, or genes, into the plant 
genome.  In the case of maize, the -endotoxin of early interest 
was CryIA(b) from the Bacillus thuringiensis kurstaki strain 
HD-1.189
The CryIA(b) -endotoxin protein is approximately 130 
kDa in size and the amino-terminus half of the protein is 
proteolytically active in the insect midgut.190  Insertion of the 
native gene for a -endotoxin into the genome of plants191 has 
been successful in some circumstances,192 but has been 
determined to depend, in part, upon the particular promoters 
employed for expression193 and, in part, upon the particular 
codon usage preference of the plant.194  When the native gene 
for Bacillus thuringiensis kurstaki kurhd1 -endotoxin
 188. A gene consists of deoxyribonucleic acid, which is a hetero-polymer of 
nucleotides. A nucleotide is composed of a backbone of sugar and phosphate 
molecules, to which one of four bases is attached. The four different types of 
bases are: adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G). Every three 
bases in order are called a codon, and each codon codes for a specific amino 
acid (of which there are 24). For example, the sequence CTA-AGG-GTC codes 
for the amino acid sequence leucine-arginine-valine. Amino acids make up all 
proteins, and proteins, in turn, are responsible for the manufacture of every 
molecule that comprises an organism. See Note, Altering Nature’s Blueprint 
for Profit: Patenting Multicellular Animals, 74 VA. L. REV. 1327, 1330-33 
(1988).
189. See M. S. Geiser, S. Schweitzer & C. Grimm, The Hypervariable 
Region in the Genes Coding for Entomopathogenic Crystal Proteins of Bacillus
thuringiensis: Nucleotide Sequence of the kurhd 1 Gene of Subsp. kurstaki HD-
1, 48 GENE 109 (1986). 
 190. A nice brief discussion of the mechanism of activity is given by Robert 
Shields. See Shields, infra note 204, at 12. 
191. See M. Vaeck et al., Transgenic Plants Protected From Insect Attack,
328 NATURE 33 (1987). 
192. See K. A. Barton et al., Bacillus thuringiensis•delta-endotoxin
expression in transgenic Nicotiana tabacum Provides Resistance to 
Lepidopteran Insects, 85 PLANT PHYSIOL. 1103, (1987); D. A. Fischhoff et al., 
Insect Tolerant Transgenic Tomato Plants, 5 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 807 (1987). 
193. See N. B. Carozzi et al., Expression of a Chimeric CaMv 35S Bacillus
thuringiensis Insecticidal Protein Gene in Transgenic Tobacco 20 PLANT
MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 539 (1992); G. W. Warren et al., Field Evaluation of 
Transgenic Tobacco Containing a Bacillus thuringiensis Insecticidal Protein 
Gene, 5 J. ECON. ENTOMOL. 1651 (1992); X. Delannay et al., Field Performance 
of Transgenic Tomato Plants Expressing the Bacillus thuringiensis var. 
kurstaki Insect Control Protein, 7 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 1265 (1989). 
194. See E. E. Murray, J. Lotzer & M. Eberle, Codon Usage in Plant Genes,
17 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 477 (1989). 
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CryIA(b) was inserted into maize, the endotoxin was not 
expressed.195  When a synthetic gene for only the active region 
of the CryIA(b) protein, which contained approximately 65 
percent G-C content as compared with approximately 37
percent in the native form, was inserted into maize, high levels 
of CryIA(b) -endotoxin protein were expressed.196
To create the final maize product, the synthetic gene was 
fused with several promoters197 inserted into the genome, and 
the progeny plants were cross-bred with several different 
pristine elite maize inbred lines using traditional breeding 
techniques.198  Because the promoter sequence may be tissue 
type specific,199 it is theoretically possible to limit the tissues 
within the maize plant in which the -endotoxin protein is 
actually expressed, even though every cell in the plant may 
contain the gene coding for the protein.  It is possible, then, to 
develop transgenic maize plants that do not express the 
transgenic protein in the edible portion of the plant.200
However, such a transgenic plant has yet to be produced.  
Because the transgenic maize is an article of manufacture, the 
European corn borer resistant maize expressing the CryIA(b) -
endotoxin protein is protected under utility201 patent.202
195. See generally Michael G. Koziel et al., Field Performance of Elite 
Transgenic Maize Plants Expressing an Insecticidal Protein Derived from 
Bacillus thuringiensis, 11 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 194 (1993). 
196. See Koziel, supra note 173, at 166. 
197. See generally R. L. Hudspeth & J. W. Grula, Structure and Expression 
of the Maize Gene Encoding the Phosphoenolpyruvate Carboxylase Isozyme 
Involved in C4 Photosynthesis, 12 PLANT MOLEC. BIOL 579 (1989); C. J. 
Thompson et al., Characterization of the Herbicide-Resistance Gene Bar from 
Streptomyces hygroscopicus 6 EMBO J. 2519 (1987). 
198. See generally KOZIEL, supra note 195. 
199. See generally KOZIEL, supra note 173. 
200. See M. E. Fromm et al., Inheritance and Expression of Chimeric Genes 
in the Progeny of Transgenic Maize Plants, 8 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 833 (1990). 
201. See U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: PATENTING LIFE-SPECIAL REPORT 13 
(1989).
202. See Gregory W. Warren Michael G. Koziel, Martha A. Mullins, Brian 
Carr, Nalini M. Desai & Kristy Kostichka, Pesticidal Proteins and Strains,
U.S. PAT. NO. 5,840,868 (issued Nov. 24, 1998) (“The present invention is 
drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins. Bacillus strains which are capable of 
producing pesticidal proteins and auxiliary proteins during vegetative growth 
are provided. Also provided are the purified proteins, nucleotide sequences 
encoding the proteins and methods for using the strains, proteins and genes 
for controlling pests.” Id. at 1.); Gregory W. Warren, Michael G. Koziel, 
Martha A. Mullins, Gordon J. Nye, Brian Carr, Nalini M. Desai, Kristy 
Kostichka, Nicholas B. Duck & Juan J. Estruch, Pesticidal Proteins and 
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A central concern to farmers, seed manufacturers, the 
Environmental Protection Agency,203 and the public204 is the 
development of Bt -endotoxin protein resistance in targeted 
insect types.205  One argument holds that the concerns are 
based upon projections obtained from computer models that are 
sensitive to various parameters in the models.206  The same 
 
Strains, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,849,870 (issued Dec. 15, 1998) (“The present 
invention is drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins. Bacillus strains which 
are capable of producing pesticidal proteins and auxiliary proteins during 
vegetative growth are provided. Also provided are the purified proteins, 
nucleotide sequences encoding the proteins and methods for using the strains, 
proteins and genes for controlling pests.” Id. at 1.); Gregory W. Warren 
Michael G. Koziel, Martha A. Mullins, Gordon J. Nye, Brian Carr & Nalini M. 
Desai, Pesticidal Proteins and Strains, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,872,212 (issued Feb. 
16, 1998) (“The present invention is drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins. 
Bacillus strains which are capable of producing pesticidal proteins and 
auxiliary proteins during vegetative growth are provided. Also provided are 
the purified proteins, nucleotide sequences encoding the proteins and methods 
for using the strains, proteins and genes for controlling pests.” Id. at 1.); 
Gregory W. Warren, Martha A. Mullins & Annick J. de Framond, Pesticidal 
Proteins and Strains, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,888,801 (issued Mar. 30, 1999) (“The 
present invention is drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins. Bacillus strains 
which are capable of producing pesticidal proteins and auxiliary proteins 
during vegetative growth are provided. Also provided are the purified 
proteins, nucleotide sequences encoding the proteins and methods for using 
the strains, proteins and genes for controlling pests.” Id. at 1.); Gregory W. 
Warren, Michael G. Koziel, Martha A. Mullilns, Gordon J. Nye, Brian Carr, 
Nalini M. Desai, Kristy Kostichka & Juan J. Estruch, Nucleotide sequences 
encoding pesticidal proteins, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,889,174 (issued Mar. 30, 1999) 
(“The present invention is drawn to pesticidal strains and proteins. Bacillus 
strains which are capable of producing pesticidal proteins and auxiliary 
proteins during vegetative growth are provided. Also provided are the purified 
proteins, nucleotide sequences encoding the proteins and methods for using 
the strains, proteins and genes for controlling pests.”  Id. at 1.). 
 203. See COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED 
PLANTS, supra note 172, at 100. 
 204. See Robert Shields, Towards Insect-Resistant Plants, 328 NATURE 12-
13 (1987) (raising the issue of whether “widespread use of plants depending on 
a single gene encoding pest resistance” could be inviting the rapid 
development of insecticide resistance in insect pests, id. at 12). 
 205. See W. H. McGaughey & M. E. Whalon, Managing Insect Resistance to 
Bacillus thuringiensis Toxins, 258 SCIENCE 1451 (1992). 
 206. See Koziel, supra note 173, at 168.  This statement by Koziel is either 
disingenuous or based upon ignorance regarding the development and use of 
valid models.  A central tenant of theoretical model development is that the 
essence of the system, which is being modeled, is captured in as simplistic a 
mathematical theory as possible with the fewest possible number of 
parameters.  Within this last constraint, the model must incorporate as many 
known parameters as are available, thus reducing the number of unknown 
parameters to the bare minimum.  Those parameters that are highly 
correlated (the correlation between the model parameters can be readily 
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argument also holds that where resistance has been observed 
in field situations or in the laboratory, the resistance was 
developed in isolated populations of insects that were exposed 
to sub-lethal concentrations of -endotoxin protein for relatively 
short periods.207  It is further argued that the transgenic plants 
express high concentrations of -endotoxin protein to which the 
insects are exposed for an extended period.208  Therefore, the 
argument concludes, the development of resistance in insects to 
Bt -endotoxin protein will not develop.209  Recent reports have 
indicated that such a dismissive attitude toward the 
development of insect resistance to Bt -endotoxin protein is 
indeed misplaced.210
Because the selection among insect communities211 for 
resistance to Bt -endotoxin protein is intense due to the large 
amount of transgenic plants being employed in the United 
determined by considering the matrix product JTJ, where J is the jacobian 
matrix) should be redefined to eliminate the correlation, and those parameters 
that influence the variability in the independent parameters should be 
eliminated entirely.  The resultant model, then, will have only a few 
parameters; the remaining parameters will be uncorrelated, and small 
variances in the resulting parameters will have a significant affect upon the 
predicted value of the independent variable.  Given these basic rules, then, it 
is easy to see that Koziel’s dismissal of the predicted development of -
endotoxin tolerance by the European corn borer, because such predictions are 
based upon the sensitivity of parameters in the model, is equivalent to a 
complete dismissal of the basic rules underlying theoretical model 
development.  Alternatively, such a dismissal is simply a statement that if 
Koziel claims that -endotoxin tolerance will not develop in the European corn 
borer, then that is the way that reality actually works.  The conclusion to be 
drawn from the first analysis is that the dismissal is based upon ignorance 
regarding the area of theoretical model development and use; the conclusion to 
be drawn from the second analysis is that such dismissals are disingenuous.  
In fact, the predictions of a well-developed theoretical model can be quite 
accurate and should be seriously considered. 
 207. These conditions constitute the so-called “acute” exposure selection. 
208. See Koziel, supra note 173, at 166. 
209. See id.
210. See generally F. Huang et al., Inheritance of Resistance to Bacillus
thuringiensis Toxin (Dipel ES) in the European Corn Borer, 284 SCIENCE 965 
(1999).
211. Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin resistance has been observed in 
approximately fifteen laboratory colonies of insect pests, including: Indian 
meal moth, tobacco budworm, beet armyworm, pink bollworm and Colorado 
potato beetle. Also, Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin resistance has been 
observed in the diamondback moth in field populations of cole crops in Hawaii 
and Florida. See generally Witkowski, supra note 171.  There are a growing 
number of observations of insect resistance to the Bacillus thuringiensis -
endotoxin in the field, requiring spraying with traditional insecticides. 
2002] JACK AND THE BEANSTALK 47 
 
States, the development of resistance212 is, arguably, a given 
certainty.  The U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
has recognized this possibility and has taken an active role in 
developing resistance management programs213 to secure the 
long-term utility of the Bt technology.214  The currently 
employed management strategy is the “high-dose215 /refuge”216 
strategy217 in which approximately 20 percent of the farmer’s 
fields are to be planted with a non-genetically modified variety 
 
 212. An understanding of the development of resistance to Bt protein has 
been developed through studies of resistance development in many insects and 
through studies of Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin resistance by tobacco 
budworm and diamondback moth in particular.  Specifically, in any given 
population of European corn borers a fraction of the insects will have no copies 
of the gene for Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin resistance (ss), a fraction 
will have one gene (rs), and a small fraction will have two genes (rr).  Those 
(rr) and (rs) individuals could survive and produce offspring after feeding on 
Bt corn.  With an increase in the acreage of Bt corn, increase in time of 
exposure of an increasing population of resistant individuals, more (rs) or (rr) 
larvae could survive to adulthood.  The fraction of the European corn borer 
population which carry Bt resistance genes would increase until a control 
failure occurs.  At that point, the population of Bt resistant insects would be 
similar to those levels found in non- Bacillus thuringiensis fields.  See id. 
 213. See generally B. E. Tabashnik, Evolution of Resistance to Bacillus 
thuringiensis, 39 ANNU. REV. ENTOMOL. 47 (1994). 
 214. See generally McGaughey & Whalon, supra note 205; EPA and USDA 
Position Paper on Insect Resistance Management in Bt Crops, (1999) available 
at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/otherdocs/bt-position-paper- 
618.htm (visited Aug. 21, 2001).  See also COMMITTEE ON GENETICALLY 
MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS, supra note 172, at 97-101. 
 215. The Bt crops, particularly corn, were designed to produce levels of Bt 
-endotoxin protein in concentrations that are much higher than levels found 
on corn treated with endogenous Bt insecticides.  It is presumed that with 
such high concentrations of Bt -endotoxin protein, those individuals with no 
resistance gene and those with a single resistance gene would not survive to 
adulthood.  If the level of Bt -endotoxin protein is not sufficiently high, and if 
(rs) individuals survive, then they would mate with other (rs) individuals or 
with (rr) individuals.  The result would be a population of individuals that are 
resistant to the Bt -endotoxin protein. See Witkowski, supra note 171. 
 216. The second prong of the resistance management strategy is the use of 
refuges.  The refuge provides a population of insects that are not exposed to 
either plants expressing Bt protein or to Bt insecticides, which could mate 
with individuals from the non-refuge areas that are resistant to the Bt 
protein.  Since the population of non-resistant insects produced by the refuge 
areas is considerably higher than the population of resistant insects produced 
by the non-refuge areas, then the probably of two resistant moths mating and 
producing a resistant progeny is very small.  For this strategy to work, the 
resistant and non-resistant insects must emerge into adulthood at the same 
time, and the two populations must be close enough to mate.  Most plans are 
designed so that approximately 20-30% of the fields are non-Bt corn, and the 
non-Bt corn is immediately adjacent to the Bt corn fields.  See id. at 15. 
 217. See McGaughey & Whalon, supra note 205. 
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of the species.218  The refuge area serves as a breeding ground 
for non-resistant insects.  Assuming that the insect genes 
promoting resistance are recessive or partially recessive,219
those rare insects, which manage to survive a high-dose of Bt -
endotoxin protein would be highly unlikely to find a Bt 
resistant mate.220 Rather, it would be highly likely that their 
mate would be non-resistant.  Assuming that the gene 
conferring Bt resistance is recessive, the gene would not be 
expressed in the progeny from the mating of the resistant and 
non-resistant insect.221  There would be either no or minimal 
growth in the population of resistant insects.  To function 
properly, the “high-dose/refuge” strategy requires first, that the 
heterozygotes for Bt resistance be killed by highly toxic plant 
tissue; second, that the resistant alleles are very rare; third, 
that non-resistant insects are within an effective mating 
distance for resistant insects222 such that when the resistant 
adults emerge from the Bt plants and the susceptible adults 
emerge from non-Bt plants synchronously there is a high 
probability that the resistant adults will find a susceptible 
adult with which to mate.  If developmental asynchrony 
occurred in the field, then assortive mating among Bacillus
thuringiensis -endotoxin resistant moths would accelerate the 
evolution of resistance.223 That the resistance to Bt -endotoxin
protein in the European corn borer, Ostrinia nubilalis, is 
incompletely dominant rather than recessive224 raises serious 
 218. Whether the refuge strategy is actually employed by the farmers is 
subject to serious doubt.  Mr. Dallas Thomason was found guilty of not 
employing the refuge strategy for the Bt cotton that he planted without a 
technology-use license.  Evidently, failure to employ the refuge strategy is a 
common practice, even amongst farmers who have signed the technology-use 
license requiring the refuge area, because it is too cumbersome to implement.  
It is a sad irony that Monsanto pursued Mr. Thomason so aggressively as to 
drive him into bankruptcy for, in part, engaging in exactly the same practice, 
of failing to use the refuge strategy, that his neighboring farmers employ.  See
Interview: Thomason, supra note 7. 
219. See generally F. Huang, R. A. Higgins, and L. L. Buschman, Baseline
Susceptibility and Changes in Susceptibility to Bacillus thuringiensis subsp.
kurstaki Under Selection Pressure in European Corn Borer (Lepidoptera: 
Pyralidae), 90 J. ECON. ENTOMOL. 1137 (1997). 
220. See McGaughey & Whalon, supra note 205. 
221. See Huang, supra note 219. 
222. See Tabashnik, supra note 213. 
223. See Yong-Biao Liu, Bruce E. Tabashnik, Timothy J. Dennehy, 
Amanda L. Patin & Alan C. Bartlett, Development Time and Resistance to Bt 
Crops, 400 NATURE 519 (5 August 1999). 
224. See Huang, supra note 210. 
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doubts about the efficacy of the currently employed “high-
dose/refuge” strategy for managing Bt resistance in insects.  
Further, in the near future transgenic plants containing 
Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin will be ineffective against 
insect pests with probability unity.  A similar phenomenon will 
occur in the case of herbicide resistant field crops.  In that case, 
however, it is the noxious weeds that become resistant and may 
require the development of new, more potent herbicides to kill 
the weeds, or return to the use of traditional herbicides such as 
2,4-D.
D.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ITS PROTECTION BY
 PATENT LAW
Currently, intellectual property includes intangible goods 
such as copyrights, trademarks, and patents, as well as that 
information retained in the private mind.  This perspective on 
intellectual property leads to confusion,225 muddled analyses, 
and imprecise conclusions226 when defining property and 
 225. For example, an essay published by the United States Department of 
State states that intellectual property includes “patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, and trade secrets” which, the essay pronounces, are “collectively 
referred to as intellectual property” (internal quotations deleted).  See
Laurence R. Hefter and Robert D. Litowitz, What is Intellectual Property,
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp (last visited 09 
August 2001).  The authors further state that the “intellectual property owner 
has the right to prevent the unauthorized use or sale of the property.” Id.  It is 
well established in trade secret law that others may indeed use or sell the 
trade secret provided that they discovered the subject matter of the trade 
secret by themselves or obtained the subject matter using “good faith” 
methods.  This is because once others have knowledge of the subject matter of 
the trade secret then it is “public knowledge” and is no longer secret.  See B. F. 
Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemugh, 192 N. E.2d 99 (C. A. Ohio 1963) (stating that 
the “subject matter of a trade secret must be secret, and matters of public 
knowledge or of general knowledge in an industry cannot be classified as trade 
secrets,” id. at 104).  Therefore, the statement that the provisions of trade 
secret law and patent law uniformly “prevent the unauthorized use or sale of 
property” is not only misleading and confusing, but also patently incorrect. 
 226. By starting with the fundamental definition that “[p]atents, 
copyrights, trademarks and related interests are known as intellectual 
property,” Thomas G. Field, Intellectual Property: Some Practical and Legal 
Fundamentals, 35 IDEA: J. L. AND TECH. 79 (1994), the analysis may lead to 
the very imprecise conclusions that patents are property, see id. at 93; 
copyrights are property, see id. at 101; trade secrets are property, see id. at
110; and that trademarks are property, see id. at 123. Any such conclusion is 
imprecise because it is not clear what, if anything may be protected by a cause 
of action.  Indeed, it is a useless endeavor to “protect” patents, copyrights and 
trademarks when it is the physical manifestation of the original thought that 
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property rights in inventions in general227 and with regard to 
genetically modified plants in particular.  In order to avoid 
such a morass, it is important to be precise in defining 
intellectual property228 as the collection of inherent exclusive 
rights, granted by law, which are vested in an individual as the 
result of the physical manifestation of his original thought.229  A 
the inventor wishes to protect (i.e. the intellectual property). 
227. See generally Clare K. Hare, Towards an Ontology of Intellectual 
Property (1999), at http://wings.buffalo.edu/philosophy/farber/hare.html (last 
visited 09 August 2001).  The discussion by Hare was presented at the 
Conference on Ontology, which was held at University of Buffalo, New York.  
Hare argues, incorrectly, that the current “legal system puts almost every 
aspect of intellectual property into” either patent law, copyright law, or 
trademark law. See id.  Further, Hare states, again incorrectly, that there 
“are currently two legal documents which define the limits of patent 
protection.” See id.  Hare continues to argue that the current ontology of 
intellectual property has lead to the current situation in which “there are 
categories of ideas and their expressions which are excluded from 
protection . . . no matter how useful or unique” including business methods.  
See id.  Using this as a motivation, Hare presents and defends a new ontology 
for intellectual property which she asserts will lead to broader protection for 
new and developing technologies.  The motivational basis of Hare’s new 
ontology can be easily defeated: first, it is erroneous to classify patent, 
copyright and trademark protection as “intellectual property.”  Rather, patent, 
copyright and trademark law are vehicles for protection of intellectual 
property.  Secondly, to state that the United States Constitution is a legal 
document which “define[s] the limits of patent protection” is to ignore the 
entire body of constitutional law.  Indeed, Article I, of which Useful Arts 
Clause is part, grants powers to Congress to act in certain enumerated areas.  
The limits of the protection are defined in statute, which the Constitution 
grants Congress the power to enact.  Third, usefulness and uniqueness (new) 
are only a subset of the elements that must be satisfied before a physical 
manifestation of original thought may be granted protection through patent 
law.  Thus, the confusion with regard to intellectual property has little to due 
with ontology (and hence a new ontology is unnecessary) but with the lack of 
understanding amongst the judiciary as to what constitutes intellectual 
property and a lack of understanding about the interaction between the 
intellectual property and patent, copyright and trademark law. 
 228. Intellectual property has been defined as the inherent exclusive rights 
in the work and invention of the inventor which were developed by statutes 
and which are not lost by publication of the work or invention.  See Frank D. 
Prager, The Early Growth and Influence of Intellectual Property, 34 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC’Y. 106, 108 (1952).  Before intellectual property may exist, there 
must be the creation of a physical manifestation of the original thought; and if 
the physical manifestation is an improvement on a prior physical 
manifestation, the improvement must be of some considerable merit. See id. 
at 139. 
 229. Manifestation of an original thought in physical form appears to be a 
required element for the courts to protect the property.  For instance, the 
court in Bowen v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 62 (D. Mass 1942), stated 
that original thought, or “[i]deas not reduced to concrete form are not 
protected.” Id. at 63. 
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physical manifestation of the original thought is required 
because it is the only manner by which the originator of the 
thought can present proof positive of the thought.  It is all too 
easy to claim, after others have created a physical 
manifestation of that original thought, that one was the 
originator of the thought when there is no proof of such an 
assertion.  The preceding definition prevents such 
unsubstantiated claims.  The rights of property vest to the 
owner of the physical manifestation of the original thought, at 
the time that the physical manifestation occurs.230  When the 
property rights vest, the intellectual property comes into being.  
The intellectual property is a creation of the law and does not 
exist until the law acts to bring it into being.231  Under this 
construction, intellectual “property” is the collection of rights 
that define the relationship between the individual (or entity) 
and the physical manifestation of the original thought and, 
therefore, has the full protection of the Takings Clause of the 
Constitution.232  Unlike tangible objects in which a single 
property right may vest only to a single entity at any given 
point in time, a single intellectual property right may vest in 
multiple entities at the same point in time.233  When two or 
more entities reduce an original thought to physical form, and 
the original thought of each party was generated independent 
of all other parties, then property rights vest in each entity 
except the right to exclude others from using that original 
 230. Such a position was clearly articulated by Mr. Justice Gray in 
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (Supreme Judicial Court, Mass 1868) 
as: if the inventor “invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of 
manufacture” then “he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will 
protect against one who . . . undertakes to apply it to his own use, or to 
disclose it to third persons.” Id.
231. See Jeremy Bentham THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION (C. K. Ogden ed. 
1931).  Bentham takes the position that natural property does not exist, 
rather “it is entirely the work of law.”  Id. at 111.  “Property and the law are 
born together, and die together.  Before laws were made there was no 
property; take away laws, and property ceases.”  Id. at 113. 
 232. The Supreme Court in United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 
373, 377-78 (1945), stated that the term property, as used in the Takings 
Clause of the Constitution, was used “to denote the group of rights inhering in 
the citizen’s relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and 
dispose of it.” Id.
 233. This distinction may very well have been apparent to Mr. Judge Gray 
when he stated that even though the property right is recognized, the inventor 
is not afforded, at common law, an “exclusive right to it as against the public, 
or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of” the invention.  See
Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 458 (Supreme Judicial Court, Mass 1868). 
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thought or its physical manifestation.  However, if the 
knowledge of one party is “obtained by any breach of 
confidence” by another party, then disclosure by the acquiring 
party may be enjoined by the court.234
Under common law, intellectual property included the 
right to possess, use, and alienate the subject matter, but did 
not include the right to exclude others from possession, use, or 
alienation.235  Early statutory patent law in the United States, 
preserved the common law rights and supplemented those 
rights with the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
alienating the subject matter of the physical manifestation.236
Under modern statutes in the United States, intellectual 
property is defined and protected by several bodies of law 
depending on the type of intellectual property.  This includes 
state trade-secret law237 as long as the state trade-secret law 
does not conflict with Congress’ constitutionally granted power 
to legislate protections for intellectual property,238 patent,239
copyright and trademark law.240  While the modern patent 
statute has eliminated the exclusive right of making, using, 
and selling of the invention, the intellectual property rights 
under modern patent statutes continue to embody the common 
law notions that the intellectual property vests when the 
original thought is manifest in its physical form.241
234. See Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 72 N.W. 140, 142 (Mich. 1897) (secrets 
confided in an employee may not be divulged to others upon termination of 
employment if a condition of the employment was that the employee should 
maintain the secret). 
235. See Norfolk, 98 Mass. at 460. 
236. See AN, infra note 243. 
237. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974) 
(stating that trade secret law protects the holder of the trade secret against 
disclosure by another through surreptitious means). 
238. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 
(1989).  While the Florida statute at issue, extending “patent-like” protection 
to unpatented boat hull designs, was analyzed with respect to federal patent 
laws, the principle may naturally be extended to any state law defining and 
protecting intellectual property which conflicts with federal laws that define 
and protect the same intellectual property. 
239. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 259 (1979) 
(stating that the design of the keyholder “was so simple that it readily could 
be copied unless it was protected by patent”). 
 240. It is recognized that trade secret law, copyright and trademark law 
are only peripheral to the discussion at hand, but they are included only to 
identify them as legal vehicles for protecting intellectual property. 
241. See Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 
1787, 26 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 711 (1944) (arguing that the patent statute 
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Pursuant to Article I, section 8 of the Constitution,242 in 
1790 Congress243 created the United States patent244 system.245
Several policy arguments underlie the patent laws.  One 
argument states that the patent laws were intended to give 
inventors an incentive to invent by granting protection for their 
original thought.246  Another states that the public benefits 
from the disclosure of the intellectual property’s subject 
matter.247  This argument also includes the notion that patent 
should be interpreted as declaratory of the common law doctrine of intellectual 
property).
 242. “The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science 
and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”  U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 243. Act of April 10, 1790, 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2212, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 
(1790).  The 1790 Act, approved on April 10, 1790 by the First Congress, 
provided that “upon petition of any person or persons to the Secretary of State, 
the Secretary for the Department of War, and the Attorney General of the 
United States” either of the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Department of 
War or the Attorney General, or any two of them, may “cause letters patent to 
be made out in the name of the United States.”  Act of April 10, 1790, 2 
ANNALS OF CONG. 2212 (1790) (the act is entitled: “An Act to Promote the 
Progress of Useful Arts”).  The debates and proceedings of the First Congress 
were collected and printed by Gales and Seaton in THE DEBATES AND 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, (1834).  The 
collection is also available through the American memory project at 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwac.html (last visited June 21, 2001).  
The granting of power to three persons was eliminated by the Second 
Congress in 1793 such that only the Secretary of State could be petitioned for 
granting of letters patent. See Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 111, 1 Stat. 318-
23 (1793) (the act published as: An Act to promote the progress of Useful Arts, 
and to repeal the Act heretofore made for that purpose, ANNALS OF CONG.
1431-35 (1793) (2d Cong. Sess. 2)). 
 244. It is imprecise to label the 1793 Act the “Patent Act” since the 1793 
Act referred only to “Useful Arts” in its title, and because the word “patent” 
did not enter into the title of an act codifying the provision of Article I, § 8, cl. 
8 of the Constitution until 1800. See Act of Apr. 17, 1800, 6 ANNALS OF CONG.
1473 (1800) (The act is entitled: “An Act to Extend the Privilege of obtaining 
patents for useful discoveries and inventions to certain persons therein 
mentioned, and to enlarge and define the penalties for violating the rights of 
patentees.”  It is collected and printed by Gales and Seaton in THE DEBATES 
AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, (1851)). 
 245. A complete discussion of the genesis of intellectual property protection 
by statute in the United States is given by BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS 
OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (1967).  It seems unnecessary to 
review the genesis at this point. 
246. See id. at  9. 
247. See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional 
Definition of Property?: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 649 
(1994).
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protection encourages, regulates, and manages competition 
amongst inventors.248  Perhaps the clearest summary of the 
policy basis for patent protection rests upon two presumptions: 
that creative and original thought benefits society in general 
through the development and deployment of new technologies 
and improvement in existing technologies; and that individuals 
are stimulated to creative thought as a result of a government 
grant of limited exclusive property rights as incentives.249
Under modern federal statutes,250 the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) is authorized to grant a patent to an 
inventor for an invention.  The subject matter251 of a patentable 
invention is defined in 35 U.S.C. section 101.252  Because section 
101253 extends patentability to a broad range of subject matter, 
it provides the primary incentive for an inventor to invent.254
248. See id.
249. See BUGBEE, supra note 245, at 9.  The common argument for the 
patent system is that the grant of exclusive rights in the patented invention 
acts as a stimulus for creativity.  Consideration of the history of science 
indicates that this argument is without merit.  Because of space constraints, 
we shall consider, briefly, only a single case.  This case is chosen because the 
creativity of the patentee was already well known before the patent was 
granted.  On September 15, 1594, Galileo Galilei was granted a patent in the 
Venetian Republic for a machine to raise water. See id. at 24.  The motivation 
for Galileo to seek the patent was to prohibit the invention from becoming 
public property, and to permit him to accrue a pecuniary gain. See id.
Galileo’s creativity and genius are now legendary.  In fact, Galileo clarified the 
mechanical structure of the solar system using relatively simple mechanics, 
see GALILEO GALILEI, DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE TWO CHIEF WORLD
SYSTEMS, (1630) (translated by Stillman Drake and published in 1967).  Also, 
Galileo developed the foundation of dynamics (the study of the motion of 
bodies) and the foundation of solid mechanics (the resistance of solid bodies to 
fracture by external forces), GALILEO GALILEI, DIALOGUE CONCERNING THE 
TWO NEW SCIENCES (Henry Crew ed. & trans., Dover Press 1954) (1638).  
Galileo faced considerable obstacles to publishing and distributing the results 
of his genius.  In his later years, Galileo was certainly driven by ad plenioren 
scientiam rather than by pecuniary gain.  Thus, the grant of a patent cannot 
be the underlying motive for his creativity.  That Galileo did not patent either 
his telescope or the method of his observations tends to indicate his desire to 
further scientiam rather than enlarge his own wealth. 
 250. 35 U.S.C. sections 100-211, Patentability of Inventions and Grant of 
Patents.
251. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 
(1989).
252. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
 253. The 35 U.S.C. § 101 definition of patentable subject “remained 
essentially unchanged for approximately 200 years.”  David Burke, Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg: Renewed Challenge to Animal Patents, 59 
UMKC L. REV. 409, 412 (1991). 
 254. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron the Court stated that: “[n]o patent is 
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While section 101 is expansive in its definition of patentable 
subject matter, the corpus of patent law restricts the range of 
patentable subject matter.  The invention must have “utility,” 
that is, the function of the invention must be useful.255 Neither 
the demonstrated perfection of operation nor commercial 
success of the invention need be shown.256  Patents cannot be 
granted for the discovery of fundamental laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, or abstract ideas257 because such 
discoveries “are manifestations . . . nature, free to all men and 
reserved exclusively to none.”258  The subject matter of the 
patent must be novel and nonobvious.259  Finally, the inventors 
must file a complete, full, and exact description260 of the 
invention sufficient to enable any person skilled in the 
pertinent art to make and use the claimed invention.261
In return for the patent disclosure, the inventor is granted 
an exclusive right to use his invention for a period of years.262
available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls 
within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 
101.” See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 475-76. 
255. See Application of Jacques George Pottier, Patent Appeal No. 7790, 
376 F.2d 328 (C. C. P. A. 1967); E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkeley & 
Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1260 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980). 
256. See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkeley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 
1260 n.17 (8th Cir. 1980). 
 257. HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS. TRANSGENIC 
ANIMAL PATENT REFORM ACT, H. R. REP. NO. 888, at 40 (1988). 
 258. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
259. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (subsection (e) amended Nov. 29, 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 106-113 § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501A-565 (S. 1948 § 4805); 
subsection (g) amended Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 § 1000(a)(9), 113 
Stat. 1501A-590 (S. 1948 § 4806)) and § 103 (1994) (amended Nov. 1, 1995, 
Pub. L. No. 104-41, § 1, 109 Stat. 3511; subsection (c) amended Nov. 29, 1999, 
Pub. L. 106-113, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501A-591 (S. 1948 § 4807)). 
 260. The Court has clearly stated that the “ultimate goal of the patent 
system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain 
through disclosure.” See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 
U.S. 141, 151 (1989). 
261. See 35 U.S.C. § 111-113 (1994). See also In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 
1236 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  In the case of biotechnology, a full written description 
may be difficult if not impossible. Therefore, a sample of the genetic material 
(i.e. an aliquot of cells frozen in liquid nitrogen) must be deposited with a 
registered depository. See generally In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 
1985).
 262. In Kewanee Oil Co., the Court stated that the patent laws have 
fostered “a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products 
and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way of 
increased employment and better lives for our citizens.”  Kewanee Oil, 416 
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The Court stated, “[w]hen a patent is granted and the 
information contained in it is circulated to the general 
public . . . such additions to the general store of knowledge are 
of such importance to the public wealth that the Federal 
Government is willing to pay the high price of” twenty years 
after the filing of the patent application “of exclusive use for its 
disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed will stimulate ideas 
and the eventual development of further significant advances 
in the art.”263  Disclosure of knowledge by the inventor to the 
public is one of the most important functions of the United 
States patent law system.264  Furthermore, disclosure of the 
invention also encourages other inventors to either improve on 
or design around the subject matter.265
The argument is established that an invention or 
discovery, which is a physical manifestation of an original 
thought, is the property of the person who made the invention 
or discovery.  The property is his to dispose of as he pleases.  
However, once the invention or discovery is published to the 
general public, the person to whom it belonged may no longer 
assert property rights in the invention or discovery under 
common law.  The inventor then has two alternatives: either 
keep the invention secret and use it as a trade secret or release 
it to the general public.  If the discovery is used as a trade 
secret, then the inventor runs the risk that others, in good 
faith, may discover the invention.  Once the invention is 
released to the public, the inventor may no longer control the 
intellectual property.  If the invention is published, then the 
public benefits from the knowledge and others may use the 
knowledge to advance technology.  However, the inventor is no 
longer able to profit from the exclusive use of the invention. 
Through the grant of a patent, the inventor, or patentee, 
U.S. at 481. 
263. Id.
 264. Justice Story once stated that: 
[p]atents for inventions are now treated as a just reward to 
ingenious men, and as highly beneficial to the public, not only by 
holding out suitable encouragements to genius and talents and 
enterprise; but as ultimately securing to the whole community great 
advantages from the free communication of secrets, and processes, 
and machinery, which may be most important to all great interests 
of society, to agriculture, to commerce and to manufacturers, as well 
as to the cause of science and art. 
Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F. Cas. 648, 650 (No. 1,518) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839). 
265. See R. G. Adler, Biotechnology as an Intellectual Property, 224 
SCIENCE 35, 358 (1984). 
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may retain his property rights in the invention while the public 
gains the benefit of the invention.  The inventor benefits in 
several ways from the publication of his intellectual property in 
the form of a patent.  First, when the intellectual property is 
published through the grant of a patent, the patentee retains 
exclusive property rights in that intellectual property.  When 
the inventor chooses to keep his ideas and thought processes 
(the invention) secret, then he runs the risk that another will 
obtain the invention through either good faith observation of 
the physical manifestation or cleverness of another by 
independent original thought and work.  In either case, the 
invention is published to the general public and the original 
inventor no longer retains any common law property rights in 
the invention.  When a patent is granted then the inventor 
intentionally and purposefully publishes his invention as 
consideration for the retention of exclusive property rights in 
that invention.  As a result, any other person who in good faith 
discovers the invention is prohibited, by statute, from enjoying 
the benefit of that discovery without the permission of the 
patentee.266
The second benefit, which accrues to the inventor by a 
patent grant is that the inventor retains control over the 
intellectual property.  Because the inventor retains control, he 
may choose to either use the invention strictly for his own 
benefit or may license or sell the invention to others.  The 
control is enforced because the statute authorizing the granting 
of a patent provides for a private right of action against any 
person who infringes the patent.  That is, should any other 
person discover, by any means, or attempt to exercise the 
exclusive property rights granted to the patentee, then that 
person is an infringer and is subject to a private right of action 
brought by the patentee. 
The public benefits from the publication of the intellectual 
property in the form of a patent for several reasons.  First, the 
general public will have access to the ideas and thought 
processes behind the physical manifestation which will permit 
those interested to either use the invention to make, use, or sell 
the physical manifestation after the termination of the patent 
term; or to incorporate the thought processes into their own 
 266. In the case of genetically modified plants, the holder of the patent 
grants the farmer permission to use and reproduce the genetically modified 
seed through a technology-use license. Failure to obtain the license subjects 
the farmer to liability that may be very large. 
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inventive activity before the termination of the patent term.  
Second, by having access to the mental processes behind the 
physical manifestation, other inventors are encouraged, some 
by a profit motive, to “design-around” the old invention to 
create a new invention.267  The process of designing around an 
old invention advances technology that advances commerce.  
Should the ideas and thought processes be kept secret and 
hidden from public view, then each inventor would necessarily 
have to go through the same, or substantially similar, thought 
processes to reach the same conclusion.268  Such a system would 
 267. It might be argued that the motive to design around a patent is 
strictly the profit motive associated with advancing science and technology.  
However, some consideration must be given to the validity of such an 
argument.  Consider a doctoral student in chemical engineering who requires 
the use of a particular process for the extraction of a particular compound 
from biomass.  It turns out that the compound and the process for extracting it 
are patented; and the patentee is charging a prohibitive amount for both the 
compound and licensing of the extraction process.  Further, the compound is to 
be derivatized in the plant (biomass before harvesting) before extraction.  The 
director of the laboratory and the University both believe that the patent is 
invalid and unenforceable; however, neither has the resources to either fight 
an infringement case nor pay the licensing fees.  Further, the doctoral student 
simply does not have time to await resolution of the case before proceeding 
with his work (only to possibly encounter a similar obstacle in the near 
future).
Only two alternatives remain open to the director of the laboratory and 
doctoral student: either design around the patent; or abandon that particular 
line of inquiry.  The latter alternative is being embraced at a worrisome rate 
in the academic arena.  The former, while time consuming, can yield some 
progress with the project.  However, whether the doctoral student or the 
director of the laboratory actually “profit” from the design around is open to 
serious debate.  Certainly the design around may minimize the cost of 
advancing the inquiry, but unless the fruits of the inquiry are marketable, 
then the direct profitability of designing around the patent does not exist. 
 268. The strategy of relying on “trade secret” as a mechanism for 
protecting intellectual property would restrict advancements in science and 
engineering as well as inventive activity.  The scientific and engineering fields 
rely on open and free exchange of ideas, data, and conclusions: which accounts 
for the voluminous scientific and engineering literature.  The data, 
observations, and conclusions obtained by one investigator supports those of 
all other investigators working in either the same or closely connected fields of 
study (more frequently in recent years, the work of an investigator in one field 
may prove of considerable value to an investigator in a completely unrelated 
field even if the work is of only minor importance in its original field of study).  
It is the free exchange of data (that is the intellectual property) and ideas, 
which is the engine advancing modern science and engineering.  Any 
mechanism that serves to restrict the free flow of data, ideas, conclusions in 
the scientific and engineering communities will eventually halt progress in 
these communities.  While such mechanisms may profit those who impose 
them in the short term, the general public will be harmed in the long term 
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be inefficient to the point of severely restricting the 
advancement of the “useful arts.” 
E. PROPERTY RIGHTS
This discussion, focuses on the property rights attendant to 
genetically modified plants.  To the seed manufacturers, these 
rights include the right to make a profit, the right to develop 
technology, and the right to exclude others from making a 
profit on that same technology.  To some seed manufacturers, 
the property rights also appear to include the right to enter the 
premises of the farmer to test his plants (which requires taking 
some of the plants269), the right to pollute the farmer’s fields,270
and the right to the value of the farmer’s crop after having 
polluted his fields.271  To the farmer, these rights include the 
because technological advancements will stagnate. 
 269. In the case of Mr. Dallas Thomason, agents for Monsanto entered his 
cotton fields and took samples of his cotton plants. Evidently, this entry and 
taking was committed without a valid warrant and without the permission of 
Mr. Thomason. See Interview: Thomason, supra note 7.  Even if Monsanto had 
obtained a court order requiring Mr. Thomason to allow Monsanto to collect 
plant samples from his fields, Monsanto may still not exercise authority to 
enter and take the plants. Such an authority must rest only with the 
government and any permission for Monsanto to do so is relinquishing the 
police authority of the government to a corporation. An analogous situation is 
where representatives of a company enter a private residence because the 
company suspects that stolen property may be found there. Such authority to 
enter and search must rest only with the government through its police power 
and not with a corporate entity. 
 270. Mr. Percy Schmeiser maintains that the wind will easily carry the 
canola seed across long distances.  Sufficiently far, in fact, that genetically 
modified canola plants wind up dispersed in fields where it was never planted 
and, evidently, was blown a considerable distance by the wind from a road 
heavily traveled by trucks carrying canola seeds.  In another case, genetically 
modified canola was found in a field where the farmer neither planted canola 
nor wanted such canola.  The genetically modified plant when neither planted 
by the farmer nor desired by the farmer is defined as genetic pollution.  The 
seed manufacturer, evidently, neither can nor desires to control such 
pollution.  Telephone Interview with Mr. Percy Schmeiser, Farmer, 
Saskatchewan, Canada (July 6, 2001) [hereinafter Interview: Schmeiser{July 
6, 2001}]. 
 271. Federal Judge MacKay neither considered nor cared to consider the 
source of the genetic pollution found on Percy Schmeiser’s land. See Monsanto 
Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256, paragraph 31 (Fed. Ct. 
Canada 2001) available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/2001fct256.html
(last visited Aug. 25, 2001).  Judge McKay further stated that: “[y]et the 
source of the Roundup resistant canola in the defendants’ 1997 crop is really 
not significant for the resolution of the issue of infringement which relates to 
the 1998 crop.” Id. ¶ 112.  Judge McKay agreed with Monsanto’s argument 
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right to engage in the legitimate business practice of 
maximizing profit while minimizing input capital and labor 
costs, the right to save and replant seeds, and the right to 
dispose of his property as he deems fit.  It may be argued272 that 
there is no common law basis for the farmer to save and 
replant seeds from his own fields.  The analysis leading to such 
a conclusion was based upon the common law doctrines of real 
property including: the prescriptive easement; the public trust 
doctrine; the doctrine of customary rights; and reliance by the 
public upon access to the property.  These doctrines of property 
law are briefly reviewed here, as they will be useful in the 
ensuing analysis. 
1. Legal Theories 
It is textbook doctrine that rights in property dictate the 
relations between persons with regard to control of that 
property.
273  The law protects the rights of individuals in their 
property, including the liberty to use; the right to exclude 
others; the right to alienate; immunity from damage to the 
property; and immunity from expropriation.274  Further, 
property law doctrine teaches that all rights in property do not 
necessarily vest in the same person at the same time, and that 
the property rights are not absolute.275  In fact, it is common for 
the property rights to be shared between several different 
people depending upon the temporal epoch of the property.276
In the case of genetically modified plants, property rights in 
both the plant and the seed are shared between several distinct 
entities or individuals at any given moment in time. 
There are several issues to be resolved regarding property 
rights in genetically modified plants.  One is whether the 
that the presence of the glyphosate-resistant plants on Mr. Schmeiser’s farm 
was sufficient to find him guilty of patent infringement. 
272. See Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the “Terminator” Technology 
Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds 
and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41 B. C. L. REV. 627 (2000). 
273. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND
PRACTICES 3-4 (1997). 
274. See id. at 4-5. 
275. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 86 (3d ed. 
1993).
276. See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 10 
STAN. L. REV. 611, 665 (1987). 
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farmer may dispose of the seeds and plants that he has grown 
in a manner he deems necessary.  Oczek considered several 
legal theories and concluded that there is no common-law right 
for the farmer to save and replant seeds.277  By arguing that 
common-law property doctrines relate only to real property, 
Oczek states that, “common law property right for farmers to 
save seed is difficult to recognize.”278  Such a conclusion is 
against the basic doctrine of property law in the United States, 
that personal and real property are treated essentially the 
same.279  The law of property is left to the purview of the states 
under the United States Constitution,280 and it is anticipated 
that variations will exist in the substantive law depending 
upon the state in which the cause of action is brought.  
Nonetheless, through study of the same property law doctrines 
used by Oczek, and by introducing a small aliquot of public 
policy argument, it is possible to come to a conclusion contrary 
to that arrived at by Oczek. 
Oczek employed the doctrine of customary rights in his 
analysis of the farmer’s right to save and replant seeds.281  The 
doctrine of customary rights requires that a customary right be 
acquired only if seven elements are satisfied.282  The acquisition 
of customary rights require that the right must be ancient, 
“exercised without interruption”, “peaceable and free from 
dispute”, reasonable, certain (which may be satisfied by visible 
boundaries to the use), obligatory (meaning the landowner does 
not have the option of deciding whether the property is used by 
the general public), and the use must not be inconsistent “with 
277. See Oczek, supra note 272, at 651-52. 
278. Id. at 652. 
279. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 11-12 (2d 
ed. 1993). Interests in cultivated crops are treated as either real property or 
personal property depending upon the circumstances.  Id.  With the merger of 
personal and real property law the distinction of whether cultivated crops are 
real property or personal property seems quaint at best and misleading at 
worst.
280. See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332 (Mem) (1994) 
(Justice Scalia and Justice O’Connor dissenting from the denial of certiorari. 
Case below was Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993)). 
281. See Oczek, supra note 272, at 652. 
282. See Erin Pitts, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool for Ensuring 
Continued Public Use of Oregon Beaches, 22 ENVTL. L. 731, 737 (1992) 
(recommending the use of the public trust doctrine over the doctrine of 
customary rights in protecting access to beaches in Oregon, and possibly 
elsewhere).
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other customs or with other law.”283  Where the public has 
relied upon access to the property and has relied upon the 
allowance by the property owner of such access, the doctrine 
grants to the public an interest in continued use of the 
property.284  The doctrine has been adopted only by a small 
number of states285 and in a narrow range of circumstances.286
The public trust doctrine was also considered by Oczek 
with the aim of resolving the issue of the farmer’s right to save 
and replant seeds.287  Historically, the scope of public trust law 
includes the land area below the low-water mark along the 
ocean coasts288 and the coasts of the Great Lakes.289  The 
purpose of the public trust doctrine is to have the public 
authority hold title to the land so that the people of the state 
“may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce 
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the 
obstruction or interference of private parties.”290  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court articulated a clear definition of the public trust 
doctrine in a set of five factors.291  These factors are:
 283. State ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 676-78 (Or. 1969) (referring 
to Blackstone’s traditional criteria for customary rights). 
284. See id.
 285. The doctrine of customary rights has been, most notably, adopted by 
Texas and Florida.  In Texas, the public retained a right to use the beach 
above the high-water mark even though the original line of vegetation had 
been moved as a result of hurricane damage. See Matcha v. Mattox, 711 
S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1986).  In Florida, continuous use by the public of 
the dry-sand portion of the beach resulted in a public interest in private land 
through the doctrine of customary rights.  See City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-
Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974). 
286. See generally Pitts, supra note 282. 
287. See generally Oczek, supra note 272, at 647-53. 
288. See Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (the 
dominion and jurisdiction over navigable waters and land under these waters 
belongs only to the state within its territorial jurisdiction and only that state 
has the constitutional authority to exercise the dominion and jurisdiction); 
Weber v. Harbor Commissioners, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 66 (1873) (the state 
reserves the right to dispose of all soils under tide waters subject to the 
“paramount right of navigation over such waters” as required by the 
necessities of commerce between the several states and with foreign nations). 
289. See Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 437 (1892) (holding 
that the doctrine of public trust applies to equally to the “dominion and 
sovereignty over and ownership of lands under the navigable waters of the 
Great Lakes” and to the “dominion and sovereignty over and ownership of 
lands under tide waters on the borders of the sea”). 
290. Id. at 452. 
291. See Wisconsin v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957) (the 
city of Madison, Wisconsin proposed to fill part of a lagoon on Lake Wingra for 
construction of a public parking lot granted property use rights but not the 
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(1) the use of the affected area will be controlled by public bodies; 
(2) the affected area will remain open to the public and it will be 
devoted to public purposes; (3) the affected area will be small in 
comparison with the whole of the area held in public trust; (4) no 
one of the uses of the whole of the area held in public trust “will be 
destroyed or greatly impaired”; and (5) “[t]he disappointment of 
those members of the public who may desire” to use the affected 
area is “negligible when compared with the greater convenience to 
be afforded to those members of the public who use” the entire 
area held in public trust.
292
Although useful as a guide to application, the precise 
doctrine that the court adopts is of far less import than the 
attitude that that court takes towards the inadequacies of the 
democratic process in protecting public interests.293  This is 
because the public trust doctrine is meant to protect the public 
and is applicable in those “situations in which diffuse public 
interests need protection against tightly organized groups with 
clear and immediate goals.”294  While the traditional application 
of the doctrine has been quite narrow, the principle underlying 
the doctrine may be employed in controversies relating to 
subject matter beyond soils below the low-water mark and 
natural resources.295
To obtain an easement by prescription requires the 
exercise of the rights of ownership against the actual owner for 
a defined period of time without obtaining the permission of the 
property itself, and reserves all property rights for the state). 
292. Id. at 73-74. 
293. See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource 
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 521 (1970) 
(arguing for an extension of the doctrine of public trust beyond the 
traditionally narrow applications in matters of land below the low-water 
mark).
294. Id. at 556. 
295. See id. at 556-57. For instance, New Jersey employed the public trust 
doctrine to allow public access to beaches, by both residents and non-residents, 
by extending the doctrine to land above the low-water mark.  See Neptune
City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55 (N.J. 1972) (holding that 
municipalities may charge for the use of their beaches, but that discrimination 
between residents and non-residents is not permissible); Matthews v. Bay 
Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (extending the public trust 
doctrine: to include “bathing, swimming and other shore activities,” id. at 363, 
because those activities are “consonant with and furthers the general welfare,” 
id.; and to the use and enjoyment of the upland beach for the purposes of 
bathing and swimming below the mean high water mark, id. at 364), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). 
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actual owner who has had notice.296  A prescriptive easement 
arises from the open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use of 
the servient estate for a period years.297  In a prescriptive 
easement the actual owner retains title in the property while 
the claimant obtains a limited right to make use of the 
property.  Any positive easement may be obtained as a 
prescriptive easement.298  However, a prescriptive easement 
cannot be obtained against public property that is not 
alienable.  Also, a prescriptive easement cannot be obtained on 
non-governmentally owned property where there is a public 
interest that affects the property.299
2. Application of the Theories 
The background section demonstrated that the 
development of domesticated plants currently in use in the 
United States was the result of efforts on the part of private 
individuals initially, on the part of farmer-government 
cooperation later, and on the part of the researchers in 
agricultural research stations funded by the federal 
government still later.  It has also been demonstrated that the 
development of the agricultural genome was mature before the 
arrival of the seed manufacturing industry.  A review of the 
history of American agricultural research and development 
leads to a conclusion that public funds went to the development 
of an agricultural genome suitable for agricultural practices in 
the United States and for the benefit of the American people.300
Because public funds paid for the development and deployment 
of the agricultural genome, then that genome belongs to the 
general public as public property.  It is natural, then, to raise 
the issue of whether a single person may obtain an interest in 
the agricultural genome in general, and in a plant genome in 
particular.  If the public owns the plant genome, then a private 
party cannot gain an interest in the property under the 
prescriptive easement doctrine because the private party may 
296. See 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 60.03(b)(6)(i) 
(David A. Thomas ed., 1994). 
297. See, e.g. Goodall v. Whitefish Hunting Club, 528 N.W.2d 221, 223 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1995). 
298. See 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 
60.03(b)(6)(iii) (David A. Thomas ed., 1994). 
299. See id. at § 60.03(b)(6)(iv). 
300. See generally TRUE, supra note 29. 
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not obtain a prescriptive easement against public property.  
Due to the limited jurisdictions that have adopted the doctrine 
of customary rights, and due to the narrow range of 
circumstances to which it has been applied, it is a fruitless 
endeavor to attempt to use the doctrine in analyzing the public 
interest in the genome of the plant.  Because a diverse public 
interest exists in the availability and maintenance of the plant 
genome301 and because one clear and immediate goal of the seed 
manufacturers would be to establish dominion over the 
genome, the doctrine of public trust may apply to the genome.  
In this case, it is possible that the public trust doctrine would 
allow alienation of the public interest in the plant genome, but 
the legislature must be very clear of its intent to do so.302
Whether the farmer may use the genome to produce a crop 
for sale, and whether he may save and plant seeds in the next 
crop cycle, turns upon a point of public policy.  A fundamental 
requirement of a strong nation is that its people are properly 
nourished.  Nourishment requires food to eat.  Without the 
farmer, the country would have a dearth of food.  Therefore, the 
public has a strong interest in allowing the farmer free access 
to the agricultural genome to produce crops for (eventual) 
human consumption.  The farmer and the public are able to 
form a mutually beneficial contract: the farmer gives his labor 
and the crop as consideration and the public gives the genome 
and cash as consideration.  Whether the farmer may save and 
replant the genome in the form of seeds turns upon matters of 
convenience to members of the public. 
As discussed earlier, the farmer traditionally provided his 
own plant genome through a save-and-plant program, or the 
government provided it gratis.  In modern times, it is 
inconvenient for members of the public to provide the requisite 
genome to the farmer, therefore, the seed manufacturer may be 
used as an agent of the public to provide the plant genome.  
Alternatively, the farmer may be allowed to save and plant the 
genome that he produces on his own lands because he is given 
a license to do so by the public.  Therefore, contrary to the 
conclusion drawn by Ozcek, a legal basis does exist for the 
301. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DESIGNING AN 
AGRICULTURAL GENOME PROGRAM 1 (1998) (published by the National 
Academy Press); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING GLOBAL GENETIC 
RESOURCES: THE U.S. NATIONAL PLANT GERMPLASM SYSTEM 1 (1991) 
(published by the National Academy Press). 
302. See SAX, supra note 293, at 486-89. 
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common law to protect the right of a farmer to save seeds from 
a crop for planting in the next planting cycle. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The man who makes two blades of grass grow where but 
one grew before is a benefactor of his race.303
Three sets of rights attach to the design, manufacture, and 
use of genetically modified plant tissue.  The seed 
manufacturers claim the right to develop the technology, the 
right to exclude others from making a profit on that technology, 
and the right to make a profit for themselves from the 
technology.  The farmers claim the right to engage in the 
legitimate business practice of farming, the right to business 
autonomy, and the right to use and dispose of their property 
(both personal and real) as they see fit.  The farmer also has 
the right to have his crop free of unwanted transgene 
contamination.  The public claims the right to a stable and safe 
fiber and food supply and the right to minimum impact on the 
environment in producing the fiber and food.  Where Jack’s 
purchased seeds have been genetically modified, a clash exists 
between his property rights and those of the owner of the grant 
of protection on the seeds.  The tension between the rights of 
the farmer and of the seed manufacturer must be resolved in 
light of the rights of the public in genetically modified plants.  
The seeds may be protected under either the Plant Variety 
Protection Act or the Patent Act; by license; or, by a contract 
Jack may have entered into for production of the bean crop.304
The ultimate form of protection of the seeds is by biochemical 
means through the terminator technology.  The beans Jack 
planted, which eventually led him to the magical kingdom in 
the clouds, could have been derived by a number of techniques: 
deliberate engineering by technicians working for the seed 
manufacturer; the harvesting of progeny seeds generated from 
 303. OWEN LOVEJOY, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, H.R. REP. NO. 37-21, at 4 (1862).  This 
statement is the clearest articulation of the goal of agricultural biotechnology.  
It remains to be seen whether such a lofty goal can, indeed, be attained using 
genetic manipulation techniques. 
304. See generally Neil D. Hamilton, Why Own The Farm If You Can Own 
The Farmer (And The Crop)?: Contract Production And Intellectual Property 
Protection Of Grain Crops, 73 NEB. L. REV. 48 (1994). 
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parent seeds which in turn were generated by deliberate 
engineering; or, cross pollination where the pollen was 
transported to the progenitor non-modified plants from remote 
genetically modified plants.  While this mode of acquiring the 
genetic material for his magic beans at first glance appears to 
fall under the purview of tort law, it actually implicates two 
sets of rights including Jack’s right to have his plants free from 
the genetic material which confers the magical qualities, and 
Jack’s neighbors’ right to grow the beans with this material.  
The seed manufacturer’s position regarding Jack’s beans, is 
that the source of the seeds or plants is irrelevant, rather, that 
the plants or seeds were found on Jack’s land is relevant.  This 
position leads the seed manufacturer to conclude that Jack is 
infringing its property rights in the seed.  Such a simple 
answer may be neither statutorily correct nor just.  What is 
taken from the farmer by statute must be given back by reason 
of justice. 
A.  THE TAKING FROM THE FARMER
In this modern version of the tale of Jack and the 
Beanstalk, the seed manufacturers sue Jack for infringement of 
their patent, for violation of the conditions of the license 
agreement, and for violation of the provisions of the PVPA.  
What result?  The answer depends upon how the beans are 
protected, and is independent of whether Jack signed a license 
agreement for the beans. 
1. Property Rights Under the Plant Variety Protection  
 Act 
Consider the case in which Jack purchased the magic 
beans from a seed manufacturer who had obtained protection 
for the beans under the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 
and who intended to sexually reproduce the beans.  The Plant 
Variety Protection Act grants to the owner of a certificate of 
protection the attribute of personal property in the protected 
plant variety305 which means that the owner of the certificate 
has the “right to exclude others from selling the variety, or 
offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing, or exporting 
it, or using it in producing . . . a hybrid or different variety 
305. See 7 U.S.C. § 2531(a) (1997). 
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therefrom.”306  When Jack purchased the beans, the seller 
retained certain property rights while certain rights were 
transferred to Jack.  Before 1995, Jack could have reproduced 
the seed and sold it to his neighbors for reproductive purposes.  
However, since 1995 the situation has changed. 
The seed manufacturers, whom we presume hold either 
rights under the Plant Variety Protection Act, or patent 
protection, or both,307 are limited under the Plant Variety 
Protection Act as previously discussed.  Of relevance to the 
current discussion is the crop exemption which allows the 
farmer to save progeny seed from a planting of the variety of 
seed protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act, and to use 
the seed without compensating the holder of the Plant Variety 
Protection Act certificate.  The right to save and plant the seed 
in the next crop cycle, the limitations on selling to others for 
reproductive purposes, and the right to either hybrid or new 
variety development is called “the crop exemption.” Without 
the crop exemption, the Plant Variety Protection Act would be 
meaningless because no farmer would buy Plant Variety 
Protection Act protected seeds and invest the labor and expense 
required to grow a crop if he could not profit from the crop by at 
least selling it for non-reproductive purposes.  While the crop 
exemption was written into the Plant Variety Protection Act to 
protect farmers from increased costs, Congress clearly did not 
intend that it would provide the farmer with an unlimited right 
to save, sell, and dispose of protected seed as he saw fit.308
The central question is: exactly what property rights does 
 306. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(1) (1997). 
 307. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated in
dictum that a seed or seed produced plant may enjoy protections under both 
the Plant Variety Protection Act and patent, under Title 35 of the United 
States Code. See Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 
F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The defendant argued that Pioneer held both 
patents under Title 35 and certificate of protection under the Plant Variety 
Protection Act, and that simultaneous protection could not be afforded because 
these two statutes are in conflict. The Federal Circuit stated that: 
The district court observed, correctly, that the asserted conflict is 
simply the difference in the rights and obligations imposed by the 
two statutes.  It is not unusual for more than one statute to apply 
to a legal or property interest. For example, an ornamental design 
may qualify for protection under both copyright and design patent 
law. The fact that the laws are of different scope does not 
invalidate the laws. 
Id.
308. See Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1015-
16 (5th Cir. 1983). 
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the crop exemption afford the farmer?  The Court in Asgrow309
answered this question under the statute as it stood in 1995.  
When the Supreme Court decided Asgrow, 7 U. S. C. section 
2541 defined the crop exemption as follows: “it shall not 
infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed produced 
by him from seed obtained” by the “authority of the owner of 
the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in the 
production of a crop for use on his farm, or for sale as provided 
in this section.”310  Subsections (3) and (4) of section 2541 
provide respectively, that it is a violation of the Plant Variety 
Protection Act to: (3) “sexually multiply the novel variety as a 
step in marketing (for growing purposes) the variety”; and (4) 
“use the novel variety in producing (as distinguished from 
developing) a hybrid or different variety therefrom.”311  The 
Plant Variety Protection Act, as it stood in 1994, could 
reasonably be interpreted as granting the farmer the right to 
save progeny seed from Plant Variety Protection Act 
certificated progenitor seeds and plant those progeny seeds on 
his own farm.  However, apparently the farmer could not 
reproduce a Plant Variety Protection Act certificated progenitor 
seed with the intent of selling the progeny seed to others, nor 
could the farmer use a Plant Variety Protection Act certificated 
progenitor seed to produce either a hybrid seed or a different 
variety of seed.  The statute was not clear on the extent to 
which the farmer’s rights, in light of the crop exemption, in his 
own progeny seed extended. 
In Asgrow,312 plaintiff Asgrow Seed Company was the 
309. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 (1995) (held 
that “a farmer who meets the requirements set forth in the proviso to § 2543 
may sell for reproductive purposes only such seed as he has saved for the 
purpose of replanting his own acreage”). The first sentence of 7 U.S.C. § 2543 
states that “it shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to save seed 
produced by the person from [protected] seed . . . and use such saved seed in 
the production of a crop,” and that the crop may be used “on the farm of the 
person,” or sold as provided in the PVPA.  7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997). The Asgrow
Court stated that the “first sentence of § 2543 allows seed that has been 
preserved for reproductive purposes . . . to be sold for such purposes.” 513 U.S. 
at 190. The Court articulated the meaning of the crop exemption as being that 
“a farmer saves seeds to replant his acreage, but for some reason changes his 
plans, he may instead sell those seeds for replanting under the terms set forth 
in the proviso” of § 2543. Id. at 191. 
 310. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994). 
 311. 7 U.S.C. § 2541(a)(4) (1997).  A sexually reproduced plant is one which 
is reproduced from seed, 7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(6) (1997), and an asexually 
reproduced plant is reproduced by either propagation or by grafting. 
312. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995). 
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holder a Plant Variety Protection Act certificate313 on each of 
two varieties of soybean seed that it had developed.314  The 
certificate granted to Asgrow Seed Company “patent-like 
protection to [its] novel varieties of sexually reproduced 
seed.”315  Defendants purchased seed from plaintiff, planted it, 
harvested seed, cleaned it, and sold it to neighboring farmers.316
Defendant Winterboer admitted that the seeds were 
protected under the Plant Variety Protection Act and that they 
had sold the seeds. However, he argued in defense, that the 
sales were exempt under the Plant Variety Protection Act 
because their primary farming occupation consisted of growing 
313. See 7 U.S.C. § 2421 (1994) (application for a certificate of recognition 
of plant variety rights); 7 U.S.C. § 2481 (2001) (issuance of certificate of 
recognition of plant variety rights); 7 U.S.C. § 2483 (2001) (rights granted by 
certificate of recognition of plant variety rights). The owner of the novel plant 
variety sought to be protected applies to the Secretary for the Department of 
Agriculture for a certificate of plant variety protection. 7 U.S.C. § 2421. If the 
application meets the examination requirements, 7 U.S.C. § 2441, of the Plant 
Variety Protection Office, 7 U.S.C. § 2321, then the Secretary of the 
Department of Agriculture “shall issue a notice of allowance of plant variety 
protection,” 7 U.S.C. § 2441 (2001), for the seed.  The holder of the certificate 
of plant variety protection “has the right, during the term of the plant variety 
protection,” which is 20 years from the date of issuance of the certificate of 
plant variety protection, 7 U.S.C. § 2483(b)(1), “to exclude others from selling 
the variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, or 
exporting it, or using it in producing . . . a hybrid or different variety 
therefrom.” 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(1) (2001). The language which dictates the 
protections afforded to the holder of the certificate of plant variety protection 
is similar to the language dictating the protections afforded to the holder of a 
patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (1994) (amended Oct. 11, 1996, Pub. L. 104-295, 
§ 20(e)(1), 110 Stat. 3529). Therefore, the protections afforded to the holder of 
a certificate of plant variety protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act 
are indeed similar to those granted to the holder of a patent under the Patent 
Act.
314. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995). 
315. Id.
316. See id. at 181-82. During 1990, defendants planted 265 acres of the 
protected soybean and sold the entire saleable crop of 10,529 bushels 
neighboring farmers for reproductive purposes. See id.  The seed from the 265 
acres was enough to plant approximately 10,000 acres.  See id. at 182. Asgrow, 
acting upon suspicion that defendants were deriving substantial profits out of 
selling the protected soybean, sent an agent to defendant’s farm and 
determined that the defendants were indeed selling Asgrow’s protected 
soybean variety. See id. at 182. The Winterboers sold the two varieties of 
soybeans, which they labeled A1938 and A2235, for an average price of  $8.70 
per bushel where Asgrow sold the two varieties, A1937 and A2234, for 
between  $16.20 and $16.80 per bushel.  See id.  The total revenue lost by 
Asgrow was approximately $173,728.  Asgrow sued the defendants, seeking 
damages and a permanent injunction against selling the protected variety of 
seed. See id.
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crops for purposes other than sale in the seed market for 
reproductive purposes.317  The trial court rejected the 
defendant’s arguments318 and held that the farmer may sell for 
reproductive purposes only that quantity which he has saved 
for replanting his own fields.319  The trial court justified the 
narrower interpretation of “saved seed” by stating that 
Congress’ intent “in enacting the Plant Variety Protection Act 
was to encourage companies to develop improved varieties of 
seed and to provide for these developers the right to protect 
this seed from unauthorized sales by others.”320  The court 
reasoned that if defendant were allowed to make unauthorized 
sales of Plant Variety Protection Act certificated seed to fellow 
farmers beyond the amount required for planting his own 
fields, then Congress’ intent would be “thwarted when a 
developer’s sales of such seed is diluted by the lower priced 
sales by those who have contributed nothing to the 
development of the novel variety.”321
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and rejected 
317. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 795 F. Supp. 915, 916-17 (N.D. 
Iowa 1991).  The issues before the Asgrow trial court were: 
(1) that defendant Winterboer sold Plant Variety Protection Act 
protected seeds without authorization from Asgrow Seed 
Company, 7 U.S.C. § 2541(1); (2) that defendant Winterboer 
sexually multiplied the varieties as a step in marketing the 
varieties, 7 U.S.C. § 2541(3); and (3) defendant Winterboer 
distributed the seed for reproductive purposes without notice that 
the seed is protected by a Plant Variety Protection Act certificate, 
7 U.S.C. § 2541(6).
Id.  The defendant did not dispute that the soybean varieties that they had 
planted, harvested, cleaned and sold for reproductive purposes were indeed 
protected under the Plant Variety Protection Act.  See id. at 917.  Pointing to 
the language in 7 U.S.C. § 2451 regarding the farmer exception, “[t]his section 
provides that no infringement occurs if: . . . a person, whose primary farming 
occupation is the growing of crops for sale other than reproductive purposes” 
sells the “saved seed to other persons so engaged, for reproductive purposes,” 
defendant argued in defense that the sales were allowed under the crop 
exemption of the PVPA, because since almost 80 percent of their crop was sold 
for other than reproductive purposes then the sale was within the farmer 
exception. See id. at  917. 
318. See id. at 918. The court stated that “[i]n 7 U.S.C. § 2543 Congress 
specifically protected the historical and traditional right of small farmers like 
the Winterboers to make seed sales to fellow farmers.” Id.  Indicating that 
Congress intended for limitations in § 2543, the court further stated that, “the 
intent of Congress in enacting the Plant Variety Protection Act was not to give 
a farmer an unrestricted right to sell seed.” Id.
319. See id. at 918-19. 
320. Id. at 919. 
321. Id. at 920. 
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the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,322
holding that the farmer may sell for reproductive purposes only 
that quantity he has saved for replanting his own fields.323
Specifically, the Asgrow Court held that a farmer who satisfied 
the crop exemption requirements could engage in “brown-bag” 
sales of the protected seed for reproductive purposes, but could 
sell only that quantity of protected seed necessary to replant 
his own fields.324
The Supreme Court in Asgrow considerably narrowed the 
scope of the “crop exemption” by prohibiting the practice of 
saving more seed than is necessary to replant one’s own fields 
with the intent of selling the seeds to others for reproductive 
purposes.  Because it was not before the Court in Asgrow, the 
question of whether a farmer may save the seeds from his own 
farm and then plant that seed on another farm in the following 
year remains unanswered.  The question is of some 
considerable practical import, especially in circumstances in 
which one farmer, who is a member of a cooperative or 
partnership, grows Plant Variety Protection Act certificated 
seeds and then distributes those seeds to other members of the 
cooperative or partnership.325
It is common practice for a farmer to rent fields from 
another farmer for the purpose of planting.  Typically, the 
322. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the trial court and stated 
that if a “farmer grows more crop from a protected seed variety for sale to 
consumers than for sale to other farmers for planting, that farmer qualifies 
under [the crop exemption] to buy or sell saved seed.” Id. at 490. 
323. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192 (1995). 
324. See id. The term “brown-bag” is derived from the traditional practice 
of farmers selling seed, which had originally been obtained from the seed 
manufacturer, planted, harvested, and cleaned on their own farm, to other 
farmers in nondescript brown bags. See id. at 182. Although apparently 
insignificant, the aggregate effect of brown-bag sales of protected seed 
varieties can significantly decrease the profit of a seed manufacturer. See
Hamilton, supra note 304, at 95.  In 1989, Pioneer Hi-Bred International 
discovered that only eight percent of the variety of red winter wheat grown in 
Kansas had been raised from seed actually purchased from Pioneer, with the 
illegal brown-bag market accounting for the balance of that particular variety. 
As a result, Pioneer Hi-Bred International ceased sale of its red winter wheat 
variety in Kansas. See id. at 95.  Hence the “brown-bag” sales, in aggregate, 
can have a crippling effect on the seed manufacturers. The long-term result is 
that the available seed will diminish in quality as the “brown-bag” seeds 
diminish in integrity. 
 325. Such a situation is very similar to that practiced by the early 
agricultural societies as discussed previously. 
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renter farmer will enter into a “share cropper” arrangement 
where the renter farmer agrees to supply the seed, fuel, and 
labor necessary to plant the seeds.  The profit from the harvest 
is then split with the land’s owner.  The arrangement is 
dynamic in that the total number of acres involved may change 
from year to year.  In the event that the renter farmer has a 
good yield on some of the fields using protected seed, then he 
would be inclined to save a portion of the seed for subsequent 
planting (part of the artificial selection process which has 
produced many of the agricultural crops in use today).  Since 
the Court in Asgrow specified that the farmer may save only 
that amount necessary to replant his own fields, the planting of 
an expanded number of fields not his own might be precluded. 
The trial court in Asgrow stated, in dictum, that the farmer 
might be allowed to save seed from one planting cycle to plant a 
larger number of acres in the next planting cycle.  Specifically, 
the trial court stated that the crop exception “allows a farmer 
to save, at a maximum, an amount of seed necessary to plant 
his acreage for the subsequent crop year.”326  It is not clear, 
unfortunately, whether the Supreme Court will adopt the trial 
court’s dictum regarding how much Plant Variety Protection 
Act certificated seed the farmer may save from one planting 
cycle for replanting the next planting cycle. 
The Plant Variety Protection Act, however, may illuminate 
the answer.  The statute states that it is not an infringement 
for “a person to save seed produced” from the protected seed for 
“use on the farm of the person.”  Construing this last phrase 
strictly, it would seem that the crop exemption granted the 
property right of use for planting to the farm of the person who 
originally purchased the protected seed.  A far more reasonable 
wording for the second quoted phrase is “use by the person” 
which would remove the restriction that the purchaser had to 
actually own the land upon which the progenitor, protected 
seeds are planted or upon which the progeny seeds are 
planted.327  Under the interpretation suggested here, the crop 
 326. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 795 F. Supp. 915, 919 (N.D. Iowa 
1991).
 327. Our interpretation flows naturally from the decision in Asgrow.  The 
Asgrow trial court reasoned that allowing a farmer to save enough seed to 
satisfy his planting needs in the next planting cycle would comport with the 
intent of Congress in enacting 7 U.S.C. § 2543.  See id. at 918.  The result, 
however, could have potentially devastating impact upon the seed 
manufacturers.  Under the preferred interpretation of 7 U.S.C. § 2543, a 
single farmer or farming entity could purchase a small amount of protected 
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exemption would confer the property right of use for planting 
upon the farmer, rather than leaving it with the seed 
manufacturers. In addition, it would permit the seed 
manufacturers to dictate to the farmer which fields may be 
planted with certificated seeds (whether progenitor or 
progeny).  The farmer may then plant the saved seed upon any 
field of his choosing.  To interpret the statutory language any 
other way would be to deny the farmer the property right of 
using his property (that is, the seeds grown on his own lands) 
as he sees fit, and would defy Congress’ intent (of protecting 
the right of farmers to save and replant) when it passed the 
crop exemption of the Plant Variety Protection Act. 
The farmer’s right to save and replant Plant Variety 
Protection Act certificated seed can also be considered under 
the doctrine of alienation of property.  The owner of property 
(including a patented article) is free to dispose of that property 
as he deems necessary.328  Since the farmer grew the crop on his 
own land with the investment of his own time and money, it 
would seem reasonable that the progeny seeds produced would 
be his own property329 independent of the status of ownership of 
the progenitor seeds.330  Since the progeny seeds are the 
seed for planting in the first year.  The farmer or farming entity, under both 
the Asgrow trial court decision and 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997), would be entitled 
to save that quantity required to replant his farm during the next growing 
season.  This would be of great benefit to the single farmer since he would 
realize considerable savings in seed for subsequent planting cycles.  The 
benefit would also be realized by corporate farmers who farm many hundreds, 
if not thousands, of acres.  Farm cooperatives or partnerships of farms would 
also be able to take advantage of the preferred interpretation, articulated 
here, since the crop would not belong to a single farmer but to the cooperative 
or partnership.  This last construct avoids the problems confronted in Delta
and Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1983), 
because the co-operative or partnership would not be acting as an 
intermediary, but rather as original owners of the right to use for planting.  
The net result would certainly be a substantial decline in profits to the seed 
manufacturers.
328. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 194 (1995) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting).  The majority does not reject this well-established point of law.  
However, the majority does take issue with the application of this point in the 
context of the Plant Variety Protection Act. 
 329. Recall that this article has described a seed as real property when still 
connected to the plant, which is growing or standing on the farmer’s field.  The 
seed becomes personal property when harvested.  For simplicity, this article 
follows the modern trend in property law and merges the concepts of real and 
personal property and speaks of them as “property”. 
 330. The language of the Plant Variety Protection Act indicates that 
through certification, plants and seeds attain statutory protection as property 
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farmer’s own property, he should be able to dispose of the 
progeny seed at his own discretion.  Such an interpretation 
would be consistent with both the Supreme Court precedent331
of “viewing restraints on alienation of property with 
disfavor,”332 and with Congress’ intent to protect the farmer 
against increased seed costs. 
The precedent explicitly states that because of “that 
absolute power which a man possesses over his own property,” 
then, “he may make any disposition of it which does not 
interfere with the existing rights of others.”333  The doctrine 
disfavoring restraints on alienation of personal property, as set 
forth by Chief Justice Marshall,334 states that the alienation of 
property will be considered valid “if it be fair and real”335 with 
only those limitations “which are prescribed by law.”336  Justice 
Stevens’ dissent in Asgrow337 argues that the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in Asgrow338 is supported by the doctrine disfavoring 
restraints on the alienation of personal property.339  The Asgrow
Court, however, indicated that such reasoning is clearly 
misguided.340  The majority of the Court in Asgrow disposes of 
the dissent’s argument by stating that “[a]pplying the rule 
disfavoring restraints on alienation to interpretation of the 
Plant Variety Protection Act is rather like applying the rule 
disfavoring restraints upon freedom of contract to 
interpretation of the Sherman Act.”341  The Court’s use of such 
an obtuse analogy to dispose of a clear argument for retaining 
the doctrine in the context of seeds grown by the farmer on his 
own farm indicates a refusal to recognize the very important 
of the certificate holder.  As we will describe later, such a reference is 
imprecise because it does not allow clear identification of the rights of 
certificated plants. 
331. See generally Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U.S. 229, 242 (1823) (opinion of 
Marshall, C.J.). 
 332. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 194-5 (1995) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
333. See Sexton v. Wheaton, 21 U.S. 229, 242 (1823). 
334. See id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See supra text accompanying note 309. 
338. See generally Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 982 F.2d 486 (Fed. Cir. 
1992).
339. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 194-5 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
340. See id. at 188 n.3. 
341. Id.
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limitation imposed by Chief Justice Marshall.  The doctrine 
requires that if the alienation of personal property is within the 
limitations set by law, then the disposition of the property will 
be viewed as valid. 
Before the issue of whether the disposition of the progeny 
seed of a Plant Variety Protection Act certificated progenitor 
seed is lawful can be addressed, it is necessary to carefully 
answer the central question of what property rights the farmer 
retains in his own seeds.342  If he retains the right of alienation, 
then the dissent in Asgrow must be correct and Asgrow must 
have been incorrectly decided.  However, if the farmer retains a 
limited right of alienation, then Congress has taken a property 
right without compensation and appropriated that property to 
the holder of the Plant Variety Protection Act certificate.  It 
would appear from the language of the PVPA343 that 
propagation of the progeny seeds constitutes infringement of 
the rights of the owner of the certificate of protection.  
However, the language in § 2451(d) stands in stark contrast 
with § 2541(e)344 and § 2543.345  In order to reconcile the 
statute’s language and give effect to the statute as a whole, it is 
necessary to conclude that the farmer retains only the right of 
alienation of the progeny seed for non-reproductive purposes; 
that the farmer retains the right to use the propagating 
material from a certificated seed for reproductive purposes only 
if the crop produced is used upon his own farm; that the farmer 
does not retain the right to alienate the progeny seed from the 
certificated progenitor seed for reproductive purposes; and that 
the farmer does not retain the right to alienate the second 
generation progeny seed from the certificated progenitor seed 
 342. Since a definition of property rights in progeny seeds of statutorily 
protected progenitor seeds is required under both the Patent Act and the 
Plant Variety Protection Act, and since the discussion of these rights will be 
enriched by analysis of the protection afforded to the holder of the statutory 
protection, the discussion of the property rights will be deferred until later.  
Instead, this article will concentrate on identifying the statutory protections 
under the Plant Variety Protection Act and identifying the ambiguities 
associated with the statutory protections. 
343. See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(d) (1997). 
 344. It is not an infringement of the rights of the owner of a Plant Variety 
Protection Act certificate to perform any act with the propagating material 
harvested with a certificated seed, if it is “done privately and for 
noncommercial purposes.” See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(e) (1997). 
 345. So long as the act does not violate 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (3)-(4), the farmer 
may save progeny seed for “production of a crop for use on the farm of the 
person.” 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997). 
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for either non-reproductive or reproductive purposes. 
The Court in Asgrow sidestepped articulating the exact 
rights granted to the owner of a Plant Variety Protection Act 
certificated seed and those rights granted to the farmer who 
has produced progeny seeds on his own farm.  The Court does, 
however, explain that the Plant Variety Protection Act creates 
a “valuable property in the product of botanical research by 
giving the developer the right to exclude others from selling the 
variety, or offering it for sale, or reproducing it, or importing it, 
or exporting it, etc.”346  This comment, made by the Court in 
dictum, cannot be squared with the language identified above 
in § 2541 and § 2543, and does little to clarify the rights of 
either the farmer or the holder of the Plant Variety Protection 
Act certificate.  In fact, the statutory language in § 2541 states 
that “any act concerning propagating material of any kind” is 
deemed to not be infringement of the rights of the owner of the 
certificate “unless the act involves further propagation of the 
variety.”347  In addition, the language in § 2541 permits 
reproduction of the certificated seed for private and 
noncommercial purposes.348  Finally, § 2543 contemplates sale 
of the progeny seed, of certificated progenitor seed, for non-
reproductive purposes.349  Nowhere in  § 2541 or § 2543 is 
language found “giving the developer the right to ‘exclude 
others from selling the variety, or offering it for sale, or 
reproducing it, or importing it, or exporting it,’ etc.”350 Nor is 
language found that vests control of such rights in the holder of 
the Plant Variety Protection Act certificate. 
The Court in Asgrow seems to have clarified relatively 
little with regard to infringement of the rights of the holder of a 
Plant Variety Protection Act certificate.  What is certain, then, 
is that if the farmer grows the protected seed variety for the 
purpose of selling the seeds for replanting by another, the 
 346. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.3 (1995) (quoting, 
in part, 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994)). 
347. See 7 U.S.C. § 2541(d) (1997). Furthermore, the language specifically 
states that export of the protected seed is permitted if the “exported material 
is for final consumption purposes.” Id.
348. See  7 U.S.C. § 2541(e) (1997). 
349. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997). The precise language is: “[a] sale for other 
than reproductive purposes, made in channels usual for such other purposes, 
of seed produced on a farm either from seed obtained by authority of the 
owner for seeding purposes . . . shall not constitute an infringement.” Id.
350. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.3 (1995) 
(quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2483 (1994)). 
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farmer loses the protection afforded in § 2543 of the Plant 
Variety Protection Act.  However, if the farmer sets aside a 
portion of his crop from the first year with the intent of using 
that “saved seed” to replant his farm the following year and 
then changes his mind, then the farmer may sell the “saved 
seed” for reproductive purposes to another.351  In Asgrow, the 
Court seems to be signaling that the individual farmer does not 
“own” the seeds he produces on his own farm in the sense that 
he holds all of the property rights in those seeds.  In fact, it is 
the position of the Court that by creating the genetically 
modified seed, the seed manufacturer holds the property right 
of transfer of the property.352  The farmer is restricted to two 
options: selling his crop for non-reproductive purposes and 
retaining a portion for replanting his fields, or selling that part 
he retained for reproductive purposes and selling what remains 
for non-reproductive purposes.  After Asgrow, it appears that in 
using genetically modified, protected seeds, the farmer loses 
the property right of selling his entire crop for reproductive 
purposes.
Shortly before Asgrow was decided, Congress amended the 
crop exemption provided in 7 U. S. C. § 2543 by removing the 
“brown bag” exemption, thus making only sales for non-
reproductive purposes eligible under the crop exemption.353
Because the amendment took effect after the Supreme Court 
decided Asgrow, the Court held that brown-bag sales of only 
that seed sufficient to replant the farmer’s own fields were 
permissible under the “crop exemption.”354  Were Asgrow
decided today, it would come out differently because farmers 
would be totally prohibited from selling seed for reproductive 
purposes.355  The substantive law now indicates that a farmer 
may not sell Plant Variety Protection Act certificated seed that 
he has grown on his land for anything other than non-
 351. With the “terminator technology,” this entire problem is moot because 
the seeds cannot be sexually reproduced beyond the first generation. See
generally Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the “Terminator” Technology 
Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds 
and the Right to Save and Replant Seed, 41 B.C. L. REV. 627 (2000). 
352. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.3 (1995). 
353. See Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103-349, 108 Stat. 3142, 3144 (1994). The Supreme Court decided Asgrow 
shortly after the 1994 amendment of the crop exemption, but before the 
effective date of the amendment. 
354. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.2 (1995). 
355. See generally Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995). 
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reproductive purposes.356  Also, the Plant Variety Protection Act 
allows farmers to save the Plant Variety Protection Act 
certificated seed from one planting cycle for use in a 
subsequent planting cycle.357  It is precisely for this reason that 
the seed manufacturer would be motivated to seek a utility 
patent under 35 U.S.C. for the seed rather than Plant Variety 
Protection Act certification. 
The current value of the Plant Variety Protection Act 
should be seriously questioned for the following reason: 
Congress’ stated intent of protecting the certificate holder’s 
profits and rights was circumvented by permitting the farmers 
to save and replant certificated seed. In addition, the patenting 
and subsequent licensing of new varieties has made Plant 
Variety Protection Act protection unattractive.  When Congress 
enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970, it expressly 
stated that its purpose in enacting the Act was to encourage 
research and marketing for eventual public benefit.358  Of 
course, lawmakers raised concerns that the new law would 
impose higher costs on farmers that would ultimately be passed 
on to consumers.359  Even though § 2543 was added to exempt 
sales of seeds between individual farmers360 to lessen the 
potential rise in certificated seed prices, Congress recognized 
that a price rise was inevitable.361  Recognizing that the Act 
356. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997). 
357. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 188 n.2 (1995); 
Plant Variety Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-349, 108 
Stat. 3136, 3142 (1994); 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994); 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1997). 
 358. Specifically, the language is: “[i]t is the intent of Congress to provide 
the indicated protection for new varieties by exercise of any constitutional 
power needed for that end, so as to afford adequate encouragement for 
research, and for marketing when appropriate, to yield for the public the 
benefits of new varieties.”  7 U.S.C. § 2581 (1970). 
359. See generally 116 CONG. REC. 40,295-40,303, 40,295 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 
1970) (statement of Rep. Poage). 
360. See Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1017 
(5th Cir. 1983) (holding that the crop exemption contemplates only direct sales 
between individual farmers without the participation of a third party). 
 361. Representative Poage stated that: 
I do not think there is any doubt that it will mean if somebody 
produces a seed that gives better results than anybody else’s seed, 
and if he is the only one who can sell that seed, then he will get more 
for it . . . . This is the only way we know to get people to invest their 
time and money. It is expensive to develop such seeds. So in the end, 
we believe there will be beneficial results for the producers and 
farmers.
116 CONG. REC. at 40,296. 
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would clearly benefit the seed manufacturers through 
competition, it became clear that the farmer could not be 
insulated from the negative economic side effects of the Plant 
Variety Protection Act, notwithstanding § 2543.362  Since a 
farmer can replant seed produced on his farm from Plant 
Variety Protection Act protected seed without liability,363 the 
seed manufacturer loses a potential sale each time a farmer 
does replant.  Despite the prohibition on sale of protected seed 
between individual farmers, the crop exemption of the Plant 
Variety Protection Act runs counter to the Act’s express 
purpose because the farmer can still replant his fields with 
protected seed that he has grown on his own land.  Therefore, 
in order to prevent significant financial loss to the seed 
manufacturers, the Plant Variety Protection Act must be 
amended to remove this exemption as articulated in § 2543. 
2. Property Rights Under the Patent Act 
Section 101 of Title 35 of the United States Code defines 
patentable subject matter.  The Supreme Court stated in 
Chakrabarty364 that statutory subject matter “include[d] 
anything under the sun that is made by man” including man-
made life forms.  Living organisms are considered patentable 
because they are either articles of manufacture or compositions 
of matter.365  The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
addressed the question of whether either the Plant Patent Act 
of 1930366 or the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970367 were the 
exclusive forms of protection for plants, or whether protection 
could be afforded by 35 U. S. C. § 101 in addition to either the 
Plant Patent Act or the Plant Variety Protection Act.368  Based 
on the analysis set forth in Chakrabarty, the Board found that 
neither the Plant Patent Act nor the Plant Variety Protection 
362. See Delta and Pine Land Co. v. Peoples Gin Co., 694 F.2d 1012, 1016 
(5th Cir. 1983). 
363. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994). 
 364. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
365. See id. at 309-10 (quoting Hantranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 
(1887)).
366. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994). 
367. See 7 U.S.C. § 2321 (1994). 
368. See generally Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. 
App. & Interf. 1985) (holding that a maize plant variety which produced a 
high level of tryptophan was patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and may be 
certificated under the Plant Variety Protection Act). 
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Act narrowed the scope of patentable subject matter under 35 
U. S. C. §101.  While the question was not directly before the 
Board in the case, the Board stated that genetically modified 
plants, seeds, and plant tissue are patentable369 under the 
principles set forth in Chakrabarty.  The Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit in Pioneer Hi Bred International, Inc. v. 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.370 clearly stated371 that a novel plant 
369. See id. at 443, 447-48. 
370. See Pioneer Hi Bred International, Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 
F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 371. While the statement was made in dictum, it is a clear representation 
of the position of the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, and is a 
position that the Supreme Court has taken as well.  As this manuscript was 
entering the final editing stage for publication, the Supreme Court decided the 
case of Pioneer Hi-Bred Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc.  Because of the 
importance of the case, a brief review is given here. 
In Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1813 (N.D. Iowa 1998), the District Court of the Northern District of 
Iowa denied a motion for summary judgment brought by defendants in favor 
of Pioneer Hi-Bred on the question of patentability of plants.  Specifically, the 
issue before the district court, upon the motion for summary judgment, was 
whether “the Plant Variety Protection Act is the exclusive federal statutory 
mechanism for granting patent like protection for sexually reproducing plants 
to the exclusion of the general patent law.”  Id. at 1814.  An interlocutory 
appeal was made to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  See Pioneer 
Hi-Bred Intern. Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  
Judge Newman wrote the opinion, for the panel consisting of Judges Mayer, 
Newman and Lourie, affirming the denial of summary judgment by the 
district court.  On December 10, 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the denial of 
summary judgment on writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. 
Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593 (2001).  The case was the first opportunity for the Supreme 
Court to decide the issue of patentability of plants since the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences, of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 
held that plants were patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  See Ex parte
Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443, 444 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1985).  The 
Supreme Court held “that utility patents may be issued for plants.” J.E.M. Ag. 
Supply, 122 S. Ct. 593, 596 (2001).  The question before the Supreme Court 
was whether “utility patents may be issued for plants under 35 U.S.C. § 101,” 
J.E.M. Ag. Supply, 122 S. Ct. 593, 596 (2001), or whether the Plant Patent Act 
and the Plant Variety Protection Act are the exclusive means “of obtaining 
federal Statutory right to exclude others from reproducing, selling, or using 
plants or plant varieties,” id.  J.E.M. Ag Supply had purchased bags of hybrid 
corn seeds bearing a limited label license and resold those same bags to 
farmers.  J.E.M. Ag Supply was not a licensed agent of Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International.  Pioneer Hi-Bred brought a cause of action against J.E.M. Ag 
Supply for patent infringement and J.E.M. Ag Supply counterclaimed patent 
invalidity.  See id. at 597.  The District court for the Northern District of Iowa 
held that plant life is patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  See J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 597 (2001); 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 
82         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
(BNA)  1813 (N.D. Iowa 1998).  Significantly, the district court stated that the 
seed was not removed from the Pioneer Hi-Bred seed corn bags, was not 
rebagged, and “the markings on the Pioneer bags have not been altered.” 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA)  1813, 1814 (N.D. Iowa 1998).  The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit affirmed both the reasoning and the decision of the district court.  See
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 597 
(2001); Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374 
(Fed. Cir. 2000).  The Federal Circuit stated that: “[n]either Congress nor the 
courts excluded new plant varieties from the patent statute; the enactment of 
the PVPA did not effect such an exclusion.” Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc. v. 
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000).  The Supreme 
Court affirmed the decision of the Federal Circuit, and thus the case must be 
tried to a jury in the Northern District of Iowa on the question of patent 
infringement.  Specifically, the Supreme Court held that “newly developed 
plant breeds fall within the terms of §101.” J.E.M. Ag. Supply, 122 S. Ct. 593, 
606 (2001).  Two unresolved issues are immediately apparent: first, even if 
“newly developed plant breeds” are patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101, whether 
the patent is valid in light of obviousness and prior art; and second, whether 
the first sale doctrine applies to seed that has been purchased from the seed 
manufacturer such that it can be resold without being reproduced under 
United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U. S. 241, 249 (1942).  The first of 
these issues is briefly discussed here; the other is discussed elsewhere in this 
article.
The first immediately apparent issue is whether the patent, issued on a plant 
variety, is valid.  35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that: “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition 
of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  35 U.S.C. § 
101 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  In 1980, the Supreme Court concluded that 
living things were patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “the relevant 
distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between 
products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.”  
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980).  The issue upon which 
Chakrabarty turned was whether a “composition of matter” included living 
things.  The Supreme Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty stated that: “[i]n 
choosing such expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ 
modified by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the 
patent laws would be given wide scope.”  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303, 308 (1980).  Because the Court viewed living things as compositions of 
matter, then it held, in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, that living things were 
patentable.  The Supreme Court extended this logic to plants in J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc.  However, reliance by the Supreme 
Court upon the decision by the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, in 
Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1985), as to 
whether plants are “compositions of matter” and hence patentable under §101 
is misplaced.  This is because of three interconnected concepts: (a) the term 
“plant” is ambiguous; (b) the plant cell is actually a biological machine; and (c) 
naturally occurring mutations in the plant variety genome preclude a clear 
definition of exactly what legal estate is actually protected by the letters 
patent.  While these concepts will be considerably expanded elsewhere, space 
limitations permit only the briefest exposition of them here. 
When the Court states that “plants” are patentable, it does nothing to clarify 
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the state of the patent law with respect to genetic manipulation of the plant 
genome.  This is because the term “plant” is ambiguous.  While common sense 
dictates that a “plant” is that item that we can perceive using our five senses, 
a clear definition of the term “plant” such that the force of patent law may be 
engaged is certainly not in hand.  Turning to the plain meaning canon of 
construction, a plant is defined as: “any living thing that cannot move 
voluntarily, has no sense organs, and generally makes its own food by 
photosynthesis; a vegetable organism, as distinguished from an animal 
organism; any tree, shrub, herb, etc.”  WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY
DICTIONARY 1373 (1983).  While this moves us further toward what the term 
“plant” means for patenting purposes, the movement is only incremental.  
This is because, as indicated earlier, 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that: “[w]hoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may 
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this 
title.”  Thus, for “plants” to be patentable, the inventor must have either 
invented or discovered the “plant” or “any new and useful improvement” of the 
“plant” (accepting for the time being that a “plant” is included in the 
“composition of matter” category).  That is, the inventor must have either 
invented or discovered an inanimate object devoid of senses and voluntary 
movement, which generates its own food by photosynthesis, or “any new and 
useful improvement thereof.”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  One can easily make 
the argument that indeed by inserting a transgene into the genome of a plant 
variety, the criteria articulated in the previous sentence are indeed satisfied.  
However, the inanimate object devoid of senses and voluntary movement, 
which generates its own food by photosynthesis, existed before the inventor 
inserted the transgene.  The only difference between the inanimate object 
before the inventor inserted the transgene and after the transgene was 
inserted is that after the transgene was inserted the cells of the inanimate 
object produce the protein or chemical specifically encoded for by the 
transgene (presuming, of course, that the transgene is completely expressed 
by those same cells).  The inventor did not change the physical form of the 
inanimate object, except, possibly, for a scaling in size, (which accounts for the 
lack of ability of the average farmer to know whether genetically manipulated 
plants exist on his fields by mere visual inspection) nor did the inventor 
change the function of the cells of the inanimate object.  Because nothing 
changed about the inanimate object upon insertion of the transgene, except for 
the production of a single chemical species, the inventor did not either invent 
or discover an inanimate object devoid of senses and voluntary movement, 
which generates its own food by photosynthesis, or “any new and useful 
improvement thereof,” id., then the inventor did not invent a “plant.”  In order 
for the physical manifestation of the inventor’s original thought to be 
protected by the granting of a letters patent the term “plant” must be replaced 
by a term that correctly describes the nature of that physical manifestation. 
The Supreme Court considers the combination of the transgene and the plant 
genome a “plant” which it places within the statutory subject matter 
“composition of matter.”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  As discussed elsewhere, 
labeling the aforementioned inanimate object/transgene a “composition of 
matter” is to use clever language of form to mask the reality of function.  A 
plant is composed of cells.  Each cell is a biological machine that uses the 
information stored in the plant genome (the cellular DNA) to produce a 
myriad of chemical compounds (some of which are more useful to the plant 
than others).  That is, the expression of a gene, contained in the plant genome, 
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causes the cell (the biological machine) to produce a particular chemical 
compound.  If the codons of the gene are altered, through either natural 
mutations or through insertion of foreign codons, then the chemical compound 
produced by the cell will be altered.  If a given naturally occurring gene is 
replaced by a foreign gene, which may be a transgene, then the cell will (or 
may) not produce the original chemical compound but will generate a different 
compound.  If the plant genome is supplemented by the insertion of a 
transgene (a gene that is from a sexually incompatible species) then the cell of 
the plant will produce a new chemical compound in addition to the previous 
set of chemical compounds (presuming, of course that the transgene is 
completely expressed, and that insertion of the transgene does not inhibit 
normal expression of the native genes).  The cell of the plant, that is the 
biological machinery, is not altered by the presence or expression of the 
transgene and the biological machinery is not changed by the presence of the 
chemical compound encoded for by the inserted transgene.  To give a concrete 
analogy, consider a manufacturing plant that initially produces green widgets.  
A change in instructions to the machinery of the plant to produce blue widgets 
does not change the machinery of the manufacturing plant, only the color of 
the product produced by that machinery.  So it is for the biological machinery 
of the plant cell.  The biological machinery is not altered by the expression of 
the transgene, only the type of chemical compound produced. 
While the presence of the chemical compound, encoded for by the inserted 
transgene, in the cells of the plant may be new, and may confer useful 
characteristics upon the plant, the inventor has neither invented or discovered 
“any new and useful” biological machinery nor has the inventor invented “any 
new and useful improvement thereof.”  35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  The most that 
the inventor has done is to take a previously existing biological machine and 
instructed it to produce a different chemical compound. 
Finally, as discussed elsewhere in this paper, the plant genome is public 
property.  Therefore, even if a patent is granted for a “transgenic plant,” the 
genome of the plant is public property and the patent is not infringed because 
to hold otherwise would be to allow adverse possession against public 
property.
While it is the position of the author that patents on “transgenic plants” 
cannot be valid (even given that the Supreme Court held that “plants” are 
patentable), it is also the position of the author that valid patents may be 
obtained to protect the rights in intellectual property of inventors who 
genetically manipulate plants.  To see this, consider the statement of the 
Supreme Court, in J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., that: 
“advances in biological knowledge and breeding expertise have allowed plant 
breeders to satisfy § 101’s demanding description requirement.” J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 593, 600 (2001).  When 
a transgene is inserted into the plant genome, current biological techniques 
can be used to determine that: (a) the complete transgene has been inserted; 
(b) the introns can be both identified and their location within the transgene 
can be precisely determined; (c) the transgene is completely expressed by the 
cell; and (d) the chemical compound encoded for by the transgene is both 
produced and is produced as a direct result of the expression of the transgene 
by the cell.  Thus, the physical manifestation of the original thought of the 
inventor can be completely characterized sufficient to meet the patenting 
standards of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) and 112, ¶ 1 (1994).  Thus, a claim that 
covers the transgene satisfying the criteria enumerated in (a) through (d) 
above is not only patentable, but indeed valid.  In fact, such a claim may be all 
2002] JACK AND THE BEANSTALK 85
variety might be protected under both Title 35, Section 101 of 
the United States Code and the Plant Variety Protection Act. 
Thus, a seed manufacturer may obtain a patent on a variety of 
genetically modified seed as well as certification under the 
Plant Variety Protection Act.  Furthermore, the case history 
indicates that a particular variety of plant may be protected 
under both Section 101 and Section 161 of Title 35.372  Because 
Section 161 of Title 35 relates to asexually reproduced plants 
while the Plant Variety Protection Act relates to sexually 
reproduced plants, and since “variety” is defined differently 
under each statute, a plant cannot be protected under both the 
Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act. 
In Jack’s case, statutory protection for the beans could 
have been obtained by a utility patent on that particular bean 
variety.373  The statute states that the utility patent protection 
may be obtained for “any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.”374  In exchange for creating Jack’s beans 
and making full public disclosure of the invention, the seed 
manufacturer is granted patent protection.375 In order to obtain 
a patent on Jack’s beans, the seed manufacturer must convince 
the Patent and Trademark Office376 that the pertinent 
requirements of Title 35 of the United States Code have been 
satisfied.377  Once this demonstration has been made the Patent 
and Trademark Office will issue a patent on the beans, which 
that is required to fully protect the interests of the inventor in his legal estate. 
372. See generally Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. 
App. & Interf. 1985). 
373. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). “Whoever invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” Id.
374. Id.
375. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: 
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1989). 
 376. In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must show that the invention 
is useful and novel, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 (1994), and non-obvious, 35 U.S.C. § 
103(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  Also, the patent holder must enable the 
invention, meaning that the inventor must provide sufficient information 
about the invention to enable “others skilled in the art” to replicate the 
invention. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997). 
 377. Since the beans are presumed to have been obtained by sexual 
reproduction, the Plant Patent Act provisions of Title 35 are not applicable. 
The seed manufacturer may only obtain a utility patent on the beans it sold to 
Jack.
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protects the invention for a period of twenty years after the 
date of filing the patent.378  As discussed infra, the granting of a 
patent on an invention creates rather broad and exclusive 
rights to exclude others from producing, selling, using, or 
offering for sale the invention within the United States.379
When infringement of the patent occurs,380 the patent holder 
has a cause of action against the infringer.381
Since Jack purchased the seeds, he may plant them and 
reap the harvest382 from the magical kingdom in the clouds.  
The question is what may Jack legally do with the beans 
produced by his mighty beanstalk? 
The grant of a patent by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office creates a legal estate in the patentee for a 
statutorily specified period.  Similar to other legal estates, 
equitable interests may be incident to the estate created by the 
patent, and these interest may be conveyed by either contract 
or by operation of law.  The person to whom the patent is 
issued, the patentee, holds a present interest in the legal 
estate, which descends to his heirs or assigns.383  The interest, 
378. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
379. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 380. Infringement of the patent may occur in a number of ways, including 
imitation of the invention, see Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical 
Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997), and independent invention after the original invention 
was made. 
381. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994). 
 382. While it is common sense that Jack should be able plant the beans 
and to reap the harvest from the plants, in light of the patent statute, it is not 
so clear what rights Jack has in his beans. 
383. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The patentee holds 
a present interest in a legal estate, which his heirs or assigns may take either 
by contract or by operation of law. The patentee, however, need not be the 
inventor because the inventor may have assigned the patent to the patentee 
either before the invention was completed or before the patent was issued. See
35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). When the invention has been assigned by the inventor, 
the patent will issue to the assignee.  See 35 U.S.C. § 152 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997) (“Patents may be granted to the assignee of the inventor of record in the 
Patent and Trademark Office, upon the application made and the specification 
sworn to by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title.”) When the 
patent is granted to the assignee, the interest in the legal estate becomes 
vested in the assignee, and the assignee becomes the patentee of the 
invention.  Since the entire interest in the legal estate is vested in the 
patentee, upon granting of the patent, the inventor cannot, and does not, hold 
an interest in the legal estate; hence the inventor is divested of title to any 
interest in the legal estate. 
In the case that the inventor assigned his title in the legal estate before the 
patent was granted, the assignee does not take possession of title to the legal 
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which the holder of the legal estate possesses, is only the power 
to exclude others from “making, using, [or] offering for sale”384
the invention for a period of 20 years from the date of filing of 
the patent application in the United States.385
In order to analyze the interests held by the patentee, it is 
necessary to look at the Patent Act because the statute 
“regulate[s] the whole subject of transferring or subdividing the 
exclusive right vested by the patent in the patentee,”386 and the 
transfer and subdivision are not regulated by common law.387
The statutory provision recites that the patents “shall be 
assignable in law by an instrument in writing.”388  The statute 
addresses only the legal estate vested in the patentee.  That is, 
the statute recognizes an exclusive right, vested in the 
patentee, which can be conveyed to another only in the form of 
estate until the patent has actually issued.  Between the time that the 
assignment was made by the inventor and the issuance of the patent, the 
assignee holds only the right to obtain title to the legal estate and the right to 
pursue remedies, in both law and equity, against the inventor and third 
parties.  A question arises as to whether the right to obtain the title to the 
legal estate can be conveyed to another before the invention is perfected.  That 
is: is a conveyance of the right to take title to the legal estate valid before 
either conception or reduction to practice of the invention?  The answer is no.  
The statute mandates that “[a]pplications for patent, patents, or any interest 
therein, shall be assignable in law.” 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994).  Since constructive 
reduction to practice occurs when the application for patent is filed, and the 
invention is presumed to exist when the patent is granted, then the statute 
appears to contemplate assignment of title to the legal estate of completed 
inventions.  Since the invention must exist before title may be assigned, then 
an assignment of an incomplete or inchoate invention is not valid.  However, a 
contract to convey the exclusive interest in a legal estate of a future invention 
may be enforced by a bill of specific performance.  See Nesmith v. Calvert, 1 
Wood. & M. 34, 18 F. Cas. 2 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 10,123).  The conveyance 
of interest in the legal estate can only operate when the device or process has 
been either conceived or reduced to practice and is suitable subject matter for 
an application for a patent.  A contract may be negotiated between the 
inventor, or his heirs or assigns, and the party who is to take legal title to the 
invention before the invention has been perfected.  However, the contract to 
convey the interest in a future invention or an improvement to be made to an 
existing invention will not, standing by itself, authorize the party who is to 
take legal title to take the patent upon issue. 
 384. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
385. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 386. George T. Curtis, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS 162 (1867). 
 387. Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1850) (the court stated that: 
“the monopoly granted to the patentee . . . is created by the act of Congress; 
and no rights can be acquired in it unless authorized by statute, and in the 
manner the statute prescribes,” id. at 494). 
 388. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). 
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writing.  The statute provides that either the whole or part of 
the vested exclusive right may be conveyed389 to another and 
that the conveyed exclusive right may cover either the “whole 
or any specified part of the United States.”390
The statutory grant of an exclusive right in the patentee is 
peculiar to patent law because the interest, as stated above, is 
the “right to exclude others from making, using, offering for 
sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States.”391
In addition, the interest relates spatially to various regions of 
the United States.  This means that the patentee may, by a 
written instrument, convey to any other person the right to 
exclude others from “making, using, etc.” within any particular 
part of the United States.  The patentee retains all other rights 
in the legal estate.392  The statute does not, however, act to 
create an exclusive interest in a legal estate which includes the 
right to make, use, offer for sale, or sell the “invention 
throughout the United States,”393 but rather, the exclusive 
interest is the right to exclude others from doing so. 
The statute relates solely to the conveyance of the 
exclusive interest in the legal estate created by the grant of a 
patent within a particular territory of the United States.  After 
the conveyance, the patentee retains no interest in the legal 
estate within that particular territory of the United States.  
Consider an instrument, which conveys a limited and non-
exclusive right to exercise some of the privileges secured to the 
patentee by the grant of a patent within a limited territory or 
the whole of the United States.  The statute does not relate to 
such an instrument of conveyance because the instrument is a 
license, and no language can be found in the statute relating to 
the conveyance of less than the exclusive interest.  The 
formalities attending the conveyance of exclusive interest must 
be reduced to “an instrument in writing.”394  The conveyance 
 389. If a contract or covenant has been made that the inventor will convey 
his exclusive interest in the legal estate to a party, in whose favor the contract 
operates, then equity holds that the inventor is compelled to make the 
conveyance, including any improvements made to the invention after the 
patent application has been filed. See Nesmith v. Calvert, 1 Wood. & M. 34, 18 
F. Cas. 2 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 10,123). 
 390. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994). 
 391. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
392. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1850). 
 393. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).  See also 35 U.S.C. § 
261 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 394. 35 U.S.C. § 261, ¶ 2 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
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may operate as either an assignment or a license.  To 
distinguish, recognize that to operate as an assignment, the 
instrument must convey to the grantee the exclusive interests 
which the patentee, or inventor, holds in the legal estate.395
Therefore, the patentee may partition his legal estate as he 
sees fit.396  Of course, the marketability of a limited interest in a 
legal estate may be inhibited.  Once the interest has been 
assigned, it is not revocable.397  The statute contemplates that 
the interest is divisible into two parts: first, the “patent, or any 
interest therein” is “assignable in law”;398 and second, an 
exclusive right under the patent can be granted to any specified 
part or the whole of the United States.399  The conveyance of the 
exclusive interest in the legal estate created by the patent must 
be recorded with the Patent and Trademark Office.400
Three classes of conveyances of exclusive interest must be 
recorded with the Patent and Trademark Office: first, an 
assignment of the whole exclusive interest must be recorded; 
second, an assignment of an undivided part of the exclusive 
interest must be recorded; and third, the exclusive interest to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention 
within a specified part or the whole of the United States must 
be recorded.401  One can see that the conveyance to be recorded 
must divest the patentee of his entire interest in such part of 
the legal estate, or in such part of the United States, as the 
instrument affects.  If the instrument vests an exclusive 
interest in the grantee such that the patentee is no longer able 
to exert control over that interest in law or equity, then that 
instrument must be recorded with the Patent and Trademark 
Office.
The instrument conveys a license, and as such, is not 
required to be recorded with the Patent and Trademark office if 
the instrument permits the patentee to exercise control over 
that interest which the instrument affects, and vests in the 
grantee the privilege to be free from liability if the grantee 
 395. The patentee has the right to exclude others from making, using, 
selling, or offering to sell the invention; further, in granting to others an 
interest in his legal estate, the patentee also retains the right to limit the 
interest granted. 
396. See Steam Cutter Co. v. Sheldon, 10 Blatch. 1, (C.C.D. Vt. 1872). 
397. See id. at 12. 
398. Id.
399. See id.
400. See 35 U.S.C. § 261, ¶ 3 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
401. See id.
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chooses to make, use, sell, or offer to sell the invention 
patented.402  Whether the conveyance is an assignment of 
exclusive interest (either in whole or in part of the legal estate 
created by the patent grant) or a license is to be determined by 
the following: an “inquiry into the fair meaning and intention 
of the parties;”403 the nature of the transaction; the type and 
quantity of consideration; and extrinsic circumstances 
indicating that an assignment was conveyed.404  If the patentee 
holds the interest to make, use, sell, or offer to sell within a 
particular part or the whole of the United States with the 
grantee, then the instrument of conveyance will certainly be a 
license, which need not be recorded with the Patent and 
Trademark Office. 
To be precise, an assignment relates to the interest in the 
patent whereas the license relates to the mere right to not be 
liable for infringement of the patent should the grantee use the 
patented invention or practice the invention.  The license does 
not grant to the grantee the primary interest in the legal 
estate; that is, the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention patented.  The 
assignment necessarily diminishes pro tanto the interest that 
the patentee holds in the legal estate, while the interest of the 
patentee remains unencumbered by the rights conveyed by the 
license.  The licensee cannot acquire an exclusive interest in 
the patented invention, and hence takes no part of the legal 
estate.  For example, consider a composition of matter as the 
subject matter of the invention.  If the patentee authorizes 
another to make and sell a composition of matter, the grantee 
402. See Brooks v. Byam, 2 Story 256, 4 F. Cas. 258 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) 
(No. 1,947); Pitts v. Whitman, 2 Story 609, 19 F. Cas. 767 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) 
(No. 11,196). The precise result derived from the cited cases is that: if the 
instrument permits the patentee to exercise control over that interest which 
the instrument affects, and vests in the grantee the privilege to make, use, or 
sell the invention free of liability then the instrument of conveyance is a 
license and as such is not required to be recorded with the Patent and 
Trademark Office.  This result cannot be reached under modern patent law 
because the patentee is granted, by letters patent, the exclusive right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale or selling the invention 
patented.  Since the only interest, of present concern, in the legal estate is the 
right of the patentee to exclude others then the only interest that can be 
conveyed is the right to not be liable when the grantee chooses to infringe the 
patent. 
 403. Dorsey Revolving Harvester Rake Co. v. Bradley Mfg. Co., 12 Blatch. 
202, 208, 7 F. Cas. 946, 948 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 4,015). 
404. See id.
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becomes a licensee and has no authority to grant to other 
parties the right to make and sell the composition of matter.405
The patentee retains the exclusive interest of granting to the 
other parties such a right.406  Thus, the licensee has the 
authority to exercise only those privileges contemplated by the 
patentee when the license was conveyed and the exclusive 
interest in the legal estate remains with the patentee. 
Having described in detail that which is created when a 
patent is granted, this Note will now examine the nature of the 
legal estate with respect to genetically modified plants.  There 
can be no doubt that the current status of the law holds that 
genetically modified plants are patentable subject matter under 
35 U. S. C. § 101 (they may also be certificated under either the 
Plant Variety Protection Act or the Plant Patent Act).  In fact, 
the Supreme Court decided on December 10, 2001, just as this 
work was in the last stage of the editing process, that plants 
are patentable subject matter.407  The question of patentability 
of Roundup Ready408 canola was also raised by the defense in 
the case of Monsanto v. Schmeiser.409  The corpus of the legal 
405. See Brooks v. Byam, 2 Story 256, 4 F. Cas. 258 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) 
(No. 1,947). 
406. See Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 495 (1850) (holding: “the 
legal right in the monopoly remains in the patentee, and he alone can 
maintain an action against a third party who commits an infringement upon 
it”). See also Woodworth v. Wilson, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 712 (1846); Wilson v. 
Rousseau, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 646, 686, 688 (1846). 
407. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 
593 (2001).  The case clarifies relatively little, and in fact may have actually 
set the stage for a multitude of problems for the seed manufacturers in the 
future.  A brief discussion of the case is presented supra, note 371. 
 408. Roundup® and Roundup Ready® are trademark names of products 
produced and marketed by Monsanto.  For simplicity, these trademark names 
will be used throughout the text, unless a specific quotation is identified, 
without the symbol ®. 
409. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256 
(Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fctcf.gc.ca/fct/2001/
2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001). In discussing the validity of the 
patent which Mr. Schmeiser was accused of infringing, Mr. Judge MacKay 
stated in paragraph 83 that: 
[m]oreover, the fact that replication of the gene may occur in the 
natural course of events, without human intervention after 
insertion of the gene in the original plant cells, and plants, 
produced for seed, and that this may result in differences between 
individual canola plants does not in itself preclude registration, 
under the Patent Act, of the invention, that is, creation of the gene 
and the process for inserting the gene.  Not all progeny from pollen 
of Roundup Ready plants will be Roundup tolerant if outcrossing 
with Roundup susceptible plants occurs, but only use of those 
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plants containing the gene can be subject to Monsanto’s claims as 
patent holder. 
Id. Because this paragraph may be dispositive in determining liability for 
contamination of a non-licensed farmer’s fields through genetic pollution and 
because it is determinative in assessing liability for patent infringement by 
Mr. Schmeiser (and similarly situated farmers), it warrants some 
consideration.  The conclusion that “only use of those plants containing the 
gene can be subject to Monsanto’s claims as patent holder” is both drawn on a 
faulty analysis of the relevant plant genetics and plant biochemistry, 
discussed infra, and leads to a serious undercutting of Monsanto’s legal 
position, of the farmer’s legal position, and puts the court in a position that it 
very well might not want to be.  The court’s analysis appears to hinge on the 
presumption that the exhibition of Roundup resistance in a variety implies 
that the transgene is present in that variety.  The court’s conclusion is that 
the right of Monsanto to protect its interest in the transgene follows the 
transgene independent of where that transgene might be found.  Thus, the 
court appears to desire to find that any farmer who has the transgene in 
plants on his fields, without a license, is guilty of infringement of Monsanto’s 
patent. 
Several possible outcomes are immediately apparent as a result of the court’s 
conclusion that Monsanto’s right to protect its interest in the transgene is 
independent of where the transgene is found.  Provided the court was correct 
in its assertion that “[n]ot all progeny from pollen of Roundup Ready plants 
will be Roundup tolerant if outcrossing with Roundup susceptible plants 
occurs,” which it was not, then a case could exist in which the transgene is 
present in the progeny (of the originally Roundup Ready progenitor variety) 
but not be expressed, and hence the progeny would be Roundup sensitive.  
Unless Monsanto performed a careful DNA analysis on the progeny variety it 
would be unable to determine whether the transgene was present in the 
progeny (that is, Monsanto could not simply rely on the grow-out test it used 
to determine whether Roundup Ready canola was growing on Mr. Schmeiser’s 
fields).  In this case, it would not be economically, or practically, feasible for 
Monsanto to obtain the probable cause to believe that the transgene was 
present on the farmer’s fields.  Further, because the court is equating the 
presence of the transgene with Roundup tolerance, if Monsanto attempts to 
claim infringement of a patent where the transgene is found on the farmer’s 
field when the transgene is not expressed, under the court’s statement it 
cannot do so (because the plants are Roundup sensitive).  When the transgene 
is present in the plants on the farmer’s fields but not expressed, the farmer 
has no way of knowing of the existence of the transgene until testing of the 
crop occurs prior to selling that crop into a premium market (such as for 
human consumption).  Here, the farmer has two options: first, to not sell into 
the premium market and hence eliminate the need for testing for the presence 
of the transgene; second, to attempt to sell into the premium market and run 
the dual risk associated with testing for the presence of the transgene.  The 
first risk is that his crop will not be suitable for sale into the premium market 
and hence he will lose his premium price.  The second risk is that Monsanto 
will find out about the presence of the transgene on the fields of the farmer 
and sue the farmer for patent infringement.  Finally, if the farmer is 
producing a crop to be sold into the premium market for reproductive 
purposes, and that crop is contaminated by the transgene unbeknownst to the 
farmer, then the farmer has the same dual risk just identified. 
The second possible outcome may result when the transgene is both present 
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and expressed in the progeny (of originally Roundup sensitive progenitor 
variety) plants.  The result concerning the farmer, as discussed in the previous 
paragraph, will occur in this case.  The current case is the strongest case for 
Monsanto because when it is observed that the progeny both has the 
transgene present in its genome and the transgene is (apparently) expressed, 
then the court will conclude that the farmer is guilty of infringement.  There 
are several problems with this outcome.  First, as discussed infra, the 
presence of the transgene and the exhibition of Roundup tolerance by the 
progeny variety is not sufficient to conclude infringement of the patent.  
Second, it necessarily denies the farmer his right to not have the transgene in 
the plants on his fields.  Third, it denies Monsanto the possible defense of 
disclaiming all interest in the transgene when the transgene has polluted the 
farmer’s fields. 
The third possible outcome may result when the progeny (of an originally 
Roundup sensitive progenitor variety) exhibits Roundup resistance but the 
underlying biochemical and genetic basis for the resistance is not certain.  
Because the court is equating Roundup tolerance with the presence of the 
gene, then the court must necessarily conclude that whenever Roundup 
tolerance is found then the transgene is present.  This is problematic for 
Monsanto on several levels: first, if the progeny of originally Roundup 
sensitive weeds exhibit Roundup tolerance, then the court must conclude that 
the transgene is present in the noxious weeds.  In this case, Monsanto may be 
liable for genetic pollution and creation of a nuisance and may not be able to 
use the defense that the progeny noxious weeds lack the transgene.  Second, if 
a progeny plant (of an originally Roundup sensitive plant variety) that is 
Roundup tolerant occurs in the farmer’s field, then the farmer will be unable 
to use the defense that the tolerance was naturally developed because the 
court must conclude that the tolerance is the result of the transgene’s 
presence on the farmer’s fields.  Also, should the farmer sue Monsanto for 
genetic pollution, then Monsanto will be unable to argue that it has no 
interest in the gene (that has caused the plant to exhibit Roundup tolerance) 
and, simultaneously, Monsanto may successfully sue the farmer for 
infringement of the patent (because the court has held that Monsanto’s 
interest in the legal estate containing the transgene travels with the 
transgene independent of where that transgene may be found).  Because the 
court fails to separate the existence of Roundup tolerance from the presence of 
the gene, its statement that “only use of those plants containing the gene can 
be subject to Monsanto’s claims as patent holder” undercuts Monsanto’s legal 
position with respect to the farmer; undercuts the farmer’s legal position with 
Monsanto; and puts the court into the position of coming to unjust conclusions 
(as it did in the Schmeiser case).  The court came to this untenable position 
because it failed to recognize the basics of plant genetics and plant 
biochemistry.
Stating that “[n]ot all progeny from pollen of Roundup Ready plants will be 
Roundup tolerant if outcrossing” occurs, clearly mixes the concepts underlying 
the areas of plant genetics and plant biochemistry while failing to understand 
the biochemistry of gene expression.  The court in paragraph 83, quoted supra,
is making two highly questionable assumptions: first, that the presence of the 
transgene is a necessary condition for the plant to exhibit commercially useful 
Roundup resistance; and second, that outcrossing with a Roundup sensitive 
variety may lead to the existence of the transgene in the progeny without 
being expressed and that the transgene simply may not be transferred at all.  
The presence of the transgene is not conclusive as to whether the plant 
94         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
exhibits Roundup resistance.  If the gene is not properly expressed or is not 
expressed at all, then the plant may not exhibit Roundup resistance.  Further, 
the presence of the transgene might not be necessary for the plant to exhibit 
Roundup resistance (as is amply demonstrated by the development of 
Roundup resistance in noxious weed species).  The transgene (conferring 
Roundup resistance) was designed to be dominant; that is, both present and 
expressed in the progeny plant.  In fact, Robert Horsch, under cross-
examination at trial in the case of Monsanto v. Schmeiser, “agreed [that] a 
dominant gene, such as the Roundup resistant gene transferred to canola 
plants, would be present in any pollen from that plant and could be 
incorporated by nontransgenic plants.” Murray Lyons, Farmer’s Reapings No 
Fluke, Court Told: Schmeiser Planted Roundup Ready Canola Knowingly, THE
SASKATOON STARPHOENIX at A1 (June 6, 2000), available at 
http://www.biotech-info.net/no_fluke.html (last visited July 21, 2001). 
Since the transgene is neither recessive nor quasi-dominant, outcrossing 
between a Roundup resistant variety and a sexually compatible Roundup 
sensitive species or variety will yield a progeny plant with the transgene 
present (with the caveat discussed below).  Because the biochemistry of the 
Roundup sensitive variety determines, in part, whether the transgene will be 
expressed, an a priori conclusion of transgene expression in the progeny plant 
is far from certain.  In addition, because a transgene designed to have a less 
than unity probability of expression in the progeny of Roundup resistant 
progenitor plants would be useless, the probability of the transgene failing to 
express in the progeny plant of a Roundup sensitive plant is vanishingly 
small.  Further, those progeny plants in which the transgene is present but 
not expressed will be Roundup sensitive.  Those progeny plants will not 
survive treatment with Roundup, and hence their variety of genome will be 
eliminated.  One might say that, with probability near unity, outcrossing with 
a Roundup sensitive variety will yield a Roundup resistant progeny. 
In exceedingly rare circumstances, the transgene for Roundup resistance is 
present in the progeny of an originally Roundup sensitive variety, but is not 
expressed. The reason for this event may be due only to prohibitive plant 
biochemistry, not plant genetics.  Monsanto is as acutely aware of this fact as 
any other entity.  When Koziel, who was and is working for Monsanto, 
inserted the native gene for Bacillus thuringiensis kurstaki kurhd1 -
endotoxin CryIA(b) into Zea mays L., the endotoxin was not expressed.  See
MURRAY, supra note 194 and associated text; KOZIEL, supra note 195 and 
associated text; KOZIEL, supra note 173 and associated text.  This is because 
the codon usage of the native gene was not compatible with the biochemistry 
of Zea mays L. See MURRAY, supra note 194 and associated text; KOZIEL,
supra note 195.  If a gene is expressed that confers Roundup resistance on a 
particular variety which is not a transgene, then that plant does not infringe 
the patent.  Further, that particular gene may be recessive or quasi-dominant 
and hence may not be either be present or expressed when the Roundup 
resistance variety is outcrossed with a Roundup sensitive variety.  The 
remaining possibility is the case in which the transgene is both present and 
expressed.  In this case, the progeny of the originally Roundup sensitive 
variety will be Roundup resistant.  In this case, the plant genetics dictate the 
presence of the transgene and the plant biochemistry dictates the expression 
of the transgene.  One needs to recognize at this point that the Roundup 
sensitive variety may contain a gene that would confer Roundup resistance if 
it were expressed, but the variety is Roundup sensitive because that 
particular gene is not expressed.  Employing techniques that have the effect of 
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upregulating that gene, or set of genes, would confer Roundup resistance on 
that variety. 
Two conclusions are then readily available.  First, outcrossing between a 
Roundup resistant variety and a Roundup sensitive variety will produce a 
progeny that both contain the transgene and that transgene is expressed (that 
is, the progeny variety is Roundup resistant).  The case where the transgene is 
present but not expressed would be exceedingly rare and due only to the plant 
biochemistry of the Roundup sensitive progenitor variety.  Second, evidence of 
Roundup resistance in the progeny variety is not, and cannot be, conclusive 
that either the transgene is present and completely expressed or that part of 
the chimeric gene (comprised of the transgene), is not responsible for the 
upregulation of a previously existing (that is, native) gene that would have 
conferred Roundup resistance had it been expressed. 
Thus, to show infringement of the patent, Monsanto must shew that: (1) the 
transgene is present; (2) the transgene is completely expressed (that is, the 
variety exhibits Roundup resistance); and (3) the exhibition of Roundup 
resistance is due to complete expression of the transgene rather than 
upregulation of a native gene by part of the chimeric gene. 
In summary, the court, in making the statement that “[n]ot all progeny from 
pollen of Roundup Ready plants will be Roundup tolerant if outcrossing with 
Roundup susceptible plants occurs,” assumes that the transgene is recessive, 
or at most quasi-dominant, rather than understanding that the transgene is 
necessarily fully dominant by design.  Further, the court assumes that no 
mechanism exists for exhibiting Roundup resistance other than the presence 
of the transgene and that the lack of Roundup resistance necessarily implies 
the lack of the transgene.  By continuing with the statement that “only use of 
those plants containing the gene can be subject to” infringement, the court is 
equating transgene expression (Roundup resistance) with transgene presence 
in the progeny plant.  Thus the court has unnecessarily mixed independent 
concepts and has only muddled the legal conclusion that should have been 
drawn.
Since the court appears to have been interested in finding in favor of 
Monsanto, and since the court is interested in preserving the claimed patent 
rights of Monsanto in the future, the statement discussed supra should have 
been written differently.  By recognizing that outcrossing to Roundup 
susceptible varieties can happen, the court is precluding itself from agreeing 
with Monsanto in a future genetic pollution case that outcrossing cannot 
happen, or that outcrossing with remote fields of Roundup sensitive varieties 
cannot happen.  Also, the court weakens a future claim by Monsanto that if 
the transgene exists then the plant will be Roundup resistance.  Further, the 
statement that “only use of those plants containing the gene” are subject to 
claims of infringement puts Monsanto into the position of proving that the 
transgene exists (in such a case, merely showing Roundup resistance is not 
sufficient) and that the farmer “used” the plant containing the transgene.  But 
most importantly, in the single phrase “only use of those plants” the court has 
completely obliterated, obviously unwittingly, its own position in the case at 
hand.  As discussed elsewhere in this work, “use” requires a volitive act and 
the plant (while an ambiguous term as used here) can be readily construed as 
that object produced by the seed and not necessarily containing the progeny 
seed.  Therefore, the court has concluded that Monsanto must shew that the 
accused infringer (Mr. Schmeiser in the case at hand) committed a volitive act 
with the plant (which may exclude the seeds) for there to be an infringement.  
The position in which the court has placed Monsanto leads to nowhere because 
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estate is defined by the patent’s language.  It would not serve 
to examine the claim language of all the current plant patents 
for purposes of this analysis. Therefore, emphasis is given to 
examining the language of a few representative claims. 
Representative language, of interest to the current 
discussion, may be found in a patent issued to Monsanto 
Company and Ecogen, Inc. for insect-resistant transgenic 
plants.410  The patent claims,411 “[a] transgenic plant having 
incorporated into its genome a gene.”412  This language is 
excessively broad.  Recognize, of course, that in the case of a 
pioneer invention, the claims of the patent are interpreted very 
broadly, in recognition of the extraordinary contribution that 
such an invention makes to the progress of technology.413
However, the ‘013 patent is not a “pioneering” patent because a 
number of patents were issued before it which involved claims 
of a genome with a transgene included.414  For the patent to be 
Monsanto is interested in volitive acts committed with the seed, not the plant.  
Also, the plant has no value.  Thus, even if the court could find infringement 
there can be no damages. 
The far superior statement by the court would have excluded the preamble 
phrase and merely concluded that: “[t]he making, use, offering for sale, or 
selling of seeds containing the transgene constitutes infringement of the claim 
in Monsanto’s patent.”  This statement clearly articulates the law of patent 
infringement and leaves Monsanto in the position of proving infringement of a 
claim upon which substantial damages can be collected. 
410. See Leigh H. English, Insect-Resistant Transgenic Plants, U.S. PAT.
NO. 6,023,013 (issued Feb. 8, 2000) (assignee: Monsanto Company (St. Louis, 
MO) and Ecogen, Inc. (Langhorne, PA)). [the ‘013 patent] 
 411. The relevant claims of the ‘013 patent are: (1) “A transgenic plant 
having incorporated into its genome a transgene that encodes an amino acid 
sequence selected from the group consisting of . . . .”; (2) “A transgenic plant 
having incorporated into its genome a transgene comprising a nucleic acid 
sequence selected from the group consisting of . . . .”; (3) “A progeny or seed 
from the transgenic plant of claim 1 or claim 2 comprising a modified cry3B* 
gene”; (4) “A seed from the progeny of claim 3 comprising a modified cry3B* 
gene;” (5) “A plant from the seed of claim 3 or claim 4 comprising a modified 
cry3B* gene.” Id.
412. Id.
413. See Grubman Eng. & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Goldberger, 47 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 
1931)  The court stated that the “latitude we give does indeed depend upon 
how far the inventor has stepped forward; he may be a ‘pioneer.’  When he is, 
we stretch his claims to the breaking point.” Id. at 153. 
414. See, e.g., Dilip M. Shah, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert B. Horsch & 
Robert T. Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 4,940,835 (issued 
July 10, 1990) (claiming a “glyphosate-resistant dicotyledonous plant” in 
Claim 29); Camille Deluca-Flaherty, Victor J. Chan, Liliana E. C. Scarafia & 
Karen J. Brunke, Thiol Protease Inhibitor, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,629,469 (issued 
May 13, 1997) (claiming the “transgenic plant of claim 9 wherein said plant is 
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“pioneering” in the sense of being among the first to claim a 
transgenic plant, no other patents would exist before the 
issuance of the ‘013 patent.415  Since other patents claiming a 
“transgenic plant” were issued before the ‘013 patent, the ‘013 
patent cannot be a “pioneering” patent.  Hence, the legal estate 
created by granting the ‘013 patent cannot be a “transgenic 
plant” with a transgene incorporated.  Therefore, further 
examination is needed to determine what constitutes the legal 
estate.
The specification of the ‘013 patent defines the term 
“transgenic plant” as “a plant that has incorporated DNA 
sequences, including but not limited to genes which are 
perhaps not normally present,” or “any other genes or DNA 
sequences which one desires to introduce into the non-
transformed plant, such as genes which may normally be 
present in the non-transformed plant but which one desires to 
either genetically engineer or to have altered expression.”416
Such a definition of “transgenic plant” may very well include 
nearly all plants on the planet because all that is required is 
the desire to introduce into a plant, or alter the expression of, a 
gene which is already in the plant.  Although one may “desire[] 
to introduce [the gene] into the non-transformed plant” or one 
may “desire[] to either genetically engineer or to have altered 
expression” of a gene in a plant, it may not be possible, using 
the techniques put forth in the ‘013 patent, to do so.  Also, even 
if the gene is successfully inserted into the plant, the disclosed 
methods in the ‘013 patent cannot guarantee that the gene will 
be expressed.  Now, consider the language “including but not 
limited to genes which are perhaps not normally present.”  A 
gene is either normally or not normally present in the plant.  If 
maize” in Claim 15 and teaching in Claim 9 “[a] transgenic plant comprising a 
foreign gene which encodes a peptide according to claim 1”). 
 415. Presumably, Agracetus, a small biotechnology company, obtained a 
pioneering patent on genetically engineered cotton in the United States in 
1992. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY 17 (1997) (proceedings of the forum on 
“Intellectual Property Rights and Plant Biotechnology” held at the National 
Academy of Sciences, November 5, 1996).  Indeed, the patentee claimed a 
“[c]otton seed capable of germination into a cotton plant comprising in its 
genome a . . . chimeric gene construction being effective in the cells of the 
cotton plant to express a cellular product coded by the foreign gene” in Claim 1 
and “[c]otton plants germinated from the seeds of claim 1” in Claim 1.  See
Paul F. Umbeck, Genetic Engineering of Cotton Plants and Lines, U.S. PAT.
NO. 5,159,135 (issued Oct. 27, 1992). 
 416. English, supra note 410, at § 2.6. 
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there are no genes, which are not normally present, then the 
specification of “transgenic plant” can only be referring to the 
native genome of the plant.  The native genome of the plant is 
naturally occurring and has been part of this country’s 
germplasm base since its beginnings.  The only way that the 
language, “a plant that has incorporated” can retain any 
meaning within the patent context is if it means “a plant that 
has incorporated DNA sequences not normally present.”  
However, even this would be overly broad because it would 
include all genomes with naturally occurring mutations (the 
mutations occur by alterations in the DNA sequences).  Thus, 
in order to retain meaning, the language can only mean “a 
plant that has incorporated a gene not normally present.”  
Since the definition of “transgenic plant” disclosed in the 
specification is so broad as to be meaningless because it 
includes all plants on the planet now or in the future, then the 
definition of “transgenic plant” claimed in the ‘013 patent 
cannot be supported by the disclosure in the specification.417
It must be recognized that the courts do not interpret the 
claims strictly.  In fact, while claim interpretation requires the 
same formalistic approach used to interpret other legal 
documents, such a method of interpretation requires close 
scrutiny of the language of the claims and analysis of both the 
file history and prior art.418  Likewise, it is a principle of law 
 417. For cases in which patents were found invalid due to overly broad 
claims and definitions, see: Consolidated Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light 
Co., 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895) (the objective of the disclosure “is to apprise the 
public of what the patentee claims as his own, the courts of what they are 
called upon to construe, and competing manufacturers and dealers of exactly 
what they are bound to avoid”); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970); 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re 
Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir. 
1988).
 418. In an earlier case, the Second Circuit stated that: 
 [o]n the one hand, therefore, the claim is not to be taken at its face—
however freely construed—but its elements may be treated as 
examples of a class which may be extended more or less broadly as 
the disclosure warrants, the prior art permits, and the originality of 
the discovery makes desirable.  On the other, it is not to be ignored 
as a guide in ascertaining those elements of the disclosure that 
constitute the “invention,” and without which there could no patent 
at all.  It is obviously impossible to set any theoretic limits to such a 
doctrine, which indeed its origin forbids, since it is in misericordiam 
to relieve those who have failed to express their complete meaning.  
Somewhat the same process is indeed inherent in the interpretation 
of any verbal expression, and perhaps the best that can be said is 
that in the case of patent claims much greater liberties are taken 
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that to give value to the patent grant, the patent claims are not 
limited by the precise details of the disclosure in the 
specification.419  However, the language of the claims define the 
“metes and bounds” of the invention and cannot be disregarded 
in interpreting the scope of the invention.  The language of the 
claims necessarily must be malleable, stretching to preserve 
the entire scope of the invention,420 and shrinking to limit the 
claim to allow the invention to survive a challenge.421  The 
language should be filled “as full as it will bear without 
bursting,” or pressed “so long as it will not quite break,” while 
recognizing that “of course the words have their limits.”422
When the word is defined in the specification, then that word 
must be given the same meaning in the claims.423  Since the 
words in the specification and claims must have the same 
than would be allowed elsewhere. Each case is inevitably a matter of 
degree, as so often happens, and other decisions have little or no 
value.  The usual ritual, which is so often repeated and which has so 
little meaning, that the same result must follow by substantially the 
same means, does not help much in application; it is no more than a 
way of stating the problem.  Any decision is therefore bound to have 
an arbitrary color, as in all close cases of interpretation, and it is 
difficult to give it greater authority than an appeal to the 
sympathetic understanding of an impartial reader. 
Claude Neon Lights, Inc. v. E. Machlett & Son, 36 F.2d 574, 576 (2d Cir. 
1929). Later, the principle was stated as: 
[n]o doubt the interpretation of patent claims depends more upon 
the advance made by the inventor than upon the words used, and in 
spite of protestations to the contrary, courts do at times play fast 
and loose with them as they do not with other formal documents. It 
is therefore always proper, and generally necessary, to look at the 
prior art in order to learn how closely it presses upon the disclosure. 
Cole v. Malleable Iron Fittings Co., 70 F.2d 686, 687 (2d. Cir. 1934). 
 419. Judge Learned Hand stated that: 
[a]n inventor is, of course, not confined to the exact details of his 
disclosure, else his patent would be of small value. The extent to 
which he may generalize it depends, not only upon the surrounding 
pressure of the art, but the extent to which the variations which he 
wishes to cover in his claims, are themselves within the initiative of 
a journeyman in the art. For the inventor’s contribution must be a 
sufficient guide in itself, and its extent is limited to such substitutes 
for any disclosed element, as the art needs no help to find. 
H. Ward Leonard, Inc. v. Maxwell Motor Sales Corp., 252 F. 584, 588 (2d Cir. 
1918).
420. See Gibbs v. Triumph Trap Co., Inc. 26 F.2d 312, 314 (2d Cir. 1928). 
421. See Herz Straw Co., Inc. v. Smith, 52 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1931). 
422. Gibbs, 26 F.2d at 314. 
423. See Page Machine Co. v. Dow, Jones & Co., 235 F. 121, 123 (2d Cir. 
1916).
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meaning, and to allow “transgenic plant” to be an element of 
the claim would be to defeat the claim for lack of enablement,424
the phrase “[a] transgenic plant having incorporated into its 
genome” must be read as the preamble to the claim and not as 
an element of the claim.425
Because claim language of the form “[a] transgenic plant 
having incorporated into its genome”426 cannot be interpreted as 
an element of the claim, the claim must relate to either the 
transgene which was inserted into the genome and expressed, 
or, at most, to the composition of the matter constituting the 
transgene which is expressed, and the original genome into 
which the gene was inserted.427  In either case, the insertion 
424. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).  The disclosure in the specification of the 
‘013 patent does not teach one of ordinary skill in the art how to “desire” the 
“transgenic plant” in existence, or what “DNA sequences” must be 
incorporated that already exist in the plant genome in order to create the 
transgenic plant. 
 425. Also, to allow a broad and expansive interpretation of the language 
would cause an infringement of earlier patents. For example, patent number 
5,159,135 recites in claim 5 “[a] cotton plant comprising in the genome of at 
least some of its cells” and in claims 6 and 7 “[a] cotton plant comprising in its 
genome at least two . . . .”  See Paul F. Umbeck, Genetic Engineering of Cotton 
Plants and Lines, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,159,135 (issued Oct. 27, 1992).  Similar 
language claiming a plant with a gene inserted into its genome is found in the 
following examples: Paul F. Umbeck, Genetic Engineering of Cotton Plants 
and Lines, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,004,863 (issued Apr. 2, 1991) (application filed 
December 3, 1986); Kenneth A. Barton, Insecticidal Cotton Plants, U.S. PAT.
NO. 5,608,142 (issued Mar. 4, 1997) (application filed January 23, 1989; based 
upon prosecution in action since December 3, 1986); Gregory W. Warren, 
Michael G. Koziel, Martha A. Mullins, Gordon J. Nye, Brian Carr, Nalini M. 
Desai & Kristy Kostichka, Genes Encoding Insecticidal Proteins, U.S. PAT. NO.
6,066,783 (2000); Ronald C. Lundquist, David A. Walters & Julie A. Kirihara, 
Fertile Transgenic Corn Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,160,208 (issued May 23, 2000) 
(filed March 20, 1996; the application was in the process of prosecution 
between Jan. 22, 1990 and its issue date in 2000). 
 426. English, supra note 410. 
 427. Permitting the legal estate to include the composition of matter 
constituting the transgene and the original genome is going further than the 
comfort level of the author permits.  In the view of the author, labeling the 
product of the genetic manipulation a “composition of matter” is merely 
relabeling an intrinsically unpatentable invention such that it conveniently 
falls within the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).  To be concrete, the plant cell 
is a biological machine that uses the instructions encoded into the DNA of the 
genome to carry out its normal operations.  By genetic manipulation, the set of 
instructions is altered such that the cellular machinery produces a compound 
that it did not previously produce, or produce a compound that it did 
previously produce, at a higher rate or to a higher concentration.  By altering 
the set of instructions that the cellular machinery uses is neither creating a 
new composition of matter (as the compound newly produced by the cellular 
machinery or produced at a higher level than was previously the case) nor is it 
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must have occurred by genetic manipulation technology.428
However, it is improper to claim the balance of the genome 
because it was neither created by the hands of man429 nor 
extracted, purified, and completely characterized as part of the 
genetic modification.430  Under the law, as it currently stands, it 
is possible to make a claim for the composition of the gene and 
the genome but not for the genome itself.431
Two situations may arise subsequent to the composition of 
the transgene and the plant genome: first, the plant genome 
may mutate; second, the transgene may mutate.  While these 
creating a new machine (the cellular machine still operates as it did without 
the transgene).  Also, the cellular machinery is not “improved,” it is merely 
acting as it always has; only it is producing a new type of compound.  The 
analogous situation is found in a weaving loom operated by a program 
contained in a deck of Hollereth cards.  If a small set of cards is inserted into 
the original deck of Hollereth cards the weaving loom will generate a new 
pattern of fabric and colors, but the weaving loom goes on as it did with the 
original deck of Hollereth cards.  Simply providing a new subset of 
instructions does not entitle the operator of the weaving loom to claim that he 
has a new invention that entitles him to a patent for the weaving loom.  On its 
face then, the act of inserting a small subset of instructions into the 
instruction set for the plant cell does not entitle the seed manufacturer to the 
right to claim the entire plant cell.  Because the seed manufacturer cannot 
claim the cellular machinery as discussed above, clever relabeling of that 
cellular machinery must not lead to a contrary conclusion. 
428. See id. at § 2.1 The patent specifies the technique required for the 
gene insertion as “[s]uch modifications to primary nucleotide sequences to 
enhance, target, or optimize expression of the gene sequence in a particular 
host cell, tissue, or cellular localization” and the technicians who are capable 
of carrying out the techniques as being: “those of skill in the art of protein 
engineering and molecular biology, and it will be readily apparent to such 
artisans, having benefit of the teachings of this specification, how to facilitate 
such changes in the nucleotide sequence to produce the polypeptides and 
polynucleotides disclosed herein.” Id.
429. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
430. See Ingo Potrykus et al., Genetic Engineering of Crop Plants, in
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 119-59 (Arie Altman ed., 1998) (describing 
several techniques for inserting a particular gene into the complete, intact 
nuclear genome of the plant cell). 
 431. A very candid discussion of an attempt to claim both the composition 
and the individual elements in an infringement case was presented by Justice 
Grove in Westinghouse v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., 4 DIGEST OF 
THE PATENT CASES REPORTED IN VOLUME I OF THE REPORTS OF PATENT CASES
230, 246 (1884).  Justice Grove stated that: “[s]o that every element of the 
combination, although all are old . . . is to be claimed in aid of including an 
infringer; but to be disclaimed and to be treated only as a particular 
combination of five or six elements when you come to treat the question of the 
safety of the patent and the question of whether the patent is new or not.” The 
word must be used “rationally and in the same sense” in both situations. Id. at 
246.
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two possibilities present a divergence from this article’s path 
that would be of some interest to follow, they shall be examined 
only briefly due to their relevance to present discussion.  Once 
the genome or transgene has mutated, either or both may be 
expressed to give new characteristics to the plant, which did 
not previously exist.  Although it is not entirely certain in any 
given plant variety how many of the base pairs must be 
mutated in order to give rise to a new expression of different 
characteristics than were originally expressed in the progenitor 
plant, once the set of characteristics has changed, then the 
composition is no longer the same as when the patentee 
invented it. 
It is a fundamental principal of patent law that the claims 
are the most important part of the patent and that the claims 
are the patent grant.432  Recognize that the elements of the 
claim can extend no further than to the composition of a 
genome constituting a transgene, inserted by genetic 
manipulation techniques, which is expressed.  Therefore, the 
legal estate created by the granting of the claim is either to an 
expressed transgene, inserted into the plant genome by genetic 
manipulation techniques or, at most, to the composition of the 
plant genome with the expressed transgene inserted by genetic 
engineering techniques.  The exclusive interest of the patentee 
is the right of the patentee to exclude others from making, 
using, selling, or offering to sell a genome constituting an 
expressed transgene, inserted by genetic engineering 
techniques.
This definition of the legal estate in which the patentee has 
an interest excludes genomes other than the one employed by 
the patentee, and excludes transfer of the transgene by 
methods other than by genetic engineering techniques.  As 
discussed earlier, “a genome” may reasonably be interpreted as 
being one genome from all possible plant genomes.  The 
patentee did not disclose insertion of the transgene into each of 
the possible plant genomes.433  In fact, the patentee did not 
432. See Frank F. Smith Metal Window Hardware Co. v. Yates, 216 F. 361 
( S. D. N. Y. 1914) (the court stated that a “change in the claims is as bad, if 
not worse, than a change in the disclosure, for the patent especially lives in 
the claim,” id. at 363-4). 
 433. The difficulty attendant to inserting a transgene into a plant genome 
and having it successfully expressed is well known.  See POTRYKUS, supra note 
430; See Koziel, infra note 434.  Thus for any given genome the inventor would 
have to perform a considerable amount of experimentation, possibly an 
excessive amount, to determine the precise method for successfully inserting 
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disclose insertion of the transgene into the genome of each 
variety of plant within a species and successful expression of 
that transgene.434  Based upon the available reports, the most 
that can be attributed to the patentee is that the transgene was 
successfully inserted into a particular plant cell and expressed 
by the variety of plant grown from that cell.  Thus, the most 
that could have been contemplated by the patentee is that the 
transgene was inserted into a single unitary genome and not 
any one of the set of all possible genomes.  Therefore, the 
genome used by the patentee is exclusive, not inclusive, of all 
other genomes. 
In Arie Altman’s book,435 many fine discussions are 
presented on methods by which a transgene may be in the 
genome of a particular variety of plant.  Those that may qualify 
under the classification of “genetic engineering techniques” 
necessarily involve human intervention.436  All other methods 
for translocating the transgene necessarily do not involve the 
direct intervention of man.  Because the current standard for 
patentability of subject matter is that it be “anything under the 
sun made by man,”437 then, under the current state of the law, 
only a composition created by genetic engineering may be 
patentable. 
The patentee cannot claim a composition of any genome 
and the transgene because the patentee did not contemplate 
the set of all genomes,438 has not enabled one of ordinary skill in 
 
the transgene into the plant genome and having it expressed. 
 434. Koziel admitted that insertion of a transgene into cells of the same 
variety of maize yielded different varieties (called “events”) of plants each with 
a different characteristic expression of the transgene depending on the 
promoter used for the transgene. See Michael G. Koziel et al., Transgenic 
Plants for the Control of Insect Pests, in AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 283, 
287-88 (Arie Altman ed., 1998) (describing research and developments in 
expressing Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin in both dicotyledonous and 
monocotyledonous plants).  Based upon the information available, it may 
reasonably be concluded that in most cases the transgene was either not 
successfully inserted or was not successfully expressed. See id. See also 
Potrykus, supra note 430. 
 435. See generally AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY (Arie Altman ed., 
1998). 
 436. In fact, if the transgene is inserted by any method other than by 
human intervention neither the method of translocation nor the resultant 
composition is patentable under the standard articulated in Chakrabarty. See 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 437. Id. at 309. 
 438. The doctrine underlying this statement is articulated in Consolidated 
Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 474 (1895). The 
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the art to insert the transgene into any one given genome of the 
set of all possible genomes,439 and has not enabled one of 
ordinary skill in the art to have the plant express the 
transgene.  Therefore, the legal estate is at most only the 
combination of the particular genome (or limited set of 
genomes) actually employed by the patentee and the transgene.  
All other genomes are necessarily excluded, including those 
that differ from the contemplated genome only in the 
expression of certain genes.  Now that the legal estate has been 
established, it is necessary to determine what rights the seed 
manufacturers may assert against Jack. 
Plants and seeds constitute a particular problem for utility 
patent protection because of the possibility of replicating the 
seed to a very large number of progeny.  In fact, it is the 
reasonable expectation of both the patentee and the purchaser 
of the seed that the seed will be reproduced.  Unlike hybrids, 
where the genome of the seed is notoriously unstable, 
genetically modified seeds will produce plants that in turn 
produce seeds with exact copies (presumably) of the genetic 
code artificially inserted into the progeny plant.  Jack then, 
obtains a free copy of the genetically modified variety of seed 
from his crop.  At this point, Jack has two possible alternatives 
for disposition of the progeny genetically modified beans.  He 
may sell all of the beans for non-reproductive purposes.  He 
may sell part of the seed for non-reproductive purposes and 
retain the balance of the seed for either planting during the 
next growing cycle or selling to his neighboring farmers.  
Whether Jack may engage in either of these alternatives 
depends, to a large extent, on the interpretation of the utility 
patent as applied to plants. 
First, consider whether Jack may sell his crop of beans for 
non-reproductive purposes.  The Plant Variety Protection Act 
has a crop exemption that specifically states that the protected 
seed may be reproduced to a very large number of progeny 
seeds, which may be sold for non-reproductive purposes.  
Without the crop exemption, the protection of the seed would 
patentee must identify “some general quality, running through the whole” set 
“which distinguishe[s] it from every other, and g[ives] it a peculiar fitness for 
the particular purpose.” Id. In this case, “the man who discovered such quality 
might justly be entitled to a patent.” Id. at 475. 
 439. “If the description be so vague and uncertain that no one can tell, 
except by independent experiments, how to construct the patented device, the 
patent is void.”  Id. at 474. 
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render it useless.  The plant patent act specifically states that 
the patentee has the “right to exclude others from asexually 
reproducing the plants”440 and any plant so reproduced cannot 
be offered for sale or sold.  Section 101 of Title 35 of the United 
States Code does not have a crop exemption analogous to that 
found in the Plant Variety Protection Act.441  If the variety of 
beans is certificated under the Plant Variety Protection Act, 
then Jack may sell the progeny beans for non-reproductive 
purposes only.  If the plant is protected under the Plant Patent 
Act, then Jack may plant the seeds to yield the mighty 
beanstalk and both sell the progeny beans for non-reproductive 
purposes and save seeds from crop for planting in the next crop 
cycle.  This is because the only act constituting infringement of 
a plant patent, issued under section 161 of Title 35, is the 
asexual reproduction of the ancestral plant.  If a patent has 
issued on the variety of beans under section 101, of Title 35, 
then Jack may purchase the seeds, but he may not reproduce 
the plant from which the beans originated, either asexually or 
sexually.442  That is, Jack may not plant the seeds to grow the 
mighty beanstalk.  Even if Jack does sexually reproduce the 
beans, he has no interest in the beans, which allows him to 
dispose of the progeny seeds as he sees fit.  Such a conclusion is 
also independent of whether Jack knew that a patent existed 
that protects the interests of the patentee in the beans.  This 
result seems contrary to common sense because the beans are 
meant to be reproduced and because, typically, when a person 
purchases something, the right to use that thing is implied in 
the sale. 
According to the first sale doctrine of patent law,443 once 
the patent holder has sold the patented item, the patent 
holder’s right to limit use or sale of that item has ended.  This 
 440. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
441. See Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand That Feeds: Toward Socially 
Optimal Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 CAL. L. 
REV. 1395, 1400 (1996). 
 442. This conclusion may be reached only if the existence of the mighty 
beanstalk on Jack’s land constitutes infringement of the patent.  This is the 
view employed by Judge W. Andrew MacKay in the case of Monsanto v. 
Schmeiser. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256, 
at ¶ 119 (Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001).  It is likely to be 
a common belief that possession of a genetically modified plant constitutes 
infringement.  Therefore, that is the perspective that will be followed in the 
analysis of this issue. 
443. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456-57 (1873). 
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means that a purchaser of a patented widget may use and 
dispose of that particular widget as he sees fit without 
infringing the patent.444  However, if the widget is purchased 
and used as a template to mechanically reproduce the widget 
for sale, or reproduced for the use of the purchaser of the 
original widget, then the patent would be infringed. 
Plants pose a problem that is different from mechanical 
widgets.  In plants, the patented invention is reproduced as the 
plant grows and matures. However, mechanical widgets 
cannot, yet, reproduce themselves.  Also, in mechanical 
widgets, common sense indicates that the “make” and “use” 
function are separable, while in plants the same common sense 
indicates that the “make” and “use” functions are not 
necessarily separable.  The sole purpose of purchased plant 
seed is to plant them to produce a progeny crop.  Both the seed 
manufacturer and the farmer are fully aware of this purpose.  
It is easy to argue that in the case of patented plants, the 
“make” function and the “use” function are inseparable, both of 
which the patentee has the right to exclude others from 
performing.445  The issue is whether the first sale doctrine 
should apply in the case of patented plants.446  If the doctrine 
 444. A complete discussion on the doctrine of first use, or the doctrine of 
exhaustion, is given by Scott A. Chambers, Exhaustion Doctrine in 
Biotechnology, 35 IDEA:J. L. & TECH. 289 (1995). 
 445. The argument is as follows: The farmer purchases the seed with the 
clear intention of reproducing that seed to a very large number of progeny, 
harvest the progeny seed, and sell the harvested progeny seed (presumably) 
for a profit.  The farmer plants the seed that he purchased, and a plant and 
progeny seed are produced.  Because the farmer planted the seed, then he is 
using the invention patented (the seed); and because the farmer fertilized, 
cultivated, and possibly watered the field where the plant was growing then 
the farmer is making the invention patented.  Therefore, the farmer is both 
making and using the invention patented.  Under this argument, it is 
impossible to use the seed and not make the invention patented because as 
soon as the seed germinates the invention patented is reproduced, and hence 
“made”.  Thus, it might be concluded that the use and make functions are 
inseparable in the case of plants. 
 446. This question has not yet been directly addressed by the Supreme 
Court.  In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern. Inc., 122 S. Ct. 
593 (2001), the Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a utility patent, 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994), may be obtained for a genetically modified seed 
or plant.  Because the decision that was taken on certiorari by the Supreme 
Court was the denial of summary judgment for the defendant, the underlying 
issue in the case remains unresolved.  The central issue to be decided at trial 
is whether the first sale doctrine applies to genetically modified seeds.  See
Pioneer Hi-Bred International Inc. v. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1813 (N.D. Iowa 1998).  Since the issue will not reach the Supreme 
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does apply, then Jack may purchase the protected seeds and 
dispose of them as he sees fit.  If the doctrine does not apply, 
then Jack may purchase the seed, but his right to dispose of 
them is limited. 
The Supreme Court has stated that “[a]n incident to the 
purchase of any article, whether patented or unpatented, is the 
right to use and sell it,” and that when the patentee, or his 
licensee, sells “an article which is capable of use only in 
practicing the patent [then there] is a relinquishment of the 
patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.”447  Either the 
court must treat all articles that are offered for sale the same 
under the exhaustion doctrine or plants must be treated as a 
unique class of articles because the “use” and “make” functions 
cannot be separated.  Under the first alternative, once the seed 
manufacturer sold the seeds to the farmer then it would lose all 
control over the seeds.  Under the second alternative the seed 
manufacturer would retain all rights to the seed and the 
farmer would purchase worthless seed because he could not 
plant it to produce a crop. 
It is worthwhile to note at this point that the sale of hybrid 
seeds by the seed manufacturer causes this problem to be 
solved in a natural manner.  When Jack plants his beans, 
raises the mighty beanstalk, and reaps the harvest of the 
progeny beans from the beanstalk, he is engaged in biological 
reproduction rather than mechanical reproduction.  The policy 
of protecting the interests of the seed manufacturer indicates 
that both cases of reproduction should be held equal under the 
light of patent law, and both should constitute infringement.  
This means that the doctrine of exhaustion would not apply to 
biological reproduction.  Jack, then, may purchase the seed 
from the seed manufacturer and put the seed into the ground.  
From there, infringement of the patent depends upon the 
nature of the legal estate.  If, indeed, the legal estate owned by 
the seed manufacturer is the transgene, or at most only the 
Court until several years after the publication of this article, we must 
speculate as to the disposition of the issue by the Court.  The author predicts 
that the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by Justice Thomas, 
will hold that legal title in the legal estate will remain with the seed 
manufacturer independent of the number of times that the genetically 
modified seed is sold.  This is because should legal title pass to the purchaser 
of the genetically modified seed then the seed manufacturer will no longer 
have a basis for asserting his interest in the genetically modified seeds against 
the farmer. 
 447. United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942). 
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composition of the plant genome and the transgene, then as 
soon as the seed germinates, the patent is infringed.  This is 
because each cell of the plant will have a copy of the subject 
matter of the legal estate that the patentee may exclude others 
from making.  If the legal estate is the seed of the plant, then 
the patent is infringed as soon as the seed starts to grow.  
However, it is not entirely clear whether the doctrine of 
exhaustion applies to biological reproduction when that 
function is the only use to which the seeds may be put.448
Turn now to Jack’s second option for disposing of his 
progeny beans.  Consider the case of Jack selling the crop of 
beans from his magic beanstalk for reproductive purposes.  If 
the doctrine of exhaustion were applied to biological 
reproduction, then the seed manufacturer would not have the 
right to exclude Jack from selling the seeds for any purpose and 
Jack would be permitted to engage in biological reproduction of 
the invention patented where he would not be allowed to 
engage in mechanical reproduction of the patented widget.  If 
the doctrine of exhaustion were not applied to biological 
reproduction, Jack would be infringing the patent upon selling 
the progeny seeds for reproductive purpose because, as 
discussed, there should be no difference under utility patent 
law between mechanical and biological reproduction, and Jack 
would have made the patented invention by growing the plant 
on his land.  It would be unjust to the patent holder of a 
genetically modified seed to apply the doctrine of exhaustion 
and hence allow Jack to reproduce the seed for any purpose he 
sees fit, whereas the holder of the patent on the mechanical 
widget would be protected from such activity. 
Mechanical and biological reproduction must be treated 
the same under patent law, therefore, the doctrine of 
exhaustion does not apply to biological reproduction and Jack, 
upon buying patented seed, does not acquire the right of 
production of the beans for sale, either for non-reproductive or 
for reproductive purposes.  Jack only acquires the property 
right transfer, use, and waste of the beans that he originally 
purchased.  A cause of action for equity and damages would 
exist for mechanical reproduction of a widget, so the same 
should lie for biological reproduction of beans.  In order for 
Jack to produce progeny seeds, either for his own use or for sale 
for non-reproductive purposes, he must obtain a license from 
448. See Chambers, supra note 444, at 321-29. 
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the seed manufacturers. 
3. Property Rights Under Licensing Agreements 
The seed manufacturers have increasingly turned to 
licensing agreements to provide protection for their intellectual 
property in genetically modified plants.  The standard practice 
in the seed industry is to require the farmer to sign a license 
agreement449 with the seed company before purchasing 
genetically modified seeds for planting on his farm.450  In the 
case where the genetically modified plant is protected by a 
utility patent, the license allows the farmer to plant the seed 
and sell the progeny seed for non-reproductive purposes.451  If 
the plant is also protected by a certificate issued pursuant to 
the Plant Variety Protection Act,452 then the license agreement 
adds a redundant layer of protection for the seed 
manufacturers by prohibiting the farmer from transferring, or 
alienating, any of the seed he produces for any purpose other 
than non-reproductive purposes.453
449. See Rick Weiss, Seeds of Discord; Monsanto’s Gene Police Raise Alarm 
on Farmers’ Rights, Rural Tradition, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1999, at A1. 
450. See Lewontin, supra note 127. 
451. See HAMILTON, supra note 304. 
 452. The Plant Variety Protection Act, as interpreted in Asgrow, limits the 
sale of seed for reproductive purposes to only that quantity sufficient to 
replant the farmer’s fields.  The amendment to the Plant Variety Protection 
Act, § 2543, prohibits the farmer from selling any of his seed for reproductive 
purposes. Therefore, the provision in the license agreement, which prohibits 
the farmer from selling genetically modified seeds certified under the Plant 
Variety Protection Act for reproductive purposes, is redundant. 
 453. A copy of the Technology-Use License Agreement used by Monsanto in 
Canada for glyphosate-resistant canola was kindly provided by Mr. Schmeiser. 
It states: 
Technology Use Agreement terms and conditions 
[1.] The Grower shall use any purchased Roundup Ready® canola 
seed for planting one and only one crop for resale for consumption.  
The Grower agrees not to save seed produced from Roundup Ready® 
canola seed for the purpose of replanting nor to sell, give, transfer or 
otherwise convey any such seed for the purpose of replanting. The 
Grower also agrees not to harvest any volunteer Roundup Ready® 
canola seed crops. 
[2.] The Grower shall purchase and use only Roundup® branded 
herbicide labeled for use on all Roundup Ready® canola seed 
purchased.  The Grower shall purchase both the Roundup® branded 
herbicide and the Technology Use Agreement as a package from his 
retailer of choice.  The Seed Purchase Fee shall be non refundable 
after the date of reconciliation of actual acres planted as set forth in 
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The license agreement prohibits the farmer from using the 
seed produced on his land for planting in the next growing 
cycle.  However, the license does not prohibit the farmer from 
purchasing and using “brown-bag” seed as long as the 
technology-use license agreement is in force, and as long as the 
farmer observes the restrictions on using the seeds for a single 
growing cycle.454  In addition, the farmer is prohibited from 
harvesting any volunteer seed.  This prohibition is perplexing: 
first, if the volunteer plants occur in a field of non-modified 
seeds of the same species (say glyphosate-resistant canola in a 
field of glyphosate-susceptible canola) then how are these 
plants to be identified?  And if they could be identified, how is 
the farmer expected to either remove the genetically modified 
plants or avoid harvesting seeds from these plants?  Second, if 
the Monsanto Roundup Ready® canola service policy. 
[3.] Monsanto warrants the tolerance of plants from Roundup 
Ready® canola seed to Roundup herbicide when used at specified 
label rates and as per label instruction. 
[4.] The Grower grants Monsanto the right to inspect, take samples 
and test all of the Grower’s owned and/or leased fields planted with 
canola, or any other land farmed by the Grower, and to monitor the 
Grower’s canola fields and storage bins for the following three years 
for compliance with the terms of this Agreement.  All such 
inspections shall be performed at a reasonable time, and if possible, 
in the presence of the Grower. The Grower also agrees to supply 
upon request the locations of all fields planted with canola in the 
following three years. Grower has or shall obtain all permissions 
required for Monsanto to exercise this right to inspect, take samples 
and test. 
[5.] If the Grower violates any of the Terms and Conditions of this 
Agreement, the Grower shall forfeit any right to obtain any 
Agreement in the future and this Agreement may, at Monsanto’s 
option, be terminated immediately.  In the event of any use of 
Roundup Ready® canola seed which is not specifically authorized in 
this Agreement, the Grower agrees that Monsanto will incur a 
substantial risk of losing control of Roundup Ready® canola seed 
and that it may not be possible to accurately determine the amount 
of Monsanto’s damages. *** 
[6.] The Terms and Conditions of this Agreement are personal to the 
Grower and shall be binding and have full force and effect on the 
heirs, personal representatives, successors and permitted assigns of 
the Grower, but the Grower’s rights hereunder shall not otherwise 
be transferable or assignable without the express written consent of 
Monsanto.
Monsanto Technology-Use Agreement provided by Mr. Percy Schmeiser, 
Farmer, Saskatchewan, Canada (July 6, 2001) [hereinafter Monsanto 
Technology-Use Agreement].  A copy of the Monsanto Technology-Use 
Agreement is on file with the author. 
454. See id.at [1.]. 
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the genetically modified seeds are growing in a field of a 
different species of crop, then who should be liable for the cost 
of removal?455  Volunteer plants arrive on the farmer’s fields 
through a number of routes, including by the wind, animals, 
and farm equipment; and by latent germination of dormant 
seeds left from a previous harvest.456  Identifying the volunteer 
genetically modified plants in fields of the same species of 
plants, or eradicating volunteer plants in a field of a different 
species of plants may be extremely expensive and difficult.  
Thus, the requirement that the farmer not harvest volunteer 
genetically modified plants places an unreasonable burden on 
the farmer’s resources and an unreasonable restraint on his 
use of his land. 
The license in the case of Roundup-resistant genetically 
modified plants also requires the farmer to purchase Roundup 
as a bundled package with the technology-use license.457  The 
provision458 grants Monsanto the exclusive right to sell 
herbicide to the farmer.  The motivation behind this provision 
might be that Monsanto warrants the tolerance of the 
glyphosate resistant field crop plants, or that Monsanto wishes 
to prohibit the farmer from using glyphosate from another 
source and hence extend its monopoly in Roundup beyond the 
expiration of the patent.  However, the warranty could easily 
be written to exclude situations in which the farmer used a 
glyphosate herbicide other than Roundup without limiting the 
farmer’s right to purchase the herbicide from vendors other 
than Monsanto. 
The most onerous provisions in the license grant Monsanto 
the right to inspect any and all fields and storage bins, which 
the farmer planted, or used, with the genetically modified seed.  
In addition, Monsanto assumes the right to inspect the farmer’s 
fields and bins the following three years for the purpose of 
 455. If the genetically modified seeds are Roundup-resistant then they 
must be removed by hand because spraying with Roundup would be 
ineffective and spraying with any effective herbicide in general would destroy 
the entire crop. 
 456. For instance, maize left behind from a previous growing cycle will 
grow as “volunteer” plants in a field of soybeans.  Furthermore, canola will lie 
dormant for up to 10 years before germinating. See Interview: Schmeiser 
{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270. 
 457. While this may raise antitrust issues analogous to those where 
Microsoft required bundling of its web browser with its operating system, 
discussion of such issues are too far removed from this paper’s thesis. 
458. See Monsanto Technology-Use Agreement, supra note 453, at [2.]. 
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monitoring compliance with the terms of the agreement.  This 
is independent of whether the farmer has chosen to use the 
genetically modified seeds in subsequent growing cycles or 
continue to grow that particular species of plant.  Recall the 
provision that prohibits the farmer from harvesting volunteer 
seeds.  If the volunteer seeds grew to a sufficiently dense 
population, and the farmer could not detect them, then the test 
for the transgene would indicate that the farmer was in 
violation of the technology-use license even if, in fact, he had 
planted non-genetically modified plants.  In order to avoid the 
possibility of a false positive test for violation of the technology-
use license, the farmer must give up his right to decide what 
seed varieties of a particular plant species to plant on his fields.  
Also, the farmer must give up the right to decide what species 
of plant to grown on his fields.  Monsanto, by license, acquires 
the right to inspect both the farmer’s fields and his bins.  The 
license does not require the farmer’s presence when Monsanto 
enters the farmer’s land to inspect the crop.  Monsanto’s 
assumed right to enter and inspect the farmer’s fields is 
independent of whether the farmer is currently growing 
genetically modified plants on those particular fields. 
The license agreement binds not only the farmer, but also 
the “heirs, personal representatives, successors and permitted 
assigns” of the farmer.459  This provision leads to very curious 
results.  First, Monsanto retains the right to enter and inspect 
the land upon which genetically modified plants were grown 
even after the farmer has died, and his estate has been 
distributed to his heirs who may not be farming the land at all.  
In fact, it is entirely conceivable that owners of the field parcels 
after the fields have been subdivided and houses built upon 
them, would not be able to exclude Monsanto from entering 
their land.  Second, is the case where the farmer dies, his 
estate is distributed, and his heirs lease the land to other 
farmers. In that situation, the farmer’s estate (where the 
farmer signed the technology-use agreement) could be liable for 
damages if the lessees unknowingly harvest genetically 
modified seeds.  Evidently, the farmer lessees may not be liable 
for damages because the license specifies that the farmer who 
signed the license would be liable.460  Third, consider the case 
where a farmer leases land from a disinterested landowner and 
459. See id. at [6.]. 
460. See id. at [5.]. 
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plants genetically modified seed covered by the technology-use 
license in year one.  At the end of year one, the first farmer is 
displaced and replaced by a second farmer who has not signed 
the license and who does not wish to grow genetically modified 
plants.  If farmer two harvests volunteer genetically modified 
plants, either knowingly or unknowingly, then it appears that 
the first farmer would be liable for damages to Monsanto, 
because the second farmer would be a successor to the land.  It 
is unjust and against the policy of contract law that a license 
signed by and agreed to by the first person should be binding 
upon the second person who was ignorant of the license and did 
not agree to the terms of the license.  Also, by its language, the 
license is binding upon the signing farmer and is not an 
encumbrance upon the land.  If the agreement were to be an 
encumbrance upon the land, then it must specifically so state 
and would be an easement, not a license.  An easement must be 
registered with an authority of the state; the license agreement 
is, evidently, not so required.  Therefore, only the grower is 
bound by the agreement and liable should the provisions be 
violated by an heir, assign, or successor.461
The above analysis is for Roundup-resistant canola.  Yet, 
reports of similar conditions have been made for other 
Roundup-resistant plants in the United States.  Typically, the 
license agreement will restrict the use of the progeny seed 
beyond that extent mandated by statute.  The license 
agreement usually prohibits the farmer from using the seed 
produced on his land for replanting in the next growing cycle.462
Therefore, the license agreement restricts the farmer to a 
single crop from a single purchased seed.  In essence, the 
farmer gives up the property right to use the purchased seed as 
 461. In the case of Percy Schmeiser, the person (we shall call him R) who 
reported Mr. Schmeiser to Monsanto as possibly growing Roundup-resistant 
canola had rented a parcel of land upon which he had planted Roundup-
resistant canola.  The landowner declined to rent the land again to person R 
the next year and rented the land to Mr. Schmeiser instead.  Because canola 
“volunteers” from one growing cycle to the next, the canola that Mr. Schmeiser 
harvested during the subsequent growing cycle was certainly contaminated 
with the transgene.  Because Mr. Schmeiser would have retained some seed 
from these fields, as was his customary practice and right, then the following 
years his entire crop of canola would have been contaminated with the 
transgene.  Since Mr. Schmeiser was a successor to the land and because Mr. 
Schmeiser did not sign the license agreement it is unjust to hold him to the 
terms of the agreement; rather person R must be held liable to Monsanto.  
Such an outcome would be ironic indeed. See supra note 456. 
462. See Lewontin, supra note 127, at 72. 
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he sees fit,463 and must give up substantial property rights in 
his own land. 
Ownership of land includes the right to use that land as 
the owner sees fit.  To enter into the license agreement the 
farmer is forced to give up this right.  The license agreement 
does so by requiring that the farmer return to the same seed 
company and purchase the same variety of seed for the next 
growing cycle if the farmer desires to continue production of the 
same type of crop.464  Such a license provision protects the 
market share that the seed manufacturer has established, by 
prohibiting the farmer from: saving seed and replanting his 
own fields; transferring possession of the seed, whether the 
progenitor seed or progeny seed, to others; and using a 
competitor’s seed in those growing cycles in which protection 
against either insect or herb pests is not necessary.465  It is clear 
then that the seed manufacturers who use license agreements 
to protect their genetically modified seeds may have better 
463. See id.
 464. The licensing agreement from Monsanto for use of its Roundup Ready 
seeds requires that the farmer use them for only a single planting. The license 
agreement also includes a provision which states that Monsanto has the right 
for three years after the purchase of the seed to enter the farmer’s lands and 
test the seeds to determine whether a Roundup Ready seed has been planted.  
See Monsanto Technology-Use Agreement, supra note 453.  See also Weiss, 
supra note 449.  Not only is this requirement an invasion of the farmer’s 
property rights in his own land to exclude, it is unnecessarily costly because 
the farmer is required to purchase Roundup Ready seeds each year.  Evidence 
is being accumulated which indicates that noxious plants adapt to 
environmental stress such as periodic glyphosate, the active ingredient in 
Roundup, exposure at a surprising rate.  It is unclear whether the successful 
adaptation is the result of stress induced genetic modification by the plant 
species or by some other coping mechanism.  See Gregg Hillyer, PROGRESSIVE 
FARMER 36 (Oct. 2000).  The recommendations are that Roundup not be used 
for each growing cycle, and that several years intervene between its use. See
id. at 37.  Because glyphosate has a very short lifetime in the environment, it 
is unnecessary for the farmer to use Roundup Ready seeds during the growing 
cycles in which Roundup is not used for noxious plant control.  Therefore, the 
license agreement permits an unnecessary invasion of the farmer’s property 
rights by requiring the farmer to submit to random inspections during those 
planting cycles when he need not use Roundup Ready seeds. 
 465. In order to reduce the possibility of the development of herbicide 
resistance in noxious plants or bio-insecticide resistance in insects, it is 
necessary to alternate growing cycles in which either herbicides are applied 
for control of noxious plants or bio-insecticides are applied for control of 
insects with growing cycles in which the control is not applied.  In those 
growing seasons in which the control is not applied, it is not necessary for the 
farmer to incur the additional costs associated with the genetically modified 
seed.
2002] JACK AND THE BEANSTALK 115
control over the disposition of the seed crop by the farmer than 
they may have under the Plant Variety Protection Act or under 
Title 35 of the United States Code.466
Control by the seed manufacturer comes at a high cost to 
the farmer.  The farmer no longer has the right of alienation of 
his property in the seed, either the progenitor seed or the 
progeny seed.  He loses the right to use his lands as he sees fit: 
he may not plant a particular crop type with the genome of his 
choice and he may not be able to leave his fields lie fallow 
because the license stipulates that the farmer purchase the 
particular seed variety each year.  Because the seed 
manufacturer has written the license agreement such that the 
company investigators may enter the farmers lands and test 
the crop for compliance with the license agreement, the farmer 
must give up the right to exclude others from his lands.  The 
farmer can, however, choose to not plant the genetically 
modified plant and to not sign the technology-use license.  This 
will not guarantee that the farmer will be immune to liability 
when the transgene is translocated onto his lands. 
Without the genetically modified crops, the farmer must 
use pesticides to control insect pests, and herbicides and 
cultivation of the fields to control noxious weeds.  The 
genetically modified crop is claimed to be beneficial to the 
farmer because of the reduced pesticide and herbicide costs and 
the reduced costs associated with the cultivation of the fields.  
In fact, the genetically modified crops are delivering high 
transaction costs and may not be living up to their 
expectations.  The high transaction costs come when the farmer 
attempts to market the progeny seeds from genetically 
modified plants.  The progeny seeds must be tested for the 
existence of the modified genome, and must be kept separate 
from the stream of crops destined for human consumption 
unless the crop is specifically licensed for consumption by 
humans.  The failure to live up to expectations is seen in the 
development of glyphosate resistance in noxious plants and 
with the development of bio-insecticide resistance in insect 
pests.  In summary, the farmer, by agreeing to the license 
agreement, becomes locked into the use of a variety of 
genetically modified plant marketed from a particular seed 
manufacturer which carries with it high input costs to his 
operation without the guarantee that the seed will yield the 
466. See Lewontin, supra note 127, at 72. 
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results expected.467  As part of the bargain, the farmer must 
 467. It also appears that if the reasoning of the Federal District Court in 
Canada is followed then all farmers in the vicinity of the licensed farmer, who 
has the genetically manipulated plants on his farm, must also sign the 
Technology-Use License Agreement and pay the licensing fee, even though 
they may not wish to have the genetically manipulated plant on their fields.  
To see this, consider the case of Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enter., Ltd.,
2001 FCT 256 (Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001), in which 
Monsanto sued Mr. Schmeiser for patent infringement. In paragraph 28 of the 
court’s decision in Monsanto v. Schmeiser, Judge MacKay discussed the rights 
retained by Monsanto under contract.  Specifically, Judge MacKay stated that: 
[a]ll of the plaintiffs’ licensing arrangements in Canada are made by 
or on behalf of Monsanto Canada. It licenses commercial seed 
growers to grow Roundup Ready canola for seed purposes. Farmers 
are required to attend a Grower Enrollment Meeting conducted by 
Monsanto representatives who describe the gene technology and the 
licensing terms for its use. A grower must be certified to use the 
gene technology by signing a Roundup Ready grower agreement. 
This entitles a farmer to purchase Roundup Ready canola seed from 
an authorized Monsanto agent, but to acquire seed the farmer must 
also sign a Technology-Use Agreement provided by the retail seed 
agent acting for Monsanto Canada. Under the latter agreement, the 
farmer can use the seed for planting only one crop, to be sold for 
consumption to a commercial purchaser authorized by Monsanto. 
The farmer undertakes not to sell or give seed to any other third 
party and not to save seed for his own replanting or inventory.  
Under the TUA Monsanto has the right to inspect the fields of the 
contracting farmer and to take samples to verify compliance with the 
agreement.
Id.  The court indicated that the farmer must sign the Technology-Use License 
as a prerequisite for acquiring the genetically modified seed.  This does not 
address the situation in which the farmer does not “acquire” the transgene 
through a vendor but rather the transgene contaminates his fields through 
natural forces.  However, the tenor of the court’s decision in paragraphs 94 
through 97 indicates that even if the farmer does not “acquire” the transgene 
through normal retail channels, he must have signed a Technology-Use 
License Agreement in order to avoid infringement of the patent. 
Three important items in paragraph 28 need to be recognized.  First, the court 
is stating that Monsanto, by means of the Technology-Use License Agreement, 
claims the right to determine the retail channels through which the 
genetically modified seeds may be conveyed to the farmer (by stating that the 
farmer is entitled “to purchase Roundup Ready canola seed from an 
authorized Monsanto agent,” paragraph 28).  Second, Monsanto claims the 
right to dictate the channels through which the farmer may dispose of his crop 
(by stating that the farmer’s crop may “be sold for consumption to a 
commercial purchaser authorized by Monsanto,” paragraph 28).  The court is, 
then, recognizing that Monsanto, by contract, may create a vertical monopoly 
which eliminates competition amongst retail level seed suppliers and which 
eliminates competition amongst commercial purchasers of the farmer’s crop.  
The third important item in paragraph 28 is the court’s statement that: 
“Monsanto has the right to inspect the fields of the contracting farmer and to 
take samples to verify compliance with the agreement.”  Thus, by contract the 
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farmer relinquishes the right to exclude Monsanto from his fields.  However, 
the contractual right, claimed by Monsanto, to control the vertical structure of 
the market for genetically modified crops and the contractual right of access to 
the fields and crops of the licensee, see Monsanto Technology-Use Agreement, 
supra note 453, does not extend to the control of the vertical market structure 
for non-licensed farmers and does not extend to the right of access to the fields 
and crops of those non-licensed farmers.  Further, Monsanto cannot claim 
such rights under the patent law. 
However, Judge MacKay seems to have missed the distinction between 
contractual rights and interest protected by the grant of letters patent.  In 
paragraph 37, Judge MacKay recognized that: 
[i]n the summer of 1997, the plaintiffs, through Robinson 
Investigations, a private agency in Saskatoon, undertook random 
audits of canola crops growing in Saskatchewan.  The farms were 
identified by Monsanto from among their licensed farmers, or from 
leads or tips suggesting that Roundup Ready seed might be growing 
on property of an unlicensed farmer, or from random inspections 
undertaken to audit a farming area. The defendants’ farm was 
included in this audit process after an anonymous tip was received 
indicating that Roundup Ready canola was being grown in 
Schmeiser’s fields, where it was not licensed. 
Id. Indeed, while the Technology-Use License Agreement allows Monsanto to 
inspect the fields of the licensee, it certainly does not grant Monsanto the 
right to enter and inspect the fields of a farmer who is not a licensee.  Neither 
the technology-use license nor the patent grants Monsanto the right of entry 
onto the fields of non-licensed farmers or to take plants from those fields.  As 
early as 1997, Monsanto was identifying target farmers and target fields using 
either informants, or more worrisome, through illegal inspections of the fields 
of farmers who did not sign the license.  This strategy of conduct becomes 
particularly egregious when the farmer’s land is contaminated by the 
transgene without the knowledge of the farmer.  Further, neither the 
Technology-Use License Agreement nor the grant of a patent gives neither 
Monsanto nor any other person the right to take and convert the property of a 
farmer who has chosen to not become a licensee.  Judge MacKay recognizes, in 
paragraph 46 of the decision, that: 
[l]ater in the spring of 1998, Monsanto representatives learned that 
the defendants had seed treated at the HFM and that HFM had 
retained samples of his seed for its own purposes.  They requested a 
sample of the seed withheld from Mr. Schmeiser by HFM. Mr. 
Schmeiser had not previously used HFM for seed-treating purposes, 
and he was not aware that samples were regularly taken from the 
seed provided by farmers. As was done for all others whose seed was 
treated, HFM did take samples of the seed brought in by the 
defendants and of the seed after treatment and before delivery to 
Schmeiser. HFM provided a portion of both samples to Monsanto 
without informing Mr. Schmeiser that this had been done. 
Id.  Without criticism of Humboldt Flour Mills (HFM) or of Monsanto, Judge 
MacKay apparently approved of the practice engaged in by Humboldt Flour 
Mills of retaining seed from a customer without permission of that customer, 
and making that retained seed freely available to Monsanto without prior 
permission of the customer and without compensation to the customer.  
Humboldt Flour Mills is not contractually bound to the customer to retain the 
seed, is not contractually bound to the licensee farmer to retain the seed, and 
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certainly is not contractually bound by Monsanto to either retain or assign 
possessory interest in the retained seed to Monsanto. 
Of course, it could be argued that this is a de minimis situation where the 
remedy for the customer is in tort.  However, if a representative of Humboldt 
Flour Mills were to enter a grocery and take an equivalent amount of candy 
from the store without obtaining permission to do so by paying, then that 
representative would be guilty of shoplifting and subject to a stiff criminal 
penalty.  Furthermore, if that representative then assigned possessory 
interest in that stolen candy to a representative of Monsanto, then the 
Monsanto representative would be liable under criminal law as well.  The 
situation of Humboldt Flour Mills taking from its customer and assigning that 
seed to a representative of Monsanto is analogous and similar criminal 
sanctions must be applied.  Independent of how and from where Monsanto 
obtained its evidence, the court finds the evidence admissible at trial.  Judge 
MacKay gives a clear stamp of approval to Monsanto overstepping the bounds 
of both the contractual rights and interest protected by the letters patent in 
paragraph 72 of the decision when he states that the evidence obtained from 
Mr. Schmeiser’s fields by Monsanto “was not obtained illegally” and that “its 
admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”  
Paragraph 72.  To say that trespass, theft, and conversion is not illegal is an 
insult to the face of an orderly society and it sends a clear message to each 
seed manufacturer that it may act with such impunity as to have no bounds 
that the law will proscribe.  Neither contract nor patent law should be 
stretched to the point that it was in the decision by Judge MacKay in allowing 
plaintiff’s evidence into court. 
One may, of course, argue that Mr. Schmeiser has a cause of action in tort 
against Humboldt Flour Mills for theft and conversion.  Further, it might be 
argued that Mr. Schmeiser has superior title over Monsanto to the sample of 
seed taken by Humboldt Flour Mills and conveyed to Monsanto.  In both cases, 
it might be argued that the remedy is in tort and since the injury is de
minimis, no damages will lie.  Such an argument is without merit and is 
clearly meant to vest rights in Monsanto and Humboldt Flour Mills that 
should not be vested and completely ignores the rights both denied and passed 
with the sample. 
Like the piece of candy in the grocery store, the small sample of Mr. 
Schmeiser’s canola seeds represent far more than the fair market value of the 
item in question (be it the piece of candy or the sample of canola seeds).  When 
Mr. Schmeiser took the canola seeds to Humboldt Flour Mills to be prepared 
for planting, he conveyed to Humboldt Flour Mills an immediate possessory 
interest in the canola seeds, but not the right to alienate the canola seeds to 
another.  Further, because Mr. Schmeiser expected to have all of canola seeds 
returned, he did not convey a permanent possessory interest in the seeds.  
Certainly, Humboldt Flour Mills could alienate the seeds but it could not 
retain the value of the seeds because it would be unjustly enriched if it did so. 
Mr. Schmeiser also had an expectation of privacy in the plant genome of the 
canola seeds.  Indeed this expectation of privacy is not vitiated simply because 
of the conveyance of a temporary possessory interest.  The conveyance was an 
essential aspect of the course of normal business conducted by Mr. Schmeiser.  
He expected that the plant genome would be disclosed to no other party, and 
he expected that Humboldt Flour Mills would neither discover the plant 
genome nor attempt to have it reproduced for itself.  Furthermore, there was 
an underlying trust between Mr. Schmeiser and Humboldt Flour Mills that 
both the canola seed would be returned in proper course and that Humboldt 
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give up property rights in not only his crop but also his land 
without recourse for failure of the seed manufacturer to 
perform by delivering a seed that is resistant to pests. 
Because the seed manufacturers have invested a considerable 
amount of resources in developing the genetically modified seed, 
there is an interest in protecting that investment so that revenue 
streams will compensate for the initial investment.  The seed 
Flour Mills would not convey the seeds to another.  By retaining the sample of 
canola seeds and conveying it to Monsanto, Humboldt Flour Mills violated 
that trust.  Such a violation might very well cost Humboldt Flour Mills dearly 
in the future because of lost business.  Also, the violation cost Mr. Schmeiser 
because of the lost ability to have his seeds processed for planting in a readily 
available facility. 
More importantly is the inability, because of the actions on the part of 
Humboldt Flour Mills, and ultimately Monsanto, of Mr. Schmeiser to use the 
canola plant genome that he had so meticulously developed over the span of 
half a century.  Because the variety of canola that Mr. Schmeiser developed 
was superior to other available varieties, he would not have abandoned it in 
favor of an inferior variety, but for the actions of Humboldt Flour Mills and 
Monsanto.  This means that his measurable loss is far greater than the value 
of the small sample of seeds conveyed from Humboldt Flour Mills to Monsanto 
(we shall leave to the side the question of chain of custody of the sample from 
Mr. Schmeiser’s fields to the scientists who tested the samples at Monsanto’s 
research facilities).  The loss to Mr. Schmeiser is a function of the lost 
availability of the canola plant genome that he had developed. 
Without specifying the nature of the function, we may assert that the loss is 
easily computed as follows.  Let N represent the number of future planting 
cycles that Mr. Schmeiser would have had available to him.  Let pS(i) be the 
profit to be realized from the crop containing the plant genome developed by 
Mr. Schmeiser in year (i) (in the future), and pC(i) be the profit to be realized 
from the crop grown from commercially available plant genome (that is, 
commercially available seeds containing a genome different from that 
developed by Mr. Schmeiser).  Further, let qj(i) be the profit realized by Mr. 
Schmeiser due to the conveyance, either by license or transfer of title, by Mr. 
Schmeiser to farmer j in year i.  Finally, define Q(N+1) as the profit realized 
by Mr. Schmeiser for conveying title to his plant genome in the year N+1, the 
planting cycle immediately following the last year that Mr. Schmeiser plants 
canola (perhaps he finally retires and goes fishing with his grandson).  Using 
some simple arithmetic, it is easily deduced that the total lost profit, PL, to Mr. 
Schmeiser due to the actions of Humboldt Flour Mills and Monsanto resulting 
from the conveyance of the sample of canola is: 
PL = ( pS (i) − pC (i))
i=1
N∑ +
i=1
N∑ qj(i)
j
∑ + Q(N +1).
This number is certain to be quite large in comparison to the fair market value 
of the sample conveyed by Humboldt Flour Mills.  In a cause of action by Mr. 
Schmeiser against Humboldt Flour Mills, this is the amount of damage that 
must be awarded. 
In summary, then, the total value of the sample of seeds far exceeds the fair 
market value of the canola seeds.  The court is, indeed, committing a grand 
insult to justice if it awards an amount less than PL to Mr. Schmeiser. 
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manufacturers should exercise every reasonable effort to protect 
their intellectual property.  The farmer is motivated to reduce the 
costs of producing a crop of progeny seeds and therefore should 
exercise every reasonable effort to obtain his seed at the lowest 
possible cost.  In the usual market place, the consumer (the 
farmer) and the producer (the seed manufacturer) negotiate the 
price of a commodity as roughly equals.  If the consumer cannot 
obtain a favorable price from one producer, he is free to go to 
another producer.  Unfortunately, the market in genetically 
modified plants is dominated by monopolies in the modified plants, 
possessed by a producer who is economically much stronger than 
the farmer.  The farmer is not in a position to negotiate better 
terms in the license agreement, either because he is not 
sophisticated enough, because he cannot afford legal 
representation, or because the seed manufacturer is the only 
supplier of the seeds and the farmer has no choice but to accept 
the terms of the agreement.  In essence, the political and capital 
strengths of the seed manufacturer simply overwhelms those of 
the farmer.  Also, the farmer is constrained in the methods by 
which he may farm which require him to use modern technology to 
stay competitive in the marketplace.  It is not clear, then, that the 
farmer is in a position to either negotiate better terms of the 
license agreement with the seed manufacturers or to refuse to 
plant the genetically modified seed variety altogether.  Once the 
farmer has used the genetically modified seed, he is bound, 
essentially permanently, by the terms of the license agreement.  
The result is that the farmer must trade his property rights in his 
land and crop in exchange for a license to use the intellectual 
property rights owned by the seed manufacturers. 
4. Property Rights in Light of the Terminator Gene 
Three mechanisms have been examined by which the seed 
manufacturers may protect their investment in the 
development of genetically modified seeds.  All three 
mechanisms modify, reduce, or eliminate the property rights of 
the farmer in favor of the property rights held by the seed 
manufacturers.  However strong the protections may be, the 
seed manufacturers still face a heavy caseload of violators of 
these protections.  The ability of the farmers to violate the 
protections is due to deficiencies in the law providing the 
protections.  This result was the motivation for several 
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companies to develop “terminator technology,”468 a biological, 
and non-statutory method for protecting the seed manufacturer 
investment in genetically modified seed.  The terminator 
technology involves inserting a gene into a plant that enables 
the seed to grow to maturity but which renders progeny seed 
sterile.469  Thus, if the farmer saves seed for reproductive 
purposes it would not produce a progeny plant. 
The terminator gene470 was originally developed by the 
USDA,471 using approximately $229,000 of taxpayer money,472 in 
collaboration with Delta and Pine Land Company, the nation’s 
largest producer of cotton seeds with a seventy-three percent 
market share.  The terminator technology comes in several 
flavors.  One company has developed a seed sterilization 
468. See Yves Savidan, Terminator Genes: Fertility Rights, 353 THE
ECONOMIST 104 (Oct. 9, 1999). 
469. See Danielle Knight, Science-Rights: New Seed Technology Threatens 
Farmers, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Mar. 31, 1998, available at 1998 WL 5986450. 
470. See Oliver, supra note 139.  In abstract, the patent states that: 
A method for making a genetically modified plant comprising 
regenerating a whole plant from a plant cell that has been 
transfected with DNA sequences comprising a first gene whose 
expression results in an altered plant phenotype linked to a 
transiently active promoter, the gene and promoter being separated 
by a blocking sequence flanked on either side by specific excision 
sequences, a second gene that encodes a recombinase specific for the 
specific excision sequences linked to a repressible promoter, and a 
third gene that encodes the repressor specific for the repressible 
promoter.  Also a method for making a genetically modified hybrid 
plant by hybridizing a first plant regenerated from a plant cell that 
has been transfected with DNA sequences comprising a first gene 
whose expression results in an altered plant phenotype linked to a 
transiently active promoter, the gene and promoter being separated 
by a blocking sequence flanked on either side by specific excision 
sequences to a second plant regenerated from a second plant cell 
that has been transfected with DNA sequences comprising a second 
gene that encodes a recombinase specific for the specific excision 
sequences linked to a promoter that is active during seed 
germination, and growing a hybrid plant from the hybrid seed. 
Plant cells, plant tissues, plant seed and whole plants containing 
the above DNA sequences are also claimed. 
Id. at 1. 
471. See Leora Broydo, A Seedy Business: A New “Terminator” Technology 
Will Make Crops Sterile and Force Farmers to Buy Seed More Often—So Why 
Did the USDA Invent It?, MOJO WIRE (Apr. 7, 1998) available at
http://www.motherjones.com/news_wire/broydo.html (last visited June 15, 
2001).
472. See Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy 
In The (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property 
Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 54 (1998). 
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technology called the “verminator” technology.473  Terminator 
technology and verminator technology are similar in that both 
would render a second-generation seed sterile.474  The two 
technologies are different in the particular genes that are 
altered.475  In the verminator technology a rat gene is 
incorporated into a plant seed to render seeds infertile.476  The 
patent covers all seeds, both transgenic and non-transgenic 
conventional varieties.477  The technology has been tested only 
on cotton and tobacco; however, the inventors believe it could 
work on all major crops.  Traditionally, seed manufacturers 
have been reluctant to invest in the wheat, oat, and rice seed 
markets, because these plant species are self-pollinating, 
meaning that their reproduction cannot be controlled.  With 
these field crops farmers can save the seeds from one crop cycle 
for use in the next crop cycle with only having to return to the 
commercial market to replenish every five years or so.478  With 
the “terminator technology,” the farmers will be forced to 
purchase new seeds for each planting cycle.479
While the USDA and Delta and Pine Land created the 
“terminator technology,” Monsanto, upon deciding to purchase 
Delta and Pine Land, stated that it disfavors the terminator 
technology.480  The terminator technology is of grave concern to 
farmers in this country and abroad.481  Since a vast majority of 
the world’s farmers still collect their best seeds each year and 
replant them the following year, fears about the terminator 
technology were especially prevalent in developing countries.  
When the public became aware that Monsanto was set to 
acquire Delta and Pine Land, a worldwide protest was ignited 
against Monsanto.  In spite of the fact that Monsanto had 
neither developed the technology nor held the patent for it, 
473. See Zeneca Pits, Verminator Against Terminator, ECON. TIMES, Aug. 
27, 1998, available at 1998 WL 16762266. 
474. See id.
475. See id.
476. See id.
477. See Oliver, supra note 139. 
478. See Broydo, supra note 471. 
479. See Bill Lambrecht, Critics Vilify New Seed Technology that Monsanto 
May Soon Control-”Terminator” Would Prevent Saving Seeds by Making them 
Sterile, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 1, 1998, at A1. 
480. See Knight, supra note 469. 
481. See John Vidal, World Embraced For Terminator 2, THE GUARDIAN,
Oct. 6, 1999, available at 1999 WL 25735652; The Transgenic Scare, TIMES
(India), Oct. 13, 1999, available at 1999 WL 28425544. 
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Monsanto was, consequently, inundated with protests against 
the terminator technology.  Stimulated by the protests, 
Monsanto’s Chief Executive Officer explained that “[t]hough we 
do not own any sterile seed technology, we think it is important 
to respond . . . by making clear our commitment not to 
commercialize gene protection systems that render seed 
sterile.”482
5.  “Legal” Versus Intellectual Property Interest 
A central question of considerable import to the defendant 
in a patent infringement case is whether the legal estate of the 
seed manufacturer also includes the right to dispose of the 
progeny plants and seed.  If it does, then the seed 
manufacturer has the right to determine how and to whom the 
farmer may transfer his crop.  This question was addressed in 
Monsanto v. Schmeiser.483  In paragraph 91 of Monsanto v. 
Schmeiser, the Court considered defendant’s argument that 
“Monsanto has no property interest in its gene, only 
intellectual property rights” because Monsanto allowed the 
uncontrolled release of the invention patented into the 
environment.  The Court 
acknowledge[d] that the seed or plant containing the 
plaintiffs’ patented gene and cell may be owned in a legal sense 
by the farmer who has acquired the seed or plant, that 
“owner’s” interest in the seed or plant is subject to the 
plaintiffs’ patent rights, including the exclusive right to use or 
sell its gene or cell, and they alone may license others to use 
the invention.484
The Court continued in paragraph 92: 
 [t]hus a farmer whose field contains seed or plants originating from 
seed spilled into them, or blown as seed, in swaths from a neighbor’s 
land or even growing from germination by pollen carried into his field 
from elsewhere by insects, birds, or by the wind, may own the seed or 
plants on his land even if he did not set about to plant them.  He does 
not, however, own the right to the use of the patented gene, or of the 
 482. Savidan, supra note 468, at 104. 
483. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256 
(Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/
2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001). 
484. Id. ¶ 91. 
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seed or plant containing the patented gene or cell.485
Although the case was decided in a Canadian Federal 
Court, the underlying property principles are as applicable 
in the United States as in Canada.  While no cases have 
come before United States Federal Courts concerning the 
exact same issue as the Canadian Federal Court addressed, 
it might be anticipated that the Federal Courts in the 
United States would resolve the underlying ownership 
issue very much as the Federal Court did in Canada.  
When a transgene exists on the field of a farmer, the 
Canadian Federal Court articulated that a “farmer who 
has acquired the seed or plant” owns the “patented gene 
and cell . . . in a legal sense,”486 and that that farmer “may 
own the seed or plants on his land even if he did not set 
about to plant them.”487  However, “that ‘owner’s interest in 
the seed or plant is subject to the plaintiffs’ patent 
rights,”488 and the farmer “does not, however, own the right 
to the use of the patented gene, or of the seed or plant 
containing the patented gene or cell.”489
Two concerns are immediately apparent in the Canadian 
Federal Court decision in Monsanto v. Schmeiser.  First, the 
court did not clarify the interest of each party in the seed or 
plant cell that contains the transgene.  Second, the court is 
apparently precluding recovery for genetic pollution of the crop 
of the farmer who does not wish for the presence of the 
transgene on his fields. 
The court failed to clearly articulate the property rights of 
the farmer in the plant cells and seeds found on his fields, and 
fails to define the property rights of the seed manufacturer in 
the transgene found in those plant cells and seeds.  When the 
court stated, in light of the conclusion articulated in paragraph 
127, that by growing “seed known to be Roundup tolerant and 
selling the harvested seeds,”490 Mr. Schmeiser had infringed 
Monsanto’s patent, that the farmer has a “legal interest” in the 
plant seed or cell, which contains the transgene, but that that 
interest is subject to the patentee’s patent rights, it, in effect, 
stated that a farmer has no viable interest in the plant seed 
485. Id. ¶ 92. 
486. Id. ¶ 91. 
487. Id.
488. Id. ¶ 91. 
489. Id. ¶ 92. 
490. Id. ¶ 127. 
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and cells found on his fields.  This is because if the transgene 
does exist in the plant seeds and cells found on the fields of the 
farmer, the farmer cannot harvest those seeds or cells and 
cannot either sell those same harvested seeds or cells for 
consumption or retain those seeds or cells for his own use.  
Also, because the court stated that the patentee “has the 
exclusive use of the invention”491 the farmer may not even have 
the transgene in seeds or plant cells on his fields without 
infringing the patent (because in deciding the case in favor of 
Monsanto, the court is, in effect, equating possession with 
“use”).  The court stated that how the transgene comes to exist 
on the land of Mr. Schmeiser is irrelevant to the question of 
patent infringement.492  The court also stated that it is not 
relevant whether Mr. Schmeiser knew that the transgene was 
present on his land.  The court is equating possession of the 
transgene, whether knowingly or ignorantly, with use of the 
transgene and hence Mr. Schmeiser is guilty of patent 
infringement.
While the court stated that the canola seeds are “owned in 
a legal sense by” Mr. Schmeiser,493 he cannot alienate the 
transgene.  If Mr. Schmeiser were a licensee of Monsanto then 
he could alienate the crop for non-reproductive purposes, but 
only through channels dictated by Monsanto.  Because the 
court stated that the evidence submitted by Monsanto “was not 
obtained illegally,”494 then Mr. Schmeiser does not have an 
expectation to the right of privacy in his crop.  Since Mr. 
Schmeiser has no viable rights at all in his canola crop then the 
assertion of the court that the seeds are “owned in a legal 
sense” by Mr. Schmeiser is in direct opposition to reality. 
The mirror of the situation in which Mr. Schmeiser is 
placed by the court is reflective of Monsanto’s position.  Because 
Monsanto has a legal estate containing the transgene, it 
appears that it possesses the right to use and the right to 
alienate the canola crop and the right to invade the property of 
Mr. Schmeiser.  This exceeds reasonable bounds, and must 
certainly not be what the court intended.  Thus, the decision of 
the court necessarily leads to the conclusion that no matter how 
the transgene arrived onto the fields of the farmer,495 the farmer 
491. Id. ¶ 93. 
492. See supra note 271. 
493. Id. ¶ 91. 
494. Id. ¶ 72. 
 495. In paragraph 119, the court stated that “the source of the Roundup 
126         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
is liable for infringement when the transgene is found on his 
fields.  Because the court denies the farmer any practicable 
interest in the crop grown on his own fields, then the court is, in 
effect, stating that to avoid the possibility of infringement the 
farmer must purchase and use genetically modified seeds from 
the seed manufacturer under license from the seed 
manufacturer.
Furthermore, the court is apparently precluding recovery 
for genetic pollution of the crop of the farmer who does not wish 
the transgene on his fields.  Because the farmer owns both his 
own time and the land upon which the crop is grown, and the 
farmer bears the risk of the market value of his crop and the 
failure of his crop due to natural causes, then the farmer must, 
necessarily, also have the right of autonomy in deciding what 
species and variety of plant shall exist on his land.  The 
autonomy of the farmer in decision making and choosing to 
have his crop free of the transgene is critical when the farmer 
is selling into the premium international commodity market.  
To see why this is so, consider that European countries and 
Japan are resistant to the introduction of genetically modified 
crops into their food stream, and that these countries are 
important destinations for American and Canadian grains.  
Because these countries are selective about the varieties of 
grain that will be allowed in their food streams, a premium 
price may be charged to the consumer.  Conversely, animal food 
streams may contain genetically modified grains and therefore 
are neither selective nor premium.  The highest premium is 
levied on organically grown grains that must be free of the 
transgene.  Thus, if the farmer wishes to obtain a premium 
price by selling into either the international market or the 
organic foods market, then he must chose those grains that are 
free of the transgene. 
The farmer’s right of choice and of autonomy is in peril 
when the courts follow the position articulated by the Federal 
Court in Canada.  Because the Canadian Federal Court decided 
to strictly adhere to the position that “Monsanto does have 
ownership in its patented gene and cell” and therefore “has the 
exclusive use of its invention,”496 it is denying the farmer the 
right of autonomy in decision making and the choice to have his 
crop be free of the transgene. 
resistant canola in the defendants’ 1997 crop is really not significant” for 
determining infringement of the patent. 
496. Id. ¶ 93. 
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By stating that the farmer “does not, however, own the 
right to the use . . . of the seed or plant containing the patented 
gene or cell,”497 the court is stating that even if the seed 
manufacturer negligently pollutes the farmer’s field with the 
transgene, then the farmer has no right to either use the 
contaminated crop for feeding to his own livestock or for selling 
it into the market for consumption, premium or otherwise.  
Apparently, the court’s stated position considers the farmer’s 
knowledge of the presence of the transgene on his fields as 
being irrelevant.  Further, the court stated that it did 
not agree that the situation is comparable to the “stray 
bull” cases that recognize that the progeny of stray bulls 
impregnating cows of another belong to that other, and that the 
owner of the straying bull may be liable in damages that may 
be caused to the owner of the cows.  Further, the circumstances 
here are not akin to those cases that the defendants urge are 
part of the larger law of admixture, where property of A 
introduced by A without B’s intervention to similar property of 
B from which it is indistinguishable, becomes the property of B. 
Monsanto does have ownership in its patented gene and cell 
and pursuant to the Act it has the exclusive use of its 
invention.  That is an important factor which distinguishes this 
case from the others on which the defendants rely.498
The court makes a distinction when no difference exists. 
It is exactly the fact that Monsanto has an interest (the 
term ownership, as used here by the court, is ambiguous to the 
point of being vitiated) in the transgene that makes the “stray 
bull” analogy apposite.  The owner of the cow may wish it to 
not be impregnated by the sperm containing the genetic code of 
the stray bull; hence the owner of the stray bull must be liable 
in tort.  The court, however, states that interest of Monsanto in 
the genetic code contained in the transgene, as granted by 
letters patent, puts it in a position different from the owner of 
the stray bull.  The court is clearly precluding the farmer from 
being able to recover damages for the value of his 
contaminated crop once it has been polluted by the transgene.  
Also, the law of admixture is entirely apposite.  Monsanto 
released its transgene to the environment without the ability 
to control the destination of that transgene.  Because 
Monsanto did not and cannot control the destination of its 
497. Id. ¶ 92. 
498. Id. ¶ 93. 
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transgene, then when that transgene becomes mixed with a 
plant genome, then Monsanto must not be allowed to assert its 
interest in that transgene without also bearing the risk of 
liability for genetic pollution.  The court clearly takes the 
position that Monsanto may assert its interest in the 
transgene and avoids liability for genetic pollution. 
The court provided ample support for this last statement in 
paragraphs 95 through 97.  Mr. Schmeiser argued on the basis 
of photographic evidence that Monsanto both released the 
transgene into the environment and failed to exercise control 
over the destination of the transgene.  The court summarized: 
On the basis of the evidence of pictures adduced by Mr. 
Schmeiser, of stray plants and of plants in fields, in Bruno and 
its environs, it is urged that unconfined release and lack of 
control of Monsanto over the replication of the plants 
containing their patented gene clearly demonstrates extensive 
uncontrolled release of the plaintiffs’ invention.  Indeed it is 
urged this is so extensive that the spread of the invention 
cannot be controlled and Monsanto cannot claim the exclusive 
right to possess and use the invention.  It is further urged that 
it was the plaintiffs’ obligation to control its technology to 
ensure it did not spread and that Monsanto has not attempted 
to do so.499
In dismissing the evidence presented by the defendants, 
the court stated that: 
[t]hat assessment places much weight on photographs of stray 
plants in Bruno, said to have survived spraying with Roundup, in 
addition to photographs of canola in fields which is said to be of 
canola, some with the potential gene incorporated.  With respect, 
the conclusion the defendants urge would ignore the evidence of the 
licensing arrangements developed by Monsanto in a thorough and 
determined manner to limit the spread of the gene.  Those 
arrangements require agreement of growers not to sell the product 
derived from seed provided under a TUA except to authorized 
dealers, not to give it away and not to keep it for their own use even 
for reseeding.  It ignores evidence of the plaintiffs’ efforts to 
monitor the authorized growers and any that might be considered 
to be growing the product without authorization.  It ignores the 
determined efforts to sample and test the crops of the defendants 
who were believed to be growing Roundup Ready canola without 
authorization.  It ignores also the evidence of Monsanto’s efforts to 
499. Id. ¶ 95. 
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remove plants from fields of other farmers who complained of 
undesired spread of Roundup Ready canola to their fields.500
The statement that “the conclusion the defendants urge 
would ignore the evidence of the licensing arrangements 
developed by Monsanto in a thorough and determined manner 
to limit the spread of the gene” is clearly equating the use by 
Monsanto of the Technology-Use License to control 
dissemination of the transgene between farmers with control of 
dissemination of the transgene in the open environment by 
natural forces501  Further, in its statement that “[i]t ignores the 
determined efforts to sample and test the crops of the 
defendants who were believed to be growing Roundup Ready 
canola without authorization,” the court implicitly recognized a 
right for Monsanto to trespass upon the fields of a non-licensee 
and take plant material from those fields without permission of 
the farmer for testing simply because Monsanto has licensee 
farmers in the neighborhood.  An analogous situation occurs 
when the representative goes into a grocery store and takes, 
without authorization by payment of value, genetically 
modified plant material from the produce section.  Under 
shoplifting laws, that representative would be guilty of theft.  
However, the court takes the position that the patent grants 
immunity to representatives of Monsanto for the very same act 
when that act occurs on the field of a non-licensed farmer.  
Careful reading of both the United States patent statute and 
Canadian patent statute fails to yield an obvious and 
reasonable basis for the position of the court. 
The final blow to the defendant’s position concerning the 
waiver of interest in the transgene by Monsanto due to 
uncontrolled release into the environment came when the court 
stated, “[i]ndeed the weight of evidence in this case supports 
the conclusion that the plaintiffs undertook a variety of 
measures designed to control the unwanted spread of canola 
containing their patented gene and cell.”502  The fallacy 
underlying the court’s position in favor of Monsanto cannot be 
clearer.  The court took the position that the efforts of 
500. Id. ¶ 96. 
 501. The court specifically identifies the need to control the dissemination 
between farmers as the reason for the Technology-Use License in paragraph 
27 of the decision as: “Monsanto developed a licensing arrangement to protect 
its patent, and its market, by limiting the opportunity of a grower, under 
license, to sell or give seed to another or to retain it for his own use.” 
502. Id. ¶ 97. 
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Monsanto to control the dissemination of the transgene from 
farmer to farmer by use of the Technology-Use License is 
equivalent to control of the pollen and seed once it is released 
into the environment.  The Technology-Use License only 
controls the disposition of the genetically modified crop and 
plant cells by the licensee.  The Technology-Use License does 
not require the licensee to prevent dissemination of the 
transgene by the wind, birds, bees, or careless truck drivers.  
Because the court equates control of dissemination between 
farmers with control in the environment, the court, 
presumably, expects the wind, the birds, the pollen and seed 
that contain the transgene, as well as careless truck drivers 
who fail to cover the beds of their trucks with tarpaulin, to be 
bound by the Technology-Use License of Monsanto.  In fact, 
because Monsanto must have regulatory approval for 
unconfined release of the transgene into the open environment, 
then both the government and Monsanto must realize that once 
released into the environment, the final destination of the 
transgene cannot be controlled (whether by license or any other 
means).  Further, the court stated in paragraph 96 that 
Monsanto cannot control the dispersion of the transgene by 
natural forces in its statement that: “[i]t ignores also the 
evidence of Monsanto’s efforts to remove plants from fields of 
other farmers who complained of undesired spread of Roundup 
Ready canola to their fields.”  It evidently did not recognize the 
importance of this statement to the validity of the defendant’s 
argument.  More important than the fallacy of the court’s 
position, articulated in paragraphs 95 through 97 of Monsanto
v. Schmeiser, is that the court views the Technology-Use 
License as a legally sufficient means of controlling the 
dispersion of the transgene in the open environment.  
Therefore, Monsanto needs to license only a single farmer in a 
large region to have a legally sufficient basis for suing every 
other neighboring farmer whose fields are contaminated with 
the transgene by genetic pollution. 
In summary, a farmer cannot transfer seed produced from 
patented genetically modified seed.  Further, the crop 
exemption of the PVPA should be eliminated so that the farmer 
is prohibited from saving seed for replanting on his own farm.  
Also, although the farmer loses property rights in his own land 
under licensing agreements, these agreements may be the only 
way that the seed manufacturers can enforce their property 
rights in genetically modified seeds protected under either Title 
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35 of the United States Code or the Plant Variety Protection 
Act.  Given this position, it is necessary to give something back 
to the farmer. 
B. THE GIVING BACK TO THE FARMER
Because the seed manufacturers are concerned with 
making a profit from investment in agricultural biotechnology, 
and because the ability exists for the farmer to grow and sell, 
for reproductive purposes, seeds that are developed by the seed 
manufacturers, protection of intellectual property is of 
overriding concern for the seed manufacturers.  In fact, the 
seed manufacturers view “[p]atenting germplasm and 
biotechnology inventions [a]s critical to [their] ability to deliver 
useful products and get paid for those products.”503  Driven by 
the need to show a profit, the seed manufacturers are 
motivated to take all steps necessary to protect their 
investment, even if such steps involve taking property rights 
from the farmers. 
Farmers are also driven by the need to show a profit.  They 
also have rights in their property, the right to continue to 
develop a germplasm base suitable to their locale, and the right 
to have a choice of whether to reproduce the transgene 
developed by the seed manufacturers.  Where the balance point 
between these two groups should be located is not clear.  What 
is clear is that it should not be so far in favor of the seed 
manufacturers that the farmer becomes a serf to the seed 
manufacturers, and it should not be so far in favor of the 
farmer that the seed manufacturer loses the profit motive to 
develop new and useful varieties through agricultural 
biotechnology.
1. Introduction 
It has been stated that: “[p]lant breeding and 
discovery. . .is fundamentally connected with the Nation’s food 
supply, and will, if encouraged and developed, be of 
incalculable value in maintaining public health and prosperity, 
 503. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY, at 13 (1997) (quoting Robert Fincher of Pioneer Hi-
Bred International). 
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and in promoting public safety and the national defense.”504
The accuracy and insightfulness of these words are as relevant 
today as they were in 1930.  Since the beginning of agriculture, 
establishing a secure food supply has been a driving force of 
society.505  Hence, current domestic plant varieties have been 
almost exclusively influenced by human intervention.506  Since 
the United States lacked a broad spectrum of crop plants in the 
early days of the country, agriculture in the United States 
depended on importation of crops from other countries.507
These imported plant varieties formed the foundation of 
modern American agriculture.508  An important player in the 
process of developing the crop varieties in use today was the 
farmer, because the farmer was able to select seeds from plants 
which gave the best performance in his locale and use those 
seeds for replanting his fields.509
To briefly summarize our extensive discussion in the 
Background section: plant development became the 
responsibility of the government with the establishment of the 
USDA in the mid 1800’s.510  The USDA guided the development 
of new plant varieties and with the cooperation of land grant 
universities and local agricultural organizations produced seed 
which was distributed free of charge to the farmers.511  Thus, 
the practice of saving and transferring seed became a 
commonly used part of the method of new seed variety 
development.512  With encouragement of Congress, the 
responsibility for producing and marketing the seeds shifted to 
the private seed manufacturers.  The Congressional action 
included: in 1924 Congress enacted legislation that terminated 
free distribution of seeds by the government to farmers which 
 504. COMMITTEE ON PATENTS, PLANT PATENTS, H. R. REP. NO. 1129, at 2 
(2d Sess., 1930) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON PATENTS: 1930]. 
505. See Karen Lehman & Al Krebs, Control of the World’s Food Supply, in
THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN TOWARD THE
LOCAL 122, 123 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996). 
506. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 407. 
507. See Blair, supra note 22, at 299. 
508. See id.
509. See Lewontin, supra note 127. 
510. See Frederick H. Buttel & Jill Belsky, Biotechnology, Plant Breeding, 
and Intellectual Property: Social and Ethical Dimensions, in OWNING
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, VALUE AND ETHICAL ISSUES 110, 
113 (Vivian Weil & John W. Snapper eds., 1989). 
511. See Weiss, supra note 449. 
512. See id.
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forced farmers to rely on private seed companies;513 intellectual 
property right protection was afforded to the seed 
manufacturers through the Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the 
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970;514 legislation passed in the 
1980s encouraged co-operation between the seed 
manufacturers and federal agencies.515
Research by both private industry and government 
scientists has lead to advancing the understanding of the 
genetics of plants important to agriculture, and has lead to 
developments in exploiting genetic modification technology to 
improve the quality and productivity of agricultural crops.516  A 
revolution in the agricultural industry has resulted from these 
changes in the law and science.517  The agricultural revolution 
had the effect of significantly reducing the number of farms in 
the United States.518  It can be anticipated that the number of 
farms and, most probably, the number of acres dedicated to 
crop production will continue to decline. 
This movement coupled with the continued aggression of 
the seed manufacturers in the agribusiness arena will cause 
the farmer to become nothing more than a propertied laborer 
employed, under contract, by the seed manufacturer.  The 
packaging of intellectual property, in the form of agricultural 
biotechnology, with pest management systems, and with 
information systems for use by the farmer, under contract, will 
strengthen the hold of the seed manufacturer over agricultural 
productivity.  Such a result is, however, not necessary.  The 
farmer has legal interests in his land, labor, and crop.  There is 
no need for the farmer to surrender his interests to the seed 
manufacturer in order to continue to engage in agribusiness.  
Within the law and historical precedent there exists tools 
through which the farmer, in cooperation with certain 
organizations, can become an equal to the seed manufacturer.  
Before reaching that analysis, there are a few points that need 
to be clarified. 
513. See Buttel & Belsky, supra note 510, at 113. 
514. See id. at 115-16. 
515. See Weiss, supra note 449, at A1. 
516. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 390. 
517. See Ehrenfeld, supra note 166. 
518. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 18, at 118-21. 
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2. Whether Growing Is “Making” or “Using” 
In 1977 the question of the patentability of 
microorganisms, and life itself, was being litigated in the 
courts.519  While the question of patenting life forms was being 
directly addressed by the courts, the prevailing belief was that 
the types of life forms which could be patented were limited.  
Specifically, the court stated that “[a]s for the . . . fears that our 
holding will of necessity, or ‘logically,’ make all new, useful, 
and nonobvious species of plants, animals, and insects created 
by man patentable, we think the fear is far-fetched.”520  The 
court was clearly wrong in believing it far-fetched that all 
things created by man will be patentable.  Now that seed 
manufacturers are being granted rights in genetically modified 
plants, it is essential to look more closely at the patent statute 
to determine when use by the farmers will infringe the rights of 
the seed manufacturers.521
The patentee gains the interest in the legal estate of 
excluding others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell 
the patented invention.  There are clear distinctions among the 
rights to make, to use, and to sell or offer to sell the invention 
patented.522  When the patentee transfers the right to exclude 
others from making or selling the invention patented, the 
purchaser obtains a portion of the interests in the legal 
estate.523  However, the purchaser of the patented invention for 
use “in the ordinary pursuits of life stands on different 
ground.”524  When sold under such a condition, the patented 
invention “is no longer under the protection of the act of 
Congress.”525  Instead, the purchaser acquires complete title to 
519. See Application of Bergy 563 F.2d 1031, 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1977), cert.
granted, vacated by Parker v. Bergy, 98 S. Ct. 3119 (Mem) (1978). 
520. Id.
 521. The following discussion moves beyond the standard legal dogma 
commonly used to analyze issues of rights in genetically modified plants and 
seeds, and enters fields rich in concepts and ideas for discussion and analysis.  
Unfortunately, limitations on time and space prohibit the full discussion of 
any of the new ideas or only a partial discussion of a few of them. 
522. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 539 (1852). The court stated that 
“the distinction is there taken between the grant of the right to make and 
vend the machine, and the grant of the right to use it. The distinction is a 
plain one.” Id. at 549. 
523. See id.
524. Id.
525. Id.
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the patented invention because of the purchase.526  The 
purchase of the patented invention for use in the ordinary 
pursuit of life converts that invention into the “private 
individual property of the purchasers.”527  Further, the Supreme 
Court has stated that “[a]n incident to the purchase of any 
article, whether patented or unpatented, is the right to use and 
sell it” and that when the patentee, or his licensee, sells “an 
article which is capable of use only in practicing the patent 
[then there] is a relinquishment of the patent monopoly with 
respect to the article sold.”528  In Bloomer v. McQuewan, Chief 
Justice Taney viewed the transfer of the right to make and to 
sell the patented invention as distinct and different from the 
transfer of the right to use, as long as such use was for “the 
ordinary pursuits of life.”  Section 271 of Title 35 states that 
infringement of the patent occurs by “whoever without 
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented 
invention, within the United States during the term of the 
patent therefor.”529  In most cases, the acts of making, using, or 
selling are distinct and separate, and when at least one is 
committed then the patent is infringed. 
A patent may be granted for a new device such as a type of 
cooling device for a computer central processor unit and a claim 
may be made for any computer containing such cooling 
device.530  When a computer is made, used, or sold with the 
patented cooling unit installed without a license to do so, then 
the person who made, used, or sold the computer system is 
liable for infringement.  By analogy, patents for genetically 
526. See Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 548 (1872) (stating that 
“[c]omplete title to the implement or machine purchased becomes vested in the 
vendee by the sale and purchase, but he acquires no portion of the franchise, 
as the machine, when it rightfully passes from the patentee to the purchaser, 
ceases to be within the limits of the monopoly”). 
527. Id.
 528. United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942). 
 529. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
530. See Bradley W. Bartilson, Large Area, Multi-Device Heat Pipe for 
Stacked MCM-Based Systems, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,055,157 (issued Apr 6, 2000) 
(claiming a “computing module for a computer, said module comprising: a first 
heat pipe assembly having a first evaporator plate” in Claim 1 and a 
“computer system comprising: a housing; a scalable computing module 
positioned within the housing, . . . said scalable computing module further 
comprising . . . a first heat pipe assembly having a first evaporator plate” in 
Claim 14); U.S. Patent No. 5,781,411 (issued July 14, 1998) (claiming a “heat 
sink for cooling an electronic component which generates heat, the heat sink 
comprising. . .” in Claim 1 and a “computer system which incorporates a heat 
sink, the computer system comprising . . .” in Claim 10). 
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modified plants are written to claim both the transgene and the 
plant.531  Because infringement occurs in our mechanical 
example, then infringement must occur in the plant situation 
as well. 
This conclusion does not, however, necessarily follow from 
the logic used for mechanical devices when applied to plants.  
Infringement occurs when a person, not the patentee, makes, 
uses, offers to sell or sells the invention patented.  The words 
“make,” “use,” and “sell” are not defined within Title 35 and 
therefore the meaning of these words must necessarily be left 
to the courts.  Whether the court should find infringement in 
the case of agricultural biotechnology should turn on the 
definition of these words, and not necessarily on whether the 
alleged infringer was aware that the invention was patented.  
The plant genome is a unique entity to the law.  It has 
contained within it the complete set of instructions to 
reproduce itself with only elemental raw materials as inputs.  
To date, man has been unable to construct any mechanical or 
biological device which simulates the ability of the plant 
genome to both reproduce itself and carry all the information 
necessary to generate a useful product.  Even in the case of 
plants, the best that man can do is to insert a miniscule part 
into a very large entity.  The plant genome not only contains 
the instructions necessary to reproduce itself, but it is also 
capable of creating, with the aid of cellular machinery, a 
variation of itself having very different characteristics.  The 
closest patentable thing that man can create is a computer 
program capable of replicating itself onto other computers, and 
those copies will replicate to still other computers.  While the 
program itself may be patentable, it is doubtful that any court 
will uphold a claim of infringement if one of the target 
computers started replicating that program onto itself or onto 
other computers with or without the knowledge of the target 
531. See Nicolai Strizhov et al., Synthetic Bacillus thuringiensis CryIC 
Gene Encoding Insect Toxin, U.S. PAT. NO. 6,043,415 (issued Mar. 28, 2000) 
(claiming an “isolated DNA sequence coding for Bacillus thuringiensisCryIC
protein comprising the nucleotide sequence shown in SEQ ID No:1,” in claim 1 
and a “transgenic plant comprising the isolated DNA Sequence of claim 1” in 
claim 5); Shah, supra note 414 (claiming a “chimeric plant gene which 
comprises. . .” in claim 1 and a “glyphosate-resistant dicotyledonous plant. . .” 
in claim 29); Deluca-Flaherty, supra note 414 (claiming a “[r]ecombinant DNA 
molecule comprising a nucleic acid sequence encoding the peptide” in claim 4 
and “[a] transgenic plant comprising a foreign gene which encodes a peptide 
according to claim 1” in claim 9). 
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computer owner. 
In the case of a transgenic plant, what was actually 
created was a transgene that was inserted into the plant 
genome by genetic manipulation of that genome such that the 
transgene is expressed.  To claim property rights in the entire 
plant is to claim too much.  The cellular machinery required to 
reproduce the inserted transgene and to effect its function was 
not “created by man”532 and was not fully characterized by the 
inventor.  The cellular machinery, instructed by the plant 
genome (discounting the presence of the transgene), has been 
evolving for longer than humans have existed.  While man has 
developed an understanding of some of the processes occurring 
in the plant cell, our understanding of all the processes 
occurring is woefully inadequate.  In fact, the entire genome of 
any plant has not been fully characterized, let alone the 
genome of all plants.533  Therefore, it is impossible that any 
inventor could have so fully characterized the entire genome of 
the target plant or could have constructed that genome 
(without the use of the cellular machinery) as to be entitled to a 
patent on it.  And, even if the inventor had fully characterized 
the genome, it is impossible that he could have characterized 
all of the functions of the plant genome to entitle him to a 
patent on the plant.  The mechanical analogy is simple to 
construct.  An inventor invents a widget which is made in a 
manufacturing plant (which has been in existence for longer 
than the inventor); the processes involved in the manufacturing 
of the widget are either poorly understood or completely 
unknown to the inventor.  Would a patent issue for the 
manufacturing plant as well as for the widget?  For the widget, 
probably yes; for the manufacturing plant, probably not.  
Rejection of an attempt to patent the plant would fail for a 
number of reasons, not the least of which, except the plant 
genome, being lack of enablement by the inventor.  Therefore, 
to claim property interest in the biological processes involved in 
replication of the transgene should not stand. 
Because the inventor has characterized the transgene and 
because the “creation by man” is a transgene inserted into the 
532. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1980). 
533. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DESIGNING AN 
AGRICULTURAL GENOME PROGRAM (1998).  (containing proceedings, published 
by the National Academy Press, of the forum on “Designing an Agricultural 
Genome Project” held on April 26, 1997 as a collaborative effort between the 
Board on Biology and the Board on Agricultural of the National Academy) 
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genome by genetic manipulation techniques and which is 
expressed, all of which may be adequately characterized, the 
inventor may only claim the expressed transgene inserted into 
the genome by genetic manipulation techniques.  The legal 
estate in what is claimed is protected by statute that grants the 
patentee the right to exclude others from making, using, 
selling, or offering to sell the claimed invention. 
Simply stated, a transgenic plant simply is not patentable 
at all.  Justice Story stated with his usual perspicacity that: 
[w]here a specific machine already exists, producing certain effects, 
if a mere addition is made to such machine, to produce the same 
effects in a better manner, a patent cannot be taken for the whole 
machine, but for the improvement only.  The case of a watch is a 
familiar instance.  The inventor of the patent lever, without doubt, 
added a very useful improvement to it; but his right to a patent 
could not be more extensive than his invention.  The patent could 
not cover the whole machine as improved, but barely the actual 
improvement.534 
The cell of a plant is a machine that operates according to 
the instructions in the plant genome.  The multiplicity of the 
cellular machines constitutes the plant, which is a machine 
that produces a consumable crop.  The addition of a single 
transgene, or even a set of transgenes, creates neither a new 
cellular machine nor a new plant, but only allows the existing 
machine, be it cellular or the whole plant, to produce the same 
effects (the consumable crop) in a better manner.  It might be 
argued that the composition of matter, constituting the plant 
genome and the transgene, is patentable.  Indeed, the 
combination of the plant genome and the transgene is a 
composition of matter, much like an alloy constituted of several 
different types of metal.  However, the combination of the plant 
genome and the transgene, separate from the cellular or plant 
machinery cannot produce an effect, much like the alloy cannot 
produce an effect; rather, it may only be used in construction to 
produce an effect.  The cellular and plant machinery produce 
an effect, the consumable crop.  They are, therefore, not simply 
compositions of matter, but rather highly complex, intimately 
interconnected machines.  The addition of a transgene to a 
plant genome is completely analogous to adding a patented 
 
 534. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 
17,601). There is no known case history specifically reversing the holding and 
arguments of this case, and there is no known legislative history specifically 
overruling the same. 
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lever to a watch.  The plant still produces a consumable crop, 
and like the watch with the patented lever, merely does it 
better with the added transgene.  Because the entire watch 
could not be patented, the entire transgenic plant cannot be 
patented.  By cloaking the cellular machinery and the plant as 
compositions of matter will not change the nature of the 
cellular machinery and the plant.  The transgenic plant, 
according to the rule articulated by Justice Story, is no more 
patentable as so-called compositions of matter than they are as 
machines.  To hold such a patent valid would be to reward 
dexterity with language of form over discernment of differences 
in substance.  A detailed analysis of this assertion will be left 
for a later date. 
The central issue is whether the activity engaged in by the 
farmer is “making” the invention patented.  The Supreme 
Court in Deepsouth Packing535 makes no attempt to define the 
word “make,” but rather defers to the construction Justice Day 
outlined in Bauer v. O’Donnell.536  While such deference moves 
only incrementally closer to the meaning of “make,” certainly 
the Court does not believe the word should be accorded the 
meaning that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals used, namely 
that make “means what it ordinarily connotes–the substantial 
manufacture of the constituent parts of the machine.”537  
Further, the Court refused to answer the question of whether 
the definition used by the Fifth Circuit more closely 
corresponds to the ordinary meaning than the meaning 
constructed by Judge Swan in Andrea538 that provided that a 
non-living object is made only when it has “reach[ed] the state 
 
 535. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972) 
(affirming the conclusion reached by Judge Swan in Radio Corp. of America v. 
Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1935), that “unassembled export of the 
elements of an invention d[oes] not infringe the patent”). 
 536. 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1912) (stating that the “right to make can scarcely be 
made plainer by definition, and embraces the construction of the thing 
invented”). 
 537. Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928, 939 (5th Cir. 
1971).  The Fifth Circuit held against Deepsouth Packing Co. because it 
believed that “substantial” construction of the deveining equipment amounted 
to “making” the patented invention in the United States.  See id.  The author 
recognizes that the line of cases up to Deepsouth Packing are concerned with 
“combination inventions” constituted of mechanical or electrical components.  
For the present purposes, the issue is determining the meaning of the word 
“make” and the word “use” which adequately describes the state in which a 
thing exists. 
 538. See Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1935). 
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of final ‘operable’ assembly.”539  While it is not possible to know 
with precision what the Court meant by “make,” it is more than 
likely that the word should be given its ordinary meaning and 
that the accused device is made only when it has reached a 
state of construction exactly equal to the patented invention. 
The ordinary meaning can be obtained from an English 
language dictionary.540  That is, “make” is “to bring into being; 
specifically, (a) to form by shaping or putting parts or 
ingredients together, physically or mentally; to build, construct, 
fabricate, fashion, create, compose. . .”541 The common meaning 
of the word “make” requires some action and volition to bring a 
thing into being by “shaping or putting parts or ingredients 
together.”542  It is not practically possible that a thing could 
construct itself without some action on the part of a person.543  
Having constructed an interpretation of the meaning of the 
word “make,” developing an interpretation  of the infringement 
provision of the patent statute is now necessary. 
Because the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act544 
indicated that it was meant to codify the patent law of that 
date, and “make” is to be given its ordinary meaning in section 
271 of Title 35 of the United States Code, then there must be 
some volitive action on the part of the accused infringer to 
bring the patented thing into being by “shaping or putting 
 
 539. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp, 406 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1972). 
 540. See WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 
1983). 
 541. Id. at 1088. To gain a fuller understanding of the meaning of the 
word, consider the meaning of the synonyms of make: to build is “to construct 
or erect . . . to unite into a structure,” id. at 238; to construct is “to put 
together the parts in their proper place and order,” id. at 392; to fabricate is 
“to make or build as a whole, by connecting its parts,” id. at 654; to create is 
“to produce; to cause; to bring about,” id. at 427; and to compose is “to form by 
uniting two or more things,” id. at 372.  The word “to” is used before a verb as 
a sign of the infinitive.  Id. at 1619.  An infinitive is the “simple, uninflected 
form of the verb, expressing existence or action without reference to person, 
number, or tense.  Id. at 939. 
 542. Id. at 1088. 
 543. A conclusion of the second law of thermodynamics is that every 
enumerable state of a system will exist with a finite probability.  However, 
without an input of work the system will be observed in some state of disorder 
far more often than in the perfectly ordered state (which will be observed with 
probability near zero).  A very penetrable discussion of the second law of 
thermodynamics is given by HANS CHRISTIAN VON BAEYER, MAXWELL’S 
DEMON: WHY WARMTH DISPERSES AND TIME PASSES (1998). 
 544. See Revision of Title 35, United States Code, H. R. REP. NO. 1923, 82D 
CONG. 2D SESS. Committee on Judiciary, at 1 (1952). 
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parts or ingredients together.”545  Indeed, there must be some 
intent on the part of the accused infringer to construct a thing, 
even if by accident it becomes equal to the patented invention.  
Of course, section 271 is devoid of any mention of intent on the 
part of the accused infringer.  This is because the right to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling is independent of 
the mental state of accused infringer.  While this is an accurate 
statement of the right to exclude granted by statute it is an 
incomplete statement of the requirements for infringement.  
This is because the statute requires that the accused infringer 
must “make” the patented device,546 it is insufficient for a cause 
of action that the accused infringer merely possess, as property, 
the patented device.547
Plants present a situation different from mechanical or 
electrical devices.  Where some volition and manipulation is 
required to form or assemble the items necessary to yield the 
mechanical device, no such volition or manipulation is required 
to produce a plant.  Of course, the farmer digs a small hole in 
the ground, places a seed in the hole, and covers it with soil.  Is 
this action sufficient to make a plant?  No more than replacing 
the seed with a pile of electronic chips would be sufficient for 
making a digital computer.  While the farmer may be initiating 
a process that eventually yields a plant, this initiation is no 
more making a plant than placing a transistor on to the 
assembly room bench would be making a radio.  As stated in 
Deepsouth Packing Co. the word “make” cannot be constructed 
to mean “substantial manufacture.”548  It means that to “make” 
the patented invention, embodied in the plant, the farmer 
would have to construct the complete genome with the 
expressed, inserted transgene. 
The farmer cannot completely manufacture a plant, only 
 545. WEBSTER’S, supra note 540 at 1088. 
 546. It is recognized that “makes, uses, sells, or offers to sell,” 35 U.S.C. § 
271 (1994), are exclusive actions, but for present purposes we require focus 
upon the word “make.” 
547. See WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, 3 THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL
INVENTIONS § 898 (1890). 
 548. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972). 
The Court stated that it will not “endorse the view that the ‘substantial 
manufacture of the constituent parts of [a] machine’ constitutes direct 
infringement when [it has] so often held that a combination patent protects 
only against the operable assembly of the whole and not the manufacture of 
its parts.” Id. at 528 (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 
F.2d 928, 939 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
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nature can do that.  In fact, if the soil containing the seed is not 
moistened occasionally by rain, and if the seedling lacks 
sunshine, then no plant will be produced.  The initiating act of 
the farmer falls far short of making the patented invention or 
even a substantial manufacture.  Once the seed is in the soil, 
the plant will either grow or not grow independent of any 
reasonable actions by the farmer.  The farmer, therefore, does 
not make the plant.  The plant is a product purely of natural 
forces.  A powerful corollary is that the farmer, even if deemed 
to have “made” the plant, cannot by his own actions cause the 
transgene to be either replicated or expressed.  Replication and 
expression of the transgene are controlled strictly by the 
cellular machinery, machinery over which the farmer can exert 
no force or influence. 
Infringement of the exclusive right of the patentee can 
occur by making the patented invention.  Making requires the 
volition to “bring into being” a patented thing.  The accused 
infringer must be aware that the thing is being created or 
brought into being.  It is irrelevant for purposes of section 271 
of Title 35 that the person knew that the thing was patented 
for there to be infringement, only that it was made.  The 
patentee must prove infringement; and to show infringement 
the patentee must show that the accused infringer made the 
patented thing.  Merely having the patented thing in his 
possession does not make him an infringer.  This is because 
there are a number of routes that the accused infringer could 
have come into possession of the patented thing other than 
having made it.  The doctrine of exhaustion states that these 
alternative routes protect the accused infringer from liability 
for infringing the patent.  With regard to plants in particular, 
merely having patented plants on his farm does not 
automatically subject the farmer to liability for infringement. 
To examine the basis for why liability does not 
automatically lie simply because the farmer possesses the 
patented plants, consider two Zea mays plants growing in a 
field belonging to the farmer.  Presume that one plant is 
genetically modified, hence patented, and the other is of 
conventional Zea mays variety.  Without testing the two plants, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to say which one is genetically 
modified.549  Consider two cases.  In the first case, the farmer 
 549. Mr. Schmeiser was completely unaware that his land was 
contaminated with a variety of canola different than his own conventional 
canola until he sprayed canola plants which were growing by the roadside 
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intentionally planted seeds for both plants.  As discussed 
above, this initiation of the process of growing the plant does 
not constitute infringement because it is only a very small step 
in the process by which the final plant comes into being.  It is 
not even a “substantial manufacture,” which the Supreme 
Court rejected as defining the word making in Deepsouth 
Packing Co.  Because “substantial manufacture” cannot rise to 
the level of “making” for purposes of infringement analysis, 
certainly the step of planting the seed is such a small step in 
the process that it cannot amount to “making.” 
In the second case, in which the genetically modified plant 
came into being in the farmer’s fields, involves translocation of 
the seed (which already contained the transgene) into the 
farmer’s field from a route other than through the farmer (the 
analysis of this particular case is as applicable to cross-
pollination with a remote plant containing the transgene as it 
is to the translocation of the genetically modified seed).  The 
plant is growing in the field of the farmer through no volitive 
act of the farmer.  The farmer is completely unaware that the 
plant seeds contain the patented transgene; the farmer did not 
plant the seed (or cause the cross-pollination of a non-modified 
plant with a genetically modified plant through a volitive act) 
to initiate the process of bringing the plant into being and the 
farmer could not distinguish, without testing, the non-modified 
and genetically modified plants.  The farmer cannot, through 
any action of his own, assemble the nucleotides to bring the 
patented DNA into being.  The farmer, through volitive acts of 
his own, cannot cause the germination of the seed; rather, he 
can only take the very small step of initiating the process by 
which the germination occurs, but the germination will occur 
only if other, far more substantial, forces act upon the seed.  
Since the seed or pollen came to be located on the farmer’s land 
through no action of the farmer, then this second case 
constitutes an even less significant step in bringing the plant 
into being than planting the seed does in the first case.  
Therefore the farmer is not “making” the patented transgene or 
plant.  The natural conclusion is that the farmer cannot be 
guilty of infringement merely for possessing the patented plant 
on his own land. 
Following the analyses above, demonstrating that the 
 
with Roundup.  See Interview: Schmeiser{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270.  When 
these plants failed to die, he began to suspect that they might have developed 
a resistance to glyphosate.  See id. 
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farmer cannot make the patented genome or plant, the farmer 
may not “use” the patented genome or plant even if it is 
growing upon his own lands.  The purchase of a patented 
invention from the patentee for use in the ordinary pursuit of 
life grants to the purchaser the right to use that invention as 
long as the invention is capable of use, and use to the full 
extent to which that invention is capable of use when title 
transfers to the purchaser.550  The right of use of the patented 
invention means “the right to put into service [the] given 
invention.”551  Working from the ordinary meaning of the word 
use we may deduce that a volitive action is required on the part 
of the actor.  Specifically, the dictionary meaning of use is “to 
put or bring into action or service; to employ for or apply to a 
given purpose.”552  Therefore, if a patented invention must be 
used, then the invention is to be brought into service and 
applied to its given purpose to the fullest extent possible. 
In the case of a genetically modified plant, “use” means 
that the expressed transgene is brought into service and 
applied to its given purpose to the fullest extent possible.  
Consider a plant that contains a transgene encoding 5-
enolpyruvylshikimate-3-phosphate synthase (EPSPS) 
polypeptide.553  This transgene contains a chloroplast transit 
peptide, which allows either the EPSPS polypeptide, or an 
enzymatically active fraction of the polypeptide, to be 
transported into the chloroplast of the plant cell.  When this 
transgene is expressed in the plant cell and the EPSPS 
polypeptide is transported into the chloroplast, the cell exhibits 
550. See Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 455 (1873) (stating that the 
purchase of an invention patented “carri[es] with it the right to the use of that 
machine so long as it was capable of use” and that the basis for this holding is 
that “the sale by a person who has the full right to make, sell, and use such a 
machine carries with it the right to the use of that machine to the full extent 
to which it can be used”). 
 551. Bauer v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 11 (1913) The Court stated that: “[the] 
right to use is a comprehensive term and embraces within its meaning the 
right to put into service any given invention.” Id. at 10-11. 
 552. WEBSTER’S TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 2012 (2d ed. 1983). 
553. See Dilip M. Shah, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert Horsch & Robert T. 
Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 4,940,835 (issued July 10, 
1990).  This patent issued from a continuation-in-part application filed July 7, 
1986, which claimed the earlier filing date of a continuation-in-part 
application filed on October 29, 1985, which in turned was filed as a 
continuation-in-part application based on the original application filed August 
7, 1985. 
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a substantial degree of glyphosate resistance.554  As illustrated 
earlier, even if the claims of the patent claim contain language 
regarding claiming “a glyphosate-resistant plant cell,”555 or a 
“plant comprising transformed plant cells”556 the claim would be 
too broad if the language were to be read as being an element; 
rather, the language is to be interpreted as merely the 
preamble to the claim.  Such a position takes on significance in 
determining the “use” of the patented invention. 
Consider a claim that reads, “[a] glyphosate-resistant 
dicotyledonous plant seed, said seed comprising a chimeric 
plant gene.”557  Say the farmer plants such a seed and a plant 
grows from the seed.  While the farmer has used the purchased 
seed for the purposes of planting, and the process of planting 
yields a plant on his land, he has not used the invention 
patented.  The language “[a] glyphosate-resistant 
dicotyledonous plant seed” is not an element of the claim, but 
rather the preamble.  Therefore, the claimed invention is the 
expressed transgene that is inserted into the genome of the 
plant by genetic engineering techniques.  The claim identifies 
that this claimed invention may be embodied within a seed.  
The farmer may have either purchased the seed from some 
source, including the seed manufacturer, or may have saved 
the seed from a previous crop cycle for planting in the current 
planting cycle.  Either way, by planting the seed he is bringing 
the seed  into service and applying it to its given purpose to the 
fullest extent possible; that is, he is planting the seed to 
initiate the process by which a plant comes into being on his 
lands.  The only way that the farmer can bring the invention 
patented into service and apply the invention to its given 
purpose to the fullest extent possible is to apply glyphosate to 
the plant or seed. 
There are two volitional acts which involve “use”: first is 
the use of the seed for planting, which does not constitute 
infringement because it is not bringing into service the 
patented invention; second is the use of the expressed gene to 
554. See id.
555. Id. at Claim 22. 
 556. Ganesh M. Kishore & Dilip M. Shah, Glyphosate-Tolerant 5-
endolpyruvyl-3-phosphoshikimate Synthase, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,145,783, Claim 
16 (issued Sept. 8, 1992). 
557. See Dilip M. Shah, Stephen G. Rogers, Robert Horsch & Robert T. 
Fraley, Glyphosate-Resistant Plants, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,188,642, Claim 8 (issued 
Feb. 23, 1993). 
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protect the plant from the action of glyphosate, which may 
constitute infringement because it is bringing into service the 
patented invention.558  The patented invention may consist of 
the plant genome, the transgene, and any promotors inserted 
into the plant genome to cause the plant to express the gene.  
The plant genome, under given necessary forces, causes the 
plant to come into being from the seed.  The transgene is not 
necessary for the process of bringing the plant into being.  The 
transgene is only necessary to confer some type of protection 
upon the plant.  This means that the transgene may be 
“switched off” such that it is not expressed and the plant will 
still be produced.  Since the patented invention may be the 
composition consisting of the plant genome and the transgene 
with its promotors, then the use of the plant gene in the 
process of growing the plant is employing only an element of 
the invention, not the entire invention.  Indeed, a process is 
initiated by planting the seed in which the plant genome, which 
is an element of the patented invention, is brought into service 
and applied to its given purpose of producing a plant to the 
fullest extent possible, and hence is “used.”  However, the use 
of a component element of an invention is not infringement, 
only the use of the entire invention constitutes infringement.  
Whether mere possession of the patented invention implies use 
has not been clearly articulated in any reported cases.559
However, to use a thing and to possess a thing are distinct and 
separate concepts; the language of the statute is clear in that it 
is the “use” that constitutes infringement, not “possession.” 
Mr. Schmeiser argued, as part of his defense, that he did 
not “use” the patented glyphosate-resistant canola found 
growing on his farm because he did not apply Roundup to his 
canola.560  While Federal Judge W. Andrew MacKay took note 
of Mr. Schmeiser’s argument, he found it irrelevant for 
determining infringement because he interpreted the language 
of the patent statute to mean that if the transgenic plant is 
growing on Mr. Schmeiser’s farm then Mr. Schmeiser is 
infringing the patent rights of Monsanto.  It is impossible to 
 558. Of course a doctrine exists in patent law in which the use of a 
patented invention for a completely different purpose constitutes “use” and 
hence infringement of the patent. However, in this case, the patented 
invention is not being used for some completely different purpose; rather, the 
patented invention is not being used at all. 
559. See ROBINSON, supra note 547, § 898. 
560. See supra note 442. 
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know precisely why Judge MacKay drew such an erroneous 
interpretation from the patent statute.  It is completely 
contrary to the clear meaning of the patent statute that mere 
possession of the patented invention on the lands of the farmer 
constitutes infringement.  To find infringement, it must be 
proven that the farmer either made, used, or sold the patented 
invention.  Since economic aspects are not at issue for the time 
being, the selling of the crop is not relevant to the question of 
whether possession of the patented invention on the lands of 
the farmer constitutes infringement.  To make or use the 
patented invention requires a volitional action on the part of 
the farmer.  As discussed above, no volitional action on the part 
of the farmer can cause the “making” of the patented invention.  
Therefore, there can be no infringement due to making the 
plant simply by initiating the process by which the plant 
eventually comes into being.  Unless the farmer actually uses 
the patented invention for its intended purposes,561 then there 
is no infringement.  Mr. Schmeiser never sprayed Roundup on 
his fields because such an action would be counterproductive to 
his efforts.  Therefore, Mr. Schmeiser never used the patented 
invention.  According to the decision by Judge MacKay, 
Monsanto never proved that Mr. Schmeiser either made or 
used the patented invention.  Their claim was that he merely 
possessed the patented invention on his lands and hence he 
must be guilty of patent infringement. 
3.  The Farmer as Plant Breeder 
The advancement of law and science has left the farmer at 
the side of the road.  The farmer has first hand knowledge of 
crops in his field.  He also would be in the position to detect and 
characterize, on a superficial level, any plants that appear 
anamolously through routine inspection and maintenance of 
his fields.  The farmer may then assume the role of plant 
breeder.  If the farmer is classified as a plant breeder, then he 
 561.   In the case of plant agricultural biotechnology, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to use the patented invention for any purpose other than for which 
it is originally intended.  The patented invention was not intended to be 
planted and produce a plant.  It was intended to confer some type of protection 
upon the plant. Indeed, the plant genome produces a plant, but that is only an 
element of the entire patented invention. Even if the farmer could “make” a 
plant by employing its genome, he still would not be employing the patented 
invention simply by allowing the plant to grow on his lands. 
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may be allowed to use protected plants without infringing the 
rights of the original developer of the plants; it may strengthen 
his hand in negotiating with the seed manufacturers as well as 
in legal disputes with the seed manufacturers.  The farmer as a 
plant breeder may also have available to him statutory 
protection from infringement claims by the seed 
manufacturers.  Appropriate places to start in defining the 
farmer as a researcher and plant breeder are the dictionary 
and case law. 
A breeder is a person who breeds either animals or plants.  
To breed plants means to “produce (plants) by selective 
pollination.”562  A plant breeder is typically thought to be a 
corporation563 or a worker for an agricultural station564 or 
university.565  However, it does not appear that the courts 
require that “selective pollination” be the sole criteria 
distinguishing a plant breeder from an ordinary grower of 
plants.566  In Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., the 
Fifth Circuit stated, “the breeder must possess the skill and 
discrimination to spot potential new varieties and recognize 
whether they possess desirable traits.”567  While corporations 
have typically been viewed as “plant breeders” common-sense 
indicates that such fictional legal entities are incapable of 
being plant breeders; rather, the people employed by these 
corporations are the actual plant breeders. 
 562.   WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 173 (3d ed. 1988). 
563. See Pan-American Plant Co. v. Matsui, 433 F. Supp. 693, 695 (N.D. 
Cal. 1977) (stating that “[p]laintiff breeds” new chrysanthemum plant 
varieties); see also Pioneer Hi-Bred v. Holden, 35 F.3d 1226, 1234 n.34 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (stating that “McConnell is a plant breeder employed by Pioneer”); 
Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir. 
1976) (identifying Mr. Duffett as Yoder’s head breeder). 
564. See TRUE, supra note 29, at 221, 255, 274. 
565. See Mumm v. Illinois, 10 Ill. Ct. Cl. 652, 652-53 (1939) (recognizing 
that plaintiff was “an associate in plant breeding in the Agronomy 
Department of the College of Agriculture of the University of Illinois”). 
 566. For instance, the court in Pan-American Plant Co. v. Matsui stated 
that the term “breeder” of chrysanthemums “also includes a person or firm 
who uses mutation inducing techniques such as radiation.” 433 F. Supp. 693, 
695 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
 567. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1352 
(5th Cir. 1976).  In describing the process for identifying and propagating new 
chrysanthemum varieties, the court stated that “a skilled breeder will select 
for further development those that display such desirable characteristics as 
fast response time, temperature tolerance, durability, size, and vigor” and 
after the new variety has been isolated, “the only way he can preserve his 
creation is by means of asexual reproduction.” Id.
2002] JACK AND THE BEANSTALK 149
No particular set of criteria establishes an individual as a 
plant breeder.  For example, in the early twentieth century, an 
individual could be registered as a “cotton seed breeder” in 
Texas upon application and compliance with statutory 
requirements.568  While the individual plant breeder may 
require that “facilities for elaborate testing and development 
must be available,”569 such requirements need not always be 
satisfied.  Indeed, plant breeders were not required to have 
elaborate facilities, only to have the ability to discern desired 
traits in individual or small groups of plants.  In fact, the 
status of the individual as a plant breeder was recognized by 
Congress in passing the Plant Patent Act of 1930.570  The report 
of the House of Representatives states that the Plant Patent 
Act is intended to correct the (then existing) discrimination 
between rewarding genius of mechanical invention and the 
failure to reward the genius of inventing new varieties of 
plants.  Specifically, the report states that by correcting such 
discrimination it was “hoped the genius of young agriculturist 
of America will be enlisted in a profitable work of invention and 
discovery of new plants that will revolutionize agriculture.”571
The author has been unable to find any case law in which the 
status of a farmer as a plant breeder has been explicitly 
568. See Terrell v. Kasch, 10 S.W.2d 208, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). The 
court upheld an injunction by the trial court restraining appellants from: 
(a) . . . registering or certifying any cotton seed produced or owned 
by the plaintiff, Ed Kasch, without his application therefor or his 
express consent.  (b) From in the future certifying any cottonseed 
that is produced from and is the 1st-year progeny of Ed Kasch’s 
unregistered commercial seed that he offers and sells to the public 
as Kasch’s improved pedigreed cottonseed.  (c) From in the future 
issuing and delivering to any person, firm or corporation 
certification tags for cottonseed that is the first-year progeny of Ed 
Kasch’s unregistered commercial cottonseed. 
Id. at 209. 
 569. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1352 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
570. See COMMITTEE ON PATENTS: 1930, supra note 504, at 2.  The 
committee recognized that “plant breeding and research is dependent, in large 
part, upon Government funds to Government experiment stations, or the 
limited endeavors of the amateur breeder.”  Id.  The statutory language was 
cited in In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834, 838 (C.C.P.A. 1940) (holding that the 
word “plant” as used in the Plant Patent Act did not include bacteria), 
distinguished by Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1039 (C.C.P.A. 1977) 
(stating that “[w]e are not here concerned with interpretation of the Plant 
Patent Act as this court was in In re Arzberger, . . . which simply held that 
that act did not encompass bacteria”). 
 571. COMMITTEE ON PATENTS: 1930, supra note 504, at 2. 
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addressed.  While the farmer may not be typically viewed as a 
scientist or engineer,572 he may certainly be considered a plant 
breeder.573
While the farmer may not possess sophisticated 
equipment, he can still engage in the practice of observing 
which crop varieties work best for his local environment and 
employ those same varieties.  In some cases, the farmer will 
conduct this practice with his own crops.  Such is the case with 
Percy Schmeiser who has grown conventional canola on his 
farm in Canada since 1947 and is known as a seed developer 
and seed saver.574  Mr. Percy Schmeiser has engaged in a multi-
decade long program of retaining select seed from one crop 
cycle for use in the next planting cycle.  He uses canola seeds 
grown on a field allowed to “summer fallow” the previous year 
for the subsequent growing cycle because those seeds are the 
“cleanest.”  In doing so, he is able to plant seeds that are the 
least contaminated with weed seeds and the least likely to 
transmit diseases.  Through his rational farming practice, Mr. 
Schmeiser has developed a variety of conventional canola that 
is relatively free of blackleg and sclerotinia with higher than 
average yield for the Saskatchewan area.575  In his practice of 
farming he displays all the characteristics of a plant breeder 
defined above.  That he lacks formal training as a scientist does 
not make him less a plant breeder than the trained scientist 
who works for a seed manufacturer.  It is the nature of his 
work that makes him a plant breeder.  In fact, any farmer that 
 572. When the term “scientist” is used, it is easy to conjure up an image of 
a bearded, slightly unkempt, pipe-smoking man in a laboratory working with 
petri dishes and test tubes in deep contemplation of serious questions of 
science.  But, it is possible to recognize the farmer as a scientist if he engages 
in the scientific method while improving the productivity of his crops.  By 
scientific method, it is meant that through the process of hypothesis 
development and testing, a clearer understanding is obtained of the system 
under investigation.  The engineer is a person who understands the scientific 
principles involved and is able to apply or manipulate those principles to 
construct a system or device capable of converting a raw material input into a 
desirable product.  Such activity is the essence of farming. 
573. See Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 276 F.2d 259, 260-61 (9th Cir. 1960) 
(identifying Mr. F. W. Anderson as “a plant breeder of some considerable 
standing, [who] produced and sold to appellant partnership a new variety of 
nectarine”).
574. See Interview: Schmeiser{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270. 
575. See generally Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 
FCT 256 (Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fct-
cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001). See also 
Interview: Schmeiser{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270. 
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meets the criteria of a plant breeder discussed above is, by 
definition, a plant breeder.  However, not all farmers are 
necessarily plant breeders. 
Another farmer is Mr. Dallas Thomason, who owns a 
cotton ginning facility in Louisiana that is used by many 
neighboring cotton farmers for ginning their cotton.  It has 
been a practice of Mr. Thomason to retain the cotton seeds from 
the farmers who have their cotton ginned at Mr. Thomason’s 
facility as partial consideration for the use of his cotton gin.576
A portion of these seeds is used by Mr. Thomason to plant his 
own fields, and the balance is sold for processing into animal 
feed.577  Mr. Thomason was successfully sued by Monsanto and 
Delta and Pine Land for planting “brown-bag” genetically 
modified cotton seed578 without a technology use license.579
However, even his long-standing practice of using part of the 
seeds retained from ginning other farmer’s cotton would have 
given Monsanto and Delta and Pine Land a cause of action 
576. See Interview: Thomason, supra note 7. 
 577. Mr. Thomason has stated that he never resold any portion of these 
seeds to farmers for reproductive purposes. See id.
 578. Mr. Thomason planted “brown-bag” cotton seed during the 1996 crop 
cycle on only 50 acres of the normal 4000 acres that he plants.  Typically, Mr. 
Thomason has cotton seeds, that he saved from his own fields, cleaned and 
delinted by Sinkers Seed Corp., Kennett Mo., for planting during the next crop 
cycle.  In 1996, Mr. Thomason did not have a sufficient amount of his own 
“saved” seed to complete the planting of the 4000 acres. He insists that he did 
not know that the seed he purchased from Mr. Pete Mulhern, then employed 
by Tri-State Chemical, in 1996 was genetically modified to contain the 
Bacillus thuringiensis -endotoxin gene. See id.  Furthermore, he insists that 
Mr. Mulhern, who sold the seed to him, neither told him that the cotton seed 
was genetically modified nor required him to sign the technology-use license.  
See id.  It is known that in the first year of general use of Bacillus
thuringiensis cotton, the cotton seed was first placed on the open market in 
1996, the farmers were sold far more seed than they would have used had they 
been planting conventional cotton, and that the farmers planted the new 
genetically modified seeds more densely than they typically planted 
conventional seeds.  In many cases, farmers would return the excess seed to 
the seed dealer, who would rebag it in unlabeled brown bags and resell the 
seed without a technology-use license.  Under such circumstances, it is 
plausible that Mr. Thomason genuinely did not know, or could not have 
known, that the “brown-bag” seed was genetically modified but, the seed 
dealer certainly must have know and for his own reasons did not want to 
bother with requiring the farmers who were purchasing the seed to sign the 
technology-use agreement. See id. Mr. Thomason stated that it was Mr. 
Mulhern who reported him to Monsanto as using Bacillus thuringiensis 
genetically modified seed without a technology-use license.  See id.
 579. A technology-use license utilized by Monsanto in Canada to regulate 
canola farmers is given supra, note 453. 
152         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
against Mr. Thomason for patent infringement and 
infringement of the PVPA.  Because Mr. Thomason is not 
engaged in the process of creating a new variety of cotton, then 
one would be hard pressed to give him the status of a plant 
breeder.  However, a serious question in the current status of 
the law remains where Mr. Thomason is liable to Monsanto 
when he does indeed engage in his conventional practice of 
using a portion of the seed retained from the cotton ginning 
process for reproductive purposes. 
After many years of artificial selection the growers of 
Washington Red Delicious apples managed to produce the 
visibly “model” apple which does not have an appealing taste to 
the consumer.580  The Washington Red Delicious apple was 
“bred for color and size and not for taste.”581  Because of a 
change in the taste of consumers, and the lack of appeal of the 
Washington Red Delicious apple, the Red Delicious apple 
growers of the United States are facing a rapid decline in their 
industry.582  Recently, one astute apple farmer in the state of 
Washington observed an anomalous apple growing in his 
orchard of Red Delicious apples.  The new apple, called the 
Cameo apple, is distinct from the Red Delicious apple in color, 
skin texture, shape, and flavor.  This case raises two 
interrelated questions: first, whether the apple grower is a 
“plant breeder;” second, whether the apple represents a new 
variety of apples.  If each of these two issues is resolved in the 
affirmative, then the owner of the intellectual property in the 
ancestral plant variety may not have a cause of action for 
infringement.  The apple growers in general, and the grower of 
the Cameo apple in particular, satisfy all the requirements 
discussed above for giving a farmer the status of a plant 
breeder.  The apple growers are continuously refining a variety 
of apples to make it more appealing to the consumer and 
awareness and development of new varieties of apples is the 
core definition of being a plant breeder.  Therefore, the farmer 
who discovered the Cameo apple is a plant breeder, as are all 
the farmers who continue to refine the particular variety of 
crop that they are growing. 
580. See Timothy Egan, ‘Perfect’ Apple Pushed Growers Into Debt, N. Y. 
TIMES, November 4, 2000, at A1. 
581. Id. (quoting Doyle Fleming, lifelong apple farmer). 
582. See id.
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4. Breeding a New “Variety” 
The second issue related to the Cameo apple considers 
whether it constitutes a new variety of apples separate from 
the Red Delicious Apple.  The answer to this question depends 
upon whether the new plant is reproduced sexually583 or 
asexually.584  If the newly observed plant or plant product was 
the result of asexual reproduction, including a sport, then it 
might be a new “variety” and hence patentable under Title 35 
of the United States Code.  If the plant or plant product was 
produced by sexual reproduction then it might be a new 
“variety” under the Plant Variety Protection Act and hence 
subject to protection.  While the discovering farmer may be able 
to claim a patent or certification on the new plant or plant 
product, will the farmer still be liable for infringement of the 
original patent or Plant Variety Protection Act certification?  
The answer depends upon whether the farmer has the status of 
583. See Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 181 (1995).  If the 
variety is sexually reproduced, then it may be protected under the Plant 
Variety Protection Act.  As indicated earlier, sexual reproduction means that 
plants grow from seeds, which in turn produce seeds. Sexually reproduced 
plants are afforded protection under the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970.  
Specifically, the Act affords “patent-like protection to novel varieties of 
sexually reproduced plants (that is, grown from seed) which parallels the 
protection afforded sexually reproduced plant varieties (that is, varieties 
reproduced by propagation or grafting) under Chapter 15 of the Patent Act.”  
Id.
 584. Asexually reproduced plants are those which are reproduced through 
cuttings, grafting, or otherwise cloning the source plant. These plants may be 
protected by the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act.  The provisions of the 
Plant Patent Act were included in Title 35 of the United States Code in 1952. 
Law of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804 (1952) (current version at 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 161-64 (1994)).  Subsequently, the plant patent grant was changed from the 
“exclusive right” to the “right to exclude” resulting from court decisions 
explaining the nature of rights granted by a patent.  See 35 U.S.C. § 163 
(1994); Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34 
(1923) (stating that: “[a]ll that the Government grants and protects is the 
power to exclude others from making, using, or vending during the grant”); P. 
J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 40-41, 
reprinted in 75 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 161, 202 (1993).  Only a single claim is 
allowed in a plant patent, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.164, and the specification of the 
plant patent must contain as complete a description of the characteristics of 
the plant as possible so as to distinguish it from related known varieties; also, 
the specification must contain language which points out with particularity 
the manner of asexual reproduction.  The entire plant is patented; hence only 
a single claim is permitted in the plant patent.  See Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167 
F. Supp. 665, 667 (S.D. Cal. 1958). 
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a plant breeder, and upon the definition of a new “variety.”585
The definition of variety depends upon whether the ancestral 
plant variety was protected under the Plant Variety Protection 
Act or the Plant Patent Act. 
a.  Protection Under Plant Variety Protection Act 
The progenitor plant may be certified under either the 
Plant Variety Protection Act586 or587 under the Plant Patent 
Act.588  The right to certification under the Plant Variety 
Protection Act depends on whether the variety589 is new, 
distinct, stable, and uniform.  Because the scope of the Plant 
Patent Act590 is different from the scope of the Plant Variety 
Protection Act,591 “the meaning of variety in the Plant Patent 
 585. As is usually the case when dealing with language, we must struggle 
with ambiguities inherent in the use and meaning of particular words.  In the 
case at hand, our problem is adequately by the following: “[i]t is very difficult 
to tell just what is meant by the word variety; in fact, it means different things 
to different people.” Carleton R. Ball, Varieties of Hard Spring Wheat, 680 
U.S.D.A. FARMERS’ BUL. 1, 2 (1915).  Mr. Ball gave a somewhat useful 
definition as “it means a collection of plants in which all the individuals are 
alike in appearance, including form, size, color, and other visible characters.” 
Id.
586. See 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994). 
 587. Because the Plant Variety Protection Act applies only to plants that 
are sexually reproduced and the Plant Patent Act applies only to plants that 
are asexually reproduced, then it is not possible to obtain protection under 
both acts. 
588. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994). 
 589. Under the PVPA, the term “variety” is defined as follows: 
[t]he term “variety” means a plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of 
the lowest known rank, that, without regard to whether the conditions for 
plant variety protection are fully met, can be defined by the expression of the 
characteristics resulting from a given genotype or combination of genotypes, 
distinguished from any other plant grouping by the expression of at least one 
characteristic and considered as a unit with regard to the suitability of the 
plant grouping for being propagated unchanged. A variety may be represented 
by seed, transplants, plants, tubers, tissue culture plantlets, and other matter. 
7 U.S.C. § 2401(a)(9) (1994). The 1994 amendments to the Plant Variety 
Protection Act were made to conform the statutory language with the 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants of 
March 1991. See H. R. REP. NO. 103-2927 (1994). 
 590. The Plant Patent Act grants a patent to anyone who “invents or 
discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant.” 35 
U.S.C. § 161 (1994). 
 591. The Plant Variety Protection Act permits certification of a plant that 
has been sexually reproduced and has met the requirements of 7 U.S.C. § 
2402(a)(1-4).
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Act and the PVPA” must not necessarily be the same.592  If the 
new plant was obtained by harvesting cells from a plant 
protected by the Plant Variety Protection Act, satisfies the 
requirements of 7 U.S.C. §2402(a), and its progeny are sexually 
reproduced, then the progeny may also be protected under the 
Plant Variety Protection Act.  If, however, the new plant 
exhibits at least one characteristic which is clearly 
distinguishable from the progenitor plant and from other 
publicly known variety then the new plant is the originator of a 
new variety of plant. 
Since the Plant Variety Protection Act grants patent-like 
protection for certified plants, then the owner of the certificate 
may exclude others from the use of the plant for breeding 
purposes,593 but only to the extent that the progenitor and 
progeny plants are of the same variety.  If the research 
farmer594 uses the Plant Variety Protection Act certificated 
plant variety to develop a “hybrid or different variety 
therefrom”595 then the owner of the certificate may not exclude 
him from doing so.  For instance, Delta and Pine Land held a 
Plant Variety Protection Act certificate on the Bacillus
thuringiensis transgenic cotton planted by Mr. Dallas 
Thomason, and was awarded damages equal to $100 per acre of 
cotton planted by Mr. Thomason.  If Mr. Thomason had been 
using the Bacillus thuringiensis transgenic cotton to develop a 
new variety of cotton (say with a superior fiber length) then 
Delta and Pine Land would not have a cause of action for 
infringement of the Plant Variety Protection Act certificate 
because Delta and Pine Land would not have the right to 
exclude Mr. Thomason from doing so. 
Because Zea Mays L. is open pollinated the argument for 
using the certificated plant variety in developing a new variety 
may be easier to make.  For example, in the case of maize, it 
592. See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1568 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (Imazio Nursery brought a cause of action for infringement of 
its plant patent for a variety of winter blooming heather.  Resolution of the 
case depended upon the definition of “variety.”). 
593. See Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 276 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1960). 
 594. The farmer who engages in the practice of developing a variety of 
plant is a plant breeder.  Also, since the farmer is also engaged in the practice 
of developing hypotheses about which plants will yield the highest return on 
investment, then the farmer is also a researcher.  See generally Ball, supra
note 585. For simplicity, the term “research farmer” will identify any farmer 
who engages in the practice of rationally refining a variety of plant. 
 595. 7 U.S.C. § 2483(a)(1) (1994). 
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would only be necessary to intercalate a number of rows of 
Bacillus thuringiensis transgenic Zea Mays L., which was Plant 
Variety Protection Act Protected, with another variety of maize 
for the purposes of developing a new variety of maize.596  Again, 
in such a case, the owner of the certificate would not have a 
cause of action against the research farmer because the 
research farmer is using the certificated variety to develop a 
new variety. 
There is no language in the Plant Variety Protection Act 
specifying that the existence of the transgene in the certificated 
plant variety precludes the use of that variety in the 
development of a new variety.  This observation has 
considerable import in the case that the field of the research 
farmer is contaminated with the transgene from a field of 
genetically modified plants.  Because the presence of the 
transgene in the field containing originally non-modified plants 
creates a new variety, the holder of the certificate has no cause 
of action when the farmer, whose plants were contaminated, 
saves seed from that field for use in the next crop cycle. 
The Plant Variety Protection Act contains a research 
exemption.597  Research is beneficial to society and must be 
encouraged rather than discouraged by the threat of liability 
for either patent or Plant Variety Protection Act infringement.  
Because of the overriding benefit to the public, Congress 
exempted experimentalist from infringement under the Plant 
Variety Protection Act.598  The overarching purpose is, of 
course, to encourage further developments of the useful arts 
and continue to add to the human understanding.  It is not 
necessary that research be conducted only by the seed 
manufacturers.  Any person in the field who is working daily 
with the plants and land have just as much, if not more, 
experience and knowledge of plant husbandry as the person in 
the lab who works with petri dishes.  In fact, the person in the 
field is more likely to understand the economic, environmental, 
 596. Such an intercalation of Bacillus thuringiensis transgenic Zea mays L. 
with non-modified maize is actually required by the refuge plan to reduce the 
possibility of creating -endotoxin  resistant European corn borers. 
 597. The “research exemption” under the Plant Variety Protection Act 
provides that “[t]he use and reproduction of a protected variety for plant 
breeding or other bona fide research shall not constitute an infringement of 
the protection provided under this chapter.” 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (1999). 
598. See Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The 
Patent System and Controversial Technologies, 47 MD. L. REV. 1051, 1073 
(1988).
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and social impact of his or her work because he is the closest to 
those effects.  Because the research farmer is, indeed, engaged 
in a bona fide research program to develop his own plant 
variety, as is Mr. Percy Schmeiser, then the research 
exemption must apply to the research farmer equally with its 
application to the laboratory investigator. 
b.  Protection Under Plant Patent Act 
35 U.S.C. § 161 provides that “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new 
variety of plant . . . may obtain a patent therefor.”599  Once 
granted, the patent allows the patent holder to “exclude others 
from asexually reproducing the plant or selling or using the 
plant so reproduced.”600  Two issues need to be resolved in order 
to identify the level of protection and liability of the farmer 
under Title 35: first, whether the newly discovered and 
reproduced plant is a new variety; second, whether the 
discoverer of the Cameo apple, or the research farmer who 
develops a new variety, is liable for infringement of the Plant 
Patent Act (the mirror issue is whether the holder of the plant 
patent has exclusive rights in the Cameo apple).  The import of 
the first issue is that if the newly discovered and reproduced 
plant is a new variety, then the plant breeder or research 
farmer that asexually reproduced the plant cannot be guilty of 
infringement of the exclusive rights of the patentee.  The 
second issue is important because the plant breeder and 
research farmer must have available to him as many legal 
protections as possible for their important contributions to the 
general public.  The resolution of the first issue was examined 
by the United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit in 
1995.601  In Imazio Nursery, the decision turned on the 
definition of variety and what steps by the plant breeder give 
rise to a new variety.  The Federal Circuit provides a starting 
point in analyzing the issue of whether the Cameo apple 
constitutes a new variety of apples. 
Presume that a plant is obtained602 which has a Plant 
 599. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994). 
 600. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (1994). 
601. See Imazio Nursery, Inc. v. Dania Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560, 1568 
(Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 602. It is irrelevant for this part of the discussion whether the plant is 
obtained as a sport, mutant, hybrid, or a newly found seedling observed in the 
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Patent protected progenitor plant, but which does not contain 
an exact copy of the progenitor plant genome.603  To be precise, 
consider a progeny plant that was produced by the protocol 
required for asexual reproduction but which differs from that 
protocol604 sufficiently to produce a plant that does not possess 
an exact copy of the ancestral plant genome.605  While the 
construction of the situation under consideration is quite broad, 
the analysis of this situation will be applicable to the much 
narrow situation in which a Plant Patent protected plant 
containing a transgene is produced by a modification of the 
protocol for asexual reproduction.  Such modifications could be 
cultivated state.  While the Plant Patent Act does not define “variety,” the 
legislative history of the statute illuminates the inquiry as follows: 
new and distinct variety results from bud variation and not seed 
variation.  A plant or portion of a plant may suddenly assume an 
appearance or character distinct from that which normally 
characterizes the variety or species.  In the second class of cases, the 
mutants, the new and distinct variety results from seedling 
variation by self-pollination of species.  In the third class of cases, 
the hybrids, the new and distinct variety results form seedlings of 
cross pollination of two species, two varieties, or a species and a 
variety.
S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 3 (1930).  Congress added another class of plants in 
1954, newly found seedlings, with the exception that seedlings found in the 
uncultivated state cannot be patented.  Act of Sept. 3, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-
775, 68 Stat. 1190; Ex parte Moore, 115 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 145, 146 (Pat. Off. Bd. 
App. 1957) (section 161, as amended was intended to include “cultivated 
sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings”). 
 603. The only way of knowing for sure that the relevant gene in the newly 
obtained plant is not an exact copy of the ancestral gene is by gene mapping.  
Currently, technology exists to do gene mapping but it is costly. 
 604. For instance, the protocol might be varied by exposing the ancestral 
plant cells to conditions that are known to modify the genetic code.  See Pan-
American Plant Co. v. Matsui, 433 F. Supp. 693, 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977). 
605. See Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th 
Cir. 1976).  In recognizing that frequently occurring, but rarely observed 
mutations would still be patentable, the court stated that: 
[a]lthough we are willing to assume for purposes of this argument 
that some mutations may appear that would have been genetically 
impossible before i. e. that a fundamental change in the biochemical 
structure of the chromosome may take place by far the majority of 
mutations and sports of chrysanthemums are predictable to some 
extent for those skilled in the field . . . .  Indeed, part of the skill 
required of a [] breeder is to know what to look for and to take steps 
immediately to preserve it by asexual reproduction if the desired 
trait appears. Given that fact we think that the purpose of the Plant 
Patent Act would be frustrated by a requirement that only those 
rare, never-before-seen, if not genetically impossible sports or 
mutations would be patentable. 
Id. at 1382. 
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accomplished by radiation or toxins directed at the plant’s 
DNA.  The case at hand differs from Pan-American because in 
Pan-American the sport from the ancestral plant was asexually 
reproduced without modification.606
Under Title 35 of the United States Code, the progeny 
plant is of the same variety as the ancestral plant only if it is 
produced as the result of asexual reproduction.607  To determine 
whether our progeny plant is an asexual reproduction of the 
ancestor plant requires review of the meaning of asexual 
reproduction.608  The importance of asexual reproduction to the 
plant act was clarified in Yoder Bros.: “[a]sexual reproduction is 
literally the only way that a breeder can be sure he has 
reproduced a plant identical in every respect to the ancestral 
plant.”609  The court went on to state that infringement of the 
patent would occur “only if stock obtained from one of the 
patented plants is used”610 and that “[i]f the alleged infringer 
could somehow prove that he had developed the plant in 
question independently, then he would not be liable in damages 
or subject to an injunction.”611
The test then for asexual reproduction requires that some 
form of appropriation612 occur from the patented ancestral 
plant.613  The district court in Yoder Bros. determined the point 
at which appropriation occurs when it ruled “that the act of 
asexual reproduction was complete at the time the cutting 
[physical appropriation] was taken.”614  It would seem then that 
at first glance asexual reproduction has occurred in our case 
606. See Pan-American Plant Co. v. Matsui, 433 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Cal. 
1977).
607. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 608. Asexual reproduction has been described as being “not only a pre-
requisite but of the very essence of the patent itself.” Peter F. Langrock, Plant
Patents-Biological Necessities in Infringement Suits, 41 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y.
787 (1959). 
 609. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
610. Id.
611. Id.
 612. An adult plant can be reproduced from a single cell grown in tissue 
culture. See CAMPBELL, supra note 13, at 410.  Some commercially important 
plants that have been grown from single cells include alfalfa, asparagus, 
cabbage, carrots, citrus fruits, potatoes, sunflowers, tobacco and tomatoes. See
id. at 390. 
613. See Langrock, supra note 608, at 788. 
 614. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1383 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
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despite the progeny having a different genetic construct than of 
the ancestral plant. 
In 1948, Magnuson set out a test of infringement of the 
plant patent protection by asexual reproduction that asked 
“whether there was a reproduction of substantially the same 
plant as covered by the patent by any means other than by 
seed.”615  The Magnuson test would seem to indicate that the 
new plant would certainly be asexually reproduced because it 
was “substantially the same plant.”616  However, the Magnuson 
test “misses the narrow confinement of the protection afforded 
to plant patents.”617  Title 35, section 161 does not allow the 
granting of a patent for substantially the same plant618 but “one 
particular plant that has one particular chromosome structure 
and when reproduced asexually will produce plants that have 
an absolute genetic identity”619 with the ancestral plant.620  To 
discriminate, our grower has not “reproduced a plant identical 
in every respect to the parent”621 but has produced a plant that 
is “substantially the same plant”622 as the ancestral plant. 
Is the “substantially the same plant” of interest still 
“identical in every respect to the parent”623 just because 
“asexual reproduction was complete at the time the cutting was 
taken”?624  The answer to this question should be no.625 Modern 
 615. Raymond A. Magnuson, A Short Discussion on Various Aspects of 
Plant Patents, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 493, 508 (1948). 
616. Id.
617. See Langrock, supra note 608, at 789. 
618. See 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1994); Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant 
Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380 (5th Cir. 1976); Langrock, supra note 608, at 789. 
 619. Langrock, supra note 608, at 789. 
 620. The court in Yoder Bros. appears to follow this reasoning.  See Yoder 
Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380 (5th Cir. 1976) 
(stating that “[a]sexual reproduction is literally the only way that a breeder 
can be sure he has reproduced a plant identical in every respect to the 
parent”).
621. Id.
 622. Magnuson, supra note 615, at 508. 
 623. Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380 
(5th Cir. 1976). 
624. Id. at 1383. 
 625. The position argued here is contrary to that taken by Langrock.  
Langrock articulated his position as being that the law must create a 
“presumption that an infringement has occurred upon the showing by the 
patentee that the defendant’s allegedly infringing plants are substantially the 
same as the patented plant and that the defendant has had at least a 
minimum opportunity to make actual physical appropriations.”  See Langrock,
supra note 608, at 789-90. 
2002] JACK AND THE BEANSTALK 161
gene mapping methods have advanced to the point that it is 
nearly trivial to show whether an allegedly infringing plant is 
genetically the same as the patented plant.  Therefore, 
Langrock’s basic premise, that genetically identical plants can 
manifest different superficial characteristics because of 
environmental factors,626 fails in light of modern science.  It is 
now possible to determine whether two plants allegedly 
genetically identical but manifesting different characteristics 
are indeed genetically different.627  Since the patent was 
granted on one particular plant with one unique genetic 
structure and the new plant has a different chromosome 
structure, then the patent cannot be valid for the new plant.628
The fact that there was physical appropriation from the 
patented ancestral plant is problematic.629  The resolution of 
our quandary appears to be in how the plant cells were 
obtained for the new plant. 
If the cells for the progeny plant are harvested from a 
Plant Patent protected plant which has already undergone the 
genetic mutations due to environmental forces, then there is 
physical appropriation of the cells from a plant which are the 
same as the one protected by the Plant Patent Act.  In this 
case, the appropriation would constitute asexual reproduction 
of the patented plant, and hence the new plant would be of a 
variety indistinguishable from the plant that is protected.630  If 
626. See id. at 789. 
 627. Of course, environmental factors may cause two genetically identical 
plants to exhibit very different characteristics.  This is because the gene, or 
genes, underlying the relevant characteristic, or characteristics, may be either 
expressed at different levels or not expressed at all.  This situation adds a 
level of complexity which will serve only to obscure the point presently being 
pursued. 
 628. How similar the genetic structure must be and still express 
distinguishable characteristics is unclear.  Quite possibly, a difference of one 
DNA base-pair may be sufficient to assert that the two varieties are 
indistinguishable.
 629. The court in Yoder Bros. cited Langrock with approval that there 
must be physical appropriation in order to have asexual reproduction.  See
Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1380 (5th Cir. 
1976).
 630. Congress defined the characteristics that may be used to distinguish a 
new variety.  These include: 
among others those of habit; immunity from disease; resistance to 
cold, drought, heat, wind, or soil conditions; color of flower, leaf, 
fruit, or stems; flavor; productivity, including everbearing qualities 
in case of fruits; storage qualities; perfume; form; and ease of 
asexual reproduction.  Within any one of the above or other classes 
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the cells themselves had undergone genetic mutation and then 
were harvested from the Plant Patent protected plant then 
there would be no appropriation because the appropriated cells 
are not an identical copy of the ancestor plant results.  
However, if the cells were harvested from the protected plant 
and genetically modified then, according to the doctrine 
articulated in Yoder Bros., there would be physical 
appropriation and asexual reproduction.  Thus, there would be 
infringement.  In summary, any cells that contain genetic 
mutations and are harvested from a plant allegedly protected 
by Plant Patent are not physically appropriated and hence 
cannot constitute an asexual reproduction of the ancestral 
plant.  The rationale is that the harvested cells cannot be the 
progeny of the ancestral plant because the progeny can only be 
identical replicas of the ancestral plant.  On the other hand, if 
the cells are harvested and then modified there would be 
physical appropriation. 
This nonsensical result need not occur in light of recent 
developments in science.  With genetic identification 
techniques now available, although expensive, it is possible to 
determine if two plant genomes are from the same source.  
Therefore, the Patent Act should be amended to provide that 
the gene or genes corresponding to the distinctive 
characteristic of the plant, to be patented, be clearly identified 
in the patent.631  This will put the alleged infringer on notice as 
to what property is protected by the Plant Patent.  Further, the 
Patent Act should include additional requirements to show 
infringement: first, that the gene or genes corresponding to the 
putative distinctive characteristic of the alleged infringing 
plant be identified and shown to be the same as the gene or 
genes in the Patent Act protected plant; second, that the gene 
or genes corresponding to the distinctive characteristics of the 
Plant Patent protected plant be identified and shown to be the 
same as the corresponding gene or genes in the allegedly 
infringing plant.  Under this construction of the Plant Patent 
Act, the entire question of physical appropriation becomes 
of characteristics the differences which would suffice to make the 
variety a distinct variety, will necessarily be differences of degree. 
S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 4 (1930). 
 631. In the case that the patent is granted for a transgenic plant, both the 
transgene and the location in the plant genome where the transgene is 
inserted must be clearly identified.  Further, the transgene must be inserted 
using genetic engineering techniques and must be expressed. 
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irrelevant.  If the allegedly infringing plant cannot be shown to 
have a gene or set of genes that makes it distinctive from the 
Plant Patent protected plant, then infringement is 
demonstrated.
The answer to the first issue surrounding the Cameo apple 
is that it constitutes a new variety and infringement does not 
exist because the cells leading to the Cameo apple were 
mutated before being removed from the Plant Protected apple 
tree.  To resolve the second issue surrounding the Cameo apple, 
whether the discoverer of the Cameo apple, or the research 
farmer who develops a new variety, is liable for infringement of 
the Plant Patent Act (the mirror issue is whether the holder of 
the plant patent has exclusive rights in the Cameo apple), 
requires a review of the experimental use exception. 
i. Experimental Use Exception 
The experimental use exception to the Patent Act appears 
to have been created by Supreme Court Justice Story in 1813.632
In defining “infringement” the trial judge had included the 
requirement that there must have been an intent to use the 
invention for profit.633  Justice Story both approved of the jury 
instruction and added that “it could never have been the 
intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed 
such a machine merely for philosophical experiments, or for the 
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to 
produce its described effects.”634  Justice Story found that the 
defendant’s complaint regarding the jury instruction was 
without merit because the instruction given by the trial judge 
to the jury was in the favor of the defendant.635  Justice Story 
gave neither authority nor evidence of legislative intent 
supporting the cited proposition.  Furthermore, the statement 
was not necessary to decide the case.  Therefore, Justice Story 
created the experimental use exception to the Patent Act in 
dictum. The Patent Act remains devoid of language concerning 
632. See Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 
17,600).  On appeal defendant Cutter objected to an instruction which the trial 
judge gave to the jury in a patent case which was that “the making of a 
machine fit for use, and with a design to use it for profit, was an infringement 
of the patent right.”  Id. at 1121. 
633. Id. at 1121. 
634. Id. at 1121. 
635. Id. at 1122-23. 
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the common law experimental use exception.  Congress, in the 
188 years since Justice Story’s decision in Whittemore v. Cutter,
has not explicitly overruled the experimental use exception 
despite sufficient opportunity to do so. 
In a separate case involving the sale of the plaintiff’s 
patent protected machinery by a sheriff under a writ of 
execution, Justice Story was called upon to decide whether the 
sale constituted patent infringement.  In dictum, Justice Story 
stated that 
it has [been] held that the making of a patented machine to be an 
offence within the purview of it, must be the making with an intent 
to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of philosophical 
experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the 
specification.636
Continuing, Justice Story stated that “the making must be 
with an intent to infringe the patent right, and deprive the 
owner of the lawful rewards of his discovery.”637  In Sawin v. 
Guild, Justice Story formalized the element required for 
infringement as being an intent to profit from the act. 
Several theories have been advanced to explain the 
creation of the experimental exception by Justice Story.638  By 
revisiting the circumstances under which Justice Story first 
established the experimental use exception it may be 
determined that while the exclusive rights of the patentee were 
established by statute, such rights were the codification of long 
established common law. 
One possible basis for the establishment of the 
experimental use exception is that it arises from the scienter 
requirement of common law tort actions.  Both Whittemore v. 
Cutter and Sawin v. Guild were decided under the Patent Act 
of 1793639 since the Patent Act of 1793 was not repealed and 
replaced until 1832.640  The Patent Act of 1793 specified that a 
patent granted to the patentee “the full and exclusive right and 
 636. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (NO. 12,391). 
637. Id.
638. See Richard E. Bee, Experimental Use as an Act of Patent 
Infringement, 39 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 357 (1957). 
639. See Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 111, 1 Stat. 318-23 (1793) (the act 
was also published as: An Act to promote the progress of Useful Arts, and to 
repeal the Act heretofore made for that purpose, ANNALS OF CONG. 1431-35 
(1793) (2d Cong. Sess. 2)). 
640. See Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 162, 5 Stat. 117-25 (1836) (the act is 
entitled: An Act to promote the progress of useful arts, and to repeal all acts 
and parts of acts heretofore made for that purpose). 
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liberty of making, constructing, using, and vending to others to 
be used, the said invention or discovery.”641  Section 5 of the 
Patent Act of 1793 states that “if any person shall make, devise 
and use, or sell the thing so invented” then that person is an 
infringer of the exclusive rights of the patentee.642  It is true 
that the Patent Act did not require an intent to infringe,643 did 
not require an intent to use for profit, and established that lack 
of knowledge of the existence of the patent is irrelevant in 
determining infringement.644
Presume that indeed Justice Story based his analysis upon 
the common-law tort action of trespass on the case to conclude 
that it required an intent to use for profit before infringement 
could be found.  Then to conclude that Justice Story was 
incorrect645 is to require both an ignoration of essential 
language in the Patent Act of 1793 (that is, infringement occurs 
when the accused infringer makes, uses, or vends) and a 
misinterpretation of the scope in relevant Supreme Court 
cases.  As discussed above, volitive acts are essential to “make” 
or “use,” and by logical extension to “sell” the invention 
patented.  Therefore, scienter must be an essential element in a 
cause of action for infringement.  Justice Brewer, in United
States v. Berdan Fire-Arms,646 and Justice Woodbury, in Hogg
v. Emerson,647 were both referring to the use of ignorance of the 
patent as a complete defense to infringement.  In both cases, 
ignorance of the existence of the patent was held to be 
irrelevant in determining whether there was infringement.  
The facts of United States v. Berdan Fire Arms do not support 
an analysis of the intent to use the invention patented for 
profit, and in Hogg v. Emerson analysis of the use for profit was 
 641. Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 321. 
642. See id. at 322. 
 643. Bee argues that because the exclusive right in an invention is a 
statutory grant, the scienter requirement that is appropriate in common-law 
tort cases is inappropriate in determining whether infringement occurred.  See
Bee, supra note 638, at 365. 
644. See United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552, 566 
(1895) (stating that it would not be a defense to an infringement action that 
the accused infringer “had, subsequent to [the] invention, and without 
knowledge thereof, devised the contrivance which he was using”). 
645. See generally Bee, supra note 638. 
646. See Berdan Fire-Arms, 156 U.S. 552. 
647. See Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587, 607 (1850) (stating that ignorance 
“of the existence of the patent right” and lack of intent to infringe may be a 
defense when making the machine was “merely for a model, or for fancy, or 
philosophical illustration” but not when the machine is made “to be used”). 
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unnecessary to reach the decision in the case. 
Justice Story correctly decided Whittemore v. Cutter and 
Sawin v. Guild under the common-law doctrine of trespass on 
the case.  Evidence that a patent grants property rights is 
obtained from the Patent Act of 1793, section 1, which states 
that any person who “shall desire of obtaining an exclusive 
property” in an invention may be granted letters patent for the 
invention.648  In Sawin v. Guild, Justice Story stated that to 
prohibit the seizure and sale by authorities of the state of the 
patented machines would create a “great public mischief” 
because the patentee could “lock up his whole property, 
however, great, from the grasp of creditors, by investing it in 
profitable patented machines.”649  Such a possibility available to 
the patentee would be “against the whole policy of the law, as 
to the levy of personal property in execution.”650  Therefore, the 
exclusive interest granted by the patent was property, and 
Justice Story clearly viewed it as personal property, which 
could be seized in execution of a judgment.651  The cause of 
action for infringement of the exclusive rights in an invention 
“is only a tort”652 and the issue to be considered is whether the 
defendant “ever trespassed on any intangible right created by 
the patent.”653  The plaintiff, then, in 1813 must plead trespass 
on the case654 because trespass vi et armis required an injury 
resulting from the “direct and immediate force or violence 
against the plaintiff or his property,”655 and most forms of 
648. See Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 320. 
 649. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (NO. 12,391). 
650. Id. (emphasis added) 
 651. At common law, the inventor possessed interest in his invention but 
not an exclusive interest.  Exclusive interest in the invention “did not exist at 
common law, and the rights, therefore, which may be exercised under it 
cannot be regulated by the rules of the common law.”  Gayler v. Wilder, 51 
U.S. (10 How.) 477, 494 (1850).  Further, “no rights can be acquired in [the 
invention] unless authorized by statute, and in the manner the statute 
prescribes.”  Id.  Thus, the exclusive interests in the invention are defined by 
statute and the exercise of those rights must conform to the language of the 
statute.  However, where the statute is silent, such as in the meaning of make, 
use, sell, the courts must turn to either common law or impose their own 
interpretation.
 652. United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552, 566 (1895). 
653. Id. at 565. 
654. See Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (NO. 2,262) 
(stating that the “patentees and their assignees . . . bring actions on the case, 
to recover damages for making, using, or selling the thing”). 
 655. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1504 (6th ed. 1990). 
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action were not abolished until 1832 to 1833.656  The cause of 
action of trespass on the case would be brought for 
consequential injuries to the plaintiff resulting from the 
negligent activity of the defendant.657  Negligence is the failure 
to exercise care and such failure is subject to liability only if the 
law imposes the duty of care.  Section 5 of the Patent Act of 
1793 imposed the duty of care in defining the damages for 
infringement as:  “if any person shall make, devise and use, or 
sell the thing so invented . . . without the consent of the 
patentee” then the offender shall pay an amount no less than 
“three times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold” 
the patented invention.658  Thus, the alleged infringer is under 
a positive duty to seek a license from the patentee before he 
may “make, devise and use, or sell” the invention.  Failure to 
determine whether a patent existed for an invention 
constituted negligence sufficient to find for the plaintiff in a 
cause of action for trespass on the case. 
The language of the statute gave Justice Story 
considerable latitude in determining if indeed infringement 
had occurred.  Section 6 of the Patent Statute of 1793 states 
that “the defendant in such action shall be permitted to plead 
the general issue”659 which allows the defendant to “explain the 
circumstances in evidence to the jury.”660  The evidence that 
may be presented must relate to the validity of the patent.  
Thus, while the statute does not impose a requirement to 
intend to infringe the patent, it does impose a duty to know 
whether the invention was already patented.  The statement 
that “lack of knowledge by a party of the existence of the patent 
rights does not excuse his infringement”661 is technically 
correct, but it is incorrect to conclude that patent infringement 
is a “creature of statute and should be governed by statute.”662
As a result, Justice Story was correct in availing himself of the 
interpretation of “make, use, sell” in determining whether the 
defendant should be liable for infringement. 
To argue that infringement of the exclusive rights of the 
656. See 2 J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 60 
(1979).
657. See id. at 345. 
 658. Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 322. 
659. Id.
 660. BAKER, supra note 656, at 340. 
 661. Bee, supra note 638, at 365. 
662. Id.
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patentee and the cause of action to obtain a remedy are strictly 
creatures of statute, and not common law,663 is simply wrong.  
In 1813 the cause of action for infringement of a patent was by 
way of trespass on the case, and was clearly stated as such in 
the Patent Act of 1793.664  The cause of action for infringement 
remained the tort of trespass on the case665 until 1952,666 when 
the statute was changed to specify that the cause of action is to 
be brought before the Federal Court as a civil action.  
Nevertheless, the cause of action for infringement of a patent is 
a tort,667 which is a cause of action established in common law, 
not statute.  This distinction was clearly recognized by Justice 
Story in Whittemore v. Cutter when he stated that “a party 
relying on an action given by a statute must bring himself 
within the provisions of the statute”668 and “where, as in the 
present case, the law is remedial, it should receive a liberal 
construction, to effectuate the intentions of the legislature.”669
The patent statute was remedial; it did not specify the cause of 
action for infringement, but rather only defined what actions 
constituted infringement.  These characteristics of the Patent 
Act remain unchanged to this day. 
A second theory offered to explain Justice Story’s 
development of the experimental use exception is that since no 
damages occur to the patent holder because of the experimental 
use, there can be no cause of action.670  Specifically, this theory 
requires that for the patentee to support an action for 
663. See id.
 664. Specifically, the Patent Act of 1793 stated that damages “may be 
recovered in an action on the case founded on this act.” See Act of February 21, 
1793, supra note 639, at 322. 
 665. The Patent Act of 1870 stated that: “damages for the infringement of 
any patent may be recovered by action on the case in any circuit court of the 
United States.”  Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 207 (1870) (the act is 
entitled: An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the Statutes Relating to 
Patents and Copyrights). 
 666. The Patent Act of 1952 states that: “[a] patentee shall have remedy by 
civil action for infringement of his patent.” The Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 
82-593, § 281, 66 Stat. 792, 812 (H.R. 7794). 
667. See Honeywell Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1141 (7th 
Cir. 1975) (stating that “[i]nfringement of a patent is a tort”). 
 668. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 
17,600).
669. Id.
 670. Under the doctrine of injuria absque damno, even though the patent 
holder’s right to exclude has been violated he has suffered no damage 
recognizable under the law. See Bee, supra note 638, at 365. 
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infringement there must both injury and damage.671  Justice 
Curtis recognized that this theory was “the principle proceeded 
upon by” Justice Story.672  Thus, if there is no damage there can 
be no cause of action.  The absence-of-damage theory developed 
by Justice Story was well-engrained into patent law by the late 
nineteenth century.673
In Whittemore v. Cutter, the defendant advanced the 
theory that the “making of a machine cannot be an offence, 
because no action lies, except for actual damage[s]” and no 
damages exist for an “infringement by making a machine.”674
Justice Story rejected this theory and stated, “where the law 
gives an action for a particular act, the doing of that act 
imports of itself a damage to the party.”675  The position 
assumed by Justice Story was that every infringement of a 
right causes some damage, even if that damage is nominal.  In 
dictum, Justice Story in Sawin v. Guild reiterated his earlier 
position that the “making must be with an intent to infringe 
the patent-right, and deprive the owner of the lawful rewards 
of his discovery.”676  As to what the making of a patented 
machine for the purposes of “philosophical experiment” has to 
do with a cause of action for patent infringement due to the 
sale of protected machinery at a sheriff’s sale remains unclear 
to this day.  Evidently, Justice Story felt compelled to finish 
molding his newly created experimental use exception even if 
he had to do it in dictum.  Bee erroneously concludes that the 
absence-of-damages theory was specifically rejected by Justice 
Story in all infringement cases because there would always be 
at least nominal damages.677
The criticism of the absence-of-damage justification is that 
it is unsound because it directly contravenes the statutory 
language and the holding in Whittemore v. Cutter.678  If the 
infringer had licensed the invention from the patent holder, or 
had purchased the invention with the clear understanding that 
671. See Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 935 (C.C.D. Mass 1852) (No. 
2,262).
672. Id.
673. See ROBINSON, supra note 547, § 898. 
 674. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 
17,600).
675. Id.
 676. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (NO. 12,391). 
677. See Bee, supra note 638, at 366. 
678. See generally Bee, supra note 638. 
170         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
the infringer was going to use the machine in experiments then 
the patent holder would have a substantial pecuniary gain for 
which the infringer is liable.679  In fact, the language of the 
Patent Act of 1793 provided a statutory counter to Justice 
Story’s absence-of-damages theory because damages shall be 
“at least equal to three times the price, for which the patentee 
has usually sold or licensed” the invention,680 indicating that 
the minimum damages must exceed nominal damages.  Of 
course, it is easily recognized that more than nominal damages 
may occur as the result of patent infringement under the guise 
of experimental use. 
The experimental use exception is readily harmonized with 
both the statutory language and with the absence-of-damages 
theory articulated by Justice Story and supported by Justice 
Curtis (if the underlying assumption is correct).681  To 
determine if the assumption that there is no damage is correct, 
it is necessary to return to the cause of action for infringement.  
Infringement occurs where the person shall “make, devise and 
use, or sell the thing so invented”682 and fails to determine 
whether the device is, indeed, patented.  In Whittemore v. 
Cutter and Sawin v. Guild, Justice Story took the position that 
679. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 
648 (1915) (stating that the “normal measure of damages was the value of 
what was taken”); Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass Co., 298 U.S. 448, 457 
(1936) (stating that the “wrongdoer must yield the gains begotten of his 
wrong”).
 680. Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 322.  In the Patent Act of 
1832, this language was changed to reflect the possibility of a de minimus 
actual damages: “it shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for 
any sum above the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages . . . 
not exceeding three times the amount thereof.” Act of July 4, 1836, supra note 
640, at 123. The language was changed to “the court may enter judgment 
thereon for any sum above the amount found by the verdict as the actual 
damages . . . not exceeding three times the amount of such verdict” in the 
Patent Act of 1870. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 207 (1870) 
(emphasis added) (the act is entitled: An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend 
the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights).  By 1952, the language 
specifying the level of damages read: “in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” The Patent Act of 
1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 813. The damage specification of 
the Patent Act has remained essentially the same since 1952. See 35 U.S.C. § 
284 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)). 
 681. In Byam v. Bullard, Justice Curtis stated that he doubted “whether 
the assumption is correct, that in such cases there is no damage; yet if the 
assumption be correct, I think the inference is sound that no action lies.” 
Byam v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 935 (C.C.D. Mass 1852) (No. 2,262). 
 682. Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 322. 
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when there is infringement of the exclusive rights of the 
patentee, then there must be at least nominal damage.  Before 
this point is reached, however, it must be demonstrated that 
infringement actually occurred.  Here, Justice Story set the 
standard that the making must be with “an intent to infringe 
the patent-right, and deprive the owner of the lawful rewards 
of his discovery.”683  Thus, even if the person was fully aware 
that the invention was patented, he may make and use it 
unless there is an intent to “deprive the owner of the lawful 
rewards of his discovery.”684
It has been argued that Justice Story believed that 
inaction of Congress to create an experimental use exception in 
the Patent Act was simply no reason for there not being one.685
This position ignores the need of the courts to render justice, 
and not just blindly follow narrow interpretations of the 
statutory language.  It is quite likely that Justice Story simply 
realized that the clear language of the Patent Statute of 1793 
forced the courts to decide patent infringement cases unjustly. 
Consider the following cases:  the patentee does not exploit 
his invention patented for profit; the accused infringer makes a 
single copy of the invention patented for exhibition without 
using or selling the copy;686 the accused infringer makes the 
invention patented strictly for experimental purposes; or the 
patentee admits that there “is no evidence of actual damage” 
but requests “damages either to the full value of the expense of 
making the machine, or of the price, at which such a machine 
might be sold.”687  Where the injury to the patentee is nominal 
or nonexistent, it would be unjust to force the accused infringer 
to “pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least equal to 
three times the price, for which the patentee has usually 
sold”688 the invention.  While the language of the statute is clear 
in defining the damages for infringement and the clarity with 
which the statute speaks on the irrelevance of knowledge of the 
existence of a patent to determination of infringement affords 
 683. Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (NO. 12,391). 
684. Id.
685. See Bee, supra note 638. 
 686. Standard Measuring Mach. Co. v. Teague, 15 F. 390, 393 (C.C.D. Mass 
1883)  (stating that in such a case “the evidence of infringement of th[e] patent 
[is] insufficient to require us to compare the inventions with each other”). 
 687. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1125 (C.C.D. Mass 1813) (No. 
17,601).
 688. Act of February 21, 1793, supra note 639, at 322 (emphasis added). 
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no mistake, Justice Story found great latitude in the language 
defining what actions constituted infringement.  To avoid the 
embarrassment to his court of having to award no less than 
triple the price of the invention patented to a plaintiff who 
clearly admitted that he was not injured or suffered damage, 
Justice Story created the exception that if there is no damage, 
then there is no cause of action.  This is the correct result.  It is 
evidence of the considerable legal genius of Justice Story that 
he so clearly saw such an opening in the otherwise 
impenetrable wall, created by the Patent Act, around the rights 
of the patentee.  By utilizing that opening, Justice Story did not 
allow the Patent Act to force the courts to render unjust 
decisions in a narrowly defined set of patent infringement 
cases.
To illuminate the application of the experimental use 
exception to the Patent Act, a number of cases have been 
analyzed689 and carefully characterized.690  To clarify the 
exception for our purposes, it seems profitable to catalogue 
these cases and review their common threads.691
ii. Experimental Use Exception Accepted as Defense 
In the following cases, the court accepted the experimental 
use exemption as a defense to infringement.  In the first case, 
the defendant experimented with patented dyes in the course of 
developing the manufacturing techniques for metal harness 
trimmings coated with celluloid.692  The experiments with the 
dies were unsuccessful, and were shortly abandoned.  The court 
stated that “[i]t is a technical infringement, and is sufficient to 
authorize an injunction restraining their future use; but no 
reference will be ordered, as no damage or profits have been 
689. See Bee, supra note 638. 
690. See Ronald D. Hantman, Experimental Use as an Exception to Patent 
Infringement, 67 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y   617 (1985). 
 691. The courts have employed the experimental use exception in only a 
small number of cases since it was first articulated in 1813. A brief review of 
some of the pertinent cases permits a determination of the scope of the 
exemption and how courts will likely apply it in the case of assessing property 
rights in genetically modified plants.  The author acknowledges that the 
following brief review depends largely upon the framework developed by both 
Ronald Hantman and Richard Bee. 
692. See Albright v. Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co., 1 F. Cas. 320  
(C.C.D.N.J. 1877) (No. 147). 
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shown or suggested.”693  Thus, liability for infringing the patent 
appears to have been excused because no profit was accrued to 
the infringer whilst using the infringed invention. 
In the second case the defendant experimented with a 
number of marble making machines before going into 
production.694  The Plaintiff held a patent on one of the 
machines, designed for making children’s marbles, which was 
tested by the defendant.  This machine was abandoned in favor 
of a machine that was not covered by the plaintiff’s patent.  The 
court held that there was no infringement because the 
defendants tested the offset rolls, required for making the 
marbles, “for a brief period before going into commercial 
production” while they decide upon which offset rolls to use in 
production and the “marbles were not commercially sold.”695  In 
both Albright and Akro Agate, the court clearly ignored the fact 
that the experimentation was conducted in the course of 
business.  Also, in both cases, the experimentation was clearly 
not “for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or 
curiosity, or for mere amusement.”696  Therefore, the decisions 
in these cases cannot be squared with, what was at that time, 
considered established law.697
In the third case, the defendant had built a radio direction-
finding and position-indicating device based upon technology 
that was covered by a patent held by the plaintiff.698  One of the 
devices was eliminated from consideration in the case699
because it appeared that the “defendant built that device only 
experimentally and that it has neither manufactured it for sale 
nor sold any.”700
693. Id. at 323. 
694. See Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305 
(D.C.N.D.W.Va. 1937). 
695. Id. at 333. 
 696. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 
11,279).  The precise articulation of the experimental use exception doctrine 
by Judge Shipman was that: “[i]t has been held, and no doubt is now well 
settled, that an experiment with a patented article for the sole purpose of 
gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement, is not an 
infringement of the rights of the patentee.” Id.
697. See id.
698. See Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1944). 
 699. It is interesting to note that even without the experimental use 
exception to exclude one of the devices, the court states that since the claims 
of the plaintiff’s patent are invalid, it must render judgment for the defendant.  
See id. at 230. 
700. Id. at 229. 
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iii.  Experimental Use Exception Not Accepted as  
 Defense 
In the following cases the court refused to accept the 
experimental use exemption as a defense to infringement.  In 
the first case the defendant used a patented process for 
creating shaped articles of vulcanized rubber.701  Previous 
attempts to analyze this case either misstated or ignored the 
process that was protected by patent (in this case 
understanding the patented process is essential to 
understanding how the court handled the experimental use 
exception).  The court rejected the experimental use defense 
because the defendant had infringed the patented invention “as 
a matter of business, [and] where the product of that 
experiment has been thrown into the market, to compete with 
the products of the plaintiff.”702  In its analysis, the court stated 
that when “use [is] merely for experiment, and not with a view 
to profit; and when there has been no profit and no sale, it will 
not make a party liable, because the patentee would not be 
injured by it.”703
The second case in which the court rejected the 
experimental use defense involved the infringement of a patent 
held by Otto P. Meyer for creating shaped articles of vulcanized 
rubber.704  Apparently, defendants were once employed by the 
plaintiff and later left Poppenhusen to form their own 
manufacturing company, the New York Gutta Percha and 
India Rubber Vulcanite Company.  The court rejected the 
experimental use defense because the defendants were rivals of 
the plaintiff “in the very business to which his patents 
relate;”705 and they “[were] perfectly familiar with his patents 
and processes, having formerly been in his employ in 
manufacturing articles under his patents.”706  The court stated 
that “it can hardly be necessary for the [defendants] to 
experiment with the [plaintiff’s] inventions in order to perfect 
701. See Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 F. Cas. 
1059 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1858) (No. 11,283). 
702. Id. at 1063. 
703. Id.
704. See Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 
11,279).
705. Id. at 1049. 
706. Id.
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their own.”707
In the third case in which the court rejected the 
experimental use exception defense, the defendants claimed 
that they experimented with a patented process for tanning 
skins in excess of nine months to determine the desirability or 
utility of the process.708  Given the extensive time frame over 
which the defendants “experimented” with the process, it was 
safe to assume that the use of the protected process was in the 
course of ordinary business with the intent to profit from the 
use of the invention and in competition with the patentee.709
In the next three cases, the court rejected the experimental 
use exception defense because the infringement clearly took 
place in the course of ordinary business.  In the first of these, 
the defendant used a patented process for three years,710 but 
claimed he was only experimenting with the machines to 
identify possible improvements.  In the second, defendant used 
a patented process for three to four months711 and attempted to 
defend the action as merely experimental.  In the third case, 
the defendant assembled six disk water meters712 according to a 
patent owned by the plaintiff, and one of the meters was sold 
by the defendant to the plaintiff.713  The court rejected the 
experimental use defense because the evidence demonstrated 
an intention to infringe the patent.714  In an additional case, the 
defendant claimed the experimental use exception because the 
use of the protected process was only incidental to their search 
for a new agent and, therefore, was not a commercial 
operation.715  Because some of the pearl essence resulting from 
707. Id.
708. See Clerk v. Tannage Patent Co., 84 F. 643 (3d Cir. 1898) (holding 
that in the absence of actual permission from the patent holder the expression 
of a willingness to sell a license under the patent did not confer the privilege 
to use the process of the patent to experimentally test its desirability or 
utility).
709. See Poppenhusen v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 F. Cas. 
1059, 1063 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1858) (No. 11,283). 
710. See Cimiotti Unhairing Co. v. Derboklow, 87 F. 997, 999 
(C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1898). 
711. See United States Mitis Co. v. Carnegie Steel Co., 89 F. 343, 346 
(C.C.W.D. Pa. 1898). 
712. See Thomson Meter Co. v. National Meter Co., 106 F. 519, 526 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900). 
713. See id. at 541. 
714. See id. at 542. 
715. See Pairpearl Prod., Inc. v. Joseph H. Meyer Bros., 58 F.2d 802, 804 
(D.Me 1932). 
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the experiments was sold, the court rejected the defense.716
In another case, the defendant built the circuit absent the 
tubes that were packaged with the circuit for sale but were not 
plugged into their sockets in an attempt to circumvent the 
patent protection on an electronic oscillator circuit.717
Immediately before the packaging, the vacuum tubes were 
plugged into their appropriate sockets to determine if the 
circuits would function properly.718  The defendant claimed that 
this was merely experimental, and hence the patent was not 
infringed.  In rejecting this argument the court observed: “one 
can well understand that the law, not concerning itself with 
trifles, would ignore a mere casual appropriation for 
amusement or even scientific purpose.”719  Upon modifying on 
other grounds,720 the Court of Appeals said, with respect to the 
question of experimental use, “[t]he tests were made to see if 
they were marketable—a commercial and hence an infringing 
use.”721
The next case in which the experimental use defense, that 
the patented anchors were used for experimental purposes, was 
rejected the court said that the defendant’s “experiments were 
evidently not made for philosophical or amusement purposes 
but were made in connection with his business as a 
manufacturer and salesman of anchors.”722  In the last relevant 
case, the defendant argued that he experimented with a 
patented method for freezing fish on board a fishing vessel at 
sea to determine the desirability of the method.723  The defense 
was rejected because the defendant used the patented process 
while the vessel was engaged in commercial fishing 
operations.724
By analyzing the cases in which the experimental use 
716. See id.
717. See Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 15 F. Supp. 685, 686 (E.D.N.Y. 
1936).
718. See id.
719. Id. at 687. 
720. See Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 90 F.2d 612, 614 (2d Cir. 1937) 
(holding that even though the tubes were not plugged in to make the complete 
circuit, which was patented, the sale of the circuit constituted infringement). 
721. Id.
 722. Northill Co. v. Danforth, 51 F. Supp. 928, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1942), 
modified on other grounds, 142 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1944). 
723. See Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F.2d 34, 36 
(9th Cir. 1963). 
724. See id.
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exception defense has been raised it can be concluded that the 
exception is not applicable when there has been a business 
purpose or profit motive associated with the experimental use.  
If the experimental use is for personal convenience then the 
exception is not a valid defense to patent infringement. 
The previously reviewed cases left open the question of 
whether the interest of the patent holder must always take the 
form of money in assessing damages.  In 1982, this question 
was resolved in a case in which the defendant made and 
distributed, without remuneration, substantial quantities of a 
drug that infringed the plaintiff’s invention.725  The court stated 
that in order to qualify for the experimental use exemption 
there must be no intended commercial use of the invention726 
and that monetary remuneration by sale of the invention 
within the United States was not a necessary condition to 
finding infringement.727  The cases indicate that if the research 
is motivated by a commercial purpose, then the experimental 
use exception defense is not available.728 
The experimental use exception to the Patent Act was 
developed from judicial dictum.  The experimental use 
exception as it now stands could be overruled in favor of 
obtaining the same results directly from the statutory 
language, and from the rules relating to patent law.  
Specifically, the extenuating circumstances of experimental use 
would be weighed when deciding the amount of damages to be 
awarded.  Alternatively, the judicially constructed 
experimental use exception could be codified within the Patent 
Act itself. 
The patent laws of the United States729 grant a monopoly to 
inventors for a period of twenty years from the date of filing the 
 
 725. See Pfizer, Inc. v. International Rectifier Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
157, 160 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that because 
none of the drug was ever sold in the United States his actions were exempted 
by the experimental use doctrine). 
 726. See id. at 161. 
 727. See id. at 158-60. 
 728. See Roche Prod., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).  The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit rejected the defendants experimental use exception defense because 
experimentation in the guise of scientific inquiry is not covered “when that 
inquiry has definite, cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.”  
733 F.2d at 863. 
 729. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1994). 
178         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
application.730  The purposes of granting the monopoly are to 
promote economic activity by encouraging the quest for new 
ideas and to encourage full public disclosure of the new ideas.  
When an infringement of the patent monopoly occurs is defined 
by statute: “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States 
or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”731
The patent holder “shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent.”732
The rights of the patent holder are clear and unambiguous 
in that he has “the right to exclude others from using, offering 
for sale or selling throughout the United States.”733  However, 
the experimental use exception, while being very narrow, limits 
these rights.  The statutory rights of the patent holder may 
necessarily be limited in order to effect the purpose of the 
Patent Act itself. 
Section 101 of Title 35 provides that “[w]hoever invents or 
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore.”734  Also, Title 35 
provides that the term process “includes a new use of a known 
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.”735  Therefore, Title 35 contains within its statutory 
language the basis for formulating the experimental use 
exception.  This is so because section 283 provides that the 
court may “grant injunctions in accordance with the principles 
of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by 
patent,”736 and that the statute also provides damages for the 
violation.737  If the experimental use exception were precluded 
by the statutory language of Title 35, then new and useful 
improvement patents would be prevented by section 283, which 
would frustrate section 101 of Title 35 that explicitly provides 
730. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). 
 731. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994). 
 732. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994). 
 733. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
 734. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 735. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1994). 
 736. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994).  It is of interest for the current discussion to 
note that section 283 also contains the language “on such terms as the court 
deems reasonable.” 
737. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). 
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for new use and useful improvement.  The only way to have a 
new use and useful improvement is to allow experimentation 
with an existing invention (which is presumably protected by 
patent).  If the experimental use exception were anticipated by 
Title 35, then the “right to exclude” language found in section 
154(a)(1) cannot be interpreted to mean the “exclusive right” 
but must be interpreted to be the “right to exclude” limited by 
the privilege of others to the experimental use of the 
invention.738  Experimental use of the patented invention is the 
only way by which new and useful improvements may be 
made.739
It might be argued that if the statutory language of Title 
35 were to be interpreted to mean that an experimental 
exception must exist, then a scientific researcher could openly 
infringe a patented invention to develop improvements.  The 
researcher would then replace the patented invention in the 
marketplace and redirect the infringed patent holders profits to 
himself.  This response is exactly that contemplated by the 
patent system.  The open, public disclosure of the invention is 
the price that the inventor must pay in exchange for the “right 
to exclude,” and it opens the inventor to the very real risk that 
his invention may be made obsolete. 
Given the importance of experimental work to the 
developments in biotechnology,740 and in particular agricultural 
biotechnology,741 an experimental use exception to Title 35 
protection is a necessity for the continued growth of our 
economy.  Of course, reasonable royalties might be awarded to 
 738. It is recognized that the stated purpose of changing the statutory 
language from “the exclusive right” to “the right to exclude” was to make the 
meaning of the rights granted by the patent clearer by conforming the 
statutory language to that used in case law. The language “the exclusive 
right” is ambiguous when applied in certain situations. See Bee, supra note 
638, at 360-61.  It was argued then that the ambiguity was resolved by judicial 
decision and codified in the Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1952).  
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The New United States Patent Act in the Light of 
Comparative Law I, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (1954).  The argument continues 
that the Patent Act of 1952 cannot have contemplated the experimental use 
exception because the granting clause of the Patent Act of 1952 “reaffirms the 
older decisions which governed while the experimental use exception was 
being developed.” See Bee, supra note 638, at 361. 
739. See Irving N. Feit, Biotechnology Research and the Experimental Use 
Exception to Patent Infringement, 71 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y. 819, 836 (1989). 
740. See Merges, supra note 598, at 1053. 
 741. Monsanto estimates that it takes a period of ten years and 
approximately $300 million to create a commercially viable product of 
genetically modified seeds. See Weiss, supra note 449, at A1. 
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the patent holder.742  The provisions of the exemptions would 
include: (1) permitting the testing of a protected invention to 
determine the veracity of the claim; (2) permitting 
experimentation for the purposes of designing around the 
invention or improving the invention;743 and (3) permitting 
testing of the invention in preparation for entering into a 
license agreement with the seed manufacturer.744  An 
unfettered experimental use exception doctrine would invite 
abuse.  Therefore, the ordinary customer of the protected 
invention should not be exempted.745  In addition, a researcher 
who used the protected invention in other experiments must 
not be exempted746 because he would be the intended user of the 
invention.
With regard to the second issue surrounding the Cameo 
apple, the experimental use exception also applies. The 
experimental use exception was developed for inventions 
patented under what is now section 101 of Title 35 (of the 
United States Code).  Since the Plant Patent Act of 1930 is now 
part of Title 35, and since plants may be patented under 
section 101, then it is reasonable that the experimental use 
exception applies to plants, whether a patent was granted 
under section 101 or under section 161. 
If plant cells of a patented plant (the analysis is 
independent of whether the patent was granted under section 
101 or section 161) spontaneously mutate to express a 
characteristic different than those exhibited by the patented 
plant, and if those cells are then harvested, a new variety of 
plant comes into being.  In the propagation of the new variety 
there is no intent to profit from the use of the invention 
patented, rather it is the characteristics of the new variety that 
are seen to be of value.  There is neither injury nor damage to 
the patentee because the patentee could not have anticipated 
the new variety, and could not have gained a financial reward 
for the new variety.  The patentee has already profited from the 
sale of the ancestral plant; there was no intended commercial 
use of the invention because the new variety arose 
spontaneously.  Even if there was human intervention that 
742. See Feit, supra note 739, at 258. 
743. See Eisenberg, supra note 375, at 1078. 
744. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, TRANSGENIC ANIMAL PATENT
REFORM ACT, H. R. REP. NO. 888, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40, 51 (1988). 
745. See Eisenberg, supra note 375, at 1085. 
746. See id.
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eventually led to the spontaneous mutation, there can be no 
intent to make that particular mutation commercially viable 
because it cannot be known a priori whether the characteristics 
of the new variety are of commercial interest. While any one of 
these reasons is sufficient to invoke the experimental use 
exception, the strongest reason to invoke the doctrine is simply 
that the research farmer or plant breeder cannot know if and 
when the cells of the ancestral plant will mutate to give rise to 
the new variety.  That is, there can be no intent to use the 
invention patented for profit because of the lack of knowledge if 
and when the mutation will occur. 
If the plants are of a variety long cultivated and developed 
by the research farmer, and if these plants become 
contaminated by a transgene, then the experimental use 
exception must be invoked.  While the research farmer is 
developing his variety for the market, his intent is to develop a 
variety suitable for his local clime and soil conditions.  It is not 
of interest to use the invention patented, the transgene, 
because if it was the research farmer would purchase the 
technology-use license and the transgenic seeds from the 
patentee.  Indeed, following Justice Story’s lead, it would be a 
manifest injustice to allow the patentee to contaminate the 
plants of the research farmer and then try to claim that the 
sale of a crop containing the transgene was an injury to the 
patentee.  Further, the cases reviewed above involve the active 
procurement of the invention patented by the accused 
infringer.  In this case, the research farmer is not actively 
engaged in procuring and experiment with the transgene, 
rather the transgene literally “fell from the sky.”  Therefore, 
the experimental use exception must be available to the 
research farmer whose land is contaminated with the 
transgene.
5. Use of Farm Cooperatives as Research Institutions 
Under the current structure of the seed market and 
statutory protection mechanisms, the farmer’s only choice, save 
for a limited number of cases, is to purchase seed from 
commercial seed manufacturers.  The farmer must return to 
the commercial seed manufacturer each year because either the 
plant variety is a hybrid, which loses vigor upon planting the 
progeny seed, or is a genetically modified variety, requiring a 
yearly renewal of the technology-use license.  The seed 
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manufacturer in turn dictates the nature of the rights which 
the farmer has in his own property to the extent that the 
farmer must effectively license the use of his own land and crop 
from the seed manufacturer in exchange for the privilege of 
planting the protected seed.  The current market and legal 
structure need not be the only structures available to the 
farmer.  An alternative structure can be built within existing 
cooperative marketing associations. 
Farm marketing associations were first created in the 
early years of the twentieth century to provide a vehicle by 
which individual farmers could lower their risk to fluctuations 
in the commodities market.  By pooling within the farm 
marketing association, the individual farmer could avail 
himself of the results, which accrue from the efforts of a large 
organization that would not be available to him if he acted 
alone.747  In the absence of the marketing association, the 
individual farmer is unable to act effectively in the market.  
This occurs for a number of reasons: he is unable to effectively 
bargain for a fair price or a reduction in his risk exposure; he is 
exposed to a high transaction cost, as is the purchaser because 
the purchaser must negotiate a large number of small contracts 
(therefore, the purchaser must pay a lower price for the 
commodity to recoup the transaction costs when he sells that 
commodity on an exchange or into the final product market); he 
is required to bear the risk of fluctuations in market price and 
demands; and he must sell his crop when and where the local 
market requires him to sell.748
By pooling operating and marketing expenses, contract 
negotiations, and management of risks associated with market 
fluctuations, the individual farmer is able to increase his profit 
margin and increase the financial stability of his farm 
enterprise.749  The most important role of the marketing 
747. See Chris L. Christensen, Pooling as Practiced by Cooperative 
Marketing Associations, 14 U.S.D.A. MISC. PUBL. 1, 2 (1929). 
748. See id.
 749. For an economic analysis of a wheat pool, a type of farm marketing 
association, see Won W. Koo, William Nganje, D. Demcey Johnson, Joon Park 
& Richard Taylor, Economic Analysis of The Proposed North Dakota Wheat 
Pool-Summary, AG. ECON. REPORT NO. 410, (25 January 1999) (the report is 
available from the Department of Agricultural Economics, P.O. Box 5636, 
North Dakota State University, Fargo, N.D.).  Also, a summary of Report 410 
is available online.  See Won W. Koo, William Nganje, D. Demcey Johnson, 
Joon Park & Richard Taylor, Economic Analysis of The Proposed North 
Dakota Wheat Pool-Summary, AG. ECON. REPORT NO. 410, (25 January 1999) 
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association is to act to reduce the financial risks associated 
with market fluctuations and expansion of the market area and 
type of products.750  The individual farmer has neither the 
financial resources nor the time and skill to expand his market 
through exploitation of a new market product and policy.  
However, the market association can do so and can minimize 
market risks by pooling the resources of a large number of 
individuals.
The agricultural marketing associations may effectively 
expand their control of the market by using the pooled 
resources to develop plant varieties, including transgenic 
varieties, suitable for their locale, or export to regions of 
comparable clime and soil conditions.751  Such investment in 
plant variety development can occur through two distinct 
mechanisms.  The association may invest the pooled resources 
to support the efforts of a group of farmers who continue to 
develop varieties for their locale, or the pooled resources may 
be used as consideration for contracting the efforts of university 
schools of agriculture.752
at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/pdf_view.pl?paperid=1172 (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2002). 
750. See id. at 4. 
 751. The cooperative marketing associations have assisted their members 
beyond coordinating marketing efforts in other cases.  Prominent amongst 
such efforts is the agricultural credit corporations established in the 1920’s.  
See William H. Rowe, Agricultural Credit Corporations Affiliated with Cotton 
Cooperative Marketing Associations, 322 U.S.D.A. TECH. BUL. 1, 2 (1932). 
 752. The functioning and long term stability of farm marketing 
associations depends upon the level of cooperation between the members of 
the association. See Nicole Witwicki, Naomi T. Krogman & Harvey Brooks, 
Theoretical Guidance on the Determinants of Success in Agricultural 
Marketing and Production Clubs, RURAL ECONOMY STAFF PAPER 98-10 (1998), 
available at http://lipsey.re.ualberta.ca/STAFF-PAPERS/sp-98-10.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2002) (the staff paper is published by the Department of Rural 
Economy, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada); John M. Staatz, The
Cooperative as a Coalition: A Game-Theoretic Approach, 65 AGRICULTURAL
ECONOMICS 1084-89 (1983); John M. Staatz, A Game-Theoretic Analysis of 
Decisionmaking in Farmer Cooperatives, at http://www.rurdev.usda.gov/rbs/ 
pub/sr18/agame.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2002); Thomas W. Hertel, Applied
General Equilibrium Analysis of Agricultural and Resource Policies, STAFF
PAPER 99-2 (March 1999) available at http://ae761-
e.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/resources/ download/11.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 
2002).
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a.  Support of Farmers as Researchers 
Under the first model the association would either contract 
for the services of a small group of farmers or would coordinate 
the services of a large number of farmers who would pool select 
seeds from each year’s crop for planting in the next crop cycle.  
Under the model of contracting for the services of a small group 
of farmers, the association would assume the risk of 
fluctuations in the success of a particular crop in exchange for 
using the results of that crop for future planting cycles.  The 
individual farmer who has and continues to develop a 
particular variety of plant would promise to sell his entire crop, 
or that portion required by the association, as consideration for 
a contract under which the association would provide operating 
costs for the production of the crop and a premium for any 
portion of his crop used for seed in the next growing cycle. 
Farmers who engage in the practice of selecting plants for 
continued propagation in subsequent growing cycles are bona 
fide researchers.  The individual research farmer engaged in 
the program would promise that his entire crop, or that 
fraction sufficient to satisfy the needs of the association, will be 
made available to the association at the time of harvest for a 
fixed price.  The price would represent a premium above 
market value of seeds sold for non-reproductive purposes to 
reflect the fact that seeds used for reproductive purpose 
command a higher price on the commercial market than the 
crop for non-reproductive purposes.  That fraction of his crop 
that would not be required by the association would be 
purchased at a premium above the market price for a non-
reproductive crop, but at a price below the price paid for that 
portion to be used for reproductive purposes. 
This scheme would insulate the research farmer against 
the risk of a decline in demand while properly compensating 
him for the efforts expended in producing the seeds.  Such an 
arrangement would shift most of the burden of the risk 
associated with production of seed for reproductive purposes 
from the research farmer to the association.  Since the 
association has a large number of members, it has ready access 
to the information required to determine the amount of seed 
necessary for the following planting cycle.  The research farmer 
would be motivated to produce seed for reproductive purposes 
for the association because of the premium above market value 
he would obtain for his crop.  The members of the association 
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would be motivated to purchase and use the seed produced by 
the research farmer for two primary reasons: first, the seed 
would presumably be available to the non-research farmer at a 
price substantially lower than the price commanded from the 
seed manufacturers; second, the seed would be of a variety 
which is optimized for the local clime and soil conditions. 
Under this model, there would be no mechanism 
constraining either the research farmer or non-research 
member from saving seed for use in the next planting cycle.  It 
is possible that such a result could be avoided by making 
continued membership in the seed pool contingent upon 
returning to the pool each year and purchasing seed.  This 
restraint would still be to the benefit of the non-research 
farmer for the reasons just cited, and would benefit the 
association in the long term.  Continued membership of the 
farmers would result in continued support of the research 
farmers and hence the plant genome would be continuously 
improved for the particular locale.  Counterbalancing this is 
the possibility that the research farmer fails to be sufficiently 
vigilant to recognize and nurture new varieties or there is a 
cataclysmic failure of the research farmer’s crop.  Both of these 
risks are reduced or eliminated by using the services of 
multiple research farmers well distributed over the 
geographical area served by the cooperative marketing 
association.  Continued vigilance on the part of the research 
farmer could be assured by requiring a showing of a superior 
crop for the location. 
The restriction that non-research farmer return to the pool 
each year for his seeds could work to the detriment of the 
association in the long run.  To recapture its market share in 
the geographical area controlled by the association, the seed 
manufacturers would be motivated to compete directly with the 
seed pool of the association.  This could be done in one of two 
ways.  First, the seed company could show that its seed was far 
superior to that produced by the association by contracting 
with non-research farmers who were members of the 
association to grow a competing variety on their farm.  If the 
seed manufacturer’s variety produced a crop sufficiently 
superior to that of the association such that the profit margin 
of the non-reproductive crop was favorable to the farmer, then 
the seed pool of the association would be broken by defection of 
members seeking superior product and a favorable profit 
margin.  Second, the seed manufacturer could undercut the 
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price for which the co-operative marketing association would 
sell its competing variety of seed.  Because the association 
could not compete, then the seed pool could no longer afford to 
exist.  In its efforts to eliminate the seed pool the seed 
manufacturer would have a strong motivation to engage in 
unfair competition and pricing. 
It may be beneficial to the association if individual farmers 
saved seed for planting in the next crop cycle.  The advantage 
exists in the increased probability of observing and propagating 
a superior variety when there are a multiplicity of observers 
than if there was a minimum number of observers.  Once a new 
superior variety was identified the machinery of the seed pool 
would lead to its rapid dissemination over the geographical 
area served by the association.  The primary shortcoming of the 
seed pool based upon the selection efforts of research farmers is 
that neither hybrid nor transgenic varieties may be introduced 
into the seed pool of the association. 
b. Coordination of Research Farmers 
By coordinating the efforts of two or more research 
farmers, the association can introduce hybrid varieties into the 
available seed pool.  Because these hybrid varieties are already 
adapted to the local clime and soil conditions, and because the 
costs of producing the hybrid variety is distributed between the 
members of the association, the hybrid variety would be 
genetically superior to varieties imported into the locale by the 
seed manufacturers and would be available at a price less than 
or competitive with varieties available from seed 
manufacturers.
Under this model, individual research farmers would be 
contracted to grow either elite or first generation hybrid 
varieties for cross-breeding and other research farmers would 
be contracted to conduct the steps required to produce the final 
hybrid variety.  The association would be in the position to hire 
the expertise in plant genetics required to assist in the 
production of the hybrid varieties.  While individual farmers 
may lack both the sophistication and resources required to 
produce hybrid varieties, the collective efforts coordinated by 
the association would almost certainly be sufficient to produce 
superior quality hybrid varieties.  The non-research farmers 
would be motivated to return each year to the seed pool for two 
reasons: first, the hybrid vigor is not sustained past the first 
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generation; second, the variety would be superior in quality 
and value to imported hybrid seed varieties.  The research 
farmer would be encouraged to participate in the hybrid seed 
pool by the premium that his seed crop would command.  
Because the hybrid variety produced by the association would 
be well suited to the locale it would be superior to that 
available from the seed manufacturer.  Therefore, the seed 
manufacturer may be disinclined to enter the geographical 
market area served by the cooperative marketing association. 
Because there would be directed human intervention in 
producing the hybrid then the variety may be protected by 
Plant Variety Protection Act certification, a utility patent, or 
both.  The association would be the patentee, and the patent or 
Plant Variety Protection Act753 certificate would give the 
marketing association leverage to enter cross-licensing 
agreements or research contracts with commercial seed 
manufacturers.  In addition, the association would be in the 
position to enter a patent pool with other agricultural 
marketing associations.754  An overriding benefit of this 
particular construct would be that the association would 
directly control the intellectual property and the farmer has a 
voice in the policies underlying the control because of his 
ability to vote as a member of the association. 
c. Cooperation Between the Cooperative Marketing  
 Association and the Land-Grant University 
The ultimate strength of the cooperative marketing 
association would be obtained when it has interests in 
intellectual property associated with genetically-modified 
plants.  Clearly, individual farmers do not possess the 
resources to make genetically-modified plants.  However, land-
grant universities certainly possess the required technological 
expertise within their colleges of agriculture.  The second 
model available to the cooperative marketing association for 
753. See, e.g., Julian M. Alston & Raymond J. Venner, The Effects of the 
U.S. Plant Variety Protection Act on Wheat Genetic Improvement, EPTD 
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 62 (May 2000) available at
http://216.15.202.3/docs/eptdp62.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2002) (The EPTD 
discussion paper is published by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute, Washington, D.C.). 
 754. The instance of ownership of intellectual property by an agricultural 
marketing association will be discussed below. 
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expanding its control over the production of seed is to establish 
a cooperative effort with the college of agriculture within the 
state land-grant university.  Under this model, the marketing 
association would provide funding for research and 
development of genetically modified plants, and individual 
farmers could be contracted by the cooperative marketing 
association to provide land for planting the test varieties.  In 
exchange for financial support from the cooperative marketing 
association, the university would provide the intellectual 
capital required to make the genetically-modified plants. 
The revenue to fund the university research would initially 
be generated by levying each member of the cooperative 
marketing association an amount based on a function of the 
total acreage he has traditionally planted in the crop species 
and upon the deviation between his own average yield and the 
average yield from the maximum yield producer.  When the 
new variety is actually produced, the initial price of the seed to 
each member will depend upon the difference between the 
average yield of the maximum producer and the average yield 
from the new variety.  This assessment structure will shift the 
greater burden of the cost of the new variety onto those 
members who will profit the most from the new variety. 
The cooperative marketing association bears a great deal of 
risk in funding research at a land-grant university.  University 
research laboratories typically follow a common model: a single 
professor is at the head of the laboratory and the laboratory is 
staffed by a mix of postdoctoral research fellows and graduate 
students.  Generally the graduate students far outnumber the 
postdoctoral fellows, and the graduate students work 
essentially independent of the postdoctoral fellows and the 
professor of the laboratory.  Typically, the graduate students 
and postdoctoral fellows will report their progress from time-to-
time to the other members of the laboratory by means of a 
semi-formal presentation.  The university laboratory is 
typically organized such that an individual staff member will 
work on a single aspect of a particular topic and multiple topics 
may exist simultaneously within the laboratory. 
While such organization of research is certainly conducive 
to development of an individual’s work within an area of his or 
her primary interest, it is a recipe for disaster when an outside 
group wishes to fund work directed toward production of a 
specific product in an economically feasible manner.  Several 
reasons exist for this observation.  First, it is common for a 
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given graduate student to start work on a particular research 
project only to either abandon or substantially modify the goals 
after a considerable amount of time has elapsed.  Second, the 
head of the laboratory may be quite unaware of the details of 
the research project and even may be unaware of the possibly 
high risk of failure of a particular course of research.  In fact, it 
is nearly impossible to start on a particular trajectory of 
research with knowledge of whether that particular trajectory 
will be successful and whether that particular trajectory will 
lead to the desired result in an economically reasonable 
amount of time.  Third, the head professor, and most associate 
professors within the laboratory, do not actually engage in the 
practice of laboratory investigation.  Also, new ideas for 
pushing the research forward will typically come from 
interactions between the postdoctoral fellows and graduate 
students rather than from the head of the laboratory.  This 
means that control of the direction of research may not lie with 
the head of the laboratory.  Fourth, in order for all members of 
the laboratory to advance their careers, it is essential that their 
results, which are many times preliminary in nature, be 
presented in the forum of professional meetings and published 
either in the press or on the Internet.  Further, informal 
discussions between members of separate laboratories may be, 
in many cases, essential to the progress of a research project 
because the discussions facilitate the transmission of 
knowledge and expertise between the parties to the 
discussions.  These forms of information transmission within 
the academic research community facilitate progress and 
inhibiting such transmission of information hampers or 
completely halts progress in research.  Conversely, such 
transmission of information may eliminate the proprietary 
interests in the results of the research.  Worse, is the very real 
possibility that the information may be inadvertently 
transmitted to a competitor who may be able to lay proprietary 
claim to the results generated from that information. 
To retain proprietary interests in the results of cooperative 
marketing association funded research at land-grant 
universities, the association must have a voice in the selection 
of both the faculty who conduct the research and the research 
staff of the laboratories that receive funds from the 
association.755  Both the land-grant university and the 
 755. It is immediately recognized that the optimal solution to the 
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laboratory receiving the funds would be motivated to accept 
these terms for several reasons.  First, such cooperation would 
supply much needed funds to the university.  Second, it would 
allow the university to hold interest in property to which it 
would not otherwise have access.  Third, such arrangements 
would help the university fulfill its land-grant mission.  
Finally, it would allow the university to remain at the forefront 
of a rapidly developing technology. The cooperative marketing 
association would be motivated to insist upon such conditions 
by the need to protect its interests in the results of the 
research.
Because the cooperative marketing association would 
provide resources for the development of the genetically-
modified plant, as would the university, both would be able to 
claim ownership interests in the results of the research.  If the 
university retained exclusive interest in the intellectual 
property generated by the cooperative effort, then it would be 
free to either license or sell it to any organization.  Further all 
royalties from the sale of the seed and the technology-use fee 
would belong to the university.  Most important is that the 
cooperative marketing association would lose all control over 
and access to the results of research that it funded.  If the 
cooperative marketing association retained all interests, then 
the university would not have two of its primary motivations 
for entering into an effort with the cooperative marketing 
association, access to the technology and access to the income 
streams generated by sale of seeds and technology-use licenses. 
The balance point can be determined by considering 
several factors.  The marketing association does not want the 
university to alienate any interest in or license the technology 
to competitors of the cooperative marketing association.  Such 
alienation would immediately defeat the primary reason for the 
association to fund the research.  The cooperative marketing 
distribution of rights between the farm marketing association and the 
university is determined as an equilibrium point in a two-person cooperative 
game, while the distribution of duties and benefits within the farm marketing 
association is determined as an equilibrium point in an n-person cooperative 
game. See, e.g., John F. Nash, Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, 36 
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 48-49 (1949); John F. Nash, The Bargaining Problem,
18 ECONOMETRICA 155-62 (1950); John F. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 
ANN. MATH. 286-95 (1951); John F. Nash, Two-Person Cooperative Games, 21 
ECONOMETRICA 128-140 (1953); John F. Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54 
ANN. MATH. 286-95 (1951); J. P. Mayberry, John F. Nash & M. Shubik, A
Comparison of Treatments of a Duopoly Situation, 21 ECONOMETRICA 141-54 
(1953).
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association must profit from the risk that it took in funding the 
research.  The university took no risk in entering into the 
cooperative effort because the university can either raise the 
required funds, if necessary, from other sources or not enter 
into the relevant area of investigation.  The balance point is 
then obtained when the cooperative marketing association 
retains all interests in the legal estate of the resulting research 
while the university is granted a revocable license to make and 
use, but not to alienate, the property.  Such an arrangement 
rewards the cooperative marketing association for bearing the 
risks involved with the subject matter of the relationship while 
allowing scientific investigations to move forward because of 
access to otherwise proprietary property.  All members of the 
marketing association could purchase for planting the seed for 
reproductive purposes without having to pay the technology-
use fee because they are already part owners of the technology. 
The association may chose not to obtain patent protection 
for the genetically modified seed, but rather to restrict sale to 
persons outside of the association by levying the member 
transferring the seed outside the association an amount equal 
to that amount the purchaser would have had to pay if the 
purchaser had been an initial investor in the research project.  
This option may be advantageous to the cooperative marketing 
association because it will eliminate the transaction costs 
associated with obtaining and defending exclusive rights under 
a utility patent.  The members of the association may 
individually purchase the seed from growers within the 
association at a premium above the price of the crop used for 
non-reproductive purposes (to adequately compensate the 
growers of the seed) or they may reproduce seed for planting 
the next cycle.  Either way, the association is not harmed.  This 
is because the cooperative marketing association functions to 
maximize profit from sale of the crop for non-reproductive 
purposes by reducing risks associated with fluctuations in 
market price and reducing transaction costs. 
The association, which consists of farmers as members, has 
exclusive control over the seed and each member has already 
paid according to the formulae described above.  Since there is 
no competition between the members of the association to gain 
a profit by selecting between several different transgenic 
varieties of seed for planting, then there is no loss of market 
share because of availability of a superior seed from within the 
association.  There may be competition between cooperative 
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marketing associations for availability of seed, but because the 
particular variety of seed is optimized for the local clime and 
soil conditions, such competition is unlikely to contribute much 
to the profit margin of individual farmers within the 
association.  In fact, it might be better for the association to 
allow farmers to save seed for use in the next planting cycle 
because this will continue to improve the varieties through 
local artificial selection.  The members are not competition 
against each other for the market for their crops, but rather are 
acting in concert to obtain the highest price possible for the 
collective.  Thus, the association can avoid the transaction costs 
associated with obtaining and enforcing the exclusive interests 
in the legal estate in the transgenic plant while obtaining its 
goal of maximizing the profit for its members by not obtaining 
patent protection for its intellectual property.  That the 
competition in the seed manufacturing industry may have 
access to the intellectual property is not problematic for 
obvious reasons. 
6. Genetic Pollution 
Cross-breeding between varieties (within the same species) 
occurs in the open environment and cannot be controlled by the 
seed manufacturers.756  Consider then two adjacent fields: the 
one owned by Farmer Jack is planted with a genetically 
modified variety of plant; the other field owned by Jack’s 
neighbor Farmer Adams is planted with a non-modified variety 
of the same species.  The crop from the non-modified field is 
intended to be sold into a market requiring that the crop does 
not contain a transgene, or some other premium market.  
Because the dispersion of the gene in the open environment 
cannot be controlled, the crop in the field containing the non-
modified variety of plants will become contaminated with the 
transgene.757  Even though the transgene translocated through 
 756. For instance, Zea mays L. pollen can travel distances up to 600-800 
feet, and canola pollen can travel at least one-half mile (sufficiently far to 
completely engulf the one-quarter section field discussed above in the case of 
Mr. Percy Schmeiser). See Interview with Dean Charles Muscoplat, Dean, 
Univ. of Mn. Coll. of Agric. (July 31, 2001) [hereinafter Interview: Muscoplat]. 
 757. If the transgene is translated through pollen, then only the crop 
(containing the progeny seeds) from the plants will be contaminated. However, 
if seeds from the first crop are used in the next planting cycle, then most, if 
not all, of the plants and their progeny seeds in the second planting cycle will 
be contaminated with the transgene. 
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no effort of Farmer Adams, his crop will be polluted by the 
transgene.  Under one interpretation of the law, Farmer Adams 
is infringing the exclusive interest of the seed manufacturer 
when his crop becomes contaminated.  To determine whether 
this is the correct outcome, it must be determined to whom 
responsibility must be assigned for the genetic pollution and 
whether that party has a right to pollute and to sue Farmer 
Adams.
To avoid infringement liability, Farmer Adams must either 
destroy his crop or have the seed manufacturer deal with the 
problem.  The first alternative, though suggested in some 
forums, is unrealistic.  The second is equally unrealistic for 
other reasons.  If the seed manufacturer were called to 
eliminate all possibly infringing plants, then each plant would 
have to be tested for the transgene and removed by hand.  
Presuming that the transgene conferred herbicide resistance, 
spraying with a herbicide would allow ready identification of 
infringing plants.  However, such destructive testing would 
cause a complete loss of the crop.  If the transgene conferred 
some other characteristic upon the plant, then other forms of 
testing would be necessary.  In either case, other techniques of 
identification, such as genetic testing or growing up progeny 
seeds and testing them in the laboratory, would be equally 
expensive, cumbersome, and impractical.  Aside from the 
impracticality and costs of identifying and destroying 
infringing plants, any strategy requiring that the farmer 
identify the supposedly infringing plants shifts the burden 
associated with the (putative) benefits of the transgene from 
the seed manufacturer onto the farmer who chose to grow a 
non-modified variety.  Determining to whom responsibility for 
causing the pollution is assigned determines to whom the 
burden associated with the genetic pollution must be assigned. 
The farmer who grows genetically modified plant varieties, 
Farmer Jack, and the farmer who grows non-modified plant 
varieties, Farmer Adams, have equal rights of choice.  Both 
farmers have the property right to use their land to yield a crop 
that they each believe will maximize their profit.  Farmer Jack 
chooses to use a genetically modified variety because he 
believes that by doing so his input costs will be minimized and 
thereby maximize his profit even if he cannot sell his crop into 
the premium market.  Farmer Adams chooses to plant a non-
modified variety because he believes that by doing so he will be 
able to sell into the premium market and hence maximize his 
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profit even if he cannot minimize all of his input costs.  Both 
farmers are using their respective lands in a manner which 
each believes will maximize his profit.  Neither farmer is 
infringing the right of the other farmer in any way.  Farmer 
Jack is not interfering with the rights of Farmer Adams to 
plant non-modified varieties, and Farmer Adams is not 
interfering with the rights of Farmer Jack to plant genetically 
modified varieties.  Recognize, of course, that the transgene 
will be translocated from the field of Farmer Jack onto the field 
of Farmer Adams.  Farmer Adams may not desire that the 
transgene be reproduced in the plant cells of the plants growing 
on his land.  Farmer Adams does not benefit from the presence 
of the transgene on his land.  He is, however, harmed by the 
presence of the transgene if the premium market is no longer 
available to him because of the transgene’s presence. 
Farmer Jack, who planted the genetically modified seed, 
initiated the process by which the transgene is reproduced in 
the cells of the plant on his field.  Farmer Jack has no (legal) 
interest in the transgene; rather the seed manufacturer 
possesses the exclusive interests in the legal estate of the 
transgene.  As discussed above, the legal estate in which the 
seed manufacturer has exclusive interest is the expressed 
transgene that was inserted into the plant genome using 
genetic manipulation techniques.  At most, the legal estate is 
the combination of the plant genome and the expressed 
transgene.  Farmer Jack has no interest in this legal estate, he 
merely has a license to use the protein, or other compound 
generated when the transgene is expressed, for its intended 
purpose.  The license allows Farmer Jack to sell the resulting 
crop for non-reproductive purposes.  Since Farmer Jack has no 
interest in the legal estate, and since the seed manufacturer 
possesses the exclusive interest in the transgene, it is the 
property of the seed manufacturer that is translocated to the 
fields of Farmer Adams.  Since the property of the seed 
manufacturer is contaminating the fields of Farmer Adams, it 
is unreasonable to hold Farmer Jack liable for the genetic 
pollution.
When the transgene is translocated from the field of 
Farmer Jack onto the field of Farmer Adams then under the 
current legal structure, Farmer Adams may be subject to 
liability for infringing the exclusive interests of the seed 
manufacturer.  Farmer Adams may also incur a substantial 
loss in the value of his crop because he may no longer have 
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access to the premium market.  Furthermore, he may have 
suffered a permanent loss of his own variety which he 
developed through either artificial selection or cross breeding.758
Since these outcomes are the result of translocation of property 
in which the seed manufacturer has exclusive interests, then 
the seed manufacturer must be liable for the damages to 
Farmer Adams.  The seed manufacturer enjoys the benefit that 
runs with the legal estate in which it has exclusive interest.  
The seed manufacturer must also bear the risk associated with 
the benefit; the risk must not be shifted onto either Farmer 
Jack or Farmer Adams.  Justice is not served by allowing the 
seed manufacturer to enforce its exclusive interest in the 
genetically modified plants against the farmer upon whose 
property the transgene is located and simultaneously avoid 
liability when the transgene was translocated onto the land of 
that same farmer either against the will of that farmer or 
unbeknownst to that farmer.759
Several theories are available under which the seed 
manufacturer may be held liable for the genetic pollution, and 
these theories have been thoroughly investigated elsewhere 
and hence need not be detailed here.  Recent proposals include: 
imposition of both negligence law and strict liability for 
 758. It might be argued that the farmer has no interest in his own plant 
variety unless it is patented.  Such a position is not only erroneous, but 
ignores a centuries old common-law doctrine that states that proprietary 
interests in all inventions are protected by common law. What is not protected 
under common law is the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling when the other person created the invention independent of and 
without knowledge of the original inventor.  Justice Clark clearly stated that 
“[i]t has long been settled that the patentee receives nothing from the law 
which he did not have before, and that the only effect of his patent is to 
restrain others from manufacturing, using or selling that which he has 
invented.”  Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 
502, 510 (1917) (emphasis added).  Thus, under common law the farmer that 
developed his own variety through his own genius does indeed have 
enforceable interests in the estate comprising the plant variety. 
 759. The liability for damage to Farmer Adams must be born by the seed 
manufacturer even if Farmer Adams knew or should have known that the 
transgene was translocated onto his land. As discussed earlier, requiring the 
farmer to be continuously vigilant for the transgene, identifying contaminated 
plants and eradicating those plants is an unreasonable position. Likewise, 
requiring the seed manufacturer to identify and remove contaminated plants 
is equally unreasonable.  To place upon the farmer the liability associated 
with the translocation of the transgene onto his property forces the farmer to 
either purchase a technology-use license for every transgene that might 
contaminate his plants or quit farming altogether. Neither of these 
possibilities is reasonable. 
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abnormally dangerous activity may be available for an injured 
party to recover damages in the United States;760 utilization of 
public and private nuisance actions when the transgene from 
genetically modified plants is translocated onto fields which 
contain non-modified plants;761 examination of the potential 
liabilities associated with genetic pollution under the tort 
liability theories of trespass, nuisance, negligence and strict 
liability;762  and examination of the legal remedies available to 
organic farmers for genetic pollution of their crops.763  While 
these theories of liability may be available to the farmer, the 
probability of success in any single case is very small 
(considering the disparity between the legal counsel available 
to the seed manufacturer and legal counsel available to the 
farmer) and the cost to the farmer is prohibitive. 
A far more powerful tool is available to the defendant-
farmer to prevent the lawsuit from ever getting into the 
courthouse door in the first place.  This tool is the long 
established doctrine of unclean hands.  Utilizing this doctrine, 
when the plants on the land of Farmer Adams are 
contaminated by the transgene the seed manufacturer should 
lose his exclusive interest in the legal estate of the 
contaminating transgene, and hence lose his right to seek 
damages in a court of justice.  Simply put, it is unjust and 
inequitable that the seed manufacturer markets a product for 
planting in a field knowing that that product will pollute 
surrounding fields and then sue the owners of the surrounding 
fields because that product is found on those surrounding 
fields.  The doctrine of unclean hands clearly states that the 
court of justice will not grant the plaintiff a remedy in such 
circumstances.
Recall that Farmer Jack initiated a process by which a 
plant was produced that reproduces the transgene in its 
760. See Stephen Kelly Lewis, “Attack of the Killer Tomatoes?” Corporate 
Liability for the International Propagation of Genetically Altered Agricultural 
Products, 10 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 153 (1997). 
761. See Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, Nuisance Law and 
the Prevention of “Genetic Pollution”: Declining a Dinner Date with Damocles,
30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10328, 10333 (2000). 
762. See Richard A. Repp, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for 
Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 585 
(2000).
763. See Joshua M. Stone, Restraints on Competition Through the 
Alteration of the Environment at the Genetic Level, 8 N. Y. U. ENVTL. L. J. 704, 
716-19 (2000). 
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cellular machinery.  Farmer Adams initiated a process by 
which a plant was produced that lacks the transgene.  If the 
transgene is translocated from the fields of Farmer Jack onto 
the fields of Farmer Adams, then the fields of Farmer Adams 
have been contaminated through genetic pollution.  Before 
turning to the discussion of why the seed manufacturers should 
not be able to obtain a remedy when genetic pollution has 
occurred, the issue to be considered is whether the seed 
manufacturers knew or should have known that the transgene 
would translocate from one field to another. 
a. Transgene Translocation Happens in the Open  
 Environment 
There can be no question that the seed manufacturers 
were aware by 1998, and quite possibly earlier, that a 
transgene could be moved from one variety to another variety, 
within a species, by traditional plant breeding techniques.764  In 
fact, evidence indicates that seed manufacturers were 
commonly using traditional breeding techniques for moving a 
transgene between varieties before 1993.  In 1993, Koziel 
published the first report on a genetically manipulated cereal 
plant with an elevated resistance to insects.765  To be specific, 
after inserting the synthetic gene for the Cry1A(b) -endotoxin
into a maize plant cell, a mature maize plant was produced.  
The resulting elite transgenic maize plant was produced using 
traditional cross-breeding techniques to create a stable, 
genetically modified variety of maize.766  Allowing 
approximately one year for analyzing the experimental results, 
writing the manuscript for publication, and publication of the 
manuscript, and between five and seven years for field 
experiments, Monsanto was most likely engaged in moving the 
transgene between varieties of maize as early as 1985 to 1987.  
Indeed, by 1985 it was known that genetically modified 
764. See generally Koziel, supra note 434  (explaining that once the new 
gene is introduced into a crop variety, the new characteristic exhibited due to 
the expression of that gene can be moved into other sexually compatible 
varieties of that plant specie using traditional breeding techniques). 
765. See Michael G. Koziel et al., Field Performance of Elite Transgenic 
Maize Plants Expressing an Insecticidal Protein Derived from Bacillus 
thuringiensis, 11 BIO/TECHNOLOGY 194-200 (February 1993). 
766. See generally Koziel, supra note 434. 
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progeny would be reproduced in “simple Mendelian fashion.”767
Moreover, by 1986 it was openly contemplated that the 
methods of genetic manipulation would “compliment those used 
in classical plant breeding” to produce varieties of transgenic 
plants.768  Because information about moving transgenes 
between varieties, within a species by traditional breeding 
programs existed from at least 1987, the seed manufacturers 
either knew or should have known that the transgene would be 
translocated from the genetically manipulated plant to a non-
modified plant of the same species when the transgene was 
released to the environment.  The transgene is present in the 
pollen, which is readily transported by the wind and insects.769
The transgene is also present in seeds that may be transported 
by the wind, humans, or animals.  None of these methods of 
transport may be controlled by the seed manufacturers.  The 
seed manufacturer is, therefore, incapable of controlling the 
movement of the transgene between plant varieties. 
Monsanto’s position is, and was, that genetically modified 
seed or pollen would be carried into a non-modified field of 
crops by no more than a few feet.770  Further, Roger Hughes, 
representing Monsanto, stated, “[f]orces of nature such as wind 
and bees are clearly insufficient to produce a ninety percent 
crop of Roundup-ready canola.”771  The conclusion that the seed 
manufacturers want to draw is that if the transgene is located 
on the land of the farmer, then the transgene must have gotten 
there by nefarious action on the part of the farmer.772  In fact, 
 767. Horsch, supra note 176, at 1230. 
 768. Patricia Powell Abel, Richard S. Nelson, Barun De, Nancy Hoffmann, 
Stephen G. Rogers, Robert T. Fraley & Roger N. Beachy, Delay of Disease 
Development in Transgenic Plants that Express the Tobacco Mosiac Virus Coat 
Protein Gene, 232 SCIENCE 738, 743 (1986). 
769. See Interview: Muscoplat, supra note 756. 
770. See Karl A. Thiel, Seeds In the Wind: For Monsanto, Patent Protection 
Stirs Controversy, available at http://www.biospace.com/ articles/120699.cfm 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2001).  In countering Percy Schmeiser’s arguments that 
the Roundup-ready gene could be carried by seeds or pollen blown into the 
fields, “Monsanto’s Evans claims that company studies show it is unlikely that 
Roundup Ready seed from one field would penetrate an adjacent field by more 
than a few feet, and that it would take hurricane force winds to spread pollen 
over the large distances described by Schmeiser.”  Id. (internal quotes 
omitted).
 771. Murray Lyons, Farmer’s Reapings No Fluke, Court Told: Schmeiser 
Planted Roundup Ready Canola Knowingly, THE SASKATOON STARPHOENIX at 
A1 (06 June 2000), available at http://www.biotech-info.net/no_fluke.html (last 
visited July 21, 2001). 
 772. Roger Hughes, the attorney for Monsanto, stated that “Percy 
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that transgenes may travel great distances was recently 
demonstrated in a documented case from northern Alberta 
Canada.773  In this case, three varieties of canola were planted 
by the same farmer on different parts of his farm in 1997.  The 
first field was planted with Roundup Ready canola, a twenty-
acre field across the road was planted with Innovator (a variety 
of canola modified to resist Liberty774 herbicide), and a field four 
hundred meters away was planted with canola that was 
resistant to Cyanamid’s Pursuit and Odessey775 herbicides.  In 
1998 it was discovered that a variety of canola that was 
resistant to two commonly used herbicides was growing on the 
farmer’s fields, and by 2000, gene stacking had produced a 
variety of canola resistant to Roundup, Liberty and Pursuit.  It 
is a reasonable deduction then that the transgene traveled a 
great distance, by transgene standards, to create a transgene-
stacked variety of plant.  The distances between the different 
fields of canola varieties and the creation, without human 
intervention, of a canola variety with “stacked” transgenes 
Schmeiser deliberately segregated seed that he knew was Roundup Ready 
from his 1997 canola crop” without first obtaining permission from Monsanto 
and in violation of the patent on Roundup Ready canola.  LYONS, supra note 
771 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, Hughes argued that the 
genetically modified canola could not have been translocated onto the land of 
Percy Schmeiser’s through either cross-pollination or being blown by the wind.  
See id. Also, in Monsanto’s complaint against Mr. Schmeiser it was claimed 
that Mr. Schmeiser “obtained canola seeds which are resistant to glyphosate 
from one or more persons licensed” by Monsanto and planted them on his 
lands.  Monsanto Canada, Inc, and Monsanto Company -and- Percy Schmeiser 
Statement of Claim, COURT FILE NO. T-1593-98, Claim 15 (06 August 1998) 
available at http://www.tv.cbc.ca/national/pgminfo/canola/doc1.html et. seq.
(last visited 20 January 2002).  Monsanto also claimed that Mr. Schmeiser 
knowingly saved seed from his 1997 crop and planted those seeds in his 1998 
crop. See id. Having dismissed the possibility that the seeds containing the 
transgene arrived on Percy Schmeiser’s farm by any means other than his 
intentionally purchasing them and planting them without a license, Monsanto 
apparently presumed that the transgene could only have existed on the land of 
Mr. Schmeiser through actions by Mr. Schmeiser which were in violation of 
the law. 
773. See Gillian Steward, Genetically Engineered Superweeds Emerge in 
Canada, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (CANADA) at A1, (June 15, 2000), available at 
www.purefood.org/ge/superweed.cfm (last visited July 21, 2001). 
 774.  Liberty® is a trademark name of a product produced and marketed 
by Aventis.  For simplicity, this trademark name will be used throughout the 
text, unless a specific quotation is identified, without the symbol ®. 
 775. Pursuit® and Odessey® are trademark names of products produced 
and marketed by Cyanamid.  For simplicity, these trademark names will be 
used throughout the text, unless a specific quotation is identified, without the 
symbol ®. 
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indicate that Monsanto’s argument against extensive genetic 
pollution by natural causes is vacuous at best. 
An article was published on November 29, 2001 in Nature 
that demonstrated that the transgene not only translocates in 
the environment, but that it can do so over considerable 
distances.776  An opinion was subsequently published in Nature 
 
 776. See David Quist and Ignacio H. Chapela, Transgenic DNA 
Introgressed into Traditional Maize Landraces in Oaxaca, Mexico, 414 
NATURE 541-43, (Nov. 29 2001) available at http://www.nature.com/cgi-
taf/DynaPage.taf?file=/nature/journal/v414/n6863/full/414541a0_fs.htm&conte
nt_filetype=PDF (last visited Jan. 12, 2002).  In the study by Quist and 
Chapela, native, or “criollo,” landraces of maize were sampled from four fields 
of standing maize, two each from two separate locations in the state of Sierra 
Norte de Oaxaca, Southern Mexico.  See id. at 541.  The fields were located in 
a remote part of Mexico, in excess of “20 km from the main mountain-crossing 
road that connects the cities of Oaxaca and Tuxtepec in the Municipality of 
Ixtlán.”  Id.  Significantly, the fields were located at least sixty miles from the 
location where the last known genetically modified maize plants were grown 
in 1998, see John Vidal, Mexico’s GM Corn Shocks Scientists, THE GUARDIAN, 
(Friday November 30, 2002) available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
international/story/ 0,3604,609293,00.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2002)), three 
full years before the discovery of the fields in the Municipality of Ixtlán. In 
five of seven samples of criollo landrace maize, the element used most 
commonly in transgenic constructs, the 35S promoter (p-35S) from cauliflower 
mosaic virus, was detected.  See QUIST AND CHAPELA, supra note 776.  In four 
of the samples, 98% homology was found between the p-35S promoter found in 
the criollo landrace maize and the cauliflower mosaic virus 35S promoter used 
in the commercially available vectors such as pMON273 (GenBank accession 
number X04879.1) and the K1 sample (GenBank accession number 
AF434746).  Also, the Agrobacterium tumefasciens nopaline synthase 
terminator sequence (T-NOS) was detected in two of the six criollo samples 
(respectively, GenBank accession number AF434752 and A434751).  See id.  
Further, in one of the criollo landrace maize sample, the Bacillus thuringiensis 
cryIA(b) gene, which, when expressed, causes the plant cell to produce the 
Bacillus thuringiensis CryIA(b) -endotoxin, was detected.  These results 
“demonstrate that there is a high level of gene flow from industrially produced 
maize towards populations of progenitor landraces.”  Id. at 542.  The results 
observed by Quist and Chapela were confirmed in a study conducted by the 
Mexican environment ministry.  See Rex Dalton, Transgenic Corn Found 
Growing in Mexico, 413 NATURE 337 (Sept. 27, 2001).  The findings by Quist 
and Chapela and by the Mexican environment ministry are particularly 
troubling to those who oppose the production and consumption of genetically 
modified plants.  See, for example, VIDAL, supra note 776; NEWS RELEASES, 
Genetic Contamination Found In Mexican: Center of Diversity for Corn 
Threatened by Gene-Altered Corn From U.S. (Sept. 27, 2001) available at 
http://www.greenpeaceusa.org/media/press_releases/ 01_09_27text.htm (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2002).  However, as anticipated, the finding, which was 
published in the journal Nature, is not free of controversy and criticism.  
Specifically, studies conducted under the direction of David Hoisington, 
director of the Applied Biotechnology Center at the International Maize and 
Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in El Batan, Mexico, and Tim Reeves, 
director-general of CIMMYT, showed that there is no evidence of either the 
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in January 2002,777 in which it was emphatically stated that the 
occurrence of the transgenes, found by Quist and Chapella in 
criollo landrace maize in Oaxaca, Mexico, is not genetic 
contamination.  Specifically, Martínez-Soriano, et al. stated 
that: “[c]ontamination means unexpected, undesirable, and 
uncontrollable spread” of the transgene, and “that is not 
happening.”778  Further, Martínez-Soriano, et al. opined that “if 
someone wants to remove the transgene from these plants, the 
procedure would be simple: select and multiply those 
susceptible maizes and do not harvest and multiply the insect-
resistant ones.”779  Finally, Martínez-Soriano, et al. state that 
commercially used cauliflower mosaic virus 35S promoter or of the Bacillus
thuringiensis cryIA(b) transgene in any of the twenty-eight maize genomes in 
its seed bank. See John Hodgson, Doubts Linger Over Mexican Corn Analysis,
20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 3-4 (January 2002) at http://biotech.nature.com 
(last visited Jan. 12, 2002).  Further studies are being conducted at CIMMYT 
on samples collected from fields in Oaxaca, Mexico.  Hodgson argues that the 
studies conducted at CIMMYT “conflict with some unreported work by the 
Berkeley group.”  Id.  However, as of December 14, 2001, CIMMYT had only 
completed screening of fifteen additional native landrace maize varieties from 
its own genebank.  See David Hoisington, Further Tests at CIMMYT Find No 
Presence of Promoter Associated with Transgenes in Mexican Landracces in 
Gene Bank or From Recent Field Collections, (Dec. 14, 2001) at
http://www.cimmyt.org/whatiscimmyt/furthertest.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 
2002).  Hoisington reported that the varieties tested from the CIMMYT 
genebank were free of the cauliflower mosaic virus promoter 35S that is 
commonly associated with a transgene.  Additionally, seeds from forty-two 
native landrace varieites from Oaxaca were tested and found to be negative 
for the transgene (at least for the year 2000 maize crop). See id.
The fact that the studies conducted at CIMMYT found no indication of a 
transgene contaminating the native landrace maize genome pool, while the 
study conducted by Quist and Chapela did find evidence of a transgene, 
indicates that the possibility exists that a transgene has become introgressed 
into the criollo landrace maize.  The most sensible way to move forward is for 
CIMMYT and the Berkeley investigators to exchange seed samples and test 
again for evidence of transgene translocation.  Hodgson may have overstated 
the difference between the results obtained by the investigators at CIMMYT 
and by the investigators at Berkeley.  The two sets of studies do indicate that 
introgression of transgene into native landrace maize varieties is a very real 
possibility and care must be taken in assessing the effect of such introgresson 
on biodiversity.  But of equal or greater significance than the effect on 
biodiversity is the legal consequences attendant to the translocation of 
transgenes into native landrace maize varieties. 
777. See Juan Pablo Ricardo Martínez-Soriano, Ana María Bailey, and Joel 
Lara-Reyna, Transgenes in Mexican Maize, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 19 
(Jan. 2002). 
778. Id.  Of course the validity of the quoted statement is open to serious 
debate.
779. Id.  The fact that a maize is susceptible, to either insect pests or 
herbicides depending upon the transgene present, is not dispositive as to the 
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“there is no need for concern.”780
This position parallels that articulated by Vivian Moss, 
chairperson of the CropGen Panel, Val Giddings of BIO (an 
U.S. industry organization in Washington, D.C.), and Tim 
Reeves, director-general of CIMMYT,781 and reported by 
Hodgson.782  Specifically, Tim Reves is quoted as stating that: 
“the real question is whether it makes any difference if one of 
the genes that has” translocated is a transgene.783  Further, 
Hodgson reported that Luis Herrera Estrella (Director of 
CINVESTAV-IPN, Mexico’s premier center for plant 
biotechnology) “pointed out that the Nature paper provides no 
experimental evidence of negative effects on biodiversity.”784
question of whether the transgene is present.  Thus, it is entirely possible that 
the simple protocol suggested by Martínez-Soriano may not be effective in 
removing the transgene from the landrace maize variety.  Further, if the 
transgene is dominant and highly promiscuous, the suggested protocol may 
not even be applicable. 
780. Id.
 781. CIMMYT has a partnership with IRD (France), Novartis, Limagrain 
and Pioneer Hi-Bred Co. that has the objective of developing, evaluating, and 
distributing apomictic hybrid maize to subsistence farmers.  The agreement is 
for five years extending from 1999 to 2004 and CIMMYT receives “[a]ccess to 
scientific expertise and proprietary technologies; a paid-up, royalty-free, 
worldwide, non-exclusive license (with the right to sub-license to non-profit 
institutions) to provide research products to subsistence farmers.” CIMMYT, 
Transparency Is Important (Oct., 2000), available at http://www.cimmyt.org/ 
whatiscimmyt/AR99_2000/transparency/transparency.htm (last visited Jan. 
13, 2002).  Further, CIMMYT receives “financial support for CIMMYT 
scientists involved” from the industrial partners.  See id. In return, CIMMYT 
provides to its partners, “[s]taff and laboratory resources; access to CIMMYT 
and IRD’s apomixis technology; a paid-up, royalty-free, worldwide, co-
exclusive license for research products.”  Id.  Also, CIMMYT received a grant 
from Monsanto (to develop a hybrid wheat) in the amount of $154,000 in 1999 
(last year for which statistics are available) and a grant from World Bank for 
$3,623,000 in 1999. See CIMMYT, Resourcing the Research: CIMMYT 
Financing, 1999-2000, (Oct., 2000) available at http://www.cimmyt.org/ 
whatiscimmyt/AR992000/resourcing/resourcing.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 
2002).
782. See John Hodgson, Doubts Linger Over Mexican Corn Analysis, 20 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 3-4 (Jan., 2002) at http://biotech.nature.com (last 
visited Jan. 12, 2002). 
783. Id. at 3. 
784. Id.  While the statement by Mr. Estrella is true, the point of the Quist 
and Chapela paper was to demonstrate the presence of the cauliflower mosaic 
virus promoter 35S in the criollo landrace varieties.  Quist and Chapela were 
entirely entitled to speculate that if the transgene has indeed introgressed 
into criollo landrace maize varieties then it could have an adverse affect on 
biodiversity.  Quist and Chapela were careful to state that further 
experimental studies were necessary in order to identify the long-term effect 
of transgenes upon biodiversity. See Quist & Chapela, supra note 776. 
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Finally, Hodgson has reported that Val Giddings argued “that 
given its demonstrable influence in improving yields, 
improving agronomic performance and decreasing agricultural 
footprints, . . . biotechnology is combating the threat to 
biodiversity.”785  Thus, the proponents of the development and 
deployment of agricultural biotechnology appear to take the 
position that it is not particularly surprising that “genes move 
around in nature” but that the fact that they do so “is hardly 
new.”786  Further, observing that “[g]ene flow is constant”787 in 
the open environment is as “shock[ing as] to discover gambling 
in a casino.”788  Finally, the proponents appear to focus not on 
the destruction of biodiversity but upon “whether it makes any 
difference if one of the genes that has flowed in is a 
transgene.”789  Evidently, the preferred answer is that not only 
diversity not be affected,790 but that it can be “predict[ed] that 
this useful transgene will be found in increasing numbers and 
types of native maizes.”791  The conclusory statements of the 
proponents of agricultural biodiversity may not have as solid a 
basis as the proponents might think.  Also, they focus only on 
one single aspect of the issue associated with transgene 
translocation in the open environment. 
Given that “[e]xotic libraries can make a wide array of 
previously unexplored genetic variation rapidly available to 
plant breeders and geneticists,”792 and that these libraries of 
exotic plants are available in existing seedbanks793 and wild 
species,794 then the presence of transgenes in native landraces 
may be quite problematic indeed.  Consider a very real 
785. Id.
 786. Hodgson, supra note 782 (quoting Professor Vivian Moses, Chair of 
the GropGen Panel). 
787. Id. (quoting Val Giddings). 
788. Id. (quoting Val Giddings). 
789. Id. (quoting Tim Reeves). 
790. See Martínez-Soriano, supra note 777. 
791. Id.
 792. Dani Zamir, Improving Plant Breeding With Exotic Genetic Libraries,
2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 983, 989 (December, 2001). 
793. See id. at 985 (stating that “[t]he observation that wild genetic 
resources can contribute to crop improvement, combined with the alarming 
rate at which locally adapted landraces are being lost and at which natural 
habitats are being damaged, has led to the establishment of large germplasm 
collections in the form of seed banks”). 
794. See id. at 983 (stating that it is “time to return to the wild ancestors of 
crop plants to use them as a source of genetic variation that has been lost 
during domestication”). 
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scenario: A Bacillus thuringiensis cryIA(b) gene, which, when 
expressed, causes the plant cell to produce the Bacillus
thuringiensis CryIA(b) -endotoxin, translocates to a variety of 
criollo landrace maize in Oaxaca.  The consequences of this 
apparently natural and “useful”795 translocation may have 
significant legal ramifications to the farmer upon whose field 
the transgene was translocated as well as throughout the plant 
breeding world.  Consider the farmer upon whose field the 
transgene was translocated.  If the Federal Courts in Mexico 
follow the decision in Monsanto v. Schmeiser,796 then by simply 
having the transgene on his land, the farmer may be guilty of 
infringing the patent on the transgene.  Further, if the farmer 
harvests the maize, then he can neither alienate that maize nor 
plant the seeds in the next crop cycle because, presuming that 
Mexican courts follow the lead of the Canadian Federal Courts, 
disposition of the transgene follows the disposition of the seeds, 
and disposition of the transgene is completely within the 
control of the holder of the patent on the transgene.  Further, if 
the farmer attempts to market the maize containing the 
transgene into the United States, and if the transgene is 
patented in the United States, then the farmer will be guilty of 
infringing the United States patent.  Also, suppose that the 
transgene is patented, and that that particular criollo landrace 
maize genome is considered part of the exotic library797 sought 
to be used for genetic diversification of domesticated Zea mays
species.  Then not only can the criollo landrace maize not be 
harvested, but the harvested maize cannot be brought into the 
United States for experimental use without either infringing 
the United States patent or obtaining a license from the holder 
of the United States patent.  The result, from the farmer’s 
perspective, is that the criollo landrace maize that was 
contaminated with the transgene is no longer of any value to 
the farmer, and that same variety of criollo landrace maize is 
no longer available for its genome to diversify the domesticated 
Zea mays varieties.  Should the transgene contaminate most, if 
not all, of the landrace maize varieties existing in Mexico, then 
that genome pool will no longer be available to any person or 
entity other than the holder of the patent on the transgene (at 
795. See Martínez-Soriano, supra note 777. 
796. See Monsanto Can., Inc. v. Schmeiser Enters., Ltd., 2001 FCT 256 
(Fed. Ct. Canada 2001), available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2001/
2001fct256.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2001). 
797. See generally Dani Zamir, supra note 792. 
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least for the term of the patent).  Clearly, then, it does matter 
that “any . . . one of the genes that has flowed in is a 
transgene.”798
In summary, it must be common knowledge among seed 
manufacturers that transgenes can, and do, translocate 
between varieties within the same species; it has been 
documented that gene stacking occurs in the open 
environment, even when the source of the transgenes are 
hundreds of meters apart.  Any argument maintaining the 
position that the transgene cannot contaminate large portions 
of non-genetically modified field is simply without support.  
Even if, for the sake of a complete analysis, the travel distance 
of a transgene were several tens of meters to several hundreds 
of meters, then a field of 1/4 section799 would still exhibit a 
considerable level of contamination.800  In fact, the 
contamination may be sufficient to cause a crop harvested from 
the entire field to test positive for the transgene, even for a 
very modest infiltration of the transgene into the field.  
Therefore, the assumption that the transgene translocated to 
the land of the farmer only through nefarious deeds is simply 
not valid. 
b. Why Seed Manufacturers Have “Unclean Hands” 
The court of equity was historically a vehicle for positively 
enforcing the requirements of good faith and conscience.  If the 
court granted relief to a party who “acted fraudulently, or who 
 798. Hodgson, supra note 782 (quoting Tim Reeves). 
 799. One of the fields at issue in Percy Schmeiser’s case was of 1/4  section 
in size. See Interview: Schmeiser{July 6, 2001}, supra note 270. 
 800. Given that, in a sample of seeds to be tested, a mixture of one part 
genetically modified seeds and five parts non-modified seeds will test positive 
for the transgene, only 1,161,600 square feet of the 1/4 section field need 
contain genetically modified plants.  If the genetic contamination is uniformly 
infiltrating from all edges of the 1/4 section, then the distance to be traveled 
into the field to obtain the required level of contamination is 115  feet. This is 
calculated by recognizing that the square annulus is composed of four 
trapezoids with the long edge being b = 1/2 mile in length; the area of each 
trapezoid is 1,161,600/4 square feet; and the area of the trapezoid is  (b - b’ 
cos(45°) ) b’ sin(45°),  where the distance into the field is  b’ sin(45°).  Solving 
for b allows ready computation of the required distance of infiltration into the 
field. It is a remarkable conclusion that a uniform infiltration to a distance of 
115 feet by the transgene into a square field of  1/4 section may cause the crop 
harvested from the entire section to test “positive” for the transgene. 
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by deceit or any unfair means has gained an advantage”801 then 
the court would be “the abettor [sic] of iniquity.”802  Whatever 
rights the plaintiff possesses, “[a] court of equity acts only 
when and as conscience commands, and if the conduct of the 
plaintiff be offensive to the dictates of natural justice,” then he 
will not be granted relief.803  The doctrine of equity states that 
“he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”804
This does not mean that the doors to the courthouse are closed 
to the plaintiff because of misconduct unrelated to the case at 
issue; rather, plaintiffs can be denied relief “only for such 
violations of conscience as in some measure affect the equitable 
relations between the parties in respect of something brought 
before the court for adjudication.”805  The doctrine of equity, or 
“clean hands,” is applied not to punish the plaintiff, but “upon 
considerations that make for the advancement of right and 
justice.”806  Thus, the court is not “bound by formula or 
restrained by any limitations that tends to trammel the free 
and just exercise of discretion.”807  This means that the doctrine 
of “clean hands” may be invoked by the court for “[a]ny willful 
act concerning the cause of action that rightfully can be said to 
transgress equitable standards of conduct.”808  Further, if the 
case involves a public interest809 as well as the private interest 
of the parties to the suit, then the doctrine “not only prevents a 
wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression but 
averts an injury to the public.”810  Because of the “social and 
economic consequences of a patent,” the public has a 
“paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring 
from backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct 
 801. Bein v. Heath, U.S. (6 How.) 228, 247 (1848). 
802. Id.
803. See Dweese v. Reinhard, 165 U.S. 386, 390 (1897). 
 804. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 814 (1945). 
 805. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 
(1933) The court denied relief to plaintiff in a patent infringement case 
because plaintiff came into court with “unclean hands.”  Id. at 246-47. 
806. Id.
807. Id. at 245-46. 
808. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815. 
 809. Indeed, a patent by “its very nature is affected with a public interest,” 
because “[t]here are issues of great moment to the public in a patent suit.”  Id.
at 816; see also Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 
246 (1944) reversed on other grounds in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 
U.S. 17, 18 (1976). 
810. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815. 
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and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate 
scope.”811  Of course, the doctrine of equity “should never be 
applied if its application results in injustice.”812
Cases in which relief was denied because of improper 
actions on the part of the patentee include: attempted use of 
the patent grant to “secure a limited monopoly of unpatented 
material used in applying the invention,”813 because the 
patentee derives a profit not from the invention patented but 
from “the unpatented supplies with which it is used and which 
are wholly without the scope of the patent monopoly,”814 a 
strategy which effectively extends the power to fix the price for 
the unpatented supplies to the patentee;815 the use of the patent 
as a mechanism for restraining commerce in violation of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act;816 making leases containing clauses, 
terms, and conditions in violation of the Clayton Act;817
committing fraud on the patent office;818  entering into a 
contractual agreement where defendant waives his right to 
manufacture using patented devices after expiration of the 
patent;819  using the patent to restrain competition and creating 
a limited monopoly in the marketing of unpatented articles;820
obtaining a patent by fraudulent misrepresentation to the 
Patent and Trademark Office;821  and committing fraud on the 
patent office in obtaining a design patent renders the patent 
unenforceable.822
811. Id. at 816. 
 812. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 1943). 
 813. Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33-4 (1930). 
 814. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
517 (1917).  This strategy effectively extends the power to fix the price for the 
unpatented supplies to the patentee. 
815. See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 
(1912) (stating that “[the] [r]ights conferred by patents are indeed very 
definite and extensive, but they do not give any more than other rights an 
universal license against positive prohibitions”). 
816. See id.
817. See United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 464 (1922) 
(stating that the “patent grant does not limit the right of Congress to enact 
legislation not interfering with the legitimate rights secured by the patent but 
prohibiting in the public interest the making of agreements which may lessen 
competition and build up monopoly”). 
818. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. 
Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). 
819. See Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224 (1892). 
820. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
821. See Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1972). 
822. See W. R. Grace & Co., Inc. v. W. U.S. Industries, Inc., 608 F.2d 1214 
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Case law indicates that the court will deny enforcement of 
a patent by the patentee if the patentee has acted in such a 
manner as to “transgress equitable standards of conduct”823
with regard to the issue brought before the court.  The genetic 
pollution of the field of Farmer Adams is germane to the issue 
brought before the court by the plaintiff-seed manufacturer.  
This is because if the genetic pollution had not occurred, or if 
Farmer Adams had unknowingly planted seeds containing the 
transgene, the transgene would not have been on the land of 
Farmer Adams and the seed manufacturers would have not 
had a cause to sue.  Also, allowing the suit to come forward 
would recognize the right of the seed manufacturer to expand 
its monopoly beyond the limitations set in the patent. 
The plant genome is analogous to any naturally occurring 
molecule in any physical phase, including dry ice.  Dry ice is an 
unpatented and unpatentable subject matter because the 
public has long known824 that it is carbon dioxide, which is 
naturally occurring and is a product of nature.  Because the 
plant genome is a product of nature and has been in public use 
since the beginning of the domestic use of the plant, it is 
unpatented and unpatentable.825  The patentee cannot exert 
control over such unpatented material because the control is 
beyond the limited scope of the patentee’s legal estate; “[E]very 
use of a patent as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly of 
unpatented material is prohibited.”826  Such a limitation is 
inherent in the patent grant and “is not dependent upon the 
peculiar function or character of the unpatented material or on 
the way in which it is used.”827  Relief in such a case must be 
denied because the patentee is using the patent to secure a 
“monopoly of unpatented material used in applying the 
invention.”828
If the seed manufacturer were allowed to enforce its 
exclusive interest in the transgene, the genetic pollution would 
(9th Cir. 1979). 
823. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. at 815. 
824. See Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 
U.S. 27, 29 (1930). 
825. See Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 461-62 (1938) (stating 
that the “sole business of the Dry Ice Corporation was to make and sell dry 
ice-which is unpatented material”).  Once a product has been in public use for 
more than one year it becomes unpatentable. 
826. Id. at 463. 
827. Carbice Corp., 283 U.S. at 33. 
828. Id. at 34. 
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affect a monopoly over the unpatented plant genome that 
existed on the lands of Farmer Adams.  The reasoning behind 
this assertion is as follows.  Either Farmer Adams planted 
seeds devoid of the transgene, or, at the very least, he was 
ignorant of whether the seeds contained the transgene.  The 
public possesses exclusive interest in the plant genome, which, 
as discussed above, is unpatentable.  When the transgene is 
translocated onto the field of Farmer Adams, it contaminates 
the plant genome of the plants on that field.  The incorporation 
of the transgene into the plant genome in the progeny seeds 
occurs by an entirely natural process, without the intervention 
of humans.  The incorporation was not by genetic engineering 
techniques as used to develop the patented invention.  The seed 
manufacturers know that such incorporation will occur in the 
open environment by natural processes.  The plant genome, 
which is contaminated by the transgene, is not within the 
limitations of the patent grant (further, the plant genome 
cannot be within the patent grant).  Once the transgene is 
translocated into the cells of the plants on the land of Farmer 
Adams, the seed manufacturer may claim infringement of its 
patent by Farmer Adams.  If the seed manufacturer is 
successful in enforcing its exclusive interest, then the plant 
genome of the plants on Farmer Adams’ field will be pulled 
within the limitations of the patent.  At that point, Farmer 
Adams is completely divested of any interests he may have had 
in the plant genome that was on his land before the transgene 
was translocated to the cells in his plants.  Also, by bringing 
the plant genome within the limits of the patent the public is 
divested of all interest in the plant genome.  Therefore, Farmer 
Adams is prohibited from having the plant genome on his land 
unless he pays the seed manufacturer the technology-use 
license fee.  Such an outcome would extend the monopoly of the 
seed manufacturer far beyond the limitations inherent in the 
patent grant. 
By permitting the seed manufacturer to enforce its 
exclusive interest when genetic pollution occurs, the seed 
manufacturer would establish, with the approval of the court, a 
limited monopoly in the marketing of unpatented material and 
would be restraining competition.829  By enforcing its exclusive 
interest, Farmer Adams would not be able to market his crop, 
in part because he would not be able to have the plants with 
829. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
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the transgene reproduced in their cells on his land.  Because 
multiple farmers in the same situation as Farmer Adams 
comprise the competition to the genetically modified plant 
industry, enforcement of the exclusive interest would 
completely eliminate the competition.  Because any crop 
yielded by the plant on Farmer Adams land could not be sold, 
then assertion of the exclusive interest would cause the seed 
manufacturer to create a monopoly in the marketing of the 
consumable portion of the plant generated by the plant 
genome.
Because the seed manufacturer polluted the land of 
Farmer Adams and because the seed manufacturer is 
attempting to assert a monopoly beyond that limited by the 
patent grant, the seed manufacturer comes to the court with 
unclean hands. 
c. Why Exclusive Interest is Not Enforceable 
Before the seed manufacturer can assert its exclusive 
interest it must have a right to do so, and it must come to the 
courthouse door with clean hands.  The right to assert its 
interests arises from either common law or Section 271 of Title 
35, United States Code.  Both of these avenues have been 
discussed elsewhere in this work.  Common law doctrine 
affords very little protection for intellectual property, and 
successful assertion of an exclusive interest under 35 U. S. C. 
Section 271 is not as simple as demonstrating possession and 
implying that the possessor is infringing the patent as a result 
of strict liability.  The reason behind this assertion is that 
while the patent statute requires strict liability with respect to 
the exclusive interest of the patentee (meaning that it is 
irrelevant whether the alleged infringer knew that the 
invention was patented) there must be scienter with regard to 
acts which cause legal liability.  Thus, scienter with regard to 
the existence of the patent is not equivalent to scienter with 
regard to the infringing acts.  An alternative route to assertion 
of the interests may exist if the seed manufacturer acquired the 
right to pollute the land of Farmer Adams.  Under this 
alternative, Farmer Adams would necessarily have to obtain a 
technology-use license from the seed manufacturer as a part of 
the shifting of the right to control the use of his land to the seed 
manufacturer.
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The patent statute830 is silent on the right of a patent 
holder to pollute, and specifically Section 101 is silent on the 
right of a utility patent holder to pollute the property of others 
with the protected property.  The statute grants only the right 
to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell 
the invention patented.831  There is no statutory grant of a right 
to make, use, offer to sell, or sell the invention patented.832  The 
patentee may grant a license to Farmer Jack.  The license is a 
waiver by the seed manufacturer of the right to sue Farmer 
Jack when he chooses to make, use, offer to sell, or sells the 
patented invention, which for simplicity is taken to be the 
transgene.  While neither Farmer Jack nor the seed 
manufacturer have the statutorily granted right to make, use, 
offer to sell, or sell the invention patented, the seed 
manufacturer, through the vehicle of the license, is 
relinquishing its right to sue Farmer Jack should Farmer Jack 
decide to make, use, offer to sell, or sell the invention.833  Since 
the seed manufacturer does not have the statutorily granted 
right to pollute, it cannot shift that right to Farmer Jack, either 
outright or through a license agreement.  The license 
agreement also does not shift the risk, of the genetic pollution 
of the fields of Farmer Adams by the transgene, onto the 
licensee, Farmer Jack.  Should Farmer Jack sign such a license 
to assume such a risk, he would certainly be a fool headed for 
financial destitution. 
The property law concepts of nuisance and trespass are 
helpful in examining these issues.  Nuisance theory arises from 
 830. Title 35 of the United States Code. 
831. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1997). See also Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. 
Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 424 (1908) (stating that the patentee “receives 
nothing from the law that he did not have before, and that the only effect of 
the patent is to restrain others from manufacturing and using that which he 
has invented”). 
 832. Justice Clarke stated in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film 
Mfg. Co, that “the only effect of his patent is to restrain others from 
manufacturing, using or selling that which he has invented.”  243 U.S. 502, 
510 (1912). 
 833. Interestingly enough, Farmer Jack cannot “make” the invention 
patented, as discussed above.  The waiver by the seed manufacturer of its 
right to sue Farmer Jack can only relate to the use, offer to sell, or sell 
privileges exercised by Farmer Jack.  Further, if the transgene expresses the 
characteristic in the plant of herbicide resistance and if Farmer Jack does not 
use the herbicide for which specific resistance is conferred on the plant, then 
Farmer Jack is also not “using” the transgene or its expressed compounds.  
While these points may seem to be fine, they do assist in clarifying the precise 
nature of the relationship between Farmer Jack and the seed manufacturer. 
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the right of the property owner to the use and enjoyment of his 
property without interference from others,834 while trespass 
theory arises from the exclusive interest that the property 
owner has in the “exclusive possession of his land.”835  There are 
two competing interests in the case: first is the right of the 
manufacturer to use its property as it sees fit, which includes 
the manufacture of a thing that is beneficial to society; the 
second is the right of the individual property owner to the use 
and enjoyment of his property without interference.  
Independent of the outcome of a trial in a court of justice, the 
loser may simply pay the winner an amount sufficient to obtain 
an easement for the continued exercise of their uninhibited 
rights.  If either Farmer Jack or the seed manufacturer has the 
right to exercise their respective property interests, they may 
simply pay Farmer Adams an amount sufficient to compensate 
Farmer Adams for his permanent losses and continue with 
business as usual.  Before assigning the right to pollute, it is 
first necessary to determine the relative interests of Farmer 
Jack and Farmer Adams in the agricultural enterprise. 
Farmer Jack has no statutorily granted right to either 
“make”836 the transgene or have the transgene reproduced by 
the cellular machinery of the plants on his land.  Since the 
public has exclusive interest in the plant genome, the public 
may grant Farmer Jack permission, in essence a license, to 
plant the seed and initiate the process whereby the consumable 
portion of the plant is generated or reproduced.837  Such a 
834. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 619 (W. Page 
Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). 
835. Id. at 622. 
 836. To clarify the distinction made here, to “make” the transgene is to 
produce, employing the techniques of molecular biology, the precise DNA 
sequence required for the transgene. Through commonly employed 
agricultural production techniques, the farmer plants a seed, which may or 
may not contain the transgene, thereby initiating the process by which the 
consumable crop is produced and the transgene is reproduced by the cellular 
machinery of the plant.  If the seed planted by the farmer does not contain the 
transgene then the farmer, by planting the seed, does not even initiate the 
process by which the transgene is reproduced in the cells of the plant or 
produced in the progeny seed.  Indeed, Farmer Jack and the seed 
manufacturer initiate the process leading to the contamination of such plants. 
 837. Even though Farmer Jack purchased the seed from a vendor, he does 
not necessarily have a license from the public to have the consumable portion 
of the plant reproduced on his lands.  The clearest example of the distinction 
is the marijuana seed.  A person may purchase marijuana seeds from the local 
vendor, and therefore the person owns the seeds.  However, it is a criminal 
offense to plant the seeds to initiate the process by which marijuana plants 
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license is granted equally between Farmer Jack and Farmer 
Adams.  The license is not granted to the seed manufacturer, 
because it is not desirous of the license; rather the seed 
manufacturer is granted the exclusive interest in the transgene 
or to the combination of the plant genome and the transgene in 
exchange for public access to the resulting technology.  The 
resulting technology advances society economically and it must 
be of benefit to the public.838  The seed manufacturer can 
neither alienate nor license to Farmer Jack the right to make, 
use, sell, or offer to sell the plant genome because it does not 
possess the interest to do so.  The rights of Farmer Jack and 
Farmer Adams are equal with respect to producing a 
consumable crop on their respective fields.  As discussed 
earlier, neither farmer interferes with the right of the other to 
plant the seed.  Because of the equality of the license, neither 
farmer can be favored over the other based on the right to use 
land for crop production.  The seed manufacturer cannot be 
granted the right to pollute on this basis because it is not 
producing a consumable crop. 
There are strongly competing public rights that exist 
within the right of choice.  These are the right of the public to 
choose crops with the transgene and the right of the public to 
choose crops without the transgene.839  The right of those 
members of the public to consume crops with the transgene is 
as strong as the right of those members of the public to 
consume crops without the transgene.  That a majority of the 
public is either indifferent to consumption of the transgene or 
wishes to consume crops containing the transgene is irrelevant 
are produced. 
 838. That the resulting technology must be for the benefit of the public 
arises from Justice Story’s statement that a “useful” invention is “one as may 
be applied to some beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an 
invention, which is injurious to the morals, the health, or the good order of 
society.”  Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1217). Justice 
Story further stated that “[a]ll that the law requires is, that the invention 
should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound 
morals of society.”  Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) 
(No. 8568).  Inventions that are not patentable include “a new invention to 
poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private assassination.”  
Id.
 839. The right of the public to have a choice will become a stronger issue 
when the consumable crop is from plants that produce plastics, see, e.g.,
Maliyakal John, Transgenic Cotton Plants Producing Heterologous 
Polyhydroxy(E) Butyrate Bioplastic, U.S. PAT. NO. 5,602,321 (issued Feb. 11, 
1997), anti-cancer drugs, antibiotics, antibodies, anti-psychotic drugs, and 
other pharmaceuticals. 
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to whether the relative rights of these two subsets of the public 
must be given equal weight.  There is no particular reason to 
favor one subset of the public over the other subset, and the 
exercise of the right of choice by each subset is reasonable.  If 
Farmer Jack is granted the right to have the transgene 
translocated from his fields, then Farmer Adams will be denied 
his ability to produce a crop free of the transgene and the 
public that chooses to consume crops free of the transgene will 
not have such crops locally available.  If Farmer Adams is 
granted the right to not have the transgene translocated onto 
his fields, then Farmer Jack will be denied his ability to 
produce a crop with the transgene and the subset of the public 
that chooses to consume crops containing the transgene will 
also not have such crops locally available.  Either way, the 
respective choice of the members of the public will be denied.  
Also, the right to pollute cannot be shifted to the seed 
manufacturer because, as in the case of favoring Farmer Jack 
over Farmer Adams, the result would be discriminatory against 
that part of the public that chooses to not have the transgene or 
its products.  Further, the seed manufacturer has no economic 
or commercial interest in planting the seeds or engaging in 
agricultural practices that would yield a crop for consumption 
by the public.  Rather, the seed manufacturer has only the 
economic interest of selling the transgenic seeds and the 
technology-use license to Farmer Jack. 
It might be argued that both the seed manufacturer and 
Farmer Jack are engaged in legitimate business enterprises, 
and hence immune to a cause of action for nuisance.  It is 
unquestionable that Farmer Jack and the seed manufacturers 
are each engaged in a legitimate business enterprise.840
However, the legitimacy of the business enterprise does not 
eliminate the clear right of the individual specially injured by 
the pollution to seek preventive relief.841  Farmer Adams is, 
indeed, specially injured by the pollution of his lands by the 
transgene.
840. See, e.g., United Verde Extension Mining Co. v. Ralston, 296 P. 262, 
264 (Ariz. 1931) (stating that the operation of a “smelter is a perfectly lawful 
business and necessarily not a nuisance per se”). 
841. See Ariz. Copper Co., Ltd. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 57 (1912).  The 
Supreme Court held that contamination of waters in Arizona by a copper 
plant upstream of the lower appropriators constituted a nuisance and under 
the circumstances of the case an injunction was properly granted.  The 
defendant might have the decree modified upon completion of remedial works 
to avoid future contamination.  See id. at 58-59. 
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Farmer Adams has a license from the public to plant seeds 
containing the plant genome in which the public has exclusive 
interests.  The public benefits from having access to the 
consumable portion of the plant resulting from the efforts of 
Farmer Adams.  The seed manufacturer was granted a license 
to develop a combination of the plant genome and the 
transgene and was subsequently granted exclusive interest in 
the combination (but not in the plant genome).  The public 
benefits from this arrangement over not having access to the 
patented technology only to the extent that a choice free from 
the transgene is locally available, and only to the extent that 
the risk of injury to the public and damage to the environment 
is no greater than that associated with the continued use of the 
non-modified variety of plant.  The general rule of property is 
that the owner may exercise exclusive interests in his own 
property, and may “subject it to such uses as will best subserve 
his private interests.”842  While no other person may, in general, 
infringe on the right of the owner to exercise his exclusive 
interests in his own property, the owner may not, in general, 
infringe excessively upon the corresponding rights of those 
around him.  This, of course, does not imply that the property 
owner must never use his “own property so as to do any injury 
to his neighbor or his property.”843  However, the owner of the 
property is bound to cause no unnecessary injury or annoyance 
to those property owners that are his neighbors through 
unreasonable use of his own property.  The basic rule of 
nuisance theory is that the property owner will be guilty of a 
nuisance if “he make[s] an unreasonable, unwarrantable or 
unlawful use of it, so as to produce material annoyance, 
inconvenience, discomfort or hurt to his neighbor.”844  The 
requirement for a successful cause of action for nuisance is that 
the property owner’s use must “produce a tangible and 
appreciable injury to neighboring property, or such as to render 
its enjoyment specially uncomfortable or inconvenient.”845  As 
noted earlier, if the seed manufacturer is granted the right to 
 842. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568 (C. App. N.Y. 1876).  The plaintiff 
was awarded damages for injury by sulphuric acid gas to white and yellow 
pines and Norway spruce as well as destruction of from “100 to 150 valuable 
pine and spruce trees, and had injured their grape vines and plum trees.” Id.
at 576.  The sulphuric acid gas was produced as the result of burning bricks 
with anthracite coal. See id.
843. Id. at 577. 
844. Id.
845. Id.
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pollute the fields of Farmer Adams with the transgene, Farmer 
Adams either must submit to the technology-use license846 or 
will not be able to enjoy the use of his lands for agricultural 
production, and the public will be harmed.  If the seed 
manufacturer is not granted the right to pollute the fields of 
Farmer Adams, then Farmer Jack either must plant a non-
modified variety of seed or will not be able to enjoy the use of 
his lands for agricultural production, and the public will be 
harmed.  The issue is then whether the seed manufacturer is 
granted the right to pollute the fields of Farmer Adams or 
whether Farmer Adams is granted the right to be free from the 
pollution.
The basis for the assignation of the right to pollute or to be 
free from pollution was clearly articulated by Judge Earl in 
1876 when he stated that: 
One cannot erect a nuisance upon his land adjoining vacant 
lands owned by another and thus measurably control the uses to 
which his neighbor’s land may in the future be subjected.  He may 
make a reasonable and lawful use of his land and thus cause his 
neighbor some inconvenience, and probably some damage which the 
law would regard as damnum absque injuria.  But he cannot place 
upon his land any thing which the law would pronounce a nuisance, 
and thus compel his neighbor to leave his land vacant, or to use it in 
such way only as the neighboring nuisance will allow.847
If the seed manufacturer is granted the right to pollute, 
then Farmer Adams will be forced to either discontinue 
agricultural production or produce a crop containing the 
transgene.  Further, the public will lose its right to choose 
between consuming crops with the transgene and crops without 
the transgene.  The assignation of the right to pollute also 
depends upon the relative injury to the two parties.  If the 
injury to Farmer Adams is small or trifling, and the damage to 
the seed manufacturer is large in the event that the seed 
manufacturer is restrained from polluting the fields of Farmer 
Adams, the restraint may not be placed upon the seed 
manufacturer.  The damage to Farmer Adams is considerable.  
He will loose access to his premium market, he will loose his 
own interests in his own plant variety, and his crop may have 
to be destroyed if the seed manufacturer is granted the right to 
 846. In this scenario, Farmer Adams may still plant the non-modified 
variety of seed but must still sign the technology-use license to avoid liability. 
 847. Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 584 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1876). 
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pollute.  The ancient maxim remains applicable: Sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas.848
The only reasonable resolution is to assign to Farmer 
Adams the right to have his lands and plants free from genetic 
pollution.  Should the transgene translocate onto the lands of 
Farmer Adams the person claiming exclusive interest in the 
legal estate consisting of the transgene must be held liable for 
the genetic pollution.  Further, if the transgene proves 
injurious to the health of the subset of the public who chose to 
not consume crops containing the transgene, then the person 
claiming exclusive interest must also be held liable for the 
injury to that subset of the public. 
One school of economic analysis in the law states that once 
the initial rights of interfering parties is delimited, market 
transactions will yield an optimum utilization of the rights of 
the parties.849  Under this theory, the institution of private 
property interests in combination with the pricing system 
inherent in the market transactions will resolve the conflicts 
between the interfering parties.  In the case of interference 
between radio operators at the same or adjacent frequencies, 
the operator who had the right to stop the interference with his 
transmission would forego his right “if he were paid more than 
the amount by which the value of his service was decreased by 
this interference or the costs which he would have to incur to 
offset it.”850  The interfering operator would pay an “amount up 
to the costs of suppressing the interference or the decrease in 
the value of the service he could provide if unable to use his 
transmitter in a way which resulted in interference” to be 
allowed to interfere.851  In the alternative, if the interfering 
operator had the right to interfere, he would desist “if he were 
paid more than the costs of suppressing the interference or the 
decrease in the value of the service he could provide if 
interference were barred.”852  In addition, the operator whose 
signals were being interfered with could halt the interference 
848. See id. at 576. “To use your own so that you do not injure another.” 
Andrews v. Andrews, 88 S. E.2d 88, 92 (N.C. 1955) (plaintiff was awarded 
damages for destruction of his crops by wild geese lured to a pond located on a 
neighbor’s land). 
849. See R. H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. 
ECON. 1, 27 (1959). 
850. Id. at 28. 
851. See id.
852. Id.
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by payment of “an amount up to the decrease in the value of his 
service that it causes or the costs he has to incur to offset the 
interference.”853
A further refinement of this line of thought leads to the 
conclusion that the rights to perform certain activities 
constitute the factors of production.  The loss, which is suffered 
by others because of the exercise of the totality of the factors of 
production, is the cost of exercising those factors.854  It is a 
tempting extension of this theory to consider only the costs 
associated with the exercise of a right (that is the factor of 
production) in determining which of the interfering parties is 
assigned that right.  This clearly ignores the basic tenant of 
social cost theory, which is that it is “desirable that the choice 
between different social arrangements for the solution of 
economic problems should be carried out in broader terms than 
this and that the total effect of these arrangements in all 
spheres of life should be taken into account.”855  The reduction 
of the right to be free of harmful effects of another’s actions to 
an economic factor of production allows the party with the 
greater economic, and hence legal, resources to place upon the 
right to engage in the harmful activity a very high value while 
placing upon the right to be free of the harmful effects of that 
activity a very low value.  This result simply ignores “the total 
effect of these arrangements in all spheres of life.”856  That is, 
while the seed manufacturer may possess resources 
considerably in excess of Farmer Adams, social cost analysis 
will not necessarily render the conclusion that the optimal 
arrangement is for the seed manufacturer to possess the right 
to pollute the lands of Farmer Adams and to possess the right 
to sue Farmer Adams when the transgene is translocated to his 
lands.
The seed manufacturer possesses no right to pollute the 
land of Farmer Adams.  No language exists in the patent 
statute that dictates that liabilities lie with Farmer Jack when 
the property of the seed manufacturer is translocated onto his 
lands.  Neither Farmer Jack nor the seed manufacturer have a 
853. Id.
854. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3, 44 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960) 
(stating that “[i]f factors of production are thought of as rights, it becomes 
easier to understand that the right to do something which has a harmful 
effect . . . is also a factor of production”). 
855. Id. at 43. 
856. Id.
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statutorily granted right to make, use, or sell the property of 
the seed manufacturer; hence there is no right to pollute 
associated with the right to manufacture or produce a 
consumable crop.  Nuisance theory dictates that Farmer Adams 
has the right to make use of his lands for agricultural 
production free of genetic pollution, and the seed manufacturer 
cannot obtain the right to pollute the lands of Farmer Adams 
either through direct application of nuisance theory or through 
the machinery of social cost theory.  Further, the public will be 
denied its right of choice if the seed manufacturer obtains the 
right to pollute.  Under common law, the seed manufacturer 
cannot enforce its exclusive interest because the discovery and 
propagation of plants containing the transgene by Farmer 
Adams was done through no nefarious deeds on the part of 
Farmer Adams.  Under the patent statute, the seed 
manufacturer cannot enforce its exclusive interests because it 
does not have the right to pollute the lands of Farmer Adams, 
it knows that the genetic pollution will occur in the open 
environment, and because it comes to the courthouse door with 
“unclean hands.” 
CONCLUSION
There is a tension between the rights of the seed 
manufacturers in the intellectual property underlying 
genetically modified plants and the rights of the farmers in 
their land and the crop produced on his land from his labors.  
The rights of the seed manufacturers include the right to 
exclude others from making, using, offering to sell or selling the 
protected plants.  A utility patent affords the strongest form of 
protection for the intellectual property, and the farmer may 
only make, use, or sell the crop from genetically modified 
plants when he has signed a technology-use license.  Because 
Jack purchased and planted the beans without a technology-
use license, the seed manufacturers can successfully sue him 
for infringement of their property rights.  Through the 
technology-use license, the seed manufacturers can force Jack 
to give up his property rights in the crop he produces and in the 
land upon which the beans are grown.  The technology-use 
license also prohibits Jack from saving seed from one crop for 
planting in the next crop cycle.  The patent statute has 
typically been interpreted as meaning that if a farmer has a 
patented transgene on his property then he is guilty of 
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infringement of the property rights of the seed manufacturer.  
While the intent of the farmer is inapposite to the right of the 
patentee to assert his exclusive rights, the strict liability 
interpretation is overly strict because it eliminates the scienter 
element required in the “making,” “using,” or “selling” of the 
invention patented.  Furthermore, the strict liability 
interpretation of the patent statute ignores the fact that the 
seed manufacturer may come to the courthouse doors with 
unclean hands, in which case the seed manufacturer may not 
assert its case against the farmer. 
The farmer need not remain the weak participant in 
agricultural biotechnology.  Through farm marketing 
associations, a collective of farmers may develop its own 
intellectual property in both conventional hybrid and 
genetically modified plant varieties.  In this case, farmers, 
through farm marketing associations, can come to the 
negotiating table with seed manufacturers as equals.857
 857. In epilog, both Percy Schmeiser and Dallas Thomason have appealed 
the decision of the trial court.  The appeals have not been decided at 
publishing of this article. 
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Appendix A 
To gain some fundamental understanding of the economics 
underlying the introduction of hybrid maize varieties into the 
United States farm market, it is necessary to review the maize 
production and cost statistics between 1900 and 1950.  In 
Figure 1, below, the annual yields of corn (for grain), in bushels 
per acre, are presented for the states of: Illinois, panel (a); 
Indiana, panel (b); Iowa, panel (c); Missouri, panel (d); and 
Ohio, panel (e).  Also, in panel (f) the aggregate annual United 
States corn yield, in bushels per acre, is given with the average 
for the five indicated states.  The yield data is readily available 
from the U.S.D.A. National Agricultural Statistical Service 
website.  Specifically, the data presented in Figure 1 was 
obtained by querying the database for the relevant states and 
for the required years.858  To insure reliability of the data 
collected from the website, the original U.S.D.A. Agricultural 
Statistics bulletins were consulted.859
It is difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish the maize 
yield levels between Illinois, Indiana, Iowa and Ohio.  By 
inspection of Figure 1, and Table 1, it is readily seen that the 
maize yield levels did not change substantially between 1900 
and 1920.  In 1920 the expected “Four State”860 yield was 
approximately 40 bushels per acre, see Table 1, the “Five 
State”861 yield was approximately 35 bushels per acre, and the 
total U.S. aggregate expected yield was approximately 27 
bushels per acre.  While the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
and Ohio had an expected yield increase of approximately 0.1 
per centum, of the yield level in 1900, per year, and the United 
States aggregate expected yield declined by approximately 0.01 
per centum, of the expected level in 1900, per year.862  The 
 858. See NASS, State Level Data for Field Crops: Grains, U.S.D.A. 
STATISTICAL SERVICE at http://www.nass.usda.gov:81/ipedp/ (last visited Jan. 
16, 2002). 
 859. Specifically, the U.S.D.A. Agricultural Statistics bulletins consulted 
were for the years 1924, 1930, 1932, 1933, 1936, 1946, 1952, 1972, 1998, and 
1999.
 860. The “Four State” annual aggregate yield is computed as the direct 
average of the annual yield of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio. 
 861. The “Five State” annual aggregate yield is computed as the direct 
average of the annual yield of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri and Ohio. 
 862. The statistical results reported in this work are computed based 
directly upon the agricultural statistical data obtained from U.S.D.A. reports.  
The analysis is as follows: The U.S.D.A. agricultural statistics for the yield of 
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expected annual yield for the “Four State” aggregate fell, on 
average, between the years of 1920 and 1936 by approximately 
1.2 per centum per year; such that by 1936 the expected 
average corn yield was approximately 32 bushels per acre.  The 
“Five State” annual average yield declined by approximately 
1.5 per centum of the 1920 yield level between 1920 and 1936 
while the overall U.S. total yield declined by 1.65 per centum of 
the average U.S. yield level in 1920.  In the 13 years between 
1937 and 1950, the expected yield changes were, in per centum 
of the 1937 expected yield for the category, 0.8 for the “Four 
State” aggregate, 1.3 for the “Five State” aggregate, 2.9 for the 
U.S. Total aggregate. 
It is not surprising that farmers in those states were 
amenable to the educational and advertising campaigns 
conducted by both the U.S.D.A. and the seed manufacturers.863
While the trend in the yields did change starting in 1938, it is 
not clear whether the modest increase was due to the 
introduction and acceptance of hybrid maize varieties, or 
whether the change was due to other factors (the yield, 
averaged over the principal four states in the corn belt is 
approximately 30% higher than the average for the two 
decades from 1900 to 1920, when the average varied little over 
these two decades).  While the average yield for the corn belt 
increased between 1939 and 1956, the average in 1956 was 
only approximately 12% higher than the average yield in 1939.  
Further, the average yield in 1956 exceed the average yield for 
the first two decades of the century by only approximately 48% 
of the latter yield level.  To examine more carefully the relation 
between yield and use of hybrid maize varieties by farmers, 
corn, in bu./acre, were obtained from the U.S.D.A. National Agricultural 
Statistical Service website at http://www.nass.usda.gov:81/ipedp/ (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2002).  The corn yields for the years in any particular desired range of 
years were segregated and analyzed using basic data statistical techniques 
(computing mean, variance, etc.) and simple linear regression to determine 
trends in the yields over the relevant range of years.  For any given range of 
years, the origin of the abscissa axis is taken as the beginning of the range of 
year, and the “y-intercept” is computed as the intersection of the linear 
regression graph and the vertical line situated at the origin of the abscissa 
axis.  The per centum change in the yield is easily computed as the slope of the 
linear regression equation divided by the y-intercept value and multiplied by 
100%.  See Table 2 for the linear regression results of the average corn yields 
for the “Four States,” the “Five States,” and the U.S. Total for the years 
between 1920 and 1936. 
863. See generally Donald N. Duvick, Biotechnology in the 1930s: The 
Development of Hybrid Maize, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 69-74 (Jan. 
2001).
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these two quantities are plotted, for the years from 1930 to 
1950, in Figure 2 for: Illinois, panel (a); Indiana, panel (b); 
Iowa, panel (c); Missouri, panel (d); and Ohio, panel (e).  The 
U.S. average corn production, for grain, is presented in panel (f) 
for the years from 1930 to 1950. 
 In Figure 2, both the annual yield per acre, for each state 
and the percentage of all acres of corn planted to hybrid maize 
varieties are given for each year between 1930 and 1950, 
inclusive.864  The data for the yield of maize was collected as 
indicated in footnotes 858 through 862.  It should be noticed 
that a substantial difference exists between the expected and 
actual yield levels for 1937.  The expected yield value in 1937, 
based upon the yield levels between 1920 and 1936, were: for 
the “Four State” aggregate, the expected yield was 31.6 bushels 
per acre and the actual average production was 45.3 bushels 
per acre (a 43 per centum difference); for the “U.S. Total” 
aggregate, the expected yield was 20.6 bushels per acre while 
the actual average production was 28.9 bushels per acre (a 40 
per centum difference).  It is striking that while the average 
percent of corn acreage planted to hybrid corn varieties in the 
“Four State” aggregate was 18 per centum, the actual yield was 
43 percent above the expected level based upon the 1920 
through 1936 yield.  Further, the corresponding numbers for 
the “U.S. Total” aggregate are  7.9 and 40 respectively.  By 
inspection from Figure 2, panels (a) and (b), it is clear that 
between 1936 and 1937 the yield nearly doubled in both Illinois 
and Indiana even though the percent of all corn acreage 
planted to hybrid varieties were approximately 25 and 11 per 
 864. The data for the percentage of all corn acreage planted to hybrid 
maize varieties was collected from U.S.D.A. publications as follows: the data 
for all states, and the United States total aggregate, for the years 1933 
through 1945 were obtained from 1945 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 42 
(1945), and for 1946 the data was collected from 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 41 (1946); the data for the years 1947 through 1950 is from 1951 
U.S.D.A. Agricultural Statistics 45 (1951).  The data for Missouri for the years 
1945 through 1948 was obtained from 1948 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 48 (1948).  The data for the United States total aggregate for the 
years 1945 through 1948 was collected from 1948 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 48 (1948) and the data for years 1949 through 1958 were obtained 
from 1959 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 32 (1959).  The data for 
Indiana for the years 1946 through 1948 was obtained from 1948 U.S.D.A. 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 48 (1948).  The data for Illinois for the years 1947 
and 1948 was obtained from 1948 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 48 
(1948).  The Ohio data for the years 1946 through 1948 was obtained from 
1948 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 48 (1948). 
224         MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 3:1 
centum, respectively.865  From a careful analysis of Figure 2 it is 
clear that the introduction of the hybrid varieties could not 
have caused the significant increase in corn yields observed 
between 1936 and 1937.  To see this, consider that by 1938 the 
percent of all corn acreage planted with hybrid corn varieties 
was 47.5 per centum in Illinois and 51.9 per centum in Iowa; 
however, in neither state did the yield levels change 
significantly between 1937 and 1950.866  Further, for all states 
studied, the yield levels changed only modestly between 1937 
and 1950.  Consider the results of the statistical analysis, of the 
agricultural statistics discussed in notes 858 through 862, 
presented in Table 3.  For the years between 1937 and 1947, 
the yield levels changed as follows: for the “Four State” 
aggregate, the increase was less than 0.01 per centum of the 
expected 1937 value (of 47.5 bushels per acre) per year; for the 
“Five State” aggregate, the increase was 0.2 per centum of the 
expected 1937 value (of 43.8 bushels per acre); and for the “U.S. 
Total” aggregate, the increase was 1.7 per centum of the 
expected 1937 value (of 29 bushels per acre). 
To gain a clearer picture of the influence of the deployment 
and use of hybrid seed varieties upon the corn yield levels 
between 1933 and 1946, it is necessary to consider the 
unexplained increase in the yield levels between 1936 and 
1937.  Presuming that the event that caused the increase was 
both not due to the use of hybrid maize varieties and was 
constant after 1937, then the yield levels between 1937 and 
1946 may be adjusted by subtracting out excess 1937 increase 
from the yields of all years between 1937 and 1946.  Appendix 
B below examines this relatively trivial calculation.  Once the 
quantity (Yact(1937) - Yexp(1937) (where y is the year of interest 
between 1937 and 1948, Yact(1937) is the actual corn yield for y 
1937, and Yexp(1937) is the expected corn yield for 1937 based 
upon the corn yields between 1920 and 1936) is subtracted 
from the annual average yields for the years 1937 through 1946 
then the statistical analysis may be executed in a relatively 
simple manner.  The results, shown in Table 4 below, indicate 
that the yield levels changed as follows: for the “Four State” 
aggregate, the increase was approximately 1.7 per centum of 
the expected 1933 value (of 30.6 bushels per acre) per year; for 
the “Five State” aggregate, the increase was approximately 1.9 
865. See 1945 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 42 (1945). 
866. See id.; infra, Figure 2, panels (a) and (c). 
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per centum of the expected 1933 value (of 27.4 bushels per 
acre); and for the “U.S. Total” aggregate, the increase was 
about 2.6 per centum of the expected 1933 value (of 19.5 
bushels per acre). 
The modest level of increase in productivity was not offset 
by a commensurate increase in profitability of maize 
production.867  As demonstrated in Figure 3, the cost of 
producing a bushel of corn increased by nearly 60 per centum, 
of the cost in 1936, between 1936 and 1945; however, the price 
of a bushel of corn did not increase significantly.  In 1933, the 
season average price of corn was $0.52 per bushel, in 1936 the 
season average price of corn was $1.044 per bushel, while in 
1945 the season average price was $1.14 per bushel.868  Thus, in 
 867. Production costs were obtained from the following sources: for the 
years between 1937 and 1945, the production costs were obtained from 1947 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 47 (1948); for the years between 1933 and 1936, 
the production costs were obtained from 1943 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 44 
(1943). See also U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1925, 3 CROPS AND 
MARKETS 170 (1926); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1926, 4 CROPS
AND MARKETS 202 (1927); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1927, 5 
CROPS AND MARKETS 196 (1928); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 
1928, 6 CROPS AND MARKETS 202 (1929); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field 
Crops, 1929, 7 CROPS AND MARKETS 220 (1930); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing 
Field Crops, 1930, 8 CROPS AND MARKETS 232 (1931); U.S.D.A. Cost of 
Producing Field Crops, 1931, 9 CROPS AND MARKETS 222 (1932); U.S.D.A. Cost
of Producing Field Crops, 1932, 10 CROPS AND MARKETS 226 (1933); U.S.D.A. 
Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1933, 11 CROPS AND MARKETS 66 (1935); 
U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production, 1934, 1936 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 342 (1936); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost 
of Production, 1935, 1937 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS  396 (1937); U.S.D.A. 
Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production, 1936, 1938 AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 440 (1938); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production in 
1937, 1939 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 492 (1939); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and 
Oats: Cost of Production in 1938, 1940 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 569 (1940); 
U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production in 1939, 1941 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 576 (1941); U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field 
Crops, 1940, 18 CROPS AND MARKETS 308 (1941); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and 
Oats: Cost of Production in 1941, 1943 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 414 (1943); 
U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production in 1942, 1944 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 434 (1944); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost 
of Production in Groups of States, 1943, 1945 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 452
(1945); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost of Production, 1945, 1947 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 548 (1947); U.S.D.A. Corn, Wheat, and Oats: Cost 
of Production in 1946, 1948 AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 604 (1948).  The 
commodity index number for seed was obtained from 1946 U.S.D.A. 
AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 551 (1946) and the consumer price index was 
obtained from 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 559 (1946). 
868. See U.S.D.A., Corn: Acreage, Production, Value, and Foreign Trade, 
United States, 1929-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 39 (1946). 
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1933 the average profit was 2¢ per bushel869 and in 1936 the 
average profit was 2¢ per bushel870 and in 1945 the profit was 
8¢ per bushel;871 however, the Consumer Price Index had 
increased nearly 48 per centum of its 1936 level by 1945. 
In partial summary, the introduction of hybrid maize 
values between 1933 and 1948 corresponded with both a 
decline in average corn yield levels, between 1933 and 1936, 
and a modest increase in yield between 1937 and 1948 as well 
as a substantial increase in yield level between 1936 and 1937.  
Because hybrid varieties were not fully introduced between 
1936 and 1937, it is difficult to argue that the use of hybrid 
maize varieties was a cause of that increase in yield.  The use 
of hybrid maize varieties did not produce a substantial increase 
in yield between 1933 and 1946 when the yield levels are 
adjusted for the spike in 1937.  Based upon the productivity 
levels discussed and the attendant economics of production, the 
deployment and use of the hybrid seed varieties did not leave 
the farmers financially better off during the two decades 
between 1930 and 1950. 
The simple statement of the summary is that the 
introduction of hybrid maize varieties did not substantially 
alter the corn yield levels.  However, even in light of modest, or 
no, increase in yield the immediate question is why did the 
farmers continue to purchase and use hybrid varieties?  Under 
the theory of a purely competitive market, other cheaper but 
equally productive non-hybrid varieties would have entered the 
market and displace the hybrid varieties.  The fact that the 
non-hybrid varieties effectively lost the entire market to hybrid 
varieties seems to indicate that the market was not purely 
competitive.872
869. See U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1933, 11 CROPS AND 
MARKETS 66 (1935); U.S.D.A., Corn: Acreage, Production, Value, and Foreign 
Trade, United States, 1929-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 39 
(1946).
870. Compare U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1933, 11 CROPS AND 
MARKETS 66 (1935) and U.S.D.A., Corn: Acreage, Production, Value, and 
Foreign Trade, United States, 1929-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL
STATISTICS 39 (1946). 
871. Compare U.S.D.A. Cost of Producing Field Crops, 1933, 11 CROPS AND 
MARKETS 66 (1935) (the U.S. average price of producing corn was $1.06 per 
bushel) and U.S.D.A., Corn: Acreage, Production, Value, and Foreign Trade, 
United States, 1929-1946, 1946 U.S.D.A. AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 39 (1946) 
(the season average price of corn in 1945 was $1.14 per bushel). 
872. See generally Donald N. Duvick, Biotechnology in the 1930s: The 
Development of Hybrid Maize, 2 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 69-74 (January 
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In the nearly four and a half decades since 1956, the yield 
levels for maize have increased substantially so that by 2001 
the yields were approximately 2.6 times the levels of 1956.  
Since hybrid maize varieties were completely integrated into 
American agriculture by 1956, the substantial rise in 
productivity must be due to factors other than the use of hybrid 
maize varieties (at least directly).  A careful examination of 
these factors is outside the scope of this endeavor. 
2001) (indicating that both the U.S.D.A. and Pioneer Hi-Bred aggressively 
promoted the use of hybrid seed varieties). 
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Figure 1.  Annual maize yields by state. 
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Figure 2.  Maize yields and percent of corn acreage planted to 
hybrid varieties. 
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Figure 3.  Maize production costs for Illinois and Iowa 
combined and for the United States in aggregate.  Also 
presented is the commodity price index and the consumer price 
index. 
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Appendix B 
The analysis of the corn yield statistics was performed as 
follows.  The corn yield statistics were collected from the 
U.S.D.A. National Agricultural Statistics Service website for a 
particular year and for a desired range of years.  The U.S. Total 
average was collected directly from the website without the 
need to collect the statistics for each of the states and then 
compute the aggregate average.  The aggregate average was 
computed for the set of “Four States,” which includes Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio for each of the years in the required 
time range.  The mean was then computed for all of the years 
in the required time range.  Also, the linear regression 
equation was computed from the set of yearly aggregate 
averages for the “Four States.”  The process was then repeated 
for the “Five States,” which include Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
Missouri, and Ohio.  The mean and linear regression equations 
were computed based upon the yearly U.S. Total averages. 
The results of the corn yield analysis are given in Table 1, 
below, for the years 1900 through 1920, and for 1920 through 
1938.  The results for the years 1920 through 1936 and 1937 
through 1950 are given in Table 2, below; results for years 1937 
through 1947 and 1933 through 1946 are given in Table 3; and 
the results for 1933 through 1946 and 1933 through 1946 
(Adjusted) are given in Table 4, below.  Some discussion of the 
results in Table 4, below, is warranted.  The “adjusted” results 
in Table 4 are computed to remove the difference between the 
actual and expected difference in the yield for 1937 for all years 
between 1937 and 1946.  The actual average yields for 1937 
are: “Four States,” 45.3 bushels per acre; “Five States,” 41.7 
bushels per acre; and “U.S. Total,” 28.9 bushels per acre.  The 
expected values for 1937, based upon the linear regression 
analysis for the years between 1920 and 1936, are: “Four 
States,” 31.6 bushels per acre; “Five States,” 28.3 bushels per 
acre; and “U.S. Total,” 20.634 bushels per acre.  The “adjusted” 
average for the years between and including 1937 and 1948 are 
computed as: Yadj(y) = Yact(y) - (Yact(1937) - Yexp(1937)); where y is 
the year of interest between 1937 and 1948, Yadj(y) is the 
“adjusted” corn yield for year y, Yact(y) is the actual corn yield 
for year y, and Yexp(1937) is the expected corn yield for 1937 
based upon the corn yields between 1920 and 1936.  The 
rational behind “adjusting” the corn yield data for the years 
between 1937 and 1948 is that the difference between the 
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actual and expected (based upon the corn yields between 1920 
and 1936) yields for 1937 are, arguably, not due to the 
introduction of hybrid maize varieties.873  Therefore, to be able 
to assess the influence of the introduction upon the trend in 
corn yields over time due to the introduction of the hybrid 
maize varieties, it is necessary to remove the differences in the 
1937 and subsequent year’s data. 
 873. The difference between the actual and expected corn yield values for 
1937 are: “Four States” equals 13.7 bushels per acre (30% based upon actual 
yield); “Five States” equals 13.4 bushels per acre (32% based upon actual 
yield); and “U.S. Total” equals 8.3 bushels per acre (29% based upon actual 
yield).
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Table 1. Part A {1900-1920, 1920-1938}.  Results of the statistical analysis of 
corn yield statistics for the range of years and for the states indicated.  The 
mean value is the mean corn yield of all years indicated in the given range, 
and the linear regression equation is computed based upon the corn yields for 
the indicated years, where “y” is the year. 
States 1900 - 1920 1920 - 1938 
Mean 37.348 Mean 36.632 Four
States
Linear 39.94 + 0.040 (y 
- 1900) 
Linear 37.251 - 0.068 (y - 
1920)
Mean 35.368 Mean 34.163 Five
States
Linear 35.28 - 0.008 (y - 
1900)
Linear 35.789 - 0.1808 (y - 
1920)
Mean 26.743 Mean 25.154 U.S. 
Total
Linear 26.994 - 0.025 (y 
- 1900) 
Linear 27.177 - 0.225 (y - 
1920)
Table 2. Part B {1920-1936, 1937-1950}.  Results of the statistical analysis of 
corn yield statistics for the range of years and for the states indicated.  The 
mean value is the mean corn yield of all years indicated in the given range, 
and the linear regression equation is computed based upon the corn yields for 
the indicated years, where “y” is the year. 
States 1920-1936 1937-1950 
Mean 35.706 Mean 49.912 Four
States
Linear 39.391 - 0.461 (y 
- 1920) 
Linear 46.301 + 0.40 (y - 
1937)
Mean 33.365 Mean 45.763 Five
States
Linear 37.897 - 0.57 (y - 
1920)
Linear 42.34 + 0.53 (y - 
1937)
Mean 24.78 Mean 33.27 U.S. 
Total
Linear 28.47 - 0.46 (y - 
1920)
Linear 27.93 + 0.82 (y - 
1937)
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Table 3. Part C {1937-1947, 1933-1946}.  Results of the statistical analysis of 
corn yield statistics for the range of years and for the states indicated.  The 
mean value is the mean corn yield of all years indicated in the given range, 
and the linear regression equation is computed based upon the corn yields for 
the indicated years, where “y” is the year. 
States 1937-1947 1933-1946 
Mean 47.67 Mean 43.69 Four
States
Linear 47.5 + 0.04 (y- 
1937)
Linear 32.5 + 1.72 (y - 
1933)
Mean 44.2 Mean 40.3 Five
States
Linear 43.77 + 0.095 (y 
- 1937) 
Linear 29.3 + 1.69 (y - 
1933)
Mean 31.51 Mean 28.74 U.S. 
Total
Linear 29.0 + 0.502 (Y 
- 1937) 
Linear 20.671 + 1.241 (Y - 
1933)
Table 4. Part D {1933-1946, 1933-1946 (Adjusted)}.  Results of the 
statistical analysis of corn yield statistics for the range of years and for the 
states indicated.  The mean value is the mean corn yield of all years indicated 
in the given range, and the linear regression equation is computed based upon 
the corn yields for the indicated years, where “y” is the year. 
States 1933-1946 1933-1946 (Adjusted) 
Mean 43.69 Mean 33.91 Four
States
Linear 32.5 + 1.72 (y - 
1933)
Linear 30.579 + 0.513 (y - 
1933)
Mean 40.3 Mean 30.7 Five
States
Linear 29.3 + 1.69 (y - 
1933
Linear 27.4 + 0.51 (y - 1933) 
Mean 28.74 Mean 22.83 U.S. 
Total
Linear 20.671 + 1.241 
(Y - 1933) 
Linear 19.5 + 0.514 (y - 
1933).
